The Eddie B Sit Edition presents an audio series of the Talmud Bavli, focusing on Masechet Chullin. This study has been dedicated by our good friend, Mr. Joey Jamal, and his wife, in honor of their son Jack's engagement to Shirley Sutton. May it be, with God's help, that they should marry at a good and successful hour, and through the merit of the study we will engage in over the next several months in Masechet Chullin, may they enjoy much joy, peace in the home, prosperity, and all blessings, Amen.
Today’s daf is Daf Tsadi, and it is being studied for the elevation of the soul of Avraham ben Esther, Mordechai Moshe ben Nun. May the soul of the righteous be bound up in the bond of life, Amen.
In our discussion, we begin with the principle of the prohibition regarding sacred offerings. The concept of issur mukdashim kadim indicates that the prohibition of offerings takes precedence over the prohibition of Gid HaNasheh. This is seen in a case where a nefel is discussed; the nefel does not yet have any gidim formed. Despite this, it is still considered a being capable of exuding tumah even before the gidim are formed. This highlights that a being can be recognized even in an incomplete state.
We are specifically referring to a human nefel here, which indeed exudes tumah. The novelty here is that even without a kzayit of flesh, it is still deemed a viable body, indicating that it can be recognized as a being even prior to the formation of its gidim. This leads us to understand that the animal can become hekdesh before the gidim are formed.
Returning to our question, how does issur chal al issur work? Once it becomes hekdesh, and we state that there is yesh b'gidim b'noten ta'am, it seems too late; it has already become hekdesh, and one should not transgress the prohibition of hekdesh. Rashi explains that the prohibition of sacred offerings takes precedence from the moment it is formed, even if the gid has not yet been created. Thus, we see that the creation of the ubar precedes the formation of the gidim.
The Gemara states that even though the prohibition of sacred offerings takes precedence, the prohibition of the gid can still apply to it, as this prohibition is also applicable to the descendants of Noah. This is significant because, under normal circumstances, we do not say issur chal al issur. However, in the case of the stringent prohibition of Gid HaNasheh, which applies even to the descendants of Noah, we can say that issur chal al issur does indeed apply.
Rashi further clarifies that the prohibition of gid applies even though the prohibition of sacred offerings takes precedence. The reason it is a stringent prohibition is that it applies to the descendants of Noah, as later sources will indicate. Thus, we see a significant innovation: even though normally issur does not apply to another issur, in the case of Gid HaNasheh, we accept that issur chal al issur is valid.
However, we face a contradiction: the Mishnah does not align with Rabbi Yehuda, who limits the prohibition of Gid HaNasheh to the right side of the animal. Our Mishnah indicates that the prohibition applies to both sides, thus making it incompatible with Rabbi Yehuda’s view. The Gemara resolves this by suggesting that our Tanna accepts Rabbi Yehuda’s opinion in one instance but not in another.
In discussing the application of issur chal al issur, Rabbi Yehuda may only assert this in cases of tumah. For example, if a behema is tameh, the prohibition of tumah can precede the prohibition of gid, as gid does not apply until the animal is born.
We see that the prohibition of Gid HaNasheh is stringent, as it applies to the descendants of Noah. The Gemara indicates that Rabbi Yehuda does not apply the prohibition of Gid HaNasheh to a shlil, meaning a fetus in the womb. Therefore, when the behema is formed, it may be tameh if the mother is tameh, but the gid does not apply until it is born.
As we delve into the details of our Mishnah, we see that it discusses a bechor that is not considered kadosh until it emerges from the womb. This means that the prohibition of Gid HaNasheh does not apply until the bechor is born, and thus the two prohibitions occur simultaneously. This leads us to understand that the prohibition of Gid HaNasheh can apply even to sacred offerings.
Moreover, if we assert that the prohibition of Gid HaNasheh applies to the ubar, then the gid would come first, and the prohibition of sacred offerings would follow. Therefore, if we consider Rabbi Yehuda’s opinion, we can understand that the gid comes first, and the prohibition of hekdesh applies subsequently.
In conclusion, the discussion around the gid and its prohibition is complex, involving multiple opinions and interpretations. The final ruling indicates that the prohibition of Gid HaNasheh applies even in the context of sacred offerings, and the Gemara emphasizes the importance of understanding these halachic nuances.