We are studying Gemara Shabbat, page 51, for the merit of Mishmat Avraham ben Ester and Yosef ben Sabut, with the help of Heaven. We have reached the Mishnah on page 51, side 1.
The Mishnah says: If one did not cover the pot before Friday, he may not cover it once it becomes dark. This is a repetition of what we already know. Even with an insulating material that does not add heat, one may not begin insulation on Shabbat. Why did the Mishnah need to teach this? Perhaps it is concerned that when a person insulates a pot on Shabbat with a material that does not add heat, he may discover that the contents have cooled off and then come to heat them.
However, if he covered the pot before Shabbat and the covering came off, he may replace it on Shabbat. He may re-insulate the pot as long as the insulation had originally been done before Shabbat. One may not begin insulation on Shabbat, but one may replace insulation that was already there.
The next case is that one may fill a jug with water and place it beneath a cushion or beneath a pillow. Why would he place it there? In this case, he wants to keep the water cool. The Mishnah is teaching that insulation applies not only to keeping something warm; one may also insulate something in order to keep it cold. That is an important point.
Rabbi Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel that it is permitted to insulate something cold. There is no concern that a person may change his mind and decide to heat it. He is insulating it for the purpose of keeping it cold, so what is the problem?
Rav Yosef asked: What does this teach us? It is stated explicitly in the Mishnah: A person may fill a jug and place it beneath a cushion or beneath a pillow. What more do we learn from Rabbi Yehuda in the name of Shmuel?
Abaye answered him: It teaches us something additional. If we had learned only the Mishnah, I might have thought that the Mishnah permits insulation only in a case involving an item that is not normally insulated to retain heat—for example, cold water, which people do not normally place beneath a pillow in order to heat it. Perhaps the Mishnah permits insulation only in a case where that is not the normal way of insulating.
But perhaps in the case of an ordinary pot, which people normally cover with sheets, cloths, and similar materials in order to retain its heat, one may not insulate it in order to keep it cold. The Gemara therefore teaches us that even an item that is normally insulated to retain heat may be insulated on Shabbat when one’s intention is specifically to keep it cool.
The reason for permitting insulation of cold items is that one does not want them to become hot. We do not decree that a person may come to insulate them for the purpose of heat. One might distinguish between cold water, which people do not normally insulate beneath a cushion in order to heat it, and a pot, which people do normally insulate. The Gemara teaches that even in the latter case, if the intention is to keep the pot cool, it is permitted.
There is a dispute regarding one case. In one place, the Rif says that there is no question that something which was already permitted by his father remains permitted. In another place, however, he says that after he heard that his father had permitted it, he retracted. A story is told about this. As soon as the son permitted the practice, his father came to him and said, “My father, the son has already issued a ruling.” He replied, “If I permit you to place those coverings there, you will come to use them for insulation in order to retain heat.”
Look at how much the rabbis respected and loved one another. If Rav Yosef had still been alive, he would have sat before Rav as though he were one of his students. Rav Yosef was subordinate to Rav, even though he later took over the position associated with Rav Yosef. Rav Yosef still submitted himself to Rav because Rav was the leader, and Rav Yosef would do the same. He could have said, “These people come to my study and sit before me like students,” but instead he gave Rav full honor.
He told his servant to insulate a cold item for him. He then told him during the week to bring him water that had been heated by a gentile. What was the basis for this? He had heard that these practices were permitted, and he was following his rabbi.
One rabbi followed the position of Rav, while another followed the position of Shmuel. Rabbi Yehuda asked Shmuel whether water or other food that is normally eaten raw is subject to the prohibition of cooking by a gentile. Water is not normally considered subject to that prohibition in the same way as cooked food. Why, then, was he upset? He was following his rabbi.
Perhaps a person has to be stringent when it comes to matters of public respect. The rabbi had been lenient regarding heating water, so the student was also lenient in reporting the ruling. In any event, the general principle is that a person who is in a position of public responsibility should be more stringent. That is how the Shulchan Aruch writes.
Let us continue. We said that one may not begin insulation on Shabbat. If the pot was already insulated before Shabbat and one wants to add more coverings, that is permitted. Since the pot is already insulated, we are not concerned that the person will discover that it has become cold and then come to heat it. The entire concern applies when the pot is not insulated and may become cold. Once it is already insulated, adding more insulation is permitted.
One may even remove one layer and replace it with another layer. For example, one may remove a more insulating covering and replace it with a less insulating covering. In the summer, if the pot has become too hot, one may remove the thick covering and use sheets instead. The same is true in the opposite direction: in the winter, one may add a more insulating covering to something that is already insulated.
The Gemara then brings the teaching of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel: The prohibition applies only to insulating the pot on the source of heat itself. If one transfers the water from one urn to another, however, it is permitted to insulate it. The reason is that transferring it to another vessel demonstrates that one is cooling it. One is not placing it back on the source of heat in order to heat it.
One might say that insulation on Shabbat is prohibited because the person may come to heat the water. But here he is transferring it from one vessel to another, which cools it. This is therefore a leniency: he is insulating it only after it has been removed from the source of heat, and there is no concern that he will come to heat it.
The Mishnah then discusses a pot insulated with items that may or may not be moved on Shabbat. If one insulated and covered the pot with an item that may be moved on Shabbat, he may remove the covering, take hold of the pot, and move it. If the pot was insulated with an item that may not be moved on Shabbat but was covered with an item that may be moved, he may remove the covering and take out the pot.
However, if the covering itself is an item that may not be moved on Shabbat, and the pot is entirely covered, he may not move it. If part of the pot is uncovered, he may take hold of the exposed part and move it, because he is not required to move the prohibited covering. But if no part of the pot is exposed, how can he take it? The only way would be to move the covering, which is prohibited.
The Gemara asks: Why can he not remove the permitted materials from the sides, take hold of the pot, and tilt it so that the prohibited covering falls away? We find a similar case involving a stone that was left on a barrel. One can remove the surrounding material, take hold of the barrel, and tilt it so that the stone falls off.
The Gemara answers that there is a distinction. When a person forgot a stone on a barrel, the stone is not necessarily the object on which the barrel has been deliberately based. In the case of insulation, however, the prohibited covering was deliberately placed there from the outset. The pot and the covering therefore have the status of a base for a prohibited item. One may not tilt the pot in order to move that covering.
If the prohibited covering is partially exposed, however, one may pick up the pot, and the covering will fall away by itself. That is not considered deliberately moving the prohibited item. The distinction is between an object that was inadvertently left in place and an object that was intentionally placed there as part of the arrangement.
We now begin the next chapter of the Mishnah: “With what may an animal go out, and with what may it not go out?” Rashi immediately explains that a person is commanded to ensure the cessation of his animal’s labor on Shabbat. It is not enough that the person himself refrain from labor; his animal must also rest from prohibited labor. For example, one may not allow his animal to carry on Shabbat.
Something that is needed to protect the animal is not considered a load. It is regarded as an ornament or as a normal item used by the animal. But something that is not needed to protect the animal is considered a load, and allowing the animal to carry it is prohibited. That is the general principle of this entire passage.
A person might ask: If it is my animal, what difference does it make? I am not carrying anything. The answer is that just as a person may not carry on Shabbat, there is also a requirement that his animal rest. Tosafot brings the source from the verse, “That your ox and your donkey may rest,” and explains that the commandment includes the animal’s resting from labor.
This applies to carrying in a public domain or in the other circumstances in which carrying is prohibited. It does not mean that every activity an animal performs is necessarily included. For example, when an animal plows on Shabbat, the issue is not dependent on whether it moves from one domain to another. Plowing is labor wherever it occurs. Here, however, the Mishnah is discussing carrying, so the relevant laws are the laws of carrying.
The Mishnah begins to list the items with which animals may go out. A camel may go out with a certain type of muzzle or halter. A wild female camel requires a stronger form of protection. A horse may go out with a collar, and the collar may also be used to pull the animal.
The Mishnah further teaches that if the collar becomes ritually impure, one may sprinkle the purification waters on it while it remains on the animal. One may also immerse it in a ritual bath while the animal is wearing it, allowing the animal to place its head in the water. This is the meaning of the Mishnah’s statement that one may immerse the animal together with its collar.
The Gemara begins by explaining the terms of the Mishnah. We know what a camel is, but what is the animal called a naakah that goes out with a muzzle?
Rav Aha bar Rav Huna explains that it is a white female camel. It is wild and tends to run away, so it requires strong protection. It may therefore go out with an iron muzzle, which provides a stronger form of restraint.
The Gemara then asks about the term referring to another type of animal. Rabbi Yishmael explains that it is a type of donkey associated with the region of Lub. The Gemara discusses the muzzle or bit used for it. It is placed through a hole in the animal’s nose, allowing the animal to be controlled securely. The purpose is to prevent it from running wild.
A story is told about someone who wanted to purchase one of these expensive animals. He sent money to obtain it, but the money was returned to him together with a bundle of grain. The advice was that he did not need to import an expensive animal. If he fed a local donkey well with grain, it would become strong enough. The strength of the donkey depends on its food.
Rabbi Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel that in the presence of Rabbi, the cases were switched. Instead of saying that a camel goes out with the stronger muzzle and the female camel with the lighter one, the question was posed in reverse.
The Gemara explains that a female camel cannot go out with the lighter muzzle because it does not provide sufficient protection. Since it does not protect the animal, it is considered a load. The real question is whether an ordinary camel may go out with the stronger muzzle. Since the lighter muzzle is sufficient, perhaps the stronger one is an unnecessary protection and is therefore considered a load. Alternatively, perhaps additional protection is not considered a load as long as it serves a purpose.
The Gemara brings a teaching concerning the animal from Lub. It says that it may go out with the lighter muzzle. This appears to support the idea that an animal may go out only with the protection it needs. But the Gemara explains that this does not necessarily prove that additional protection is prohibited. It may simply be teaching that the female camel, which needs stronger protection, may not go out with the lighter muzzle.
The Gemara then presents a dispute among the Tannaim. One teaching says that a wild animal may not go out with a certain muzzle, while Hananiah says that it may go out with it and with anything else that protects it.
What animal are they discussing? If it is a large wild animal, the muzzle is not sufficient protection. If it is a small wild animal, such as a weasel, the muzzle should certainly be sufficient. The Gemara therefore explains that they are discussing a cat, which is intermediate in size and requires some protection but not a great deal.
The first opinion holds that a small string is sufficient for the cat. Adding the muzzle is excessive protection, and excessive protection is considered a load. Hananiah, however, holds that we do not say that excessive protection is a load. Even if something less would have been sufficient, as long as the item serves a protective function, the animal may go out with it.
This is an important dispute to remember: Is excessive protection considered a load or not? The first opinion holds that it is. Hananiah is lenient and holds that it is not.
Rav Huna bar Hiyya said in the name of Shmuel that the halachah follows Hananiah. Excessive protection is not considered a load.
Levi, the son of Rav Huna bar Hiyya, was traveling with Rabba bar Rav Huna. The donkey belonging to Levi went ahead of the donkey belonging to Rabba. This was not proper, because Rabba was the greater scholar, and Levi’s animal had gone in front of his animal.
Rav Huna became upset. Levi wanted to appease him, so he asked him a question: May an exceptionally wild donkey go out with a muzzle that is normally considered more protection than necessary? By asking this question, he was indicating that he accepted Rav Huna’s authority and was asking him to rule.
Rav Huna answered that this was precisely what his father had said: even an animal that is unusually wild may go out with such a muzzle. This follows Hananiah, who holds that excessive protection is permitted. Certainly, in a case where the animal genuinely needs the additional protection, it is permitted.
There is also a discussion about whether scholars must give one another precedence while traveling. A general principle in Tractate Berachot states that people traveling on a road do not always have to give one another honor in the same way that they do at an entrance. Tosafot explains that this applies when they are traveling separately. When they are traveling as a group, however, there is a protocol, and precedence must be observed.
The Gemara next discusses a goat whose horns have been drilled so that a string can be inserted through them. If the string is merely wrapped around the horns, it may fall off. The goat shakes its head, and the string may end up on its back, causing the animal to carry it into the public domain. But if the string is fastened through the horns, it will not fall off. It is then either being used to pull the animal or serving as an adornment.
A similar case involves a string placed through the animal’s beard. If the string is merely attached to the hair, it may come loose and fall, leading the animal to carry it. But if it is fastened in a way that causes discomfort when the animal tries to remove it, the animal will not pull it off. The Gemara considers whether the string is being used for beauty or for protection, and the discussion depends on whether additional protection is considered a load.
The Gemara then discusses a cow with a string placed between its horns. The purpose might be adornment, or it might be protection. One opinion says that it is prohibited in both cases. Another opinion says that it is prohibited when done for adornment but permitted when done for protection.
The first opinion may hold that a cow does not need protection at all. Since the cow does not need the string, it is a load. The other opinion says that even if a cow does not require much protection, the string serves some purpose. This returns us to the same dispute: whether excessive protection is considered a load.
The identity of the rabbis in this dispute is not stated explicitly, but it can be inferred. Shmuel was the one who ruled that the halachah follows Hananiah, who permits excessive protection. Therefore, Shmuel must be the one who permits the string when it is intended for protection.
Abaye challenges this inference. Perhaps Shmuel should instead be identified with the opinion that prohibits both adornment and protection. Earlier, when Rabbi Yehuda asked Shmuel about switching the cases, Shmuel’s discussion appeared to treat excessive protection as prohibited. The Gemara therefore examines which statement should be deleted or reinterpreted.
The Gemara resolves the difficulty by explaining that the earlier discussion does not necessarily prove that Shmuel considers excessive protection prohibited. When the earlier teaching says that four animals go out with the lighter muzzle, it may be excluding only the female camel, which cannot go out with such insufficient protection. It does not necessarily mean that an ordinary camel may not go out with a stronger muzzle.
Thus, the clear statement that Shmuel follows Hananiah remains intact. Excessive protection is not considered a load when it serves a protective purpose.
The Gemara then discusses a red heifer. One of the requirements of a red heifer is that no burden be placed upon it, because that would disqualify it. Yet the owners placed a type of leash on the animal. If this leash is considered an excessive form of protection, perhaps it should be regarded as a burden and invalidate the animal. The fact that it does not invalidate the red heifer appears to support the opinion that excessive protection is not considered a burden.
Abaye offers several answers. First, the case may involve transporting the red heifer from one city to another. When an animal is being transported, it genuinely requires protection, so the leash is not excessive protection.
Second, even if a regular cow would not need such a leash, a red heifer is extremely valuable and must be guarded carefully. For this particular animal, the additional protection is considered normal protection, not excessive protection.
It may also be that this particular animal was rebellious or unusually wild. In that case, the leash was necessary. Therefore, the case of the red heifer does not establish that excessive protection is always permitted.
The Mishnah also says that a horse may go out with a collar and that animals may be pulled by the collar. What does it mean that they may go out with it and may be pulled by it?
Rav Huna explains that “going out with it” means that the collar may be wrapped around the animal’s neck, while “being pulled by it” means that it may be left extended so that the person can pull the animal.
Rashi explains that when the collar is wrapped around the neck, even though no one is holding it, it is not considered a load. It is an ordinary item for the animal and may be regarded as an adornment. When it is extended, it can be used to pull the animal.
Shmuel disagrees. He understands the Mishnah as saying that the animal may go out only when the collar is extended and usable for pulling. It may not go out when the collar is merely wrapped around its neck, because that is not the normal functional arrangement and is therefore considered carrying.
We therefore have a dispute about how to understand the wording of the Mishnah. Rav Huna understands it to permit the collar when it is wrapped around the animal and when it is extended for pulling. Shmuel understands it to permit only the extended arrangement, because that is the normal way of using the collar.
A baraita combines the two possibilities and says that the animal may go out with the collar wrapped around it in a loose manner, allowing the person to insert his hand between the collar and the animal’s neck and pull it. Alternatively, part of the rope may be left hanging so that it can be grasped quickly.
Rav Huna can understand this baraita according to his position: even when the collar is wrapped around the neck, it is permitted, provided it remains functional. Shmuel can also understand the baraita according to his position by explaining that the wrapped collar must have a loose portion extending from it. If it is entirely wrapped with no usable part, it is prohibited.
According to Rav Huna, it is enough that the collar is a normal and useful item for the animal. According to Shmuel, when it is merely wrapped around the neck, it is not being used in the normal manner and is therefore a load. It is permitted only when a portion remains extended and functional.
Rav Yosef said that he saw the animals of Rav Huna going out on Shabbat with the collars wrapped around their necks. This appears to support Rav Huna’s opinion. The Gemara asks whether the collars were wrapped tightly or loosely. Perhaps they were loose enough that a person could insert his hand and pull the animal.
Rav Dimi reported in the name of Rav Hanina that the animals of the House of Rabbi went out with their collars on Shabbat. The Gemara asks what precisely this report teaches. Were the collars wrapped around the animals, or were they extended for pulling?
Another report states that the collars were wrapped around the animals. The rabbis repeated this report before Rav Asi. They said that the report of Rav Shmuel bar Yehuda was unnecessary, because the matter could already be understood from Rav Dimi.
If Rav Dimi was merely teaching that the collars were extended and usable for pulling, that would not be a significant novelty. It is already known that a horse or donkey may go out with a collar that serves as protection. Rav Dimi must therefore have been teaching a greater novelty: that the animals went out even when the collars were wrapped around their necks.
But perhaps Rav Dimi’s report was itself needed to teach that the animals of the House of Rabbi were permitted to go out with a collar at all. Maybe we could not assume that Rabbi accepted the earlier teaching that a horse and donkey may go out with such a collar. Rav Dimi therefore teaches that Rabbi did accept that ruling.
The Gemara answers that the second report is still needed. The first report teaches that the collar is considered sufficient protection and is not a burden. The second report teaches that even when it is wrapped around the animal’s neck, rather than extended for pulling, it is permitted.
Thus, the discussion preserves two separate novelties: first, that a collar is considered a legitimate form of protection and does not constitute carrying; and second, according to the more lenient view, that even when the collar is wrapped around the animal rather than extended, it may still be permitted.