The Eddie B. Sitt edition of the audio series of the Talmud Bavli, dedicated to the study of Masechet Sukkah, has been generously supported by Celia and Isaac Jemal, who wish for the success of their dear children. May they derive much nachat from all of them, and may they grow up, marry at the right time, and have healthy, happy children, blessed with beracha vehatzlacha. May they see descendants and the descendants of their descendants until the coming of the righteous redeemer, ad biat goel tzedek. Furthermore, this masechet has also been dedicated for the elevation of the soul of Sarah bat Adel. May her soul find peace in the Garden of Eden. Today’s daf is being studied anonymously for the refuah sheleimah of Rav Yoshiyahu ben Salcha, may the Almighty heal him among all the sick of His people Israel. Today’s daf is Daf Lamed Aleph, and it is also being studied for the elevation of the soul of Avraham ben Esther, and for the refuah sheleimah of Chacham Ovadia Yosef ben Gurjia. Additionally, this daf is dedicated for the elevation of the soul of Mazal bat Frida, who passed away after a short time, suffering greatly. May her soul find peace in the Garden of Eden.
We begin today’s daf on Lamed Aleph Amud Rishon, starting at the top of the second line. The Gemara begins: Tanu Rabbanan: A stolen sukkah (sukkah gezulah). We transition from discussing a stolen lulav (lulav hagazul) to a stolen sukkah. If someone constructs a sukkah in the public domain (reshut harabbim), this too is considered theft (gezel) since it is not their property. Here, we encounter a machloket: Rabbi Eliezer disqualifies it (posel), while the sages (chachamim) permit it (machshirin). Rabbi Nachman will clarify the nature of this disagreement.
Rabbi Nachman states: The disagreement arises in a case where one person overpowers another and removes him from his sukkah (she-tokef et chaveiro ve-hotzio misukkato). In this scenario, a person is sitting in his backyard in his private sukkah, and a thief (gazlan) comes along, overpowers him, and sits in that person’s sukkah. This situation clearly involves theft, hence it is a stolen sukkah. The question arises whether this person is yotzei or not. Rabbi Eliezer asserts that he is posel.
Let’s analyze this further. Rabbi Eliezer maintains his position that one cannot fulfill their obligation in another’s sukkah (ein adam yotzei yedei chovato be-sukkato shel chaveiro). As we learned in the previous chapter, Rabbi Eliezer has a unique approach, asserting that one can only sit in their own sukkah for the seven days of the festival of Sukkot (Chag Hasukkot Ta’aseh Lecha Shivat Yamim). In this case, even if we argue that the individual is not considered a thief, the sukkah is still attached to the ground, and thus it cannot be stolen. At best, it is akin to a borrowed sukkah.
The Gemara now explores two perspectives. If you assert that land can be stolen (karka nigzelet), then the sukkah is indeed a stolen sukkah, and consequently, one cannot be yotzei. Conversely, if you argue that land cannot be stolen (karka einah nigzelet), then it is merely a borrowed sukkah. Therefore, regardless of the argument, according to Rabbi Eliezer, one cannot fulfill their obligation in this sukkah.
Rabbi Nachman emphasizes that the Gemara is sidestepping the question of whether land can be stolen or not. Rather, the focus is on the implication that, regardless of which side one takes, one cannot fulfill their obligation in the sukkah. The Gemara continues to explain that if land is indeed stolen, one is sitting in a sukkah gezulah, which is pasul. Conversely, if land is not stolen, it is still not better than a borrowed sukkah, hence still pasul.
Let’s now examine Rabbi Eliezer's reasoning. He derives from the verse: “You shall make a sukkah for yourself” (Chag Hasukkot Ta’aseh Lecha), indicating that it must be your own sukkah. Consequently, if it is stolen, one cannot fulfill their obligation. And even if you argue that land cannot be stolen, the sukkah still belongs to the original owner, and thus one is sitting in someone else’s sukkah, which according to Rabbi Eliezer, is not permissible.
Now, let’s turn to the sages (Rabbanan). The Gemara states that the sages maintain that a person can fulfill their obligation in another's sukkah, as they assert that land cannot be stolen and that the sukkah is merely borrowed. Thus, the sages hold that one can sit in a borrowed sukkah for the festival.
The Gemara continues with Rabbi Nachman’s explanation, noting that the sages’ opinion is consistent with their stance that one can fulfill their obligation in another’s sukkah. They assert that land is not subject to theft, so when the thief removed the person from their sukkah, he did not actually steal anything.
Next, the Gemara presents a case of someone who steals wood and uses it for sechach. According to all opinions, one can use the sechach but must repay the value of the wood. The reasoning is that once the wood is used as sechach, it is no longer considered stolen or borrowed, as it has undergone a change in purpose.
The Gemara explains that when one steals wood and uses it for sechach, it is no longer classified as stolen or borrowed, since it has undergone a transformation in its function. The change in the wood’s status allows the individual to keep the sechach while only needing to repay its value.
However, if we consider the case of a sukkah built on land that is not owned by the thief, then the sukkah is not considered stolen. The Gemara discusses a scenario where the sukkah is constructed in a public domain, and thus, the question arises whether the original owner would need to be compensated.
In summary, the Gemara explores the complexities of fulfilling one’s obligations in a sukkah that may be considered stolen or borrowed. The different opinions reflect a deep understanding of the halachic principles governing property rights and the sanctity of the sukkah during the festival of Sukkot.