The Mishnah teaches about the ritual of Nisuch HaMayim, the water libation, performed daily in the Beit HaMikdash during Sukkot. On weekdays, water was drawn from Mayana Shiloh in a sanctified vessel and brought to the Beit HaMikdash, then poured into a designated bowl on the Mizbeah, flowing into drains. On Shabbat, the process was similar, but with two key differences: the water was drawn on Erev Shabbat (Friday afternoon), and a non-sanctified vessel was used.
The reason for using a non-sanctified vessel on Erev Shabbat is rooted in halacha. When an item is placed in a Keli Kodesh (sanctified vessel), it becomes sanctified itself. Anything intrinsically sanctified is subject to the law of Lina, meaning it becomes invalid if left overnight. If the water for Nisuch HaMayim were collected in a Keli Kodesh on Erev Shabbat, it would sit overnight and become invalid by the time the libation was to be performed on Shabbat morning. Throughout the week, this is not an issue, as the water is collected and poured on the same day. The Mishnah's assumption, therefore, is that a non-sanctified vessel must be used on Erev Shabbat to prevent the water from becoming sanctified and thus subject to Lina.
The Gemara questions this assumption: Why couldn't a Keli Kodesh still be used? It offers two potential solutions. First, one could draw the water without the specific Kavana (intent) to sanctify it. Some opinions hold that for a vessel to sanctify its contents, explicit intent is required. Second, one could draw more than the prescribed Shiur (measure) of water, which for Nisuch HaMayim is three Lugim. According to some views, a vessel only sanctifies its contents if they are precisely the prescribed measure; exceeding it would prevent sanctification.
The Gemara provides three answers to explain why these solutions are not viable, thus upholding the Mishnah's ruling.
The first answer, from Ze'iri, asserts that both proposed solutions are ineffective. This opinion holds that a Keli Kodesh sanctifies its contents regardless of whether there is explicit Kavana, and it sanctifies even if the quantity exceeds the prescribed Shiur. The three Lugim represent a minimum, not a maximum, for the libation. Therefore, there is no way to prevent the water from becoming sanctified and subsequently invalid due to Lina, necessitating the use of a non-sanctified vessel.
The second answer, from Hezekiah, agrees with Ze'iri that the Shiur rule is not a factor; a Keli Kodesh will sanctify water even if it exceeds three Lugim. However, Hezekiah maintains that Kavana *is* required for sanctification. So, theoretically, one could draw water without intent, and it would not become sanctified. The Mishnah's concern, according to Hezekiah, is a Marit Ayin (appearance of impropriety). Onlookers might assume that the water was drawn with intent to sanctify it, and upon seeing it used the next day (after having been left overnight), they might erroneously conclude that the law of Lina does not apply to Nisuch HaMayim. This misunderstanding could lead to a Hurba (calamity or destruction) in future years, as people might then use water subject to Lina, rendering the service invalid.
The third answer, offered by Ravyanai in the name of Rav Zira, posits that both of the Gemara's initial solutions *are* halachically sound: a Keli Kodesh does not sanctify without Kavana, nor does it sanctify water that exceeds the prescribed Shiur. The Mishnah's prohibition, however, stems from a Gezera (rabbinic decree) to prevent a different form of Marit Ayin. People observing the water being drawn might mistakenly believe it is intended for Kiddush Adayim V'Raglayim (the washing of the hands and feet of the Kohanim), another ritual that uses water in the Beit HaMikdash. Unlike Nisuch HaMayim, water for Kiddush Adayim V'Raglayim is sanctified regardless of quantity, much like the water in the Kior (laver). If onlookers assume the water is for Kiddush Adayim V'Raglayim, they would conclude that it is indeed sanctified, even if it exceeds three Lugim or was drawn without specific intent. Seeing this "sanctified" water used the next morning after being left overnight would lead them to believe that Lina does not apply to Kiddush Adayim V'Raglayim, causing a Hurba for that service in the future. Thus, to prevent this specific confusion, a non-sanctified vessel is mandated for Nisuch HaMayim on Erev Shabbat.
The Mishnah further states that if the water for Nisuch HaMayim spilled or was uncovered (a state known as Gilui) on Shabbat, it becomes invalid. In such a case, alternative water must be drawn from the Kior, as carrying water from Mayana Shiloh on Shabbat is prohibited. The reason for invalidating uncovered water (Gilui) is a concern that a snake might have accessed the water overnight, drunk from it, and deposited venom. This would not only render the water poisonous but also alter its volume, potentially reducing it below the required Shiur.
The Gemara questions why a Misanenit (strainer) could not be used to filter the water the next day, separating the poison (which is assumed to float) from the pure water. The Gemara initially suggests that the Mishnah must align with the Rabbis, who hold that a strainer does not prevent the invalidation of Gilui, implying that poison would still contaminate the water. This stands in contrast to Rabi Nehemiah, who maintains that if the bottom vessel is covered by the strainer, the floating poison would remain on top, leaving the sifted water below pure and valid.
However, the Gemara then offers a different explanation: the Mishnah could, in fact, align with Rabi Nehemiah's view that a strainer technically works to purify the water. The reason it is not an option for the Beit HaMikdash is a matter of respect for the divine service. Even if halachically pure, water that required straining due to potential snake venom would not be considered suitable for an offering to God, just as one would not present such an item to a human governor. Thus, the Mishnah's ruling to invalidate such water and use water from the Kior is maintained, even according to Rabi Nehemiah's understanding of the strainer's efficacy.
The discussion then shifts to the fifth chapter, which details the procedures of Nisuch HaMayim. The Mishnah mentions the Halil (flute) played during the Simchat Beit HaSho'eva (Water-Drawing Celebration) ceremonies. This celebration lasted throughout the holiday of Sukkot. However, playing musical instruments is prohibited on Shabbat and Yom Tov due to the concern that an instrument might break, leading one to repair it, which constitutes a prohibited labor. Therefore, the Mishnah states that the flute was played for five or six days: six days if the first day of the holiday was not Shabbat (meaning only the Yom Tov prohibition applied on the first day, and Shabbat might fall on Chol HaMoed, the intermediate days), and five days if the first day of the holiday fell on Shabbat (combining the prohibitions). The Mishnah specifies the flute as it was the most prominent instrument, but the rule applies to other instruments as well: they do not override Shabbat or Yom Tov.
An opposing opinion, however, argues that the blowing of the flute *does* override Shabbat and even the lighter prohibition of Yom Tov. Rav Yosef attempts to define the nature of this Mahloket (dispute). He suggests that the disagreement is not about the Simchat Beit HaSho'eva, but rather about the Shir Shel Korban (song accompanying the daily sacrifice). During the pouring of the wine libation for the daily sacrifice, particularly on twelve specific days of the year, the Levim (Levites) would sing special songs accompanied by instruments. Rav Yosef proposes that the Mahloket concerns whether these instruments are integral to the service. One view holds that the main service of the Levim's singing requires instrumental accompaniment, making it an integral part of the service and thus permitted on Shabbat. The other view maintains that the primary singing is vocal, with music serving only as an enhancement, and therefore not permitted on Shabbat. Regarding the Shir Shel Sho'eva, everyone agrees that the music is merely for additional joy and not integral to the ritual, so it would not override Shabbat or Yom Tov.
Rav Yosef then seeks to prove his interpretation of this Mahloket by referencing a Braita. This Braita discusses whether a Kli Sharet (sanctified vessel used in the Beit HaMikdash) can be made of wood. Rabbi (the Tanna) rules that a wooden instrument is invalid, implying that all Kli Sharet must be made of metal. Rabbi Yosef Bar Yehuda, however, permits wooden instruments. Rav Yosef argues that this Mahloket directly reflects the disagreement over whether the primary singing is with an instrument (allowing wood, as exemplified by Moshe Rabbeinu's flute, which was made of wood and considered a Kli Sharet) or vocal (requiring metal, as Moshe Rabbeinu's flute would not be considered an integral Kli Sharet). The opinion that permits wooden instruments would learn from Moshe Rabbeinu's flute, while the one that invalidates them would not, seeing it as merely an enhancement, not a central vessel.
The Gemara then challenges Rav Yosef's interpretation, offering two alternative explanations for the Mahloket about wooden Kli Sharet. The first alternative suggests that everyone agrees that the primary singing is with an instrument, and Moshe Rabbeinu's flute *was* a Kli Sharet made of wood. The Mahloket then becomes whether one can derive a rule for making other Kli Sharet (which *could* be made of metal, an "efshar" case) from the flute (which *must* be made of wood for optimal sound, a "she'i efshar" case). The opinion that permits wooden instruments believes one *can* learn from an "impossible" case to a "possible" case, while the invalidating opinion believes one *cannot*.
The second alternative rejection of Rav Yosef's interpretation asserts that everyone actually agrees that the primary singing is vocal, and therefore Moshe Rabbeinu's flute was *not* an integral Kli Sharet. The Mahloket about wooden Kli Sharet, therefore, has nothing to do with the nature of singing or Moshe Rabbeinu's flute. Instead, it revolves around how to interpret the verses in the Torah describing the construction of the Minora (menorah), specifically using two different hermeneutical principles: Klal Prat Klal (generality, specific exclusion, generality) versus Ribui Mi'ut Ribui (inclusion, exclusion, inclusion).
According to Rabbi, who applies the Klal Prat Klal principle to the Minora verses ("make a Minora" - a generality; "pure Zahav Tahor" - a specific exclusion; "make a Minora" - a second generality), the rule is that the generality is limited to things similar to the specific. Since "pure gold" is a metal, this interpretation concludes that all Kli Sharet must be made of metal, not necessarily gold, but metal. This explains why Rabbi invalidates wooden instruments.
Conversely, Rabbi Yosef Bar Yehuda applies the Ribui Mi'ut Ribui principle to the same verses. "Make a Minora" (first inclusion) means everything is included. "Pure gold" (exclusion) limits it to things that are similar (e.g., metal). The second "make a Minora" (second inclusion) then expands the scope to include even things that are not similar to gold or metal, such as wood. The only things excluded by this principle are items that are entirely dissimilar and unsuitable for sacred use, like pottery (Ha'ares). This interpretation allows for Kli Sharet to be made of wood, aligning with Rabbi Yosef Bar Yehuda's view. Thus, the fundamental Mahloket about the material of Kli Sharet is rooted in these differing approaches to scriptural exegesis concerning the Minora.