A Yissachar / Zebulun Partnership in Loving Memory of Yishak ben Simcha A"H & Felicia bat Miriam A"H
Rabbi Eli Mansour

Daf Yomi

Shabbat 30A - 30B (13th Cycle Daf Yomi Shiur)

Lectured by Rabbi Eli Mansour

Published
August 8, 2008
Duration
49:50

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On this first day of the week, *Yom Rishon*, we gather to study the teachings found on *Daf Lamed Reish*, specifically on *Chaf Tet Amud Bet*. This study is dedicated to the memory of Avraham ben Ester and Yosef ben Sophia, may their souls be remembered and may Hashem comfort their families in the Garden of Eden, Amen. We begin our exploration at the bottom of the page, where the discussion centers on the halachic implications of extinguishing a candle on *Shabbat*.

The *Mishna* states: "One who extinguishes a candle because he is afraid of gentiles, robbers, evil spirits, or a sick person who is sleeping is exempt." The act of extinguishing a candle on *Shabbat* is a violation of one of the thirty-nine categories of work, known as *melachot*. However, in these specific cases, the person is considered *patur*, or exempt. The *Mishna* raises the question of why extinguishing a candle under these circumstances leads to exemption from liability, particularly since it constitutes a *melacha* on *Shabbat*.

Rashi explains that the fear of gentiles refers to the Persians, who historically prohibited lighting candles in homes during their festivities. Thus, one might extinguish the candle to avoid drawing attention to his home. Similarly, the fear of robbers may compel a person to extinguish the light to remain hidden. The mention of an evil spirit suggests that the light may disturb someone who is haunted, while the sick individual may find the light bothersome as he tries to sleep. In all these cases, the *Mishna* states that the individual is exempt from punishment.

We then encounter a distinction between cases where one extinguishes a candle to protect the candle itself, the oil, or the wick, which results in a liability. In these scenarios, the act is intentional and aimed at preserving the physical components of the candle, thus making one *chayav*, or liable. Rabbi Yosef, however, exempts all these cases except when it comes to saving the wick, as he believes that extinguishing it for that purpose is a *melacha shetzrichah legufah*—a work that is necessary for its own sake, as it creates a usable product (charcoal) for future use.

As we analyze the *Mishna*, we notice that the latter part indicates liability for extinguishing the candle to protect the wick, aligning with the view of Rabbi Yehuda, who holds that even a *melacha* that is not needed for its own sake incurs liability. The initial part of the *Mishna*, however, seems to reflect the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who posits that one is exempt for actions that are not necessary for their own sake. This leads to a tension between the two parts of the *Mishna*, prompting further inquiry into the underlying halachic principles.

The Gemara seeks to resolve this contradiction by suggesting that the first part of the *Mishna* could indeed refer to a case involving a sick person who is in danger, thus permitting the extinguishing of the candle. Nevertheless, the term *patur* implies that one is not liable for a *chatat*, or sin offering, but does not suggest that the act is permissible in all circumstances. If the sick person is not in danger, one would be liable for extinguishing the candle, according to Rabbi Yehuda.

The discussion continues with further exploration of the circumstances surrounding the extinguishing of the candle for a sick person. If the case involves a sick person who is not in danger, Rabbi Yehuda would maintain that one is liable for a *chatat*, whereas Rabbi Shimon would argue for exemption. Thus, we find ourselves navigating the complexities of these halachic opinions, considering the implications of each ruling.

In a related narrative, Rabbi Tanchum was asked about the permissibility of extinguishing a lamp in front of a sick person on *Shabbat*. He opened with a rhetorical question, challenging the wisdom of those who contradict themselves in their teachings. He cited King David, who stated that the dead do not praise God, yet he acknowledged the power of the deceased in certain contexts. This sets the stage for a deeper exploration of the relationship between life, death, and the observance of *Shabbat*.

Rabbi Yehuda, in his teachings, emphasizes the importance of engaging with Torah and mitzvot before death, as a person's connection to these practices ceases upon passing. The Gemara then reflects on the nature of a righteous person’s death, which is described as *mitat neshika*, a death that does not incur the impurity associated with the *malach hamavet*, the angel of death.

As we delve into the complexities of these discussions, we are reminded of the profound significance of life and the observance of *Shabbat*. The interplay between the physical and the spiritual, the living and the dead, challenges us to consider the weight of our actions and their consequences in the realm of halacha. Ultimately, the teachings we explore today serve as a guide for navigating the intricate landscape of Jewish law, illuminating the path toward understanding and observance.