The Ed B. Sit Edition of the audio series on the Talmud Bavli, focusing on the tractate Masechet Chullin, is dedicated by our good friend Mr. Joey Jamal and his wife in honor of their son Jack's engagement to Shirley Sutton. May they, with the help of Hashem, marry at a propitious and successful time, and through the merit of the study we will engage in over the next several months in Masechet Chullin, may they experience much joy, peace in their home, prosperity, and all blessings. Amen.
Today, we begin our study on Daf Tzadi Vav, starting from the first side, with the Mishnah: “Ha-notel gid hanasheh tzarich she-yitol et kulo.” This teaches that one must take the entire gid hanasheh, the sciatic nerve, which requires digging deeply into the meat to uproot it completely. Rabbi Yehuda, however, states that one only needs to remove the part of the gid hanasheh that is embedded in the meat in order to fulfill the mitzvah of removal. This distinction is significant; Rabbi Yehuda asserts that it suffices to take only the portion that is “balua” or absorbed in the meat.
The Gemara discusses the implications of this ruling in conjunction with the act of slaughtering. It aligns with the opinion of Rashi, who emphasizes the need to dig deep into the piece of meat to ensure the complete removal of the gid hanasheh. In the standard Mishnah, Rabbi Meir states that the act of digging is necessary, while Rabbi Yehuda maintains a more lenient approach, suggesting that only the part adjacent to the meat needs to be taken.
Further, the Gemara explains that one who consumes a k'zayit of gid hanasheh incurs forty lashes, as it is prohibited by the Torah. However, if one eats less than a k'zayit, they are not liable for lashes. This is intriguing because typically, liability for lashes applies only when consuming a k'zayit. In this case, the gid hanasheh is considered a separate entity, a "beriah," which carries its own legal status. Thus, even if one consumes less than a k'zayit, they are still liable for lashes due to the gid hanasheh's unique nature.
The discussion continues with a scenario where an individual consumes k'zayit portions from both sides of the gid hanasheh. If they were warned before each consumption, they would incur a total of eighty lashes, as each consumption constitutes a separate prohibition. Rabbi Yehuda, however, argues that only one side counts, resulting in a liability of forty lashes, as he believes the gid hanasheh is only considered a prohibition on one side.
As the Gemara unfolds, we encounter Bar Piyulei, who was in front of Shmuel. He was engaged in the process of nikkur, removing the gid from the thigh. Bar Piyulei was cutting the gid flush against the meat, following Rabbi Yehuda’s opinion. Shmuel advised him to cut deeper to ensure he was removing the gid that is absorbed in the meat. Bar Piyulei became apprehensive, fearing that Shmuel might perceive him as ignorant or wicked for not properly removing the gid. Shmuel reassured him, clarifying that he was following Rabbi Yehuda’s approach, which was valid, while he himself adhered to the stricter view of Rabbi Meir.
Rav Sheshet then comments on the actions of Bar Piyulei, indicating that the portion he removed was indeed the gid hanasheh that is considered a prohibition according to Rabbi Yehuda. However, he left behind the portion that is a rabbinic prohibition. This raises questions about Bar Piyulei's adherence to halachic authority, as he did not fully follow either Rabbi Meir or the Rabbanan by leaving the lower gid intact.
Shmuel states that the Torah only prohibits the gid that lies on the bone, as indicated in the phrase “al kaf hayerech.” This gid, which is located at the upper thigh, is the only part that incurs liability. The lower portion is not prohibited by the Torah, as the prohibition specifically refers to that which rests on the bone.
Rav Papa introduces a dispute among the Tannaim regarding the gid hanasheh. If one consumes the entire gid but it does not reach a k'zayit, they are not liable. Rabbi Yehuda argues that it must contain a k'zayit to incur liability, while the Rabbanan maintain that even less than a k'zayit is sufficient because it is a beriah.
The Gemara further explores the reasoning behind the Rabbanan's position, emphasizing that the gid hanasheh is treated as a separate entity, which carries its own halachic implications. Rabbi Yehuda, on the other hand, bases his argument on the interpretation of the term "achilah," asserting that one cannot be liable for less than a k'zayit.
Ultimately, the discussion highlights the complexity surrounding the gid hanasheh, including its unique classification and the differing opinions among the Tannaim regarding its consumption and the resulting liabilities. The intricacies of these rulings reflect the depth of halachic discourse and the importance of understanding the nuances within the Torah's prohibitions.
As we conclude this section, we recognize the significance of these discussions in shaping our understanding of Jewish law, particularly regarding the gid hanasheh and its implications for consumption. The careful examination of these halachic principles not only guides our practice but also deepens our appreciation for the richness of Torah study.