We begin our study on today's page, seven lines down, at the word "שביעית". To review our current discussion, our Mishna taught that one should not purchase an etrog during the Sabbatical year from an unlearned person, an am ha'aretz. This is because the money used for the purchase would acquire the sanctity of the Sabbatical year, known as kedushat Shevi'it. This consecrated money can only be used for specific purposes, such as buying food for that Sabbatical year. Since an am ha'aretz is typically not meticulous with these laws, there's a concern that they might misuse the money, perhaps spending it on prohibited items or storing it, which is forbidden. By purchasing an etrog from them, one would cause them to sin, thereby transgressing the prohibition of "do not place a stumbling block before the blind."
The Gemara then questioned why this concern applies only to an etrog and not to a palm frond, a lulav. It seemed that one should also be prohibited from buying a lulav. The Gemara clarified that the discussion concerns a lulav that began growing in the sixth year and was harvested in the seventh. For lulavim, the year of growth determines their status, not the year of harvest. Since it grew in the sixth year, it is not subject to Sabbatical year laws, thus posing no problem.
The Gemara then asked why the same logic wouldn't apply to an etrog. An etrog, too, most likely began growing in the sixth year, as it's improbable for it to grow to maturity between Rosh Hashanah and Sukkot, a mere two weeks. Therefore, it must have grown in the sixth year and been plucked in the seventh. The Gemara responded that for etrogim, the year is determined by when it is plucked, its "time of harvest." Since it was harvested in the seventh year, it is considered a Sabbatical year fruit.
The Gemara further inquired which opinion supports judging an etrog by its harvest time. It cited a Mishna stating that both Rabbi Eliezer and Rabban Gamliel held that an etrog is judged by its "emergence" (when it first appears), which usually occurs in the sixth year. The Gemara thus asked whose opinion our Tanna follows. It answered that our Tanna follows the Rabbis of Usha. We referred to a Baraita, which stated that Rabbi Yosei Abtolmos testified in the name of five elders that an etrog is judged by its harvest time for tithes. This means that for the purpose of determining which tithe (e.g., poor tithe or second tithe) is due, the year of plucking is decisive. For example, if an etrog emerged in the second year but was plucked in the third, it would be subject to the poor tithe of the third year, not the second tithe of the second year. This differs from other trees, whose fruit is generally tithed based on the year of emergence.
The Baraita continues, stating that the Rabbis in Usha voted and declared that an etrog is judged by its harvest time for both tithes and Sabbatical year laws. The Gemara questioned, "Who mentioned the Sabbatical year?" as the preceding part of the Baraita only discussed tithes. The Gemara explained that the Baraita is missing words and should be read as follows: The first Tanna stated that an etrog is judged by its harvest time for tithes, but by its emergence for Sabbatical year laws. However, the Rabbis in Usha voted and said that an etrog is judged by its harvest time for both tithes and Sabbatical year laws.
Rashi clarifies the distinction between etrogim and other fruit trees regarding tithes. While other fruit trees are tithed based on their emergence, etrogim are tithed based on their harvest. This is because etrogim are likened to vegetables for tithe purposes. The obligation to tithe fruit trees and vegetables is Rabbinic, whereas the Torah only mandates tithing wheat and grapes. For wheat and grapes, the year is determined when the fruit reaches one-third of its growth. The Rabbis extended this principle to other produce: just as wheat and grapes primarily grow with rainwater and are tithed based on the year of emergence, so too fruits that grow primarily with rainwater are tithed based on their emergence. Vegetables, however, require more water and are often irrigated, so they are tithed based on their harvest. An etrog, also requiring significant water, is therefore treated like a vegetable in this regard.
The Gemara then revisits the lulav. It stated that the only reason a lulav is not subject to Sabbatical year laws is if it emerged in the sixth year and was plucked in the seventh. This implies that if a lulav emerged in the seventh year, it would acquire Sabbatical year sanctity. The Gemara asks why this would be the case, as a lulav is merely a piece of wood, and wood is generally not subject to Sabbatical year sanctity. It cites a Baraita: "Leaves of reeds and grape leaves that were gathered for storage from the field: if plucked for consumption (by animals), they have Sabbatical year sanctity. If plucked for wood (fuel), they do not have Sabbatical year sanctity." This Baraita seems to support the idea that wood is exempt from Sabbatical year laws.
Rashi explains that the implication is that a lulav from the seventh year would indeed have Sabbatical year sanctity, meaning its monetary value would also be consecrated, preventing its use for items like clothing. The Gemara responds that the case of reed and grape leaves is different. The Torah states regarding the Sabbatical year: "It shall be for you for eating." This verse contains an apparent contradiction: "for you" implies free use, while "for eating" implies restriction. The Gemara reconciles this by interpreting "for you" as similar to "eating." This means that only uses where the pleasure and the destruction of the item occur simultaneously, like eating, are permitted. When one eats, the pleasure and the consumption happen at the same time. This excludes wood used for fuel, where the benefit (heat) comes after the destruction (burning). Therefore, items used as fuel are not subject to Sabbatical year sanctity.
Returning to the reed and grape leaves, these items can be used for either consumption or fuel. Thus, their Sabbatical year status depends on the gatherer's intention. If intended for consumption, they acquire sanctity; if for fuel, they do not. The Gemara then considers the lulav. Rashi explains that a lulav's primary use, beyond the mitzvah, was as a broom. When sweeping, the pleasure (cleanliness) and the destruction (the lulav breaking) occur simultaneously. Therefore, a lulav from the seventh year would indeed have Sabbatical year sanctity, as its use is analogous to eating in that the benefit and destruction are concurrent.
The Gemara then challenges the rule that wood is not subject to Sabbatical year laws. What about "oily wood," like balsam wood, which Rashi describes as being used for illumination, like a torch? In this case, the pleasure (light) and destruction (burning) happen simultaneously. So, how can it be said that wood is not subject to Sabbatical year laws? Rava answers that the rule applies to "ordinary wood," which is typically used for fuel. While oily wood used for illumination would indeed be subject to Sabbatical year laws due to its simultaneous benefit and destruction, ordinary wood, whose normal function is for fuel, is not. Rashi adds that even if one intends to use ordinary wood for illumination, it would not acquire Sabbatical year sanctity because that is not its primary function.
The Gemara then states that the law regarding wood used for fuel (that it is not subject to Sabbatical year laws) is actually subject to a dispute among Tannaim. A Baraita teaches: "One may not use Sabbatical year fruits for soaking or for laundering." Rashi explains that soaking refers to steeping flax in Sabbatical year wine, and laundering refers to washing clothes with Sabbatical year wine. In both these cases, the pleasure (e.g., wearing clean clothes, using processed flax) comes after the destruction of the Sabbatical year fruit (the wine). The first Tanna holds that such uses are forbidden. This implies that even if the benefit comes later, it is still forbidden, contradicting the idea that only simultaneous benefit and destruction are subject to Sabbatical year laws. This Tanna's view is that the verse "for eating" explicitly excludes soaking and laundering.
However, Rabbi Yose says that one may use Sabbatical year fruits for soaking and laundering. He interprets the word "for you" in the verse to mean "for all your needs," including soaking and laundering. The Gemara asks what the first Tanna does with the word "for you." He interprets "for you" as similar to "eating," meaning only uses where benefit and destruction are simultaneous. It excludes soaking and laundering, where the benefit comes after the destruction. The Gemara then asks what Rabbi Yose does with the word "for eating." He interprets it to exclude medicinal uses, such as using Sabbatical year fruits as an emetic, because medicine is not a common need for everyone. Soaking and laundering, being common needs, are included by "for you."
Thus, we have a dispute: The first Tanna holds that only uses where benefit and destruction are simultaneous are permitted, making wood (for fuel) and soaking/laundering forbidden. Rabbi Yose holds that any common use, even if benefit and destruction are not simultaneous, is permitted, making wood (for fuel) and soaking/laundering permissible, but excluding uncommon uses like medicine.
The Gemara then asks who authored another Baraita that states: "For eating, but not for medicine; for eating, but not for sprinkling (wine for scent); for eating, but not for an emetic." This Baraita must follow Rabbi Yose, as it prohibits only uncommon uses (medicine, sprinkling, emetic) but implicitly permits common uses like soaking and laundering, even if benefit and destruction are not simultaneous. If it followed the first Tanna, it would also prohibit soaking and laundering.
Rabbi Elazar taught a new point: The sanctity of the Sabbatical year fruit is transferred to money only through a purchase. This means if you buy Sabbatical year fruit, the money used becomes consecrated. It is important to note that unlike other forms of sanctity transfer, the Sabbatical year sanctity remains on the original fruit even after it transfers to the money. The term "transfer" here means adding sanctity to the money, not removing it from the fruit. Rabbi Yochanan, however, says that the sanctity can transfer either through a purchase or through a simple declaration of transfer, without a sale.
What is Rabbi Elazar's reasoning? The Torah, when discussing the laws of the Jubilee year (which includes Sabbatical year laws), juxtaposes it with the verse "when you sell a sale." This implies that the transfer of sanctity occurs specifically through a sale. Rabbi Yochanan, on the other hand, derives his opinion from the verse "for it is a Jubilee, it is holy." He argues that just as other holy items (like offerings) can have their sanctity transferred either through sale or a simple declaration, so too can Sabbatical year fruits. The Gemara asks what Rabbi Yochanan does with the verse "when you sell a sale." He uses it to teach about the severity of even minor transgressions related to the Sabbatical year, as one who deals in Sabbatical year produce inappropriately may eventually be forced to sell their possessions.
The Gemara then asks what Rabbi Elazar does with the word "holy." He uses it to teach the general principle that Sabbatical year fruits can transfer their sanctity to money at all. The specific method of transfer (only through sale) is derived from the other verse.
The Gemara concludes by stating that there are Baraitot supporting both Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Yochanan. A Baraita supporting Rabbi Elazar states: "Sabbatical year fruit attaches its sanctity to its monetary value, as it is written 'for it is a Jubilee, it is holy.' Just as a holy offering transfers its sanctity to its monetary value and is forbidden (for mundane use), so too Sabbatical year fruit transfers its sanctity to its monetary value and is forbidden." The Baraita then clarifies that unlike an offering, where the original item becomes mundane after the transfer, Sabbatical year fruit itself remains holy. It gives an example: If one buys meat with Sabbatical year money, both the meat and the original fruit are subject to Sabbatical year laws (e.g., destruction at a certain time). If one then sells the meat and buys fish, the sanctity transfers from the meat to the fish, but the original fruit remains holy. The rule is that the sanctity always attaches to the last item purchased. The fact that this Baraita consistently uses the term "bought" supports Rabbi Elazar's view that sanctity transfers only through purchase.
Finally, a Baraita supports Rabbi Yochanan: "Both Sabbatical year fruit and second tithe fruit can have their sanctity transferred to animals or birds, whether alive or slaughtered. This is the view of Rabbi Meir. The Sages say: They can only be transferred to slaughtered animals, not to live ones, as a decree, lest one raise herds from them." This Baraita shows that sanctity can be transferred to animals without a sale, supporting Rabbi Yochanan's view. The Sages' concern is that if sanctity is transferred to live animals, one might keep them longer than permitted, or use them for business to become wealthy, which is forbidden with Sabbatical year produce. Therefore, they restricted the transfer to slaughtered animals, which must be consumed immediately. This demonstrates that a transfer of sanctity can occur even without a formal sale.