This is from the Eddie B. Sitt edition and audio series of the Talmud Bavli. The word Horayot comes from the word hora'ah, meaning a ruling. Its primary subject is a mistaken ruling issued by a rabbinical court. For example, the court may permit something that the Torah forbids, such as forbidden fat or blood. The Gemara discusses what the law is when people follow that mistaken ruling and, as a result, commit the transgression. It examines whether they must bring a sin-offering and analyzes all the different scenarios connected with a ruling issued by a rabbinical court, whether by the entire court or by an individual member.
Massechet Horayot is the last tractate in Seder Nezikin. Technically, it could have been placed in Seder Kodashim, but because it is related to Massechet Sanhedrin, it was placed in Nezikin.
Our Mishnah begins: “If a rabbinical court ruled to transgress one of all the commandments stated in the Torah, and an individual followed them and acted inadvertently based on their ruling.” The court ruled to violate one of the commandments of the Torah. Rashi gives an example immediately: the court ruled that forbidden fat or blood was permitted. It was a mistake, but that was their ruling. The individual then followed the ruling. The rabbis said that forbidden fat was permitted, and he went and ate it.
Let us examine the word inadvertently. Why does the Mishnah need to say that he acted inadvertently? He wanted to follow the rabbis. They told him to eat the forbidden fat, and he wanted to eat it. What does “inadvertently” add? He went there deliberately. Nevertheless, the Mishnah says that it was inadvertent.
It then presents several cases. Whether the court acted according to its own ruling and ate with him; whether the court acted and he ate afterward; or whether the court did not act according to its ruling at all—in every case, he is exempt from bringing a sin-offering. What is the reason? Because, ultimately, he relied on the rabbinical court. The Mishnah is teaching that this applies not only when the court ate with him, in which case it is obvious that he relied on the court, but even when he ate after them. It applies even when the court itself never ate the forbidden fat. The rabbis ruled that it was permitted, and he ate it. We still consider him to have eaten it because of the court’s ruling.
There is a principle that if a person follows the ruling of a rabbinical court, even when the ruling is mistaken, the Torah exempts him from bringing a sin-offering. Ordinarily, if a person mistakenly ate forbidden fat because he thought it was permitted fat, he would have to bring a sin-offering. Here, too, a mistake occurred: the court made a mistake, and after the fact the court discovered that it had been wrong. Nevertheless, at the moment he ate the forbidden fat, he relied on the court. Therefore, he does not have to deal with the transgression as an individual transgression; the court’s ruling is the basis of his action.
The Mishnah then presents the same case with an important difference. One of the members of the court realized that the ruling was mistaken. Alternatively, it was a student—not an official member of the court—who knew the halakhah. He may not have been a member of the formal court, but he sat in on the proceedings, heard the cases, and possessed knowledge of halakhah. He said that the rabbis were wrong, but he nevertheless followed them. He knew that the ruling was mistaken, yet he thought that he was required to follow the rabbis because they had issued the ruling.
In that case, whether he ate with the court, ate after the court, or ate on his own, he is liable to bring a sin-offering. Why? He was not relying on the court completely. In his own mind, he knew that the court was wrong. He followed the court to some degree, because he thought he was obligated to obey the rabbis, but he did not truly accept the substance of their ruling. He was therefore only partially dependent on the court.
Rashi explains that one of the members of the court knew that the ruling was mistaken. The student, or that rabbi, possessed some advantage over the other members in this respect: he knew that they were wrong, yet he followed them. That is the distinction. When a person follows the court completely, he is exempt. Although he acted knowingly in the sense that he deliberately followed the ruling, he is not considered to have acted intentionally, because he still relied partially on the court. Nevertheless, he is not fully dependent on the court either. Since he knew that the court was mistaken, his act is treated as his own, and he must bring a sin-offering.
The Mishnah repeats the rule, and we have to understand why. We can generally infer that when a Mishnah states a broad rule, it is coming either to include an additional case or to exclude one. That leads to the Gemara’s first question: what makes a ruling a ruling?
Apparently, it is not enough for the court simply to say that an item is permitted. There is a particular formulation that the court must use in order for its statement to be considered an official ruling. If the court expresses the idea without that formulation, it is not considered a ruling for these purposes. Consequently, if a person eats the forbidden fat, he cannot claim that he relied on the court, because the court never issued a ruling in the legally significant form.
This also relates to another subject discussed in Massechet Horayot. If the court issues a mistaken ruling and the majority of the community follows it, the court must bring a special offering, a bull for the error of the community. But that rule applies only when the court issued an actual ruling. If the court never issued a formal ruling, even if the entire community transgressed, the court does not bring that offering. It may appear that the court permitted the act, but unless it issued the ruling in the required language, there was no formal ruling.
The Mishnah therefore says that the court is not liable to bring the bull when the majority of the community follows its mistaken decision until the court says, “It is permitted for you.” Rav Dimi of Nehardea said that even this is not sufficient. The court must say, “It is permitted for you to do it.” The words “It is permitted for you” alone are not enough; the statement must be followed by the words “to do it.”
Rav Dimi said that the ruling is not complete until the court says, “It is permitted for you to do it.” The reason is that until the word “to do” is stated, the ruling has not been fully expressed. The formal ruling must relate to an action. It is not enough to state an abstract principle of permissibility; the court must permit the people to act upon it.
Do we have a source for this requirement? Abaye says that we do. We learned it in a Mishnah in Massechet Sanhedrin. The case concerns a person living in a certain town who develops a new idea in halakhah, perhaps a certain point of leniency. He wants to verify it, so he goes to the Sanhedrin in Jerusalem and presents his idea. He tells the rabbis that he believes a particular matter is permitted. The rabbis in Jerusalem tell him that he is mistaken.
He returns to his city after receiving the ruling, but he continues teaching the way he had taught before. The question is whether he is considered a rebellious elder. A rebellious elder is someone who opposes the ruling of the court and continues to teach contrary to it, and there are laws governing such a person.
The Mishnah says that if he returned to his city and continued teaching in the manner in which he had taught previously, he is exempt from the law of a rebellious elder. Why? Because he merely continued teaching his mistaken idea. He did not return and issue a practical ruling. However, if he returned and instructed people to act upon his position—to treat the matter as a practical halakhah—he is liable.
We therefore see a distinction between teaching a theory and issuing a practical ruling. The court’s ruling becomes a formal hora'ah only when it authorizes an action. Rashi explains the phrase “he returned to his city”: when he issued a practical instruction, it was as though he had said, “It is permitted for you to do it.” This supports Rav Dimi’s requirement that the court must say, “It is permitted for you to do it.”
There is another proof from Massechet Yevamot. A woman’s husband is missing, and one witness comes and testifies that he died. Normally, testimony in court requires two witnesses. In the case of a woman whose husband is missing, however, the court is lenient so that she will not remain unable to remarry. The court can accept the testimony of one witness and permit her to marry.
The Mishnah says that the court instructed her, “It is permitted for you to marry.” Suppose she then engaged in an illicit relationship, and afterward her husband appeared. The court had told her that she was permitted to marry, but she did not follow that ruling. She did not marry; she acted on her own. Therefore, she is liable for what she did, because she was not relying on the court.
Notice the wording. The court permitted her to marry. If she had married and her husband had subsequently appeared, she could claim that she relied on the court’s ruling. But because she did not marry and instead acted independently, she cannot say that she relied on the court.
The Gemara derives another point from the wording “the court permitted her to marry.” It does not merely say that the court permitted her. The permission was directed toward a practical act: marrying. This again indicates that a ruling must be expressed in practical terms. If the court had merely said, “You are permitted,” without specifying the action, that would not have constituted a ruling permitting her to marry. It must be a practical instruction—“You are permitted to marry”—just as Rav Dimi said that the court must say, “It is permitted for you to do it.”
There is a third proof from the wording of our Mishnah itself. The Mishnah says that the court ruled “to transgress one of all the commandments stated in the Torah.” The expression indicates that the court ruled to carry out an act. This also supports the requirement that a ruling must be a practical authorization and not merely a theoretical statement.
At this point, the matter appears clear. We have shown that, according to Rav Dimi, the court must say, “It is permitted for you to do it.” There is, however, a second version of the discussion. According to that version, Rav Shmuel says that the court is not liable until it says, “It is permitted for you to do it.” Rav Dimi, in this version, is understood as saying that the words “It is permitted for you” are sufficient and that the additional words “to do it” are not necessary.
The Gemara then brings the same proofs against this position. From the case of the rebellious elder, we see that one becomes liable only when he issues a practical instruction, not when he merely teaches. This suggests that the phrase “to do it” is necessary. Similarly, in the case of the woman whose husband was missing, the court said, “It is permitted for you to marry.” The practical wording appears to be what makes the statement a ruling. Finally, our Mishnah says that the court ruled to transgress a commandment, which again appears to involve a practical act.
Thus, according to this second version, the proofs refute Rav Dimi’s lenient formulation. The court must say not merely, “It is permitted for you,” but, “It is permitted for you to do it.”
We now return to the two cases in the Mishnah. The court ruled that forbidden fat was permitted, and an individual followed the ruling. The Mishnah says that he acted inadvertently based on their ruling. One interpretation understands this as two cases: he may have followed the court’s ruling directly, or he may have made an ordinary mistake and taken forbidden fat while thinking that it was permitted fat.
Consider the second case. The court ruled that forbidden fat was permitted, but the person did not set out to eat forbidden fat because of the ruling. He went into the kitchen, took a piece of meat, and thought that it was permitted fat. In reality, it was forbidden fat. Is he exempt because of the court’s ruling? On the one hand, he was not thinking about the court when he ate. He thought he was eating permitted fat. On the other hand, if someone had entered the kitchen while he was eating and told him, “That is forbidden fat,” what would he have done? If he would have continued eating because the court had ruled that forbidden fat was permitted, then perhaps we can say retroactively that he was relying on the court.
This is the novelty of that position. Even though at the precise moment he ate he did not know that the food was forbidden fat, if he would have continued eating had he known the truth—because the rabbis had permitted it—he is considered to have relied on the court and is exempt.
There is another version, however, which understands the words “he acted inadvertently based on their ruling” as one case rather than two. The phrase means that the inadvertence itself must have resulted from the court’s ruling. If he made an ordinary mistake entirely on his own, he is not covered by the court’s ruling, even though the court had independently issued a lenient ruling.
According to this interpretation, the Mishnah is excluding the case of a person who thought he was taking permitted fat but accidentally took forbidden fat. The reason is that when he ate the food, he was eating it because he thought it was permitted fat, not because of the court. The later fact that he would have continued eating had he known the court’s position does not change the reason for his action at the time.
These are the two approaches. According to the first, we look at what he would have done had he discovered the truth while eating. If he would have continued because of the court’s ruling, he is exempt. According to the second, we focus on what actually caused him to eat the food. Since he ate it because he mistakenly thought it was permitted fat, and not because of the court, he is liable.
The Mishnah’s extra word “inadvertently” may be coming to teach that the exemption applies only when the inadvertence was based on the court’s ruling. It is not enough that the court issued a ruling and that the person happened to make a separate mistake. The mistake must be connected to the ruling.
The Gemara brings the case before Rami bar Hama: the court ruled that forbidden fat was permitted, the person accidentally exchanged forbidden fat for permitted fat, and he ate it. What is the law? Rava regarded the matter as obvious in one version: he is liable, because he knew the food was forbidden fat only after the fact and, when he ate it, he was not relying on the court. Rami bar Hama posed it as a question.
The dispute is therefore between two ways of understanding the Mishnah. The first approach says that if the person would have continued eating after discovering that the food was forbidden fat, because of the court’s ruling, he is exempt. The second approach says that this does not help. At the time he ate, he thought he was eating permitted fat. His mistake was his own, and he cannot attribute it to the court.
The Gemara returns to the wording of the Mishnah: “The individual followed them and acted inadvertently based on their ruling.” It may be that the words “inadvertently based on their ruling” are intended to exclude the case in which he thought he was eating permitted fat but was actually eating forbidden fat. Alternatively, the words may be read as two separate descriptions: he either acted inadvertently or acted based on their ruling. In that reading, the case of the mistaken exchange may also be included.
Thus, the Mishnah itself does not provide a decisive proof. It can be read in either way. The issue is subject to a dispute among the early authorities. The court rules that forbidden fat is permitted, and the individual mistakenly takes forbidden fat instead of permitted fat and eats it. One authority says that he is liable, because the mistake was his own. Another says that he is exempt, because if he had known what he was eating, he would have relied on the court’s ruling and continued.
We now turn to the verses that discuss the ordinary sin-offering. It says: “If one soul sins inadvertently from among the people, by committing one of the commandments of God that should not be done, and he becomes guilty; or if his sin becomes known to him, he shall bring his offering.” The verse is describing an individual who sins inadvertently by transgressing one of the commandments, and later discovers what he did. He then brings a female goat as a sin-offering for the sin that he committed.
The Gemara derives a principle from the wording “from among the people.” Not every person who sins inadvertently brings a sin-offering. The term excludes a mumar, a person who rebels against the commandments. A regular person who sins inadvertently and regrets the act when he discovers it brings a sin-offering. A mumar, however, does not.
Why not? The sin-offering is meaningful only when the person’s knowledge of his act will cause him to repent. If he is told that he committed a prohibition and responds that he does not care, his awareness does not lead him to retract. Such a person does not bring a sin-offering for the inadvertent act.
Rabbi Shimon ben Yosef derives the same point from the continuation of the verse: “When his sin becomes known to him.” The verse connects the knowledge of the sin with the obligation to bring the offering. The person must be someone for whom that knowledge leads to repentance. If knowledge of the sin does not lead him to repent, he does not bring a sin-offering.
How does this apply to our case? The individual who mixed up the forbidden fat and the permitted fat is not a rebellious person. Nevertheless, when he is told that he ate forbidden fat, he may not retract. He may say, “The court ruled that it was permitted.” The Gemara asks: if Rabbi Yohanan says that such a person is liable, how can that be? The rule is that someone whose knowledge does not cause him to repent does not bring a sin-offering. This person seems similar to the mumar.
Rav Pappa answers that Rabbi Yohanan considers him capable of repentance once the court discovers its mistake. At present, he does not repent because he believes that the court’s ruling permitted the act. But if the court later retracts and announces, “We made a mistake,” he too will recognize that he acted improperly and will repent. His repentance is delayed because it depends on the mistaken premise that the court had ruled correctly.
He is therefore different from a mumar. When a mumar is told that the act is forbidden, he remains indifferent. No new information will cause him to retract. This individual, however, will retract when he learns that the court itself recognized its error. He is considered someone whose knowledge can lead to repentance, and therefore he must bring a sin-offering according to Rabbi Yohanan.
The Gemara then states another important principle. The court issues a ruling that forbidden fat is permitted, and the majority of the community follows the ruling. The court must bring the special offering called a bull for the error of the community. The majority means more than half; exactly fifty percent is not sufficient. There must be a majority.
There is an additional requirement: the people counted toward the majority must have committed the same type of inadvertent act. If the majority of the community heard the ruling that forbidden fat was permitted and ate it because of that ruling, they are all the same type of inadvertent transgressors, and they can be counted together.
But suppose half the community ate the forbidden fat because they followed the court’s ruling, while the person who tipped the scale into a majority had made an ordinary mistake: he went to the refrigerator, thought he was taking permitted fat, but took forbidden fat instead. Even if that person would ordinarily be exempt from his own sin-offering because he would have continued eating had he known the court’s ruling, he cannot be counted as the additional person needed to establish the majority. His inadvertence was different from that of the others.
According to the position that exempts him individually, he was relying on the court in the relevant sense. Nevertheless, he cannot be counted as the person who creates the majority of the community, because the others followed the court’s ruling directly while his mistake resulted from confusing the two types of fat. To establish the communal majority, the inadvertent acts must be of the same type.
We return to the three cases in the Mishnah. The court issues the ruling, and the individual follows it. Whether he eats with the court, whether he eats afterward, or whether the court does not eat at all, he is exempt. The progression is understandable: it is not only when he eats with the court, when his reliance is obvious; even when he eats afterward he relies on the court; and even when the court itself does not eat, he may still be relying on the court’s ruling.
The Gemara asks why the Mishnah needs to state all three cases. The answer is that the first part is an example of the principle that once the greatest novelty has been taught, the lesser cases follow automatically. If the individual is exempt even when he eats together with the court, certainly he is exempt when he eats after them or when they do not eat at all, because in those cases his reliance might appear less obvious.
The second part of the Mishnah works in the opposite direction. When the individual knows that the court is wrong, he is liable. The strongest novelty there would be that he is liable even when he ate together with the court. It would then be obvious that he is liable when he ate after them or when the court did not eat, because he is clearly acting on his own knowledge. The Mishnah therefore presents the greatest novelty first in that section.
The Mishnah then says that one of the judges knew that the others had made a mistake, or that there was a student sitting before them who was qualified to issue a ruling and understood that they were wrong. Why does the Mishnah need both cases? We might have thought that only a judge who is fully learned and capable of reasoning from one halakhic case to another is considered to be acting on his own. The Mishnah therefore adds a student who knows the halakhah but may not be capable of independently deriving one case from another.
The first case, a judge, could mean someone who is both learned and analytically capable. The second case, a student qualified to issue a ruling, teaches that even if he is learned but not capable of the same level of analysis, he is still considered to be acting on his own if he knows that the court is wrong. The extra case teaches that he does not need to possess the full ability to derive one halakhah from another. Some knowledge of halakhah is sufficient for him to understand that the court’s ruling is mistaken.
The Gemara discusses the phrase “qualified to issue a ruling.” It may sound as though the student is also fully learned and analytically capable. The answer is that the additional phrase is necessary to include someone who is learned but lacks the same analytical ability, or who has analytical ability but is not fully learned. The Mishnah is teaching that as long as he possesses sufficient knowledge to recognize the court’s error, he is not considered to have relied on the court.
A further question is raised from a teaching involving Shimon ben Azai. If a person of that caliber knows that the court is wrong and nevertheless eats the forbidden fat, why should he be called inadvertent? He knows what he is doing. It would appear that he should be considered intentional.
The answer is that the case is one in which he knows the court is wrong but mistakenly believes that there is a commandment to follow the sages even when they are mistaken. He knows that the substance of the court’s ruling is incorrect. If asked whether the food is really permitted, he would say that it is not. Nevertheless, he thinks that one must follow the court because it is a mitzvah to obey the sages, even in this situation.
He is therefore not completely intentional. His mistake concerns the obligation to follow the court. He is not saying, “The forbidden fat is permitted.” He knows that it is forbidden. Rather, he thinks, “The rabbis said that it is permitted, and I must follow them even though I know they are wrong.” Because of that mistaken premise, he is treated as inadvertent and must bring a sin-offering. The offering is for the error in his understanding that he was required to follow the rabbis blindly.
Without that mistaken premise, he would indeed be intentional. A person who knows that the food is forbidden and eats it simply because he wants to eat it is not inadvertent. The special case is that he knows the rabbis are wrong but believes that the duty to follow the rabbis applies even to a mistaken ruling.
The final section of the discussion returns to the general rule stated in the Mishnah: one who relies on himself is liable, while one who relies on the court is exempt. The Gemara asks what additional case is included by the phrase “this is the rule.” It includes a person who habitually challenges the court’s rulings. He is someone who always contradicts the court, a person who rejects its authority. If the court permits forbidden fat and he then eats it, we do not assume that he is relying on the court merely because he happens to agree with the particular ruling. Since he normally rejects the court, we say that he is acting according to his own judgment, even when his action coincides with the court’s ruling.
The Gemara also asks what additional case is included by the phrase that a person who relies on the court is exempt. It includes a situation in which the court issued a ruling, later discovered its mistake, and retracted the ruling, while the individual never heard the retraction. He ate the forbidden fat based on the original ruling. The novelty is that even though the court had already retracted, he remains exempt if he did not know about the retraction, because he was still relying on the original ruling.
The Gemara notes that the next Mishnah states this case explicitly. Sometimes a Mishnah first presents a principle in a general or abbreviated form and then explains one of its applications explicitly in the following Mishnah. There is therefore no difficulty in including the case in the general rule and then repeating it in detail.
Until now, we have been assuming that an individual who follows a court’s mistaken ruling is exempt from a sin-offering. The Gemara now explains that this assumption itself is the subject of a dispute.
Rav Yehudah said in the name of Shmuel that the opinion expressed in our Mishnah is the opinion of Rabbi Yehudah: an individual who acts according to the ruling of the court is exempt. The Sages, however, say that an individual who acts according to the court’s ruling is liable. When is the individual exempt? Only when the majority of the community followed the ruling. In that situation, the court brings the communal offering, and that offering covers the community. But when only an individual followed the ruling, no communal offering is brought on his behalf, and he must bring his own sin-offering.
According to the Sages, the distinction is therefore based on whether the court is required to bring the special offering. If the majority of the community followed the ruling, the court brings the bull for the error of the community, and the individual is included in that atonement. If only one person followed the court, there is no communal offering, so the individual must bring a sin-offering himself.
The Gemara asks where these opinions are found. A teaching derives them from the verse that says, “If one soul sins inadvertently.” The wording uses several expressions that appear to emphasize an individual: “one soul,” “sins,” and “when he acts.” The verse is understood as referring to a person who acts on his own. Such a person is liable. But one who acts according to the ruling of the court is exempt. This is the source for Rabbi Yehudah’s position.
Where do the Sages derive their position? A separate teaching analyzes the phrase “from among the people.” One might have thought that if one person sins inadvertently, he brings a sin-offering, but if two people act together, they are exempt because the verse speaks of one individual. The verse therefore says “from among the people,” teaching that even many people who transgress inadvertently can be liable.
The Sages must determine how many people are included in the word “many.” It could mean a minority of the community, or it could mean the majority. The teaching first says that a minority of the community that sins brings a sin-offering, because when a minority follows a court’s ruling, the court does not bring the communal offering on their behalf. They must therefore bring their own offering.
One might then have thought that when the majority of the community sins, they are exempt, because in the case of a mistaken court ruling the court brings the communal offering. The teaching therefore adds that “from among the people” includes even the majority, and even the entire community. This indicates that the people themselves may still be liable even when the majority follows the court.
The Gemara questions this derivation. If the teaching is discussing people who made an ordinary inadvertent mistake on their own, without a court’s ruling, why does it introduce the question of whether the court brings the communal offering? If there was no ruling by the court, the court would not bring the offering in any event. The fact that the teaching discusses whether the court brings the offering indicates that the underlying case must involve a court ruling.
But there is a difficulty. The verse “from among the people” speaks about an ordinary inadvertent transgression, not about a transgression resulting from a court’s ruling. How can the teaching use that verse to discuss the case of a mistaken ruling by the court?
The Gemara explains that the teaching is comparing the two cases. It begins with a minority of the community that sinned through an ordinary inadvertent act. They are liable because, if the same minority had acted according to a court’s mistaken ruling, the court would not have brought the communal offering on their behalf. Since no offering would have been brought for them, they themselves are liable in the ordinary case as well.
It then asks about the majority. If the majority sinned through an ordinary inadvertent act, perhaps they should be exempt, because if they had followed a court’s mistaken ruling, the court would have brought the communal offering for them. The teaching therefore says “from among the people” to include even the majority. Even when the majority acts without a court’s ruling, they are still liable.
From this analysis, the Sages derive that a minority that follows a court’s mistaken ruling is liable for a sin-offering. The court does not bring the communal offering for a minority, so the individuals must bring their own offerings. This supports the Sages’ position that an individual who follows the court is liable, at least when there is no communal offering covering him.
Rav Pappa challenges the analysis. Perhaps when a minority follows the court’s ruling, neither the court nor the individuals bring an offering. The court does not bring the communal offering because the minority followed the ruling, and the individuals do not bring one because they relied on the court. If so, the comparison to the ordinary case would not prove that the individuals are liable.
The response is that this cannot be the intended reading of the teaching. The teaching begins with the minority and assumes that they are liable; it then discusses whether the majority should be treated differently. If the minority were exempt whenever they followed a court’s ruling, there would be no basis for the progression of the teaching. The structure indicates that the minority are liable and that the question is whether the majority are also liable.
In other words, the teaching’s logic is as follows: a minority that sins is liable because no communal offering is brought for them. One might think that a majority is exempt because the court brings the offering on behalf of the community. The teaching therefore adds “from among the people” to teach that even the majority are liable in the ordinary case. The discussion only makes sense if the minority’s liability is already established.
Thus, according to the Sages, the teaching provides support for the position that an individual who acts according to a court’s mistaken ruling is liable. The Mishnah, which exempts him, follows Rabbi Yehudah’s view. The Gemara has analyzed the verse and the teaching in order to identify the source of this dispute.
The main conclusion of this section is that there are two opinions. Rabbi Yehudah holds that an individual who follows a mistaken ruling of the court is exempt from his own sin-offering. The Sages hold that he is liable unless he is included in the majority of the community for whom the court brings the communal offering. The entire discussion of the verses is directed toward determining whether the court’s offering covers the individual or whether he must bring his own offering.