The Gemara recounts that Rabbi Bar Avina related a teaching from Rabbi Heschel regarding a stream of water that was sealed off before a holiday. By sealing the stream, the owner prevented new fish from entering, ensuring that any fish found within were present before the holiday began. Such fish are permissible to catch and consume on the holiday itself, as they are considered designated and prepared from before the holiday. This action serves a dual purpose: it prevents new, undesignated fish from entering, and it implicitly designates the existing fish for holiday use, thereby removing the prohibition of muktzah.
A question arises from this ruling: how is it permissible to trap fish on a holiday, given that we learned it is generally forbidden? The Megid Mishneh addresses this by suggesting that this ruling applies to very narrow ponds where fish are considered already trapped and thus do not require a separate act of trapping on the holiday. Therefore, no prohibition is violated. The novelty here is that the act of sealing the stream before the holiday is considered a form of designation, making the fish available for consumption.
Rabbi Chizda then deduces a further halachic principle from Rabbi's words. He states that if an animal resides in an enclosed orchard, it does not require explicit designation before the holiday. The natural confinement of the orchard serves as an implicit designation, making the animal permissible for holiday consumption without any prior verbal declaration. This is analogous to the fish in the sealed pond; their inability to escape renders them "designated" by default.
Upon hearing this, Rabbi Nachman remarked, "My colleagues have fallen into a dispute," implying that Rabbi Chizda's analogy was flawed. The Gemara then presents an alternative version of the teaching, an Ika D'Amri, where Rabbi Huna is the one making the analogy. Rabbi Nachman's critique, in this version, highlights a crucial distinction: in the case of the fish, an active deed (sealing the stream) was performed before the holiday, which constitutes a valid designation. However, for an animal merely dwelling in an orchard, no such action was taken. Its presence in a secure area, by itself, does not necessarily equate to designation. Designation, in this context, requires either an active deed or a clear default state of preparation.
The Gemara challenges the idea that an animal in an orchard does not require designation by citing a Baraisa. This Baraisa, attributed to Shemaya and Avtalyon, explicitly states that an animal in an enclosed area still needs to be designated. Furthermore, it mentions that even a designated wild bird requires a physical marker, like a tie on its wing, to prevent confusion with other similar birds. This directly contradicts the notion that mere confinement is sufficient for designation, thus refuting Rabbi Chizda's deduction.
The Gemara then presents another Baraisa that seems to contradict the first, stating that certain animals and birds, including those in an orchard, do not require designation. This Baraisa lists various types of birds and animals, such as those nesting in jugs, on high buildings, geese, chickens, and animals in an orchard, as permissible for consumption without prior designation. It reiterates that a wild bird still needs designation and a sign on its wing. It also adds that birds designated in pits, houses, ditches, or caves are permissible, but those designated in trees are forbidden to take on a holiday due to the concern that one might pull off fruit or branches while climbing. Additionally, the Baraisa states that a bird with a sign or one that has been handled (an act of acquisition called hinua) by one person cannot be taken by another, as it is considered stolen.
To reconcile the two seemingly contradictory Baraisos regarding an animal in an orchard, Rabbi Nachman offers a resolution. He explains that the Baraisa requiring designation refers to the mother animal, which is capable of escaping. The Baraisa that states no designation is needed refers to the young animal, which is small and confined within the orchard, unable to flee. Therefore, for the young animal, its confinement is sufficient for designation.
The Gemara questions this distinction, asking what benefit designation provides for the mother animal if it can still escape and needs to be trapped on the holiday. If trapping is forbidden, designation alone is insufficient. The Gemara then offers an alternative resolution, suggesting that both Baraisos refer to the young animal, but the ruling depends on the location of the orchard. If the orchard is close to the city, the animal is considered automatically designated because people's minds are naturally focused on animals nearby. If the orchard is far from the city, explicit designation is required because the animal is not readily on people's minds.
The Mishnah then discusses the case of an animal in danger of dying on a holiday. If one has not yet eaten, it is permissible to slaughter the animal immediately to prevent its loss, as there is no prohibition of delay. However, if one has already eaten, slaughtering for the sole purpose of preventing loss is forbidden. The Mishnah states that if there is sufficient time on the holiday to slaughter the animal and roast at least an olive-sized piece (kezayit) of its meat to make it edible, then the entire animal may be slaughtered. Roasting is specified because it is a quicker preparation method than cooking. Rabbi Akiva further extends this, stating that even if there is only enough time to slaughter and eat a kezayit of raw meat from the incision point (bet tavi hata), it is permissible. This implies that one does not even need to skin the animal, as raw meat can be consumed directly from the cut, saving time. The first Tanna disagrees, requiring at least enough time for roasting.
The Gemara then quotes Rabbi Ami Bar Abba, who states that just as a burnt offering (korban olah) must be skinned and cut into pieces before being placed on the altar, so too, butchers must skin and cut meat before selling it. From this, he deduces an ethical principle: one should not eat meat until the animal has been fully skinned and cut into pieces. Rabbi Ami Bar Abba's statement is then analyzed: is it merely an ethical teaching (derech eretz) against gluttony, or a halachic ruling (issur) due to concerns about internal defects (treifot) that might only be discovered after skinning and cutting?
The Gemara considers whether Rabbi Ami Bar Abba's statement is a halachic ruling that contradicts Rabbi Huna's principle. Rabbi Huna taught that an animal, while alive, is presumed forbidden (hazakat issur) due to the prohibition of eating a limb from a living animal. However, once properly slaughtered, its status reverses to presumed permissible (hazakat kashrut) until a defect is found. If a defect is found after slaughter, but it's uncertain when it occurred, we rely on the hazakah of permissibility and assume it occurred after slaughter. If Rabbi Ami Bar Abba requires skinning and cutting for halachic reasons, it would imply a concern for treifot that overrides Rabbi Huna's hazakah.
However, the Gemara refutes this by citing our Mishnah, which permits eating raw meat from the incision point without skinning the entire animal. This clearly supports Rabbi Huna's view that the animal is presumed kosher after slaughter, even without full inspection. The Gemara initially tries to interpret Rabbi Akiva's opinion in the Mishnah as requiring skinning by suggesting "incision point" refers to the stomach, implying that one must skin the animal to reach it. But this interpretation is rejected by a Baraisa that explicitly defines "incision point" as the neck, meaning no skinning is required. Therefore, Rabbi Ami Bar Abba's statement must be an ethical teaching, not a halachic one. It is a matter of derech eretz—proper conduct—to avoid appearing gluttonous by eating meat before it is fully prepared, akin to other examples of polite eating and drinking habits.
Rabbi Ami Bar Abba also taught about the chatzavah, an herb that grows straight down without spreading its roots, used by Joshua Bin Nun to mark borders in the Land of Israel. This herb, he said, will serve as an indictment against the wicked on the Day of Judgment. The wicked, who encroach on others' property, will be shamed by the chatzavah, which respects boundaries. Similarly, the law of orlah (the three-year prohibition on fruit from a newly planted tree) will indict butchers who rush to eat meat before it's properly skinned and those who engage in relations with a woman who is a nidah (menstrually impure) before she immerses in a mikvah. The long waiting period for orlah fruit emphasizes the virtue of patience, highlighting the impatience of those who violate other prohibitions. The turmus, a bitter bean that requires seven cookings to become edible, will also indict the Jewish people who, despite repeated divine interventions, continued to worship idols. The Gemara offers two interpretations: either the Jewish people are worse than the turmus because they remained "bitter" even after seven "cookings," or they made God worse than the turmus by worshipping idols exclusively, rather than in conjunction with God, as one might eat turmus with other foods.
A Baraisa in the name of Rabbi Meir states that the Torah was given to Israel because they are brazen. Without the Torah, their brazenness would be uncontrollable. Another Baraisa from the school of Rabbi Yishmael explains that God gave a fiery law to Israel because they are worthy of it, being strong-willed and tenacious like fire. An alternative interpretation states that the Torah itself is fire, and without it, no nation could withstand the Jewish people's brazenness, which would lead to global destruction. The Torah thus serves to pacify and subdue their fiery nature.
Rabbi Shimon ben Menasia taught that three things are considered brazen: Israel among the nations, the dog among animals, and the chicken among birds. Some add the goat among small animals, and others include the slaf (caper bush) among trees. The Tosafot explains the brazenness of the slaf either by its abundant edible fruits or by its use in strengthening spices for the Temple incense.
Returning to the Mishnah, it states that an animal slaughtered on a holiday should not be carried into town on poles, as this creates a commotion that detracts from the holiday's sanctity. It should be carried discreetly, limb by limb, by hand. Similarly, a blind person who does not truly need a stick should not carry one, nor should a shepherd carry his knapsack, as these are considered weekday items. People should also not be carried in chairs on the street, as this is a display of honor inappropriate for a holiday.
A contradiction arises from a story related by Rabbi Yaakov bar Idi: an old man in his neighborhood was carried in a folding chair on a holiday. When asked if this was permissible, Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi replied that if the person is a Torah scholar needed at the study hall, it is permitted. This is supported by accounts of rabbis carrying Rabbi Huna and Mar Shmuel in chairs. The Gemara explains that carrying a person in a chair is generally forbidden for reasons of honor, but an exception is made for a distinguished rabbi needed for Torah study or rulings, where speed and convenience are factors. However, the method of carrying also matters: it should not be done in a manner resembling weekday travel, such as using an alunki (a method where two people link arms to form a "pole" for the chair), which gives the impression of a long journey.
Rabbi Nachman, however, permitted his wife, Yalta, to be carried in an alunki because she was afraid of being carried in a less stable manner. The Tosafot clarifies that Yalta, as the daughter of the Exilarch, was considered a person of public need, justifying the leniency. The Gemara further notes that rabbis attending their holiday lectures (shiurim) were carried in chairs using the normal, faster method, even though it resembled weekday travel. This was permitted either because they were afraid of falling when walking through the crowd, or because of the need for speed (Torah tzibbur), as the congregation was waiting for them to begin the lecture.