Gemara Shabbat, daf (page) 157. Today’s daf is sponsored le'ilui nishmat (for the elevation of the soul) Avraham ben Esther, and refuah sheleimah (complete recovery) for Dina bat Sarah. We begin today’s daf with the mishnah on 156 amud bet (second side): Mechat'chin et hadelu'in lifnei habehemah (They cut gourds before the animal).
On Shabbat, the delu'in (gourds) were cut from the ground before Shabbat; that is obvious, since you cannot cut them from the ground on Shabbat. So they were telushin (detached from the ground) before Shabbat. What is the chidush (novelty) of the mishnah? You can cut the gourds for the behemah (animal), even though when Shabbat began they were technically ma'achal adam (human food), fit for people to eat.
It also says, ve'et haneveilah lifnei hakelavim (and the carcass before the dogs). If an animal became a neveilah (carcass) on Shabbat—for example, at bein hashemashot (twilight), the animal was omedet lishchitah (designated for slaughter), so a person could have eaten it, and then on Shabbat it became a neveilah—you can still cut it up and give it to the animal, even though at twilight it was ra'ui le'adam (fit for human consumption).
Rabbi Yehudah says, im lo hayetah neveilah me'erev Shabbat asurah (forbidden). He says that if it was not a carcass before Shabbat, you cannot move it; it is muktzeh (set aside and unavailable), because it was not muchan la'achilat kelavim (prepared for dog food). It was muchan lema'achal adam (prepared as human food). The teaching is that an item designated for a particular purpose at bein hashemashot is muktzeh for that purpose. Since this item was muktzeh for people, you cannot use it for an animal.
Rashi explains et hadelu'in hatelushin (the gourds detached from the ground). Ordinarily, these gourds are not intended as animal food, but as ma'achal adam. The carcass became one that day, although at bein hashemashot it had been ra'ui le'adam; nevertheless, you may cut it up.
The Gemara says: itmar (it was stated). We have a little siman over there: Erez shachaz siman. Ulla said, halachah (practical law) is like Rabbi Yehudah: once an item enters Shabbat at bein hashemashot for a specific purpose, it is asur to move it for something else. Rav also holds that the halachah is like Rabbi Yehudah. How do we see this? From medekarchei dizuzei, the case of the mats used to cover merchandise on a boat. Rav forbade moving them, because they were designated to cover the merchandise and were therefore muktzeh.
Shmuel permitted them. He said, “What do I care? Even if an item is designated for a particular purpose, a person does not take it off his mind. If he wants to use it for something mutar (permitted), he can.” So Shmuel is meikel, lenient.
Levi also holds that the halachah is like Rabbi Yehudah. When they used to bring him an animal on Yom Tov (festival day), they would ask him whether it was a tereifah (non-kosher animal). He had to check it. He would not examine it unless he was sitting beside the garbage dump. Why? If it was a tereifah, they could throw it straight into the dump. He said that if it did not turn out to be kesherah (kosher), it would not even be fit for the dogs. Since it entered Yom Tov ra'ui le'adam, it would be muktzeh. So you see that all these rabbis hold of the same principle.
Rashi explains that the ruling follows Rabbi Shimon, who does not hold of muktzeh. The mats were made for boats to cover the merchandise inside them. Zuzei means boats in Aramaic, not money; that is what I found in the response of the Geonim. Rashi explains that the animal brought to Levi had a possible defect that could make it a tereifah, and a Torah scholar had to rule on it. Levi sat by the garbage dump so that if he found the animal to be a tereifah, he could leave it there. It would not even be fit for dogs, since it had been slaughtered that day and, according to Rabbi Yehudah, was asur to move.
The Gemara continues: Shmuel said the halachah is like Rabbi Shimon. They are lenient: even if something is muktzeh for a particular use, a person does not take it off his mind and can use it if he wants to. Ze'eiri also holds that the halachah is like Rabbi Shimon. We learned in Beitzah (Egg): “An animal that died on Yom Tov may not be moved from its place.” Ze'eiri explained that this is referring to an animal of kodashim (consecrated property), because it is asur behana'ah (forbidden to benefit from). If it were regular chullin, it would be shapir dami—it is okay—to give it to the dogs. Although it entered Yom Tov as ma'achal adam, that does not matter; his mind has now changed, and it has become animal food, and that is fine. Rabbi Yochanan also says that the ruling is like Rabbi Shimon.
Rashi explains that Ze'eiri interpreted the teaching according to Beit Shammai as referring to an animal of consecrated property. It is holy, asur behana'ah, and not fit for dogs. Ordinary chullin, however, is shapir dami because it is fit for dogs.
The Gemara asks: Did Rabbi Yochanan really say that the halachah is like Rabbi Shimon, and that we are lenient about muktzeh? Rabbi Yochanan always says that the halachah follows setam mishnah (anonymous Mishnah). We learned an anonymous mishnah: “One may not split wood from the beams,” and not from a beam that broke on Yom Tov. On Yom Tov, you are not allowed to take beams set aside for construction and use them as fuel. Nor may you take a beam that broke on Yom Tov and use it for hasakah, for fuel. Although its only possible use now is as fuel, it was designated for binyan (construction) at bein hashemashot. The person had it in mind only for construction, so when Yom Tov began, he could not use it for something else. That is a setam mishnah, and Rabbi Yochanan holds that the halachah follows a setam mishnah. How, then, can you say that Rabbi Yochanan rules like Rabbi Shimon, who is lenient?
The Gemara answers that Rabbi Yochanan taught that mishnah in the name of Rabbi Yosei bar Yehudah. It is not anonymous, so there is no contradiction.
Rashi explains: Petzo'ar shel korot, set aside and standing for construction, like a storage place or a pile of beams set up for building purposes. If an old beam broke that day, its present use would be hasakah, for fuel. Nevertheless, it is asur because it was not prepared for that use at bein hashemashot.
The Gemara raises another question from an anonymous mishnah in Beitzah, 29: “One may begin using a pile of teven (straw)” on Yom Tov, even though the straw has not been used until now. Ordinarily, straw is omed le-hasakah, used for fuel. The Gemara is speaking about straw that is saru'ach, spoiled; that is why it assumes its only use is as fuel. The teaching says that one may begin using the pile of straw, “but not the wood in the storage area.” The wood in the storage area was not being used as fuel; ordinary wood there was being kept for construction. So this is a setam mishnah teaching that on Yom Tov you cannot use something for a purpose other than the one for which it was designated at twilight.
The Gemara answers that the wood there was cedar and ashucha, a female cedar, very precious wood. It was muktzeh machmat chesron kis, something that's precious, that the person will not use for anything else; nobody would use such precious wood as fuel. Even Rabbi Shimon agrees that it is asur; this is a more stringent category of muktzeh.
Rashi explains that the wood was left in the yard, where mud accumulated, and set aside for the autumn. The storage area behind the house was used to keep things. The male and female cedar trees were set aside for construction.
The Gemara raises another question from Beitzah, 40: “One may not give water to, or slaughter, the desert animals” on Yom Tov. These are animals out in the fields, staying near the marshes and sleeping outside the house. At bein hashemashot, you had not even thought about them; they were far away. So on Yom Tov you cannot start using them for slaughter, because you had not had them in mind. They were outside the settled area. But one may give water to and slaughter the domesticated animals, the ones that come home and sleep in the house, because you had them in mind. That is another mishnah. Rabbi Yochanan rules according to an anonymous mishnah, so you see why he is stringent about muktzeh: even if you now want to use the animals in the field, you cannot, because when twilight began you had not had them in mind.
So does this show that Rabbi Yochanan is stringent like the anonymous mishnah? The Gemara says: What do you want from Rabbi Yochanan? He found another setam mishnah. Where did he find the setam mishnah? We learned it already on kuf mem gimmel: Beit Shammai say that one may lift the atzamot vekelipin, the bones and shells, from the table. The leftovers from the meal can be moved because they are fit for animal food, even though when Shabbat began they had been fit for human food. Since they are fit for animal food, we say they are not muktzeh.
Beit Hillel say that you should not take these things off the table. Instead, remove the table board and shake it. You may not take the items directly. Rav Nachman said that you have to switch the positions: Beit Shammai can be identified with Yehudah, and Beit Hillel with Shimon. In this case, Beit Shammai is the lenient one. Switch them around: make Beit Hillel follow Rabbi Shimon, who says that although the leftovers entered Shabbat as human food and became animal food, they can be moved. Beit Hillel would then allow you to take them directly off the table, while Beit Shammai would be stringent. This is a setam mishnah, and Rabbi Yochanan rules according to it.
But isn’t this not a setam mishnah, since it names Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel? Whenever a mishnah presents Beit Hillel’s view, it is treated like a setam mishnah, because the halachah follows Beit Hillel. Rashi explains: “Beit Hillel is considered like an anonymous teaching.”
The Gemara says that Rav Acha and Ravina disagree about this. One said that throughout Shabbat, whenever there is a machloket (dispute) between Rabbi Yehudah and Rabbi Shimon, the halachah is like Rabbi Shimon, except in the case of muktzeh machmat mi'us, something that's disgusting. In that case, we rule like Rabbi Yehudah: the person has taken his mind off the item and cannot move or handle it. What is the classic example of something set aside due to repulsiveness? A ner (lamp)—the receptacle into which you put the oil and wicks. If it has been lit once and is made of clay, it is repulsive, with all the dirt, ash, and other residue in it.
The other opinion says that even in the case of muktzeh machmat mi'us, the halachah is like Rabbi Shimon. A person does not take his mind off an item unless it is truly disgusting, like a graf shel re'i, a bucket of excrement. A lamp that is not so repulsive can follow Rabbi Shimon, and is not muktzeh.
The exception is muktzeh machmat issur (set aside due to prohibition). This is something that was forbidden at twilight, which is why it was set aside. In this case, the halachah follows Rabbi Yehudah. What is an example? A lamp that was lit during that Shabbat. It entered twilight lit, so it was set aside because of the prohibition; you cannot move a lamp while it is lit on Shabbat. The lamp itself becomes a basis (supporting base) for something muktzeh. Even if it goes out on Shabbat, that does not matter: since it entered twilight as muktzeh machmat issur, we rule like Rabbi Yehudah.
But in the case of muktzeh machmat chesron kis, something precious that the person will not use for anything else, even Rabbi Shimon agrees. We learned: “All vessels may be moved on Shabbat.” That means even a keli shemelachto le'issur (vessel used for prohibited work) may be moved in certain circumstances, for machmat gufo, tzorech gufo (use of the object itself), or tzorech mekomo (use of its place). The exceptions are the masar hagadol, the special saw used to cut trees, and the yated shel macharesha, the special sharp peg used for the plow blade. A person does not use these for anything other than their designated functions, so even Rabbi Shimon agrees that they are muktzeh.
Rashi says that all vessels may be moved, even those whose work is prohibited, according to Rabbi Shimon, except the large saw. It is a saw used by craftsmen to cut wood. It is set aside because of its financial value, so that its teeth will not be damaged. It is made like a knife with many ridges. The same applies to the plowshare peg, which digs into the ground.
A question: Isn’t the wording of the Gemara a little strange? It says everything is muktzeh according to Rabbi Shimon except for one thing, and then it says, “By the way, there is another thing,” muktzeh machmat chesron kis. The earlier disagreement was only about whether muktzeh machmat mi'us is considered muktzeh according to Rabbi Shimon. We said that we are lenient about that, so it is a reason to permit it. The other rabbi said that the only thing that is muktzeh according to Rabbi Shimon—except, of course, muktzeh machmat issur—is muktzeh machmat mi'us. Now the Gemara says that there is also another item that is muktzeh according to Rabbi Shimon.
“Two things, you mean?”
Yes. There are two separate laws. One is that the halachah follows Rabbi Shimon, except for muktzeh machmat issur, where we rule like Rabbi Yehudah. And Rabbi Shimon agrees about chesron kis. Those are two different laws: regarding Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yehudah, we follow Rabbi Shimon except in the case of prohibition, where we follow Rabbi Yehudah; regarding financial value, Rabbi Shimon agrees that it is muktzeh.
The next mishnah says: Mefirin nedarim be-Shabbat (Vows may be annulled on Shabbat). A husband may perform hafarat nedarim (annulment of vows) for his wife on Shabbat, and a father may annul his daughter’s vows on Shabbat. One may also seek the annulment of vows from a chacham (Torah scholar), as long as the vow is letzorech Shabbat. If a man made a neder (vow), “I will not eat the Shabbat meal,” there is a prohibition on Shabbat; you have to eat the Shabbat meal, so the rabbi can find him a petach (opening for annulment). Or if a father hears his daughter say, “I will not eat the Shabbat meal”—konam—the father can annul the vow.
The mishnah also says, “One may block the skylight,” so that tum'ah (ritual impurity) will not come in from outside. It also says, “One may measure a cloth.” The measure in question is three etzba'ot (fingerbreadths) by three etzba'ot. If it is that size, it can receive ritual impurity, so you may measure it to determine whether it qualifies. One may also measure a mikveh (ritual bath). Someone who wants to use the mikveh on Shabbat may measure it to see whether it has forty se'ah (se'ah measure).
The mishnah relates that in the days of the father of Rav Tzadok, and in the days of Abba Sha'ul ben Botnit, they blocked the skylight with a betafi'ach, a vessel like a kad. The vessel’s back was used to block the window; it was made of pottery, so that ritual impurity would not enter the house. They tied a gemi (reed), like a string, to the pottery vessel to find out whether the opening in the large vessel was a tefach (handbreadth) wide. We will see that the Gemara explains what this is about.
From their actions we learn several things: one may block a window on Shabbat, since they blocked it to keep ritual impurity from entering; one may measure, including for a mitzvah (commandment); and one may tie a knot, since they tied the reed to the vessel on Shabbat. It was not a permanent knot.
Let’s read Rashi, and then the Gemara will explain the next part of the story. “One may annul vows”: a husband for his wife, and one may seek annulment from a Torah scholar when it is for the needs of Shabbat, for example, if someone swore not to eat that day. “One may block the skylight,” as we said earlier, one may block a window. A shutter? It is more like stuffing up the hole in the wall. You put a vessel in the wall to stuff it up so ritual impurity does not come in. “One may measure the mikveh,” measuring it to determine whether it has water to a depth of three amot and a width of one amah by one amah. Exactly: what are you measuring? You are measuring the area. Once you know the area—one amah by one amah and three amot deep—you know the measure that can hold forty amah, forty se'ah. We are measuring the area to see whether the mikveh has the required measure.
The cloth is three by three etzba'ot, since it is fit for a patch and can become impure through skin lesions, as we learned in Teharot. Is it impure or not? Mit a pik-pak shel—and that is over. Rashi writes that matters concerning Shabbat are like this, and the phrase miki ha de-Rav Chisda ve-Rava meshubeshet hi; the Gemara will explain it. The Gemara will explain, since we challenge it in various places, though they never said it.
The Gemara begins: iba'ya lehu (they asked them). Is the annulment that a husband performs for his wife allowed on Shabbat whether or not it is for Shabbat? A husband can annul his wife’s vows only on the day he hears them, as the verse says, be-yom sham'o (on the day he hears it). The next day, even if he wants to annul the vow, it is too late. So the rabbis said, “Listen, for a husband it is now or never.” Perhaps they therefore allow him to annul vows even when they are not for Shabbat.
Seeking annulment from a Torah scholar, however, is permitted for Shabbat needs but not otherwise. That is why the tanna (Mishnaic sage) wrote two statements: “One may annul vows” and “one may seek annulment.” Annulment by a husband may be allowed whether or not it is for Shabbat, while seeking annulment is allowed only when it is for Shabbat. Or perhaps a husband, too, may annul a vow only when it is for Shabbat. Why, then, did the mishnah state the two cases separately? Because annulment does not require a beit din (rabbinical court), while seeking annulment does. The laws differ: the husband acts by himself, but a Torah scholar or court is needed for the other case. That is the Gemara’s question: to what extent may the husband annul his wife’s vows on Shabbat—only tzorech Shabbat, or even lo letzorech?
The Gemara answers with a teaching from Zuta of Rav Pappa’s academy: “One may annul vows on Shabbat for the needs of Shabbat.” Only for Shabbat needs, not otherwise. We might have thought that everything counts as a Shabbat need for the husband because he cannot do it tomorrow and would lose the opportunity. The Gemara answers that if it is not a Shabbat need, he may not do it that day.
There is another version. The Gemara asks whether the words “for the needs of Shabbat” apply to both cases—the husband and the Torah scholar—so that neither may act when it is not for Shabbat. If so, we learn that a husband has twenty-four hours to annul a vow. If he heard it on Shabbat, he can still do it the next day. For example, if he heard it at 2:00 on Shabbat, he has until 2:00 on Sunday; it is not limited to sunset.
Or perhaps the phrase “for the needs of Shabbat” applies only to seeking annulment from a Torah scholar. A scholar can annul a vow later, so if it is for Shabbat, he can do it that day, and if not, he can do it tomorrow. But perhaps a husband may annul a vow even when it is not for Shabbat, since his opportunity ends at sunset and it is now or never. The Gemara asks: if he may annul even when it is not for Shabbat, that would show that the time ends at sunset. But if he may annul only when it is for Shabbat, perhaps he can do it the next day, since he has twenty-four hours from the time the vow was made.
The Gemara answers with the same teaching from Zuta of Rav Pappa: “One may annul vows on Shabbat for the needs of Shabbat; only for the needs of Shabbat, not otherwise.” This shows that a husband has twenty-four hours to annul a vow. He may annul on Shabbat only vows that concern Shabbat; for vows that do not concern Shabbat, he can act the next day, since he has twenty-four hours from when the vow was made.
The Gemara asks: What do you mean? Rava says, “We learned correctly” in the mishnah in Nedarim (Vows), page 76: “The annulment of vows is for the whole day.” There is both a leniency and a stringency in this rule. How so? If she made the vow on Friday night and her husband heard it, he can annul it on Friday night and throughout Shabbat, until it gets dark. That is the leniency: he has the whole day.
What is the stringency? If she made the vow as it was getting dark on Shabbat, he may annul it only before it gets dark. If he does not annul it before nightfall, he can no longer annul it. “The whole day” means you get the day. Sometimes that is a leniency: if she made the vow Friday night, he has until the next night. But if she made it one minute before sunset, he has only that one minute. So this shows that it is not a twenty-four-hour period. If she made the vow at 2:00 in the afternoon, you said he has until 2:00 the next afternoon, but the case of a vow made one minute before sunset shows otherwise. So we have a question.
The Gemara answers: it is a disagreement among the tannaim (Mishnaic sages). One teaching says that the annulment of vows is for the whole day, until sunset. Rabbi Yosei berabbi Yehudah and Elazar berabbi Shimon say that it is for twenty-four hours. That is an important halachah to know: the tannaim disagree about how long the phrase “on the day he hears it” lasts. Does it mean until sunset, or twenty-four hours from the time the vow was made?
We continue with “One may seek annulment of vows.” You can go to a rabbi on Shabbat, and he can release you from your vow. The Gemara asks whether this is permitted only when the person did not have time beforehand, or even if he did have time. Perhaps if he had time to go Friday afternoon, he should have gone then. Or perhaps it is permitted even if he had time. The Gemara answers: the rabbis happened to come to Rav Zutra, son of Rav Zeira, and released him from his vows, even though he had had time beforehand.
What is the problem with seeking annulment of vows on Shabbat? It is not electricity or one of the labors of plowing or sowing, and it is not a melachah (prohibited labor). What is the problem with releasing a person from a vow on Shabbat? Does the Gemara give a reason?
Let’s look at the Mishnah Berurah (Mishnah Clarified). The relevant law is in Orach Chayim (Path of Life), section 341. What does the halachah say? Maran (our master) says that one may release vows on Shabbat if they concern Shabbat, such as a vow not to eat or drink. This applies even if he had time to have the vow annulled before Shabbat. That is the regular case of going to a rabbi: even if you could have gone on Friday but did not, we just saw that in the Gemara.
But as for a husband, he can annul his wife’s vows even if they do not concern Shabbat, because if he does not annul them that day, he will no longer be able to annul them. Maran clearly holds that the time for vows ends at sunset. If he does not annul his wife’s vow, he loses the opportunity.
What is the problem in the other case? The Mishnah Berurah says that if the vow does not concern Shabbat, even if the person did not have time to have it annulled beforehand, he should not go to the rabbi on Shabbat to deal with it. If the vow has nothing to do with Shabbat, he should go after Shabbat. Why make him go to the rabbi and wait on Shabbat for no reason? That is tircha, a toil. The same applies if it is for a mitzvah: even if it is not specifically for Shabbat, it is permitted if it is for a mitzvah.
“Not to eat” means that day. The law is not limited to a vow to avoid all food; it also applies if he vowed not to eat meat or drink wine. Since eating meat and drinking wine on Shabbat is a mitzvah, the vow can be annulled. The Mishnah Berurah says that it is a mitzvah to have basar ve-yayin (meat and wine) on Shabbat.
The same applies if he vowed not to wear a particular garment that day—for example, “I am not wearing Shabbat clothes; I am not getting out of my pajamas on Shabbat.” He can go to the rabbi, and the vow can be annulled. See the Bi'ur Ha-Gra (Vilna Gaon’s commentary): the same applies if he vowed not to sleep on Shabbat. Sheinah be-Shabbat ta'anug—it is a mitzvah to sleep on Shabbat. So the vow may also be annulled, since sleep is one of the pleasures of Shabbat. “I’m not taking my Shabbat nap”? No nap? Go to the rabbi, and the rabbi will release the vow; it is a pleasure of Shabbat.
The same applies to a wife’s vows, and a father may annul his daughter’s vows when she is a na'arah. It will be explained that when he annuls a vow on Shabbat, he should not say to her, “It is annulled for you,” as he would during the week. Rather, he should annul or nullify it in his heart, and say to her, “Take and eat; take and drink.” In his heart he should say that it is nullified, and then tell her to go eat and drink.
It is obvious that if the husband does not know about his wife’s vow, and it does not concern Shabbat, it is better not to tell him on Shabbat until after Shabbat, so that he will not have to annul it on Shabbat, the day he hears it. The same applies if she made a vow for a set period and that period ends on Shabbat: he does not need to annul it if it does not concern Shabbat, since it will expire anyway. So why annul it that day?
Regarding “on the day he hears it,” the Mishnah Berurah says that even if he hears the vow just before nightfall, he should annul it, because once nightfall comes, it is too late. The time for annulment is not twenty-four hours; it is that day alone. If he heard it at night, he has the whole night and the whole day. But if he heard it during the day, even just before nightfall, he can annul it only before nightfall.
Again, what is the reason one may not annul vows? What category does this fall under? Perhaps it is weekday talk, or speech, or mi-metzo cheftzecha (pursuing your own affairs). The Ran writes that the reason for the prohibition is unnecessary trouble. That makes sense when you go to the rabbi: going to the rabbi is tircha, a toil—tircha de-gufo. The Pri Megadim (Precious Fruits) says it is mi-metzo cheftzecha. But that is going to the rabbi; does that apply to the husband? That is why we say that the husband is permitted.
Some say it is mi-metzo cheftzecha, because you are dealing with your personal affairs. Why should it be that? You are not doing a melachah. It is not one of the thirty-nine prohibited labors. It is not for Shabbat. You cannot talk about weekday matters, but I can't talk about going on a trip, going on a plane, or going on a boat? What is the prohibition? What melachah are they talking about? Annulment is not a labor. He says that one should not go to a Torah scholar because it looks like a legal proceeding. It looks like a beit din. The prohibition is sitting in a court; when three rabbis are needed, it is like a legal proceeding on Shabbat. The decree against legal proceedings on Shabbat is a gezeirah (rabbinic safeguard), because one might come to write or something like that.
The Pri Megadim discusses what about laypeople. Not on Shabbat, unless it is for Shabbat. The rabbi can do it, but laypeople cannot? Yes, three laypeople. Don’t we have the annulment of vows? That is what I am saying: if it is for Shabbat, that removes the issue. If the person says, “I am not eating today,” he has to eat. So three laypeople can whisper to one of the men: “Listen, I made a vow; I made a mistake; I should not have made that vow,” or whatever it is. “muttarim lachem (you are released), muttarim lachem, muttarim lachem.” That is why we have hatarat nedarim (annulment of vows) every Friday here. There is no problem here.
So now, all of you who made vows not to dress on Shabbat, not to go to sleep on Shabbat, or not to do these things on Shabbat: on Friday, “You are released, you are released,” and shalom kol tuv (peace and all good). Baruch Hashem le'olam amen ve'amen (Blessed is Hashem forever, amen and amen).