It is now time to conclude. I want to thank Rabbi Ben Ester, the fathers of Shilomot, and Ezer Ben Hayah. I also want to thank Rabbi Ben Ester and the fathers of Shilomot.
We begin today’s discussion with a question, twelve lines from the bottom, beginning with an objection. We learned yesterday that Rabbi Elazar told us there is no prohibition against using the side of an animal. The Sages instituted a prohibition on using animals on Shabbat and Yom Tov, but that does not refer to leaning against the side of an animal. Leaning against the animal is permitted. That was the Gemara’s understanding of the position that using the side is permitted.
The Gemara raises a question from a case involving a sukkah. Two of the walls are ordinary walls, while the third wall is a tree. A person constructed the sukkah in such a way that the tree served as one of its walls. The Gemara says that one may not enter that sukkah on Yom Tov. In those days, people commonly built their sukkot on roofs, so one would have to go up to the sukkah. Why, then, may one not use this sukkah on Yom Tov?
In the old days, people would store objects on top of the sukkah, placing them on the roofing. Since the roofing was tied to, or resting upon, the walls, using the roofing to store one’s belongings meant that one was benefiting from the tree. The Gemara asks: How was the tree made into a wall? Perhaps they made holes in the tree itself and placed reeds into those holes, so that the reeds functioned as the wall. In that case, one is not using the tree itself; one is using supports attached to the tree—protrusions extending from it.
If that is the case, the supports should be prohibited, because one may not enter the sukkah on Yom Tov. Rashi explains that the Mishnah is dealing with the ordinary requirement that a sukkah have at least three walls. The first two walls are complete walls, while the third is made from a tree. The walls may be attached to the ground; only the roofing may not be attached to the ground. Rashi adds that it would even be valid to construct a sukkah from four trees that remain attached to the ground.
Why, then, does the Mishnah mention two ordinary walls and one tree? It teaches us that even when only one tree serves as a wall, one may not eat, drink, or sleep in that sukkah on Yom Tov. The reason is that the roofing is tied to the walls and rests against the side of the tree. When a person uses the roofing and places objects upon it, he is found to be using the tree on Yom Tov.
The language of the Mishnah also indicates that the person must go up to the sukkah. Why does it use that expression? Because most people used to build their sukkot on top of their roofs. The Gemara brings examples in which the language of “going up” to the sukkah is used, as well as examples of bringing objects down from the sukkah.
The Gemara initially assumes that the case involves making an indentation in the tree and inserting reeds into it to serve as the walls. The roofing is placed on those reeds. The tree itself is not being used as the wall; something has merely been placed against it. Nevertheless, the person may not enter the sukkah on Yom Tov. This would seem to prove that using the supports attached to the tree is prohibited.
The Gemara rejects this proof. No, that is not necessarily the case. The tops of the trees themselves may have been bent over, and the roofing was placed on top of them. In other words, the tree itself was being used. The branches were bent toward another tree, the branches of the two trees were tied together, and they formed a wall. If so, the roofing was resting directly on the trees, and the case does not prove that using supports attached to the tree is prohibited.
The Gemara then asks: If you are now saying that the tree itself is being used, what will you do with the second part of the Mishnah? The Mishnah says that if there are three man-made walls and one wall made from a tree, the sukkah is valid and one may enter it on Yom Tov.
If the case is one in which the tree was bent over and the actual tree is being used, why may one enter the sukkah on Yom Tov? Ultimately, one is using a tree on Yom Tov. It should not matter whether there are three man-made walls and one tree or two man-made walls and one tree. If the tree itself is the wall, the same prohibition should apply.
Perhaps you will return to the original assumption and say that the Mishnah is discussing supports attached to the side of the tree. But the question remains: Why may one enter the sukkah on Yom Tov? If those supports are prohibited, then even when there are three man-made walls and one tree, the sukkah should not be usable.
The answer is that the two parts of the Mishnah are discussing different cases. In the first part, the roofing is actually resting against the tree. That is considered use of the supports attached to the tree, and it is prohibited. In the second part, the tree has many branches spreading out to the sides. The tree itself serves as the wall, but the roofing is not resting upon the tree. Since the roofing is not supported by the tree, it is permitted to use the sukkah on Yom Tov.
The final language of the Mishnah gives us a rule: If the tree were removed and the roofing would still remain standing, the sukkah is valid. This rule explains the second case. If removing the tree would cause the roofing to fall, then the roofing was relying on the tree, and the case would be prohibited. If removing the tree would not cause the roofing to fall, then the roofing was not actually resting upon it.
Rashi explains the case as follows: The tree is leaning or falling, and its branches extend from side to side. The roofing is placed over the branches, but it is not actually resting upon the tree in a way that depends on it. The Gemara asks why the Mishnah chose this complicated case. Why not simply state that the tree was bent over, without placing the roofing directly upon it?
The answer is that the Gemara would not choose a case in which a person had to exert himself to bend a tree over for a wall that was not even needed. If there was already a tree next to the fourth wall, the tree was present without any additional effort, and the person could use it as the wall without bending it down. The Gemara therefore chose the more natural case: the tree was already there, its branches extended to the sides, and the roofing was not placed upon it.
At this point, the Gemara is saying that we have no proof regarding the supports attached to a tree. The first part of the Mishnah may be discussing a case in which the roofing was made to rest on the tree itself, which is why it is prohibited. The second part may be discussing a case in which the roofing does not rest on the tree at all, so there is no issue of using supports attached to the tree.
Let us return to the original question. Perhaps there is a dispute among the Tannaim about whether one may use the side of a tree or the side of an animal on Yom Tov. The case is a sukkah in which one of the walls is a tree. One authority permits entering the sukkah on Yom Tov, while another prohibits it. The dispute must be whether the supports attached to the tree are prohibited or permitted.
One rabbi may hold that the supports are prohibited, while the other holds that they are permitted. The case would involve making holes in the tree, inserting reeds into them, placing the roofing on those reeds, and then placing objects on the roofing. One is not benefiting directly from the tree, but from the supports attached to it. The roofing, in turn, is resting on something attached to the tree.
This may be considered using the side of the side: the item attached to the tree is called the side of the tree, and the roofing touching that item is the side of the side. The dispute would then be whether even the side of the side is prohibited, or whether only ordinary supports attached directly to the tree are prohibited.
Rashi discusses a case in which one chisels into the tree and places reeds upright along its sides, then places the roofing on those reeds. When a person uses the roofing, he benefits from the supports attached to the tree. Rashi explains that the reeds placed against the tree are the supports, while the roofing is considered the item removed from those supports. One view says that using the roofing is prohibited, while the other says that it is permitted. According to both views, the dispute concerns whether the supports themselves, or the side of the supports, are included in the prohibition.
The Gemara then brings another case. A person needs a basket of food while he is in a tree. He places a peg into the tree and hangs the basket from the peg. The rule is that if the basket can be accessed on Shabbat, it is considered accessible; if it cannot be reached on Shabbat, it is not considered functional for purposes of the law.
In this case, the person placed the peg more than ten handbreadths above the ground. Since the basket itself is four handbreadths high, the basket extends into the domain above ten handbreadths. One may not transfer an object from the basket to the beam or from the beam to the basket, because the object is being transferred between domains. As long as the basket cannot be accessed properly on Shabbat, it is not considered functional.
The Gemara asks whether the problem is that the peg was placed in the tree and the basket was hung on the peg. Since the peg protrudes from the tree, perhaps that is considered using a support attached to the tree. If the basket had been hung directly on the tree, without a peg, perhaps everyone would agree that it is prohibited, because that would be direct use of the tree.
But the Gemara challenges this understanding. The earlier teaching clearly said that the case is prohibited, while another case involving the basket is permitted. How can we distinguish between them? Rav Pappa answers that the basket has a very narrow opening. It is difficult to place one’s hand inside and remove the food. Because the opening is narrow, we are concerned that when the person reaches inside, he will move the tree itself. Moving the tree would constitute actual use of the tree and would therefore be prohibited.
When a peg is placed in the tree, however, the basket protrudes slightly from the tree. We are no longer concerned that removing the food will cause the person to move the tree. The problem is therefore not merely that the basket is attached to the tree. The concern is that, because of its narrow opening, using the basket directly may cause the tree itself to move.
The practical conclusion is that when the basket is hung directly on the tree, the narrow opening creates a concern that the person will move the tree. When the basket is hung on a peg, there is no such concern, because the peg keeps the basket away from the tree.
The Gemara then gives practical advice concerning a ladder leading up to a sukkah. Watchmen who guarded the fields would sometimes climb up to a hut. They could lean a ladder against a tree and climb the ladder to reach the hut. However, if one wants to make this permissible on Yom Tov, one should place a peg in the tree and lean the ladder against the peg. Once the ladder is leaning against the peg rather than directly against the tree, the ladder is supported by an item attached to the tree.
There is an additional caution. When climbing the ladder, one should not place one’s foot on the peg itself. That would be direct use of the item attached to the tree and would constitute use of the tree’s support. One should use only the rungs of the ladder. If one places a foot on the rung that protrudes from the tree, one is again using the support attached to the tree, and that would be prohibited.
That concludes this discussion. We now proceed to the next Mishnah, which discusses preparing food for animals on Shabbat.
The Mishnah begins: One may untie bundles of straw before an animal. These bundles are tied together, but one may untie them on Shabbat so that the animal can eat them. One may also scatter another type of animal feed around the field. It is not enough merely to untie it; one must scatter it so that the animals will smell it. When the food remains tied up, it does not release its smell, and the animal does not develop an appetite. Once it is untied and scattered, the animal smells it and wants to eat.
However, one may not scatter the item called zirin. At this point, I do not yet know precisely what all these items are, so we will wait for the Gemara to explain them and to clarify why, in one case, one may untie and scatter the food, while in another case one may not even scatter it.
The Mishnah continues: One may not cut up unripe wheat stalks for an animal, and one may not cut up carobs for an animal in order to make them easier to eat. This applies whether the animal is small or large. The Sages do not want a person to undertake unnecessary labor on Shabbat. If the animal can eat the food as it is, one does not need to make it easier for the animal.
Rabbi Yehuda permits cutting carobs for a small animal. A small animal cannot eat the carobs without their being cut, so Rabbi Yehuda permits cutting them up for that animal.
We now turn to the Gemara to understand the Mishnah. Rav Huna’s first interpretation identifies the bundles of straw and the other bundles as the same basic item. Why are they given different names? The difference is that one type of bundle has two knots, while the other has three knots. The only distinction is how tightly or extensively the bundle is tied.
The Gemara then identifies zirin as moist stalks of cedar wood. Once we know what the items are, Rav Huna explains the Mishnah as follows: One may untie the bundles of straw before an animal, and one may also scatter them around so that the animal will smell them and develop an appetite. One may untie not only the bundle with two knots but also the bundle with three knots, and one may scatter both types around the animal.
When it comes to the cedar stalks, however, one may neither untie them nor scatter them. That is the basic law of the Mishnah according to Rav Huna.
Rav Chisda explains Rav Huna’s reasoning. To toil in food that is already food is permitted, but to transform something into food is not permitted. The straw in the first two cases is already food. The animal can eat it as it is; untying and scattering it merely make it easier for the animal to eat. Since it is already food, that activity is permitted.
The cedar stalks, however, are not normally food. Therefore, if one unties them and scatters them, one is effectively turning them into food. We do not permit that on Shabbat.
One might ask: Why say that the straw is already food if it is uncomfortable for the animal to eat while it remains tied? The answer is that it is nevertheless edible. The animal can eat it as it is; the person is merely making it more convenient.
Rashi explains that one may toil in something that is already suitable for eating. One may cut or arrange it in a way that improves it. The straw is already considered food, even though it is not pleasant or convenient to eat while tied. The cedar stalks, by contrast, do not ordinarily serve as animal food.
That is Rav Huna’s interpretation: if something is already edible, one may perform as much preparation as necessary to make it easier to eat. One may not, however, make something into food on Shabbat.
The Gemara then presents an alternative interpretation from Rabbi Yehuda. According to Rabbi Yehuda, the bundles of straw and the item called zirin are the same types of material. Again, one bundle has two knots and the other has three knots. The cedar stalks are also included in this discussion.
According to this interpretation, the Mishnah means that one may untie the bundles before the animal, because while they are tied they are not edible. One is permitted to make something into food on Shabbat. However, one may not scatter them, because once they have been untied, they are already edible, and scattering them would be unnecessary additional labor.
When it comes to the cedar stalks, one may even scatter them. As long as they remain tied, the animal cannot eat them. Scattering them is what makes them edible. Nevertheless, the Mishnah prohibits scattering the item called zirin, because under this interpretation zirin and the straw bundles are synonymous. One may untie them, but one may not go further and scatter them.
The rationale of this opinion is the opposite of Rav Huna’s. According to Rav Huna, making food is prohibited, but improving food that is already edible is permitted. According to the alternative interpretation, making food is permitted, but once the food is already edible, one may not perform additional unnecessary labor.
Rashi explains the Mishnah according to this second interpretation: One may untie the bundles because while they are tied the animals will not eat them. Untying them makes them edible. Once they have been untied, however, scattering them is merely an additional improvement. It is enough that the bundles have been opened; scattering them would be labor performed for the animal’s enjoyment rather than for the basic preparation of food.
Thus, the dispute between the two interpretations is whether one may make food on Shabbat but not further improve food that is already edible, or whether one may improve food that is already edible but may not make something into food.
The Gemara raises a question from the Mishnah’s statement that one may not cut up the unripe wheat stalks or the carobs for an animal. We placed the wheat and the carobs next to one another. Why did the Mishnah juxtapose these two apparently unrelated items?
Perhaps it is comparing the carobs to the wheat. Just as the unripe wheat is soft and edible as it is, so too the carobs under discussion are soft and already edible. If so, the statement that one may not cut them up would contradict Rav Huna, who said that one may toil in food that is already edible.
The Gemara answers that perhaps we should read the comparison in the opposite direction. Just as the carobs may be referring to hard, dried carobs, so too the wheat may be hard and not readily edible. Rav Huna explains that the wheat is difficult for small donkeys to eat. It is therefore necessary to cut it up in order to make it edible. Consequently, the case does not contradict his principle.
The Gemara raises another question from Rabbi Yehuda’s statement that he permits cutting carobs for a small animal but not for a large animal. Rabbi Yehuda is clearly responding to the position of the first authority. If the first authority prohibits cutting the carobs, Rabbi Yehuda is saying that he permits it for a small animal.
If the first authority follows Rav Huna’s interpretation—that one may toil in food that is already edible but may not make something into food—then Rabbi Yehuda’s statement is understandable. Rabbi Yehuda agrees with the general principle but says that carobs are not edible for a small animal. Since a small animal cannot eat them without cutting them, cutting them is considered making them edible, and Rabbi Yehuda permits it.
However, if the first authority follows the opposite interpretation, that one may make something into food but may not perform additional labor once it is already edible, what is Rabbi Yehuda adding? Rabbi Yehuda says that he permits cutting the carobs for a small animal. If making food is already permitted, why mention only a small animal? A large animal can eat the carobs as they are, so certainly one should be allowed to cut them for a large animal if the cutting is permitted.
The Gemara answers that this was the mistake in the question. Perhaps when the Mishnah says “a small animal,” it is actually referring to a large animal. Why would a large animal be called small? Because it chews its food thoroughly. The term does not necessarily refer to the physical size of the animal but to the way it eats.
Rashi explains the issue. If the first authority says that one may not toil in food that is already edible but may make something into food, Rabbi Yehuda is saying that the carobs may be cut for an animal that cannot eat them as they are. That is why the Mishnah mentions that particular animal.
But if the first authority says that one may make something into food but may not further improve food that is already edible, Rabbi Yehuda’s statement becomes difficult. If the carobs are being cut because they are already edible but are being improved, then the same permission should apply to a large animal. The Gemara therefore suggests that the term used in the Mishnah does not mean a small animal in the ordinary sense, but an animal that chews its food and is therefore categorized differently.
The Gemara brings another proof: One may cut up gourds before an animal, and one may cut up an animal that died on Yom Tov and place it before dogs. Perhaps these two cases are being compared. Just as the dead animal is soft and edible, so too the gourds must be soft and edible before they are cut. If so, we see that one may toil in food that is already edible, which would contradict the second interpretation.
The Gemara rejects this. We can compare the gourds to the dead animal in the opposite direction. Just as the gourds may be hard, so too the dead animal may be hard and inedible for the particular animals involved. Cutting it up is what makes it edible.
How can dead meat be considered hard? It may be elephant meat, or it may be a case involving very young dogs whose teeth are not yet developed. For such dogs, even soft meat is difficult to chew. Therefore, the meat is considered inedible for them until it is cut up.
The Gemara’s method here is to examine two items placed together in a Mishnah or Baraita and ask which one is being compared to the other. At first, one might say that the gourds are being compared to the meat: just as the meat is soft and edible, so too the gourds are soft and edible, and yet the Mishnah permits cutting them. That would challenge the opinion that one may not toil in food that is already edible.
The Gemara instead says that the meat is being compared to the gourds: just as the gourds may be hard and inedible, so too the meat may be hard and inedible for the particular dogs. The novelty is that one may make it edible for them by cutting it up.
The Gemara brings one more proof. Rav Hananiah of Arde’a taught that one may cut up straw and grass and mix them together. These items appear to be edible even without being cut. If so, this would show that one may toil in something that is already food, contrary to the second interpretation.
Again, the Gemara answers that the items may not actually be edible in the case under discussion. They may have become somewhat spoiled, or they may be too difficult for the particular animals to chew. For example, small donkeys may not be able to chew the grass unless it is first cut up. Therefore, the cutting is necessary to make it edible.
The structure of this entire Gemara is now clear. There are two ways to understand the Mishnah. One version follows Rav Huna: it is permitted to toil in something that is already food, but it is prohibited to make something into food. The other interpretation, attributed to Rabbi Yehuda, is the opposite: it is permitted to make something into food, but it is prohibited to perform additional labor on something that is already edible.
The Gemara brings three different questions against these interpretations. Each of the respective rabbis is able to answer the questions, except for the second question, which remains unresolved. The Gemara leaves that question as a difficulty. The dispute therefore remains regarding how far one may go on Shabbat in preparing food for animals: may one make something into food, or may one only improve food that is already edible?
What is the practical law? Do we have a final ruling regarding this dispute? Let us look in the Shulchan Aruch. Do we find anything in the Mishnah Berurah? The relevant discussion appears in section 324, law 2. There we may find an indication of which view is followed.
The law states that one may cut food before an animal. The food should have been cut from the ground before Shabbat; one should not take it from the ground and place it before the animal on Shabbat. The Mishnah Berurah explains that one may cut items that are hard, because they are not yet readily edible.
In the discussion of placing food before a dog, many authorities hold that one may toil in food that is already considered food. In that respect, the ruling follows the view that permits such preparation. The Rambam’s position is also brought in this connection, and his wording follows that approach.
If we return to the Gemara, we see that the law is presented there as well. The discussion appears in the same section, and the ruling indicates that one may untie the bundles and break them into smaller pieces in order to make them suitable for the animal. There is no problem with making the food easier to eat in that way.
However, one may not perform unnecessary labor on something that is already suitable food. The ruling follows the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda in that respect. Thus, we may prepare food for the animals when the preparation is necessary to make it edible, but we should not continue working with food that is already edible merely to improve it further.
That is the practical conclusion of the discussion. May we merit to understand the laws of Shabbat properly and to observe them correctly. Amen.