The Eri B. Sitt Edition and Audio Series of the Talmud Bavli, Tractate Beitzah, has been dedicated anonymously for the complete recovery of Meir ben Ester. We have not forgotten him—in the merit of the people of Israel. Amen.
Tractate Beitzah has also been dedicated for the recovery of Sarah bat Mazal. We bless our anonymous sponsor that, with God’s help, he should be blessed with health and, in the near future, be able to raise a family and continue all his good work for the community. Amen.
Today’s page is being dedicated by Mr. Haim Sain, one of the charter members of our Daf Yomi group, in honor of his dear parents, Jack and Lillian Seton. May their souls be bound in the bond of life. Amen.
Today’s page is also being studied for the elevation of the soul of Abraham ben Ester. May his soul rest in Paradise. Amen.
We begin today’s page on Folio 2b, two lines from the bottom, beginning with the words of Rabbi Yosef. Let us review the Gemara until this point.
The Gemara has been analyzing a statement in the Mishnah: “An egg that was laid on Yom Tov—Beit Shammai says that it may be eaten, and Beit Hillel says that it may not be eaten.”
Rav Nachman explained the dispute by saying that it is based on the laws of muktzeh. Rabbi Shimon, in Tractate Shabbat, has a very lenient view of muktzeh. According to the way the Gemara presents his position, he does not accept the laws of muktzeh. Since he does not accept muktzeh, the Gemara assumes that he would also not accept the principle of nolad, which is a category of muktzeh.
Nolad means an item that was not present in the world in its current form. In this case, the egg was inside the chicken, and nobody expected it to emerge. Suddenly, it appeared on Yom Tov. That is considered nolad. If one does not accept muktzeh, one does not accept nolad either.
Beit Shammai follows Rabbi Shimon. Since Beit Shammai does not accept nolad, the egg is permissible. Beit Hillel, however, follows Rabbi Yehudah, who does accept muktzeh. Someone who accepts muktzeh also accepts nolad, and therefore the egg is considered nolad.
In other words, before Yom Tov began, the person was not thinking about an egg being laid. Therefore, when the egg emerged, it was considered nolad, and it was muktzeh. That is how Rav Nachman understood the dispute.
The Gemara challenged Rav Nachman, but that was his opinion. Rabbah offered a different interpretation of the Mishnah.
Rabbah said that the Mishnah is discussing a chicken that is designated for eating. The chicken itself is not muktzeh; it is intended for consumption. One may slaughter it, prepare it, and eat it. If so, what is the issue? Why would Beit Hillel say that the egg may not be eaten?
Seemingly, the egg is part of the mother. If one may eat the mother, one should be able to eat the egg as well. It should be like food that emerges from food. If someone is cutting a slice of bread, why should the slice be prohibited? It came from food.
Rabbah introduced a major principle, which he learned from the Torah’s discussion of the manna. Since Yom Tov is considered a significant meal, one must prepare and designate the food for Yom Tov. One may prepare food from an ordinary weekday for Yom Tov, but one may not prepare food from Shabbat for Yom Tov.
Rabbah derives this from the manna. On Friday, which was an ordinary weekday, the Jews had to prepare and designate food for Shabbat. According to the explanation brought in the Gemara, they had to make an actual verbal designation of their food for Shabbat. The preparation could be made from a weekday for Shabbat, but not from Shabbat for Yom Tov.
That is why Beit Hillel holds that preparation is required. When was this egg prepared? The rule is that an egg laid today was prepared twenty-four hours earlier inside the chicken. Therefore, if the egg was laid on Yom Tov that occurred on Sunday, when was it prepared? It was prepared on Shabbat.
Preparation was therefore performed on Shabbat for Yom Tov. The bottom line is that Shabbat cannot serve as preparation for Yom Tov, and consequently the egg may not be eaten. That is Rabbah’s opinion.
So far, we have two interpretations of the Mishnah: Rav Nachman’s and Rabbah’s. The Gemara now gives us two additional interpretations. The first is the opinion of Rabbi Yosef.
Rabbi Yosef said that the prohibition is a decree because of fruit that falls from a tree. On Shabbat, if fruit falls from a tree, one may not eat it. For example, if someone goes into his field on Shabbat and finds that apples have fallen from an apple tree, he may not eat them.
Why not? The Sages made a decree that one may not eat fruit that fell from a tree, because if one were permitted to eat the fruit, one might come to climb the tree and pick fruit directly from it.
Rabbi Yosef says that the egg is comparable to such fruit. The egg emerged from the chicken, so it is similar to fruit that became detached from a tree. If we permit the egg, it is comparable to permitting fruit that fell from a tree. Just as the fallen fruit is prohibited, so too the egg that became detached from the mother and emerged is prohibited. This is a decree because of fruit that falls from a tree.
The Gemara asks: What is the reason that fallen fruit may not be eaten? The answer is that the Sages were concerned that one might climb the tree and pick the fruit.
But we learned yesterday that the Rabbis do not make one decree because of another decree. They may make a decree to protect a Torah prohibition, but they do not ordinarily make a decree to protect a rabbinic enactment. Here, you are saying that the egg may not be eaten because of a decree against eating fruit that fell from a tree, but the prohibition against eating fallen fruit is itself a decree, because one might climb the tree and pick fruit. It appears to be a decree because of a decree.
The Gemara answers with the expression, “It is all one decree.” This expression appears many times in the Gemara. It means that although the reasoning may appear to involve two separate stages, the two matters were included in one original enactment.
When the Rabbis convened to prohibit fruit that falls from a tree, they also included an egg laid on Yom Tov in that same enactment. They decided at one sitting that fallen fruit would be prohibited and that an egg laid on Yom Tov would likewise be prohibited. Since both were included in one enactment, it is not considered a decree because of a decree.
A decree because of a decree would mean that the Rabbis first prohibited fallen fruit, and then, six months later, returned and said, “Now we will also prohibit an egg.” That would be a second decree based on the first. But if, at the original meeting, they said that both items would be prohibited, it is considered one decree.
Let us review Rabbi Yosef’s position. The egg that became detached from the mother is comparable to fruit that became detached from a tree. Rashi explains that the egg was included when the original decree was made regarding fruit that falls from a tree. Even though there is no actual act of picking with an egg—one does not pick an egg from a tree—the egg is still comparable to detached fruit, and the decree was made at the same time.
According to Rabbi Yosef, the Mishnah is discussing a chicken that is designated for eating, so this is not a question of muktzeh. Why, then, does Beit Hillel prohibit the egg? Because it is similar to fruit that falls from a tree. Just as fallen fruit is prohibited, so too the egg that emerged is prohibited, and the two prohibitions are considered one decree.
There is a question regarding Rashi. Rashi says that the decree is because of fruit that falls from a tree on Shabbat. Seemingly, Rashi should have said that the decree is because of fruit that falls from a tree on Yom Tov. The egg is prohibited on Yom Tov because of the concern that one might pick fruit from a tree on Yom Tov. Why does Rashi refer specifically to Shabbat?
The commentators discuss this question. The Maginesh Shalomor, a work that defends Rashi against those who raise difficulties with his explanations, answers that Rashi maintains that picking fruit from a tree is permitted by Torah law on Yom Tov. Therefore, there would be no decree on Yom Tov itself. That is why Rashi must refer to Shabbat.
Rashi says that the decree is because of fruit that falls from a tree on Shabbat. The point is that Rashi is not discussing Yom Tov. He is telling us that the decree regarding the egg on Yom Tov is because of the parallel case of Shabbat. Why did he need to go to Shabbat? Because, according to Rashi, picking fruit from a tree on Yom Tov is permitted by Torah law.
The Chatam Sofer gives a different answer. He says that there is no difference between picking fruit on Yom Tov and picking fruit on Shabbat; the law is the same. However, the original enactment regarding fruit that fell from a tree was stated in the context of Shabbat, in the discussion of the people of Jericho. Rashi was therefore giving the source and context in which the law was taught. The point is not that the law applies only on Shabbat, but that this is where the matter was originally discussed.
Tosafot raises a strong question. What is the problem with picking fruit on Yom Tov? We say that acts necessary for food preparation are permitted on Yom Tov. One may slaughter an animal on Yom Tov, and one may cook on Yom Tov. Anything connected with eating is permitted. Seemingly, picking fruit from a tree should also be permitted on Yom Tov.
Tosafot brings a well-known Jerusalem Talmud. The verse discusses the laws of food preparation and then says, “That alone may be done for you.” What does “that alone” exclude? It excludes activities from the stage of kneading and earlier. From the stage of kneading onward, food preparation is permitted; anything before kneading is prohibited.
Why is that so? Because one could have performed those earlier activities before Yom Tov. Who told you to cut the wheat on Yom Tov? You should have cut it before Yom Tov. Therefore, cutting the wheat is not permitted on Yom Tov. The same applies to fruit on a tree. Picking fruit is an act of harvesting, and harvesting is prohibited on Yom Tov.
The order of the agricultural activities is plowing, sowing, reaping, and then the later stages. Reaping is the third primary labor. Those labors are prohibited because they are not included in the permission for food preparation. The verse teaches that food preparation is permitted from the stage of kneading onward, but from that stage backward it remains prohibited.
This is an important qualification to remember when we say that eating and food preparation are permitted on Yom Tov. It does not mean that everything connected with food is permitted. The permission is limited to the stage of kneading and afterward.
Tosafot raises another question, which is also discussed by the Rashba. You say that the reason one may not eat fruit that fell from a tree is a decree that one might pick fruit from the tree. But elsewhere the Gemara says that the reason fallen fruit may not be eaten is muktzeh. When Shabbat began, the fruit was still on the tree and inaccessible. Since it entered Shabbat in a state of muktzeh, it remains muktzeh even after it falls.
Why does our Gemara not discuss muktzeh? Why does it say only that there is a decree lest one pick the fruit?
The Rashba answers that there are indeed two problems with fallen fruit. First, there is a decree lest one climb the tree and pick fruit. Second, there is the ordinary status of muktzeh. Our Gemara does not discuss the muktzeh issue because if muktzeh were the only concern, the Sages would not have extended the decree to an egg. Muktzeh is not sufficiently stringent to be the basis for an additional decree.
That is why the Gemara discusses the concern that one might pick the fruit, which involves a Torah prohibition. Once the underlying concern is a Torah prohibition, it is more understandable that the Sages extended the decree to an egg. In reality, however, there are two reasons that fallen fruit is prohibited: the decree lest one pick it, and its status as muktzeh. That is Rabbi Yosef’s explanation of the Mishnah.
The Gemara now presents another answer. Rabbi Yitzhak said that the prohibition is a decree because of liquid that has oozed from fruit.
In this interpretation, the chicken in the Mishnah is also an ordinary chicken designated for eating, not a muktzeh chicken. If one may eat the chicken, why may one not eat the egg that emerges from it? Again, it appears to be like a slice of bread that comes from food.
The answer is that the egg is comparable to liquid that has oozed from fruit. For example, one may not squeeze a grape on Shabbat. This is the prohibition of squeezing, which falls under the category of extracting.
Squeezing is not listed as one of the thirty-nine primary labors by that name. It is prohibited because it is a form of extracting. When one squeezes a grape, one removes the juice from the grape. Extracting is a derivative of threshing.
What is threshing? A kernel of wheat is surrounded by a husk. When one threshes the wheat, one separates the edible kernel from the outer chaff. Similarly, when one squeezes a grape, one removes the juice from the outer part of the fruit. Squeezing is therefore considered a derivative of threshing.
The Sages made a decree regarding liquid that oozes from fruit. Suppose that on Shabbat a person has grapes and liquid begins to come out of them. One may not drink the liquid. Why? Because if one drinks the liquid, one might come to squeeze the grapes intentionally.
Rabbi Yitzhak says that the egg is comparable to such liquid. The egg emerges from the chicken in the same way that liquid emerges from a grape. If we permit the egg, one might come to squeeze fruit on Shabbat. The Sages therefore viewed the egg as similar to liquid that oozes from fruit. That is the decree because of liquid that has oozed out.
Abaye then asks: What is the reason that liquid that oozed from fruit is prohibited? The answer is that it is itself prohibited because one might come to squeeze the fruit.
But then we have the same question as before. You are saying that the egg is prohibited because of liquid that oozed from fruit, while the prohibition against drinking the liquid is itself a decree lest one squeeze the fruit. That appears to be a decree because of a decree.
The answer is again that it is all one decree. When the Rabbis sat and prohibited liquid that oozed from fruit, they included an egg laid on Yom Tov in the same enactment. Since both matters were included in one meeting, the egg prohibition is not considered a later decree based on the first one.
We therefore have four interpretations of the Mishnah. Rav Nachman says that the issue is muktzeh and nolad. His interpretation is discussing a chicken designated for producing eggs. Since the chicken itself is muktzeh, the egg that emerges from it is nolad.
Rabbah says that the issue is preparation. An egg laid on Yom Tov was prepared on Shabbat, and Shabbat cannot prepare for Yom Tov.
Rabbi Yosef says that the issue is a decree because of fruit that falls from a tree.
Rabbi Yitzhak says that the issue is a decree because of liquid that oozes from fruit. All the interpretations other than Rav Nachman’s assume that the chicken itself is designated for eating and is not muktzeh.
The Gemara now analyzes the relationship among these opinions. All the other opinions do not follow Rav Nachman. We must ask: Why did each rabbi not accept the explanation of the other rabbis? What inherent difficulty did each one see in the others’ interpretations?
Regarding Rav Nachman, the Gemara’s earlier question applies. If the issue is muktzeh, why did the Mishnah discuss the egg? It could have discussed the chicken itself. If the Mishnah is speaking about a chicken designated for producing eggs, why focus on whether the egg is muktzeh? The Gemara could simply have discussed the chicken’s status. Since that question remains, the other rabbis do not accept Rav Nachman’s explanation.
They also do not accept Rabbah’s explanation, because not everyone interprets the verse about the manna in the same way. Rabbah’s derivation that Shabbat cannot prepare for Yom Tov is not accepted by all the other opinions.
Rabbi Yosef and Rabbi Yitzhak do not accept each other’s explanations either. Rabbi Yitzhak says that an egg is comparable to liquid that oozed from a grape. Rabbi Yosef objects that an egg is a solid food, so it should be compared to fruit that fell from a tree rather than to liquid.
Rabbi Yosef would say that the egg is more similar to fruit than to liquid. An egg is a solid edible item, whereas the liquid that emerges from a grape is a drink. Therefore, Rabbi Yosef does not accept Rabbi Yitzhak’s analogy.
Rabbi Yitzhak, however, responds that the egg is absorbed inside the chicken before it emerges. The liquid is also absorbed inside the grape before it comes out. In that respect, the egg is similar to liquid that emerges from fruit.
Rabbi Yitzhak would reject Rabbi Yosef’s comparison to fallen fruit. Fruit that falls from a tree is exposed and visible on the ground. The egg, by contrast, is absorbed inside the chicken and then emerges. Since the egg is hidden inside before it comes out, it is more similar to liquid that is absorbed inside a grape and then trickles out.
Thus, the Gemara tells us that the other rabbis do not follow Rav Nachman because of the Gemara’s earlier question. Rabbah and Rav Nachman do not follow Rabbi Yosef because an egg is absorbed inside the chicken whereas fallen fruit is exposed. They also do not follow Rabbi Yitzhak because an egg is food and the liquid from a grape is a drink. Rabbi Yosef and Rabbi Yitzhak likewise reject each other’s analogies. Therefore, the Gemara does not need to state separately why Rabbah and Rav Nachman do not follow Rabbi Yosef and Rabbi Yitzhak; the difficulties that those rabbis have with each other apply to them as well.
The Gemara now brings another opinion. Rabbi Yohanan also holds that the egg is prohibited because of liquid that oozes from fruit.
Rabbi Yohanan established a contradiction between two statements of Rabbi Yehudah. Let us first study the contradiction independently, and then we will relate it back to the question of the egg.
One Mishnah teaches that on Shabbat one may not squeeze fruit to extract its liquid, and even if the liquid emerges by itself, it may not necessarily be consumed. This is the case of liquid that oozes from fruit. The reason is that if one drinks the liquid, one might come to squeeze the fruit.
Rabbi Yehudah, however, says that the law depends on the purpose for which the fruit was designated. If the grapes were designated for eating, then the liquid that emerges from them is permitted. Grapes are generally eaten, and the liquid emerged on its own. We do not make a decree that one might squeeze the grapes, because the person intended to eat them, not to produce juice.
But if the grapes were designated for producing liquid, then the liquid that emerges is prohibited. Since the person normally squeezes such grapes, if we permit him to drink the liquid that emerged on its own, he might come to squeeze the grapes intentionally.
Rabbi Yehudah’s distinction is therefore based on the purpose of the grapes. If they are designated for eating, the liquid that emerges is permitted. If they are designated for producing a beverage, the liquid is prohibited.
The Gemara infers that according to Rabbi Yehudah, anything that is considered food remains food even after something emerges from it. Since the grapes are food, the liquid that emerges from them is also treated as food. That is why he permits it when the grapes were designated for eating.
Now the Gemara brings a contradiction from another statement of Rabbi Yehudah. This second discussion concerns Rosh Hashanah and the question of whether the two days of Rosh Hashanah are viewed as one extended sanctity or as two separate sanctities.
Rabbi Yehudah clearly holds that the two days of Rosh Hashanah are two separate days. One day is holy and the other is an ordinary weekday, although we do not know which is which. Therefore, both days must be treated stringently because of the uncertainty. If the first day is holy, the second day is an ordinary weekday. If the first day is an ordinary weekday, the second day is holy.
We treat both days with the sanctity of Yom Tov because of the uncertainty, but conceptually they are two separate days. The Rabbis did not establish them as one extended sanctity. This is similar to the two days of Yom Tov observed outside the Land of Israel. One day is truly Yom Tov and the other is truly an ordinary weekday, but we observe both because of the uncertainty regarding the calendar.
What practical difference does this make? The Mishnah says that a person may designate the terumah and tithes of a basket of fruit on the first day of Yom Tov and eat the fruit on the second day.
Suppose someone has a basket of fruit from which terumah and tithes have not been separated. He may not separate them on Yom Tov, so he cannot eat the fruit. He can use the following procedure. On the first day of the holiday, he designates certain fruit as terumah and tithes and places it aside. On the second day, he identifies the same fruit and repeats the designation. He may then eat the remaining fruit on the second day.
The logic is as follows. If the first day was holy, then the designation he made on the first day was ineffective, but the second day is an ordinary weekday, and he can complete the separation then. If the first day was an ordinary weekday, then the separation he made on the first day was valid, and he can eat the fruit on the second day. In either case, by the second day he has covered both possibilities.
He takes the basket and designates two pieces of fruit, or two clusters of grapes, as terumah and tithes. He does not know whether the designation is valid, because he does not know whether the first day was holy or ordinary. He therefore repeats the procedure on the second day. The fruit may be eaten on the second day, but not on the first.
This procedure works only because the two days are viewed as one holy day and one ordinary day. If the two days were considered one extended sanctity, this solution would not work.
The Gemara presents Rabbi Yehudah’s formulation: On the first day, he may designate the fruit conditionally. He says, “If today is holy, then the designation I am making is effective, and if today is an ordinary weekday, then there is nothing in my action.” He marks the fruit so that he can identify it the next day.
On the second day, he says, “If yesterday was holy, then yesterday’s designation was effective. If today is holy and yesterday was an ordinary weekday, then I am now designating the fruit.” In this way, he can eat the fruit on the second day.
The Gemara then says that the same law applies to an egg. An egg laid on the first day of Yom Tov may be eaten on the second day.
If the first day was an ordinary weekday, there is no problem with the egg, and it may be eaten on the second day. If the first day was holy and the second day is an ordinary weekday, the egg may also be eaten on the second day because the second day is ordinary. In either case, the egg may be eaten on the second day.
Rashi explains that the same applies to the preparation issue. Either the first day was an ordinary weekday, in which case preparation was permitted, or the first day was holy and the second day was an ordinary weekday. In either case, the second day is permissible.
The Gemara analyzes this ruling. Rabbi Yehudah permits the egg on the second day but not on the first. Why? Even though the egg emerges from a chicken that is designated for eating, the chicken is food, and the egg that emerges from food should also be food. How do we know that food emerging from food is permitted? Rabbi Yehudah himself said that when grapes are designated for eating, the liquid that emerges from them is permitted.
If so, the same should apply to the chicken. The chicken is designated for eating, and the egg that emerges is food that came from food. It should be permitted even on the first day. Why does Rabbi Yehudah allow it only on the second day?
This is Rabbi Yohanan’s contradiction in the statements of Rabbi Yehudah. Rabbi Yohanan answered that the positions must be reversed. In the case of liquid that oozes from grapes, Rabbi Yehudah really holds that the liquid is prohibited whether the grapes were designated for eating or for producing a drink. Therefore, an egg is also prohibited even though it emerges from food, and it may be eaten only on the second day.
According to this answer, Rabbi Yohanan changes the distinction attributed to Rabbi Yehudah. There is no contradiction because Rabbi Yehudah’s true position is that any liquid that oozes from fruit is prohibited. The egg is likewise prohibited, and the conditional procedure permits it only on the second day.
From Rabbi Yohanan’s question, however, the Gemara infers that he compares the egg to liquid that oozes from fruit. Rabbi Yitzhak’s opinion was that the reason the egg is prohibited is precisely that it is comparable to such liquid. Since Rabbi Yohanan raised the contradiction by comparing the case of the egg with the case of liquid that oozed from grapes, Rabbi Yohanan must agree with Rabbi Yitzhak’s basic comparison.
The Gemara then brings another answer in the name of Ravina. Ravina says that there is no need to reverse Rabbi Yehudah’s positions.
According to Ravina, Rabbi Yehudah consistently maintains that if grapes are designated for eating, the liquid that emerges from them is permitted. The same should apply to an egg that emerges from a chicken designated for eating. The egg should be permitted even on the first day.
When Rabbi Yehudah says that the egg may be eaten only on the second day, he is not stating his own position. He is speaking to the Rabbis and saying: “Even according to your position, you should agree that the egg is permitted on the second day.”
The Rabbis maintain that liquid emerging from grapes is prohibited whether the grapes were designated for eating or for producing a drink. Rabbi Yehudah says to them: “I understand your position regarding the grapes. But in the case of an egg on Rosh Hashanah, at least agree that it may be eaten on the second day. Since one of the two days is certainly an ordinary weekday, the egg must be permissible by the second day.”
The Rabbis respond that Rosh Hashanah has one extended sanctity. It is not viewed as one holy day and one ordinary weekday. Therefore, the uncertainty does not permit the egg on the second day.
According to Ravina, Rabbi Yehudah himself permits the egg even on the first day when the chicken is designated for eating. His statement about the second day was addressed to the Rabbis. He was telling them: “Even if you maintain that liquid emerging from grapes is always prohibited, you should at least permit the egg on the second day because one of the two days must be an ordinary weekday.”
Thus, there are two answers to the contradiction in Rabbi Yehudah. Rabbi Yohanan reverses the positions and says that Rabbi Yehudah prohibits liquid emerging from grapes in all cases. Ravina says that there is no contradiction because Rabbi Yehudah was speaking to the Rabbis and asking them to permit the egg on the second day even according to their own position.
The Gemara presents a third answer. Rabbi Yehudah says that the case involves a chicken designated for producing eggs, not a chicken designated for eating. The entire premise of the question was therefore incorrect.
When Rabbi Yehudah says that the egg may be eaten on the second day, he is speaking about a chicken designated for producing eggs. Such a chicken is muktzeh, and the egg that emerges from it is nolad. Therefore, the egg presents a muktzeh problem, and the conditional procedure allows it to be eaten only on the second day.
Let us review this third answer. Earlier, Ravina cited Rabbi Yehudah as saying that when liquid emerges from grapes designated for eating, the liquid is permitted because food that emerges from food remains food. Seemingly, the same should apply to an egg. Why, then, does Rabbi Yehudah permit the egg only on the second day?
The answer is that the chicken in that case was not designated for eating. It was designated for producing eggs. Since it was designated for producing eggs, it was muktzeh, and the egg that emerged from it was nolad. Therefore, the egg could be eaten only on the second day after the conditional procedure.
We therefore have three answers to the contradiction. The first is Rabbi Yohanan’s answer, which reverses Rabbi Yehudah’s positions. The second is Ravina’s answer, which says that Rabbi Yehudah was addressing the Rabbis rather than stating his own position. The third answer says that the premise was wrong: the chicken was designated for producing eggs, and Rabbi Yehudah accepts the laws of muktzeh.
The Gemara now raises a new question regarding the baraita that has been taught. An egg laid on Shabbat or an egg laid on Yom Tov may not be moved. It may not be used to cover the opening of a vessel, and it may not be used to support the legs of a bed.
An egg can be used as a stopper. For example, if a vessel has an opening, one might want to cover it with the egg. One might also use an egg to support a bed. An egg has a point that can withstand pressure, and if the pressure is placed on that point, the egg can support the bed without breaking. Nevertheless, an egg laid on Shabbat or Yom Tov is muktzeh, and it may not be moved for these purposes.
We previously learned a major dispute in Tractate Shabbat. One opinion says that it is permissible to move a permitted utensil for the sake of a prohibited object. The egg is prohibited, but perhaps one may take a permitted utensil and use it to cover the egg. The utensil itself is permitted, so why should it matter that it is being used to protect or cover a prohibited object?
Rabbi Yitzhak, however, holds that one may move a permitted utensil only if it is serving a permitted purpose. How, then, can the baraita be understood according to Rabbi Yitzhak?
Rashi explains that the person needed the utensil for its own purpose. For example, he needed the place where the utensil was resting. He picked up the utensil because he needed to use it elsewhere, and once it was in his hand, he was permitted to place it over the egg. But he could not pick up the utensil solely in order to cover the egg.
The Gemara then discusses a case of uncertainty. If one does not know whether an egg was laid on Yom Tov or on an ordinary day, the egg is prohibited. The baraita continues: If an egg that is prohibited becomes mixed with one thousand other eggs, all of them are prohibited.
Let us analyze this according to Rabbah. Rabbah explained that the issue with the egg is preparation. If Yom Tov occurred on Sunday, the egg was prepared on Shabbat, and Shabbat cannot prepare for Yom Tov. According to Rabbah, this is a Torah prohibition derived from the manna.
According to Rabbah, the baraita makes perfect sense. The uncertainty in the baraita is a Torah-level uncertainty. We do not know whether the egg was laid on Sunday, which was Yom Tov and followed Shabbat, or whether it was laid on an ordinary day. Since it may be a Torah prohibition, we rule stringently in a case of uncertainty.
If the egg was laid on Yom Tov following Shabbat, Rabbah considers it prohibited by Torah law because it was prepared on Shabbat for Yom Tov. Therefore, the Gemara can say that an uncertain egg is prohibited.
But what about Rabbi Yosef and Rabbi Yitzhak? According to them, the prohibition is rabbinic: Rabbi Yosef says it is a decree because of fallen fruit, and Rabbi Yitzhak says it is a decree because of liquid that oozed from fruit. If the entire issue is rabbinic, then it is an uncertain rabbinic prohibition, and the usual rule is to be lenient. How, then, can the baraita say that an uncertain egg is prohibited?
The Gemara answers that the uncertainty in the baraita is not whether the egg was laid on Yom Tov or on an ordinary day. If that were the uncertainty, then according to Rabbi Yosef and Rabbi Yitzhak it would be a rabbinic uncertainty and would be permitted.
Rather, the baraita is discussing an egg that may have come from a chicken that was a tereifah. A chicken can become a tereifah because of certain internal defects or injuries. If the chicken is a tereifah, the egg is prohibited as well. Anything that emerges from a tereifah has the same prohibited status.
Therefore, when the baraita says that an uncertain egg is prohibited, it is discussing an egg that may have come from a tereifah. Since the status of a tereifah is a Torah matter, we rule stringently in a case of uncertainty. This is a difficult way to read the baraita, because the baraita first discusses an egg laid on Shabbat or Yom Tov and then immediately moves to the case of an egg that may have come from a tereifah. Nevertheless, that is the Gemara’s answer.
Now we must resolve one more case. If the prohibited egg becomes mixed with one thousand other eggs, why are all the eggs prohibited?
According to Rabbah, the explanation is understandable. If the egg was laid on Yom Tov, one can simply wait until the next day, when the egg will become permissible. This is an item that will eventually become permitted. The rule is that an item that will eventually become permitted is not nullified even in a thousand. One waits until the time arrives when it is permitted.
This is different from a mixture of milk and meat. Milk and meat will never become permissible merely with the passage of time, so one must consider the laws of nullification, such as whether there is a sufficient majority or the required proportion. But an egg that is prohibited only because it was laid on Yom Tov can become permissible the next day. Since it is an item that will eventually become permitted, it is not nullified even in a thousand.
According to Rabbah, the case is therefore clear. The egg was laid on Yom Tov, but one can wait until the next day and eat it. Since it will become permitted, there is no nullification in a thousand.
But if the baraita is discussing an egg from a tereifah, the egg will never become permitted. Why should it not be nullified in the majority? If one prohibited egg falls into two permitted eggs, there are three eggs in front of us, and we do not know which one is prohibited. Normally, the prohibited item should be nullified in the majority.
The Gemara asks: If the egg is a tereifah egg, which is an item that will never become permitted, why does the baraita say that it is not nullified even in a thousand? It should be nullified in the majority.
The Gemara introduces another principle concerning nullification: an item sold by number is considered significant. Such an item is not nullified. For example, certain fruits are very expensive and are sold individually rather than by the basket or case. The customer says, “I want six pieces,” and they count out six pieces. Everyone agrees that an item sold individually by number is significant, and a prohibited item of that type is not nullified.
There is, however, a dispute regarding an item that some people sell by number and others sell in bulk. Eggs fall into this category. Some people buy eggs by the dozen, while others buy them by the basket or carton. The question is whether an item is considered significant if it is sometimes sold by number, or only if it is exclusively sold by number.
According to the opinion that an item is significant if people sometimes sell it by number, the egg is not nullified in a thousand because an egg is a significant item. According to the opinion that only an item exclusively sold by number is significant, an egg should be nullified, because eggs are not exclusively sold individually.
The Gemara asks: Perhaps the egg is considered significant. That may be why it is not nullified even in a thousand. The law could be that an item does not need to be exclusively sold by number; it is sufficient that it is sometimes sold by number.
The Gemara brings a baraita to establish the dispute regarding an item sold by number. A person had bundles of fenugreek that had grown alongside grapevines. This is a case of forbidden mixture in a vineyard. The Torah says that such produce must be burned.
The forbidden produce became mixed with permitted produce, and then some of that mixture became mixed with another mixture. According to the Sages, one does not have to burn everything. One removes one stalk and burns it, and the remainder is permitted through nullification at the required ratio.
Rabbi Meir, however, says that the entire mixture must be burned. Why? He holds that an item does not have to be exclusively sold by number in order to be considered significant. Anything that is generally counted is considered a significant item. Since the forbidden produce is sometimes sold by number, it is not nullified, even if it falls into ten thousand permitted items. When that mixture falls into another mixture, the entire second mixture must also be burned.
The Sages do not require the entire mixture to be burned. They maintain that only six types of items are exclusively sold by number and therefore are not nullified. Rabbi Akiva adds a seventh item.
The six items are nuts of Perach, pomegranates of Badan, sealed barrels, beet stalks, cabbage stalks, and Greek gourds. These items are considered significant because they are sold individually or by number.
Rabbi Akiva adds loaves of bread belonging to the homeowner. These seven items are significant when sold by number and are not nullified.
The baraita explains that fruit is subject to the laws of the first three years of a tree, while vegetables and other produce that grow from the ground are subject to the laws of forbidden mixtures in a vineyard. For example, if pomegranates from the first three years of a tree became mixed with ten thousand other pomegranates, they would not be nullified if they were considered a significant item sold by number.
Similarly, a Greek gourd that grew next to a grapevine is subject to the laws of forbidden mixtures in a vineyard. If it became mixed with ten thousand other gourds, the mixture would not be nullified according to the opinion that an item generally sold by number is considered significant.
A statement is attributed to Rabbi Yohanan that takes the more lenient position—or, in this context, the more stringent position—that an item is considered significant only when it is exclusively sold by number. According to Rabbi Yohanan, since eggs are not exclusively sold by number, an egg should be nullified in a thousand.
The Gemara asks: If so, what is Rabbi Yohanan teaching us? If the egg is not exclusively sold by number, why is it not nullified?
Let us return to the Gemara’s question. An egg was mixed into one thousand other eggs and was not nullified. According to the opinion that the case concerns an egg laid on Yom Tov, we understand why. It is an item that will eventually become permitted, and one can wait until the next day. But according to the opinion that the case concerns an egg from a tereifah, it will never become permitted. It should be nullified in the majority.
The Gemara answers that if one follows the opinion that any item generally sold by number is considered significant, the egg is not nullified because eggs are sometimes sold individually or by the dozen. It is therefore a significant item. But according to Rabbi Yohanan, who says that the item must be exclusively sold by number, what explains the fact that the egg is not nullified?
That is the question the Gemara leaves for further analysis. We will have to see tomorrow how the Gemara answers this matter according to Rabbi Yohanan.
There is one additional question raised by Tosafot. The Gemara said that when forbidden produce from a vineyard becomes mixed with another mixture, the entire mixture must be burned. Tosafot asks: Why should the entire second mixture be prohibited? Seemingly, there is a double uncertainty.
Suppose a Greek gourd that is forbidden because of the laws of a vineyard falls into a mixture. Since the gourd is considered significant, it is not nullified, and the entire first mixture must be treated as prohibited. But when some of that first mixture falls into a second mixture, one can say that perhaps the forbidden gourd did not fall into the second mixture at all. Even if it did fall into the second mixture, perhaps the particular gourd now being removed is not the forbidden one. Why, then, is the second mixture entirely prohibited?
Tosafot proves from another Gemara that such a double uncertainty would ordinarily be permitted. Tosafot therefore explains that when the Gemara says that the mixture became mixed with another mixture, it means that the entire first mixture fell into the second mixture. In that case, we know that the prohibited material is certainly present in the second mixture. There is only one uncertainty—where the prohibited item is located—not a double uncertainty. That is why the second mixture must be treated stringently.