This is the Eri B. Sitt Edition, an audio series on the Talmud Bavli. The subject of Torah rulings is primarily the question of what happens when a rabbinical court issues an erroneous ruling. For example, the court may permit something that the Torah prohibits, such as forbidden fat or blood. The Gemara discusses what the law is when people follow that mistaken ruling. Do they have to bring a sin offering? Do they bring any offering at all? The Gemara examines all the different scenarios connected to erroneous rulings issued by a rabbinical court, whether by the entire court or by an individual member of the court.
Masechet Horayot is the last tractate in the Order of Nezikin. Technically, it could have been placed in the Order of Kodashim, but because it is related to the laws of the Sanhedrin, it was placed in Nezikin.
Our Mishnah begins: “If the court ruled to permit one of all the commandments stated in the Torah, and an individual acted inadvertently on the basis of their ruling...” The court ruled against one of the commandments of the Torah. Rashi, at the top of the page—there are two columns of Rashi on this page—gives the example of the court ruling that one may eat blood or forbidden fat. It is a mistake, but that is what they ruled. An individual then followed the court’s ruling and ate the forbidden fat.
Let us examine the word “inadvertently.” The individual wanted to follow the rabbis, so what is the inadvertence? The Mishnah says that whether the court followed its own ruling and ate with him, whether the individual ate after the members of the court, or whether the court did not follow the ruling at all, in every one of these cases the individual is exempt from bringing an offering.
The reason is that he relied on the court. The court told him that he was permitted to eat the forbidden fat, so it is not his fault. The Mishnah is teaching that this applies not only when the members of the court actually ate the forbidden fat with him, in which case it is obvious that he relied on them. It also applies when he ate after them, and even when they did not follow their ruling at all. The court merely said that the forbidden fat was permitted, while the individual went and ate it on his own. Even then, we consider the reason he ate it to be the court’s ruling.
The rule is that when a person follows the court, even when the ruling is mistaken, the Torah exempts him in such a case. Normally, if a person inadvertently ate forbidden fat—for example, he thought it was permitted fat and ended up eating forbidden fat—he would have to bring a sin offering. Here, too, the court later discovers its mistake and says, “We were wrong,” and it turns out that the individual ate forbidden fat. Nevertheless, at the moment he ate it, he relied on the court. The court’s error caused the situation, and he does not have to bring an offering.
However, the Mishnah then discusses the same case when one of the members of the court realized that the ruling was mistaken, or when a student who was qualified to issue rulings realized that the court was wrong. He knew that the rabbis were mistaken, but he nevertheless followed them. Why did he follow them? He had been taught to listen to the rabbis. The rabbis came along and said, “We know that they are making a mistake, but this is the situation, and we have to follow the court. Whatever they tell you to do, you do.”
In this case, whether the members of the court ate with him, whether he ate after them, or whether he acted on his own while they did not eat at all, he is liable to bring an offering. Why? Because he was not relying on the court completely. In his mind, he knew that the court was wrong. He decided, “I am going to follow them because the rabbis told me to do so,” but he did not truly accept the ruling as correct. He is somewhat dependent on the court, but not fully dependent on it.
Rashi explains: One possibility is that the court ruled and the individual acted with them, such as when he ate blood or forbidden fat together with the court. A second possibility is that the court ruled and he acted afterward. A third possibility is that the court did not act on its ruling, but the individual acted on the basis of their ruling. In the ordinary case, he is exempt from bringing a sin offering because he relied on the court and acted on its instruction.
But when he knew that the court was wrong, he is liable. Even though he is not considered entirely intentional, because he still relies partially on the court, he is not fully dependent on the court either. He knew that the court had made a mistake. He should have followed the law as he understood it rather than follow a ruling that he knew was incorrect.
The Mishnah concludes with a general rule: “One who relies on himself is liable; one who relies on the court is exempt.” If a person relies on his own understanding, he is liable. The court did not issue a ruling for him, so he cannot attribute his act to the court. He ate the forbidden fat because he relied on his own judgment, and therefore he must bring an offering. But if he relied on the court’s ruling, he is exempt.
Whenever a Mishnah says, “This is the general rule,” the Gemara often examines what additional case the general rule is coming to include or exclude. We now begin the Gemara.
Shmuel says that a court is never liable to bring the special offering required when a court issues an erroneous ruling unless it says the ruling in the proper form. It is not enough for the court merely to say that a particular item is permitted. There is a specific formulation that transforms the statement into an official ruling. If the court does not use that formulation, it is not considered a sufficiently formal ruling. Therefore, if a person then eats the forbidden fat, he cannot say that he was relying on a ruling of the court, because the court never issued a formal ruling.
This is also relevant to the law discussed in Horayot concerning a court that issued an erroneous ruling and the majority of the public followed it. In such a case, the court must bring a special offering. But that law applies only when the court issued a formal ruling. If it merely made a statement without using the required language, even if the entire community followed the statement, it is not considered a formal ruling.
What is the required language? The court must say, “It is permitted for you to do this.” Merely saying, “It is permitted,” is not enough. The court must add the words indicating that the people may act accordingly. Until the court says that it is permitted to do the act, the ruling is not complete.
Do we have a source for this? The Gemara brings a Mishnah from Masechet Sanhedrin. The Mishnah discusses a person who lives in a certain city and develops a new interpretation or leniency in Jewish law. He wants to verify his position, so he goes to the Sanhedrin in Jerusalem and presents his interpretation. The rabbis in Jerusalem tell him that he is mistaken.
He then returns to his city and continues teaching the interpretation in the same manner as before. Is he considered a rebellious elder? A rebellious elder is someone who rebels against the court, and there are specific laws concerning such a person.
The Mishnah says that if he returns to his city and continues teaching in the way he taught before, he is exempt from bringing an offering. Why? Because he merely continued teaching. He did not return and issue a practical ruling that people should act on his position.
However, if he returned from Jerusalem and said, “This is the practical law,” then he is liable. We see from this that there is a difference between teaching an idea and issuing a practical ruling. A person may continue presenting his mistaken interpretation as a theoretical teaching, but when he says that this is the law to be followed in practice, he has issued a ruling.
That is the proof that the ruling must include an instruction to act. The court must say that the people are permitted to do the act. The Gemara brings another proof from a Mishnah in Masechet Yevamot.
The case concerns a woman whose husband is missing. One witness comes and testifies that the husband died. Normally, the testimony of one witness is not accepted in court; two witnesses are required. In this case, however, because the woman would otherwise remain unable to remarry, the court is lenient and accepts the testimony of one witness. The court permits her to marry.
Suppose she then goes and commits adultery, and afterward her husband appears. The court had told her that she was permitted to marry, but she did not actually marry. Instead, she engaged in an adulterous relationship. Since she did not follow the court’s ruling, she is liable for what she did and must bring an offering. The Mishnah says that she is liable because she was not relying on the court.
The Gemara analyzes the wording. The Mishnah says that the court permitted her to marry. It does not merely say that the court said that the marriage was permitted. The wording indicates that the court gave her an instruction to perform an act. If she had actually married and her husband had subsequently appeared, she would have been able to claim that she relied on the court. But because she did not marry and instead acted on her own, she cannot say that she relied on the court.
This proves again that a court’s ruling must include the practical instruction. If the court merely says, “The matter is permitted,” without instructing the person to act, that is not a complete ruling for these purposes. The court must say, in effect, “You are permitted to do it.” The Gemara derives this from the wording concerning permission to marry.
Ravina brings another proof from our Mishnah itself. The Mishnah says that the court ruled to violate one of the commandments of the Torah. The language indicates that the court permitted the act itself, not merely that it discussed or described the law. Therefore, the court must have issued an instruction to act.
At this point, the Gemara has established the position that the court must say, “It is permitted for you to do it.” A second version of the discussion reverses the attribution. According to that version, Shmuel says that the court does not necessarily need to use those exact words. The Gemara then examines the same proofs.
The first proof concerns the rebellious elder. He is exempt when he returns to his city and continues teaching, but liable when he returns and issues a practical ruling. The Gemara responds that perhaps the distinction is not the exact wording of the ruling, but whether he taught or acted practically. The wording may not prove that the court must say, “You are permitted to do it.”
The second proof, concerning the woman whose husband was missing, also appears to indicate that the court said she was permitted to marry. But perhaps the wording does not establish a fixed formula. The Gemara then returns to the verse concerning the rebellious elder and says that the command is specifically connected to acting in practice. Once again, the discussion concludes that a formal practical instruction is required.
After this, the Gemara returns to the Mishnah’s wording. The individual followed the court and acted inadvertently. What is the purpose of the word “inadvertently”? If he followed the court, why must the Mishnah also tell us that he acted inadvertently?
Rava explains that the word comes to include another case. The ordinary case is that the court ruled that the forbidden fat was permitted, and the individual intentionally went and ate forbidden fat on the basis of that ruling. The additional case is that the court ruled that the forbidden fat was permitted, but the individual intended to eat permitted fat and mistakenly took the forbidden fat instead.
For example, the court ruled that the forbidden fat was permitted. The person went into his kitchen, intending to eat ordinary permitted fat. He mistakenly took forbidden fat, thinking it was permitted fat, and ate it. What is the law? Is he considered to have followed the court, or is he considered to have acted on his own mistake?
Rava says that he is exempt. The reasoning is that if he had discovered while eating that the item was forbidden fat, he would not have stopped. Since the court had ruled that forbidden fat was permitted, he would have continued eating on the basis of the court’s ruling. Therefore, even though at the precise moment he began eating he thought he was eating permitted fat, the underlying reason he would have continued eating is that he relied on the court. He is therefore considered to have relied on the court and is exempt.
There is another version of the discussion. According to that version, the wording should be read as one case: “He acted inadvertently on the basis of their ruling.” It is not two separate cases, one involving inadvertence and one involving reliance on the court. Rather, the inadvertence itself must have resulted from the court’s ruling.
According to this version, if the person made an independent mistake—he intended to eat permitted fat, mistakenly took forbidden fat, and ate it—he is liable. The court had ruled that forbidden fat was permitted, but that ruling did not cause this particular mistake. He ate the item because he thought it was permitted fat. Therefore, he was not relying on the court when he ate it.
The first version offers a strong rationale for exempting him. Even though he initially thought he was eating permitted fat, if someone had informed him at that moment that it was forbidden fat, he would have said, “The rabbis permitted it,” and would have continued eating. Since his conduct would ultimately have been based on the court’s ruling, he is exempt.
The second version rejects that reasoning. At the time he actually ate the forbidden fat, he believed it was permitted fat. He was not thinking about the court’s ruling. His mistake was his own. The fact that he might have continued eating if someone had informed him later does not mean that he was relying on the court at the moment of the act.
The Gemara therefore says that the word “inadvertently” may be coming to distinguish between the cases. Perhaps the Mishnah means: one who acted inadvertently on the basis of the court’s ruling is exempt, but one who mistakenly exchanged permitted fat for forbidden fat is liable. The Mishnah can be read in either way, so it does not provide a definitive answer to the question.
The Gemara concludes that this matter is subject to a dispute among the early authorities. If the court ruled that forbidden fat was permitted, and the person intended to take permitted fat but mistakenly took forbidden fat and ate it, Rav says that he is exempt, while Rabbi Yohanan says that he is liable.
Rav’s reasoning is that if the person had discovered the truth while eating, he would have continued eating because the court had ruled that the item was permitted. Rabbi Yohanan’s reasoning is that the person’s actual mistake was his own. He did not eat the forbidden fat because of the court’s ruling; he ate it because he thought it was permitted fat.
The Gemara challenges Rabbi Yohanan from the laws of a regular sin offering. The Torah discusses a person who sins inadvertently and then becomes aware of what he did. He brings a sin offering because, once he discovers that he transgressed, he regrets the act and repents.
The verse excludes a rebellious person, one who continues in his conduct even after being informed that it is prohibited. Such a person does not bring a sin offering. The purpose of the offering is for someone whose awareness of the sin would cause him to withdraw from it. But if a person is told, “What you did was prohibited,” and responds, “I do not care,” he does not qualify for the offering.
The Gemara asks: According to Rabbi Yohanan, why should the person who mistakenly took forbidden fat be liable? When he discovers what he did, he does not regret it. If someone tells him, “You ate forbidden fat,” he responds, “The court permitted it.” He would continue eating according to the court’s ruling. In that respect, he resembles the rebellious person who does not withdraw after becoming aware of his act.
The Gemara answers that this individual is different from a rebellious person. He is ultimately capable of repentance once he learns that the court itself made a mistake. He is not rejecting the Torah or refusing to accept the prohibition. He merely operated under the mistaken premise that the court had correctly permitted the item. Once he learns that the court was wrong, he will repent immediately.
A rebellious person, by contrast, remains unmoved even after being told that the Torah and the rabbis prohibit the act. He does not accept the information. This individual, however, would accept the truth once he learned that the court had retracted its ruling. Therefore, he can be liable for a sin offering.
The Gemara then discusses another important point. When the court issues a ruling and the majority of the public follows it, the court brings a special offering to atone for the public’s error. The majority must be a true majority—fifty percent plus one. There is also a requirement that the inadvertent acts counted toward the majority be of the same type.
For example, if the majority of the public heard the ruling that forbidden fat was permitted and then ate forbidden fat on the basis of that ruling, all of their actions are the same type of inadvertence. They can be counted together to establish the required majority.
But suppose fifty percent of the people followed the court’s ruling and ate forbidden fat, while the person who would complete the majority made an independent mistake. He intended to eat permitted fat, mistakenly took forbidden fat, and ate it. Even if that person would ordinarily be exempt according to one opinion because he would have continued eating on the basis of the court’s ruling, he cannot be counted toward the majority. His inadvertence is different from that of the others.
The Gemara expresses this principle by saying that the acts must be of one type of inadvertence. A person whose mistake resulted from the court’s ruling cannot be combined with people whose mistakes arose independently. The nature of the error matters in determining whether the public has reached the required majority.
The Gemara then returns to the progression in the Mishnah. The Mishnah says that the person is exempt whether he ate with the court, whether he ate after the court, or whether the court did not eat at all. Why does the Mishnah need all three cases?
The first part of the Mishnah can be understood as a progression of increasingly novel cases. If the person ate together with the court, it is obvious that he relied on the court. The members of the court themselves ate the forbidden item. It is still a greater novelty that he is exempt when he ate after them, and an even greater novelty that he is exempt when they did not eat at all. Even then, he relied on their ruling.
The second part of the Mishnah, concerning the person who knew that the court was wrong, can be understood in the opposite way. In that case, the Mishnah may begin with the greatest novelty: even if he ate together with the court, he is liable because he personally knew that the ruling was wrong. Once we know that, it is obvious that he is liable if he ate after them or if they did not eat at all. He is clearly acting on his own knowledge.
The Gemara then returns to the case of the member of the court or qualified student who knew that the ruling was mistaken. The Mishnah says that he is liable because he was not fully relying on the court. But what degree of knowledge is required?
Rav says that one might have thought that this applies only to someone who is learned and able to reason independently—to someone who both knows the relevant material and understands how to analyze and compare cases. The Mishnah therefore adds the case of a student who is qualified to issue rulings. Even if he is not a full judge and does not possess the same level of analytical ability, as long as he knows enough to recognize that the court is mistaken, he is considered to be relying on his own understanding.
He knows that the court is wrong, yet he follows the ruling because he believes that one must obey the rabbis even when they make a mistake. His error is not that he misunderstood the law. He understands that the ruling is wrong. His error is his belief that he must follow the court despite knowing that it is wrong. Therefore, he is not treated as someone who fully relied on the court.
The Gemara then asks for an example of a student who is qualified to issue rulings but has not formally received authorization. It mentions Shimon ben Azai and Shimon ben Zoma, who were great scholars but did not receive formal ordination. The point is that a person can possess the knowledge necessary to recognize the court’s error even if he does not hold the formal status of a judge.
The Gemara brings a teaching that even such a person is liable if he follows the court’s erroneous ruling. The Torah says that an individual who acts on his own is liable, whereas one who acts on the basis of the court’s ruling is exempt. The case under discussion is a person who knows that the court is wrong but nevertheless eats the forbidden fat because he believes that he must obey the rabbis even in such circumstances.
Why is he not considered entirely intentional? He does not believe that he is rebelling against the Torah. He thinks he is doing the correct thing by following the rabbis. Nevertheless, he is not considered fully dependent on the court, because he personally knows that the court is wrong. Therefore, he is liable to bring the offering.
The point is not that he had to eat the forbidden fat. He could have refrained from eating it. His reasoning was: “I know the rabbis are wrong, but I believe that one must follow them even when they are wrong.” That mistaken belief is the inadvertence in the case. He is not an intentional sinner, but he is also not someone who simply relied on the court’s ruling.
The Mishnah’s general rule says that one who relies on himself is liable and one who relies on the court is exempt. The Gemara examines another case included in the first category. Suppose a person is habitually antagonistic toward the court. Whatever the court says, he opposes it. He is constantly challenging the court and refusing to accept its rulings.
Now suppose the court rules that forbidden fat is permitted, and this person goes and eats it. One might think that because he is doing what the court said, he should be exempt. The Mishnah teaches that this is not so. Since he normally does not rely on the court, we assume that even when he agrees with the court’s conclusion, he is acting on his own judgment. He is therefore liable.
The Gemara also discusses the opposite category, one who relies on the court. Suppose the court issued a ruling permitting forbidden fat and later retracted the ruling. The individual did not know about the retraction and continued eating. Even though the court had already withdrawn its ruling, he remains exempt because he was relying on the original ruling. The next Mishnah will discuss this case explicitly, but the Gemara explains that it is already included by implication in the general rule.
Until now, the entire discussion has assumed that an individual who follows an erroneous ruling of the court is exempt from a sin offering. The Gemara now explains that this is the opinion of Rabbi Yehudah. According to Rabbi Yehudah, an individual who follows the court is exempt.
The Sages disagree. They say that an individual who follows the court is liable. When is a person exempt according to the Sages? Only when the majority of the Jewish people follow the court’s ruling. In that case, the court itself must bring the special offering for the error of the public, and the individual is covered by that offering.
But when only an individual follows the court, and there is no public offering brought by the court, the individual must bring his own sin offering. According to the Sages, the fact that he followed the court does not by itself exempt him.
The Gemara asks where these opinions are found. It brings a teaching based on the verse concerning an individual who sins inadvertently. The verse uses several expressions that appear to refer specifically to one person. The teaching derives from these expressions that not every person in every circumstance brings a sin offering. One who acts on his own is liable, while one who acts on the basis of a court’s ruling is exempt. This appears to support Rabbi Yehudah’s position.
The Sages, however, derive their position from another teaching. The verse says that when an individual acts, he brings an offering. One might have thought that if two people commit the same inadvertent act, they are exempt because the verse refers to one person. The Torah therefore adds a broader expression indicating that even many people can be liable.
The question is how many people are included in the word “many.” It might refer to a minority of the public, or it might refer to the majority of the public. If a minority of the public commits the act, the court does not bring the special offering, so the individuals must bring their own offerings. But if the majority commits the act, perhaps they are exempt because the court brings the public offering.
The Gemara analyzes the teaching carefully. It must be discussing a case involving a court’s ruling, because it contrasts the cases in which the court brings an offering and those in which it does not. If the people simply sinned inadvertently without any ruling by the court, there would be no reason to discuss whether the court brings an offering. The teaching is therefore dealing with a court that issued a ruling.
But there is a difficulty. The verse being cited appears to discuss an ordinary individual who sins inadvertently, not a public that acts on the basis of a court’s ruling. How can that verse be used to analyze the distinction between a minority and a majority who followed the court?
The Gemara explains that the teaching is comparing the two situations. When a minority of the public sins inadvertently, and the court did not bring the special offering on their behalf, the individuals must bring their own offerings. This teaches that a minority that acts on its own is liable.
One might then think that when the majority sins, the individuals are exempt because the court brings the public offering. The teaching therefore adds that even a majority can be liable in a case where the court did not issue a ruling. The fact that many people acted does not automatically exempt them. The type of case—whether there was a formal court ruling—determines who brings the offering.
Rav Papa challenges the attempt to derive the Sages’ opinion from this teaching. Perhaps the teaching means that neither the people nor the court brings an offering in the case of a minority that followed a court ruling. The court does not bring because the required majority did not follow the ruling, and the people do not bring because they relied on the court.
If so, there would be no proof that an individual who follows the court is liable. Perhaps both the minority and the majority are exempt when they follow the court, because the court’s ruling covers them even when the court itself does not bring the special offering.
The Gemara responds that this cannot be the meaning of the teaching. The structure of the teaching indicates a distinction between the minority and the majority. It begins with a minority and explains why the minority is liable. It then proceeds to discuss the majority and asks whether the majority is exempt because the court brings an offering. The progression makes sense only if the minority is already understood to be liable.
If both the minority and the majority were exempt when they followed a court ruling, there would be no reason to begin with the minority and then ask a separate question concerning the majority. The fact that the teaching moves from the minority to the majority indicates that the minority is liable, while the status of the majority requires further discussion.
The Gemara therefore concludes that the teaching supports the Sages’ position. An individual or minority that follows the court’s erroneous ruling is liable to bring a sin offering. Only when the majority of the public follows the ruling does the special public offering become relevant, and even then the exact requirements must be met.
The discussion has established the disagreement between Rabbi Yehudah and the Sages. According to Rabbi Yehudah, an individual who follows the court’s erroneous ruling is exempt. According to the Sages, he is liable unless he is included in the majority of the public for whom the court brings the special offering.
The Gemara’s final analysis returns to the teaching based on the phrase referring to the people of the land. At first, one might understand that expression as referring to a minority of the public. If a minority acts inadvertently without a formal ruling, they must bring an offering because the court is not bringing one for them. One might then think that a majority is exempt because the court brings the public offering.
The teaching therefore adds that even a majority can be liable when there is no formal court ruling. The public offering is relevant only when the court issued the required ruling and the public followed it. Without a formal ruling, the individuals—whether a minority or a majority—are not covered by the court’s offering.
This is the Gemara’s conclusion regarding the opening section of the tractate: an individual who acts on the basis of his own judgment is liable; an individual who relies on the court may be exempt according to Rabbi Yehudah, while the Sages require him to bring an offering unless he is part of the majority of the public covered by the court’s special offering. The distinctions depend on who acted, whether the court issued a formal ruling, whether the person relied on that ruling, and whether the majority of the public followed it.