Let us begin today’s study of Keritot, on the second side of the page, near the bottom, approximately four lines above the words “Matkif le-Rava.” We are discussing a form of sorcery called Ov. The question is: what exactly is an Ov, and what does the practitioner do?
Yesterday, the Gemara said that the practitioner of Ov in the Mishnah is the one who brings incense to a demon. This is clearly an action that he performs. The issue is that the Mishnah discusses all the cases for which a person is liable to bring a sin offering, and the Sages excluded the blasphemer because his transgression does not involve a physical action. The Gemara therefore considered whether Ov should also be excluded, since perhaps it does not involve a significant action.
The Gemara answered that the Ov under discussion is not merely the case in which a person moves his hands while a bone is placed beneath his armpit. Perhaps that would not be considered a significant action according to the Sages. Rather, this is a more substantial action: he actually brings incense to the demon. That is why the Sages consider it an action, and why he is liable to bring a sin offering. This is why the Mishnah did not exclude Ov together with the blasphemer.
Rava challenged this explanation: If so, this is simply idolatry. Bringing an offering of incense to a demon is already a form of idolatry, and idolatry is explicitly listed in the Mishnah as one of the transgressions for which a person brings a sin offering. Why, then, would Ov be a separate case?
The Gemara answered that the person is not bowing to the demon or worshipping it. His intention is to connect himself to the demon, to establish a bond with it, so that the demon will assist him. He brings the incense in order to draw the demon toward himself and attach it to him, enabling him to use it to carry out his wishes.
The Gemara then asks whether this is not another form of sorcery, known as a practice of gathering and combining forces. That form of sorcery involves bringing different animals or forces together so that the practitioner can use them. We know that there is no liability to bring a sin offering for that transgression. We therefore seem to be stuck: if the person brings incense to a demon, it is idolatry; and if he is merely combining forces, there is no obligation to bring a sin offering.
The Gemara answers that the Torah distinguishes between the ordinary case and this particular case. The ordinary case is when a person gathers animals, such as snakes and scorpions, in order to use them. For example, he might bring them together so that they will fight one another rather than harm someone. That is one type of sorcery, and it is prohibited by a negative commandment, for which he receives lashes.
However, when he performs the act in order to connect himself to a demon, that is a different form of the practice. The connection itself is a more severe transgression, and that is the case of Ov mentioned in the Mishnah. Thus, the ordinary gathering of animals is a prohibition punishable by lashes, whereas bringing incense to a demon in order to attach oneself to it is the more severe case for which the person is liable to a sin offering.
If someone gathers animals in order to save his own life—for example, if snakes or scorpions are pursuing him—he may obviously do what is necessary to protect himself. The case under discussion is when he gathers them without such a purpose, merely so that they will fight one another or so that he can use them. That is the ordinary prohibition. The case of Ov, however, involves bringing a demon to oneself through incense and creating a connection with it.
Rabbi Yohanan said that bending one’s entire body is considered a physical action. This relates to the question we discussed yesterday concerning bowing to idolatry: is bowing considered an action, making a person liable to a sin offering, or is it not considered an action? Rabbi Yohanan clearly says that bending the entire body is an action.
The Gemara challenges this from the case of the blasphemer. If moving one’s lips is considered an action, then blasphemy should also involve an action. Yet the Sages in the Mishnah said that the blasphemer is not liable to a sin offering because his transgression does not involve an action.
Rava answers that moving one’s lips is normally considered an action. Blasphemy, however, is fundamentally dependent on the heart. A person must have the intention to blaspheme. Since the essential element of the transgression is the intention in his heart, the physical movement of his lips is not treated as the relevant action for purposes of a sin offering. Ordinary movement of the lips is considered an action, but in the case of blasphemy the decisive element is the person’s intention.
Rabbi Zeira challenges this from the case of conspiring witnesses. The Torah states that conspiring witnesses are excluded because they do not perform an action. These are witnesses who testify in court that they saw a particular event, and other witnesses then establish that the first witnesses could not have seen it because they were with them elsewhere at that time. The first witnesses become conspiring witnesses.
Why do conspiring witnesses not receive lashes? The Torah says, “According to the testimony of witnesses.” They certainly moved their lips when they testified. If moving one’s lips is considered an action, then their testimony should be considered an action, and they should receive lashes.
Rava answers that the essential element of their testimony is not the movement of their lips but what they claim to have seen. Their testimony is fundamentally based on their alleged perception. The fact that they uttered the words is secondary. Their liability is connected to the testimony concerning what they supposedly saw, and that is why the case is treated as lacking a physical action.
This is connected to a difficulty discussed by the commentators. One explanation cited in the Gemara is that, in certain circumstances, the second witness does not actually need to repeat the first witness’s words. The court asks the second witness whether he agrees with what the first witness said, and he answers with a simple affirmation. Such an answer can be given without moving the lips. The first witness’s testimony by itself is insufficient; the second witness must affirm it, but his affirmation may consist of a sound or gesture that does not involve the formal movement of the lips required for speech. According to this explanation, the conspiring witnesses do not necessarily perform an action through their testimony.
At any rate, the difficulty remains that the witnesses are being disqualified on the basis of what they allegedly saw, even though the testimony itself is delivered orally.
We now come to the next case in the Mishnah: one who eats forbidden fat.
The Sages taught that the prohibition against eating forbidden fat is written in Leviticus: “You shall not eat any fat of an ox, sheep, or goat.” We immediately see a question. The Torah identifies three species: an ox, a sheep, and a goat. Rabbi Ishmael says that the reason all three are mentioned is to make a person liable separately for each species. If a person eats forbidden fat from an ox, a sheep, and a goat after receiving one warning, he is liable for three sets of lashes.
The Sages say that he is liable only once. What is the basis of their disagreement?
Rabbi Ishmael understands the verse as establishing separate prohibitions. Although the Torah uses the general wording, “You shall not eat,” the mention of the ox, the sheep, and the goat makes it as though the Torah had stated separately: “You shall not eat the fat of an ox,” “You shall not eat the fat of a sheep,” and “You shall not eat the fat of a goat.” Therefore, he is liable for three separate prohibitions.
The Sages disagree. In their view, the verse contains one general prohibition that applies to all three species. Even though the Torah lists three examples, the person has violated one prohibition and is therefore liable only once.
The Sages challenge Rabbi Ishmael: If the Torah had wanted to teach that each species constitutes a separate prohibition, it could have written only, “You shall not eat all fat of an ox.” Since an ox is an animal, we would have understood that the fat of an ordinary animal is prohibited, whereas perhaps the fat of a wild animal would be permitted. Why, then, did the Torah also mention sheep and goat? This suggests that the additional species are not intended to create separate prohibitions but to exclude the fat of wild animals.
Rabbi Ishmael answers that the fat of wild animals is excluded from the prohibition for another reason. The context of the verse itself teaches that the prohibition applies only to domesticated animals. Therefore, he does not need the words “sheep” and “goat” to exclude wild animals. Those additional words must be coming to establish separate prohibitions.
The Sages respond that the context does not establish this distinction. If the Torah had mentioned only the ox, one might have reasoned by analogy from the laws of Shabbat. In the laws of Shabbat, the Torah speaks of one’s ox, but the prohibition also applies to other animals, including wild animals and birds. One might therefore have assumed that when the Torah says “the fat of an ox,” the prohibition also applies to the fat of a wild animal. The mention of sheep and goat teaches that the prohibition is limited to the listed domesticated species.
Rabbi Ishmael answers that the Torah did not need to mention the ox at all. It could have written only “sheep and goat,” and we would not have made the analogy from Shabbat. Once the Torah nevertheless mentions all three species, the additional words must be intended to establish separate prohibitions.
The Sages challenge this as well. If the Torah had written only “the fat of a sheep,” one might have thought that sheep are treated more stringently because a special part of a sheep, the tail fat, is offered on the altar. Since sheep possess this special feature, perhaps the Torah’s prohibition is limited to them. The Torah therefore had to mention the ox and the goat as well, to teach that the prohibition applies to all three species. The additional species are not evidence of separate prohibitions.
The Gemara says that this is a valid challenge to Rabbi Ishmael. Rabbi Ishmael therefore revises his explanation. His teaching is not based on the idea that the Torah listed three species merely to exclude wild animals. Rather, the fact that the Torah mentions all three species indicates that the prohibition is divided into separate categories. If the Torah had intended only to prohibit the fat of domesticated animals, it could have chosen one species. Since it deliberately wrote all three, the verse teaches that the categories are distinct.
The Sages then explain why all three species are necessary according to their view. If the Torah had mentioned only sheep and goat, one might not have known that the prohibition applies to oxen. Sheep and goats possess features that oxen do not. Sheep and goats are suitable for the Passover offering, whereas an ox is not. Therefore, the Torah had to mention the ox as well. Conversely, if it had mentioned only an ox and a sheep, one could have argued that the fat of a goat is excluded because goats have other special features. Each species therefore needs to be mentioned, not to create a separate prohibition, but to prevent an argument based on a unique characteristic of the other species.
The Gemara develops this reasoning through several possible pairings. One might combine sheep and goat and infer the ox from them, but sheep and goats are both suitable for the Passover offering, whereas an ox is not. One might combine an ox and a goat and infer the sheep, but an ox and a goat are both used for communal offerings connected with idolatry, whereas a sheep is not. One might combine an ox and a sheep and infer the goat, but oxen and sheep possess special features connected with offerings on the altar: an ox has more extensive libations, and a sheep has the special tail fat that is offered on the altar. Each possible pair therefore has a feature that prevents us from deriving the third species through a common principle. For that reason, all three species must be written.
At this point, the Gemara has temporarily shifted from the prohibition against eating forbidden fat to another verse concerning the offering of forbidden fat on the altar. The Torah states that the fat of an ox, sheep, and goat is offered on the altar. Why are all three species mentioned there as well?
If the Torah had mentioned only an ox, we could not necessarily have derived sheep and goats, because an ox has a special stringency: its libations are greater. If it had mentioned only a sheep, we could not necessarily have derived the other species, because the sheep has the special tail fat that is offered on the altar. If it had mentioned only a goat, we could not necessarily have derived the others, because a goat is used for a sin offering. Thus, each species has a unique feature, and all three must be explicitly mentioned to teach that the fat of each is offered on the altar.
The Gemara then returns to the original issue. The Sages had argued that the Torah could not have written only “sheep,” because one might have thought that the prohibition applies only to sheep, which possess the special tail fat. Rabbi Ishmael responds that the very fact that the Torah mentions the ox, sheep, and goat together demonstrates that the verse is dividing the prohibition into separate categories.
Rabbi Hanania explains that the Torah’s repeated references to the fat of an ox, sheep, and goat in connection with the altar teach that the fat of each of these species is offered there. The Torah could not have written only one of them, because each species has a characteristic that prevents us from deriving the others through a simple analogy.
We now return to the question of whether eating the fat of an ox, sheep, and goat after one warning creates liability for three sets of lashes. The Gemara says that Rabbi Ishmael’s position is based on the additional wording of the verse. The Sages, however, maintain that the additional species are needed to exclude the fat of wild animals. According to the Sages, the verse is not dividing the prohibition into separate prohibitions.
Rabbi Ishmael responds that the permission to eat the fat of wild animals can be learned from the context of another verse. The Torah states that one who eats the fat of an animal from which an offering is brought is liable to excision. The surrounding verses concern sacrificial animals and the fat placed on the altar. Since wild animals are not offered on the altar, the comparison between the fat forbidden for consumption and the fat offered on the altar teaches that the prohibition applies only to domesticated animals. Therefore, Rabbi Ishmael does not need the words “ox, sheep, and goat” to exclude wild animals.
The Sages reject this derivation. They agree that one may learn from the context of a verse, but they require the contexts to be sufficiently similar. Here, one verse states a prohibition against eating fat, while the other verse states the punishment of excision for eating sacrificial fat. Since one verse concerns a prohibition and the other concerns a punishment, they do not regard them as the same context. Therefore, the prohibition against the fat of wild animals must be learned from the explicit mention of the three domesticated species.
The Gemara considers whether one may nevertheless derive a prohibition from a verse concerning excision. The answer is that a prohibition may be derived from another prohibition, and in some circumstances even from a verse concerning excision. However, the Sages do not accept that derivation in this case. They therefore maintain that the words “ox, sheep, and goat” are needed to exclude wild animals, leaving Rabbi Ishmael to use the additional words to establish separate prohibitions.
Rav Mori raised another issue to Rav Zvid. In another discussion, the Gemara establishes that the tail fat of a sheep is also called forbidden fat. If so, why is the tail fat of an ordinary non-sacrificial animal permitted? The Torah says, “You shall not eat any fat,” and the tail fat is called fat. Why should it not be included?
Rav Zvid answered that the Torah’s wording requires a type of fat that is called fat with respect to all three species—ox, sheep, and goat. The tail fat is called forbidden fat only with respect to a sheep. It is not called that with respect to an ox or a goat. Since it does not share the designation across all three species, it is not included in the prohibition. The tail fat of a sheep may therefore be eaten when it comes from an ordinary non-sacrificial animal.
Accordingly, the mention of all three species serves two purposes. It excludes the tail fat of an ordinary sheep from the prohibition, because that designation does not apply equally to all three species, and it also teaches Rabbi Ishmael’s principle that each species constitutes a separate prohibition.
Rabbi Hanina now discusses the distinction between lashes and a sin offering. Rabbi Ishmael says that if a person eats the fat of an ox, sheep, and goat after one warning, he receives three sets of lashes. One might assume that he would also bring three sin offerings, since he violated three prohibitions. Rabbi Hanina teaches that Rabbi Ishmael agrees that, with respect to the sin offering, he brings only one.
This follows the distinction between the cases of the forbidden relationships and the present case. In the case of forbidden relationships, each prohibition is stated in a separate verse, and therefore each can generate a separate sin offering. Here, however, all three species are included in one verse. Even though the verse creates separate liabilities for lashes, it does not create separate obligations for sin offerings. Therefore, Rabbi Ishmael agrees that the person brings only one sin offering.
The Sages taught that the verse says, “And he shall do one of them,” and also uses language that can be understood to mean “many.” This teaches that a person can perform one general type of transgression and nevertheless become liable for several sin offerings.
What is the case? If a person eats forbidden fat, remembers that it is prohibited, forgets again, and then eats more forbidden fat, he brings two sin offerings. Each time he remembers and then forgets, a new period of inadvertence begins. The separate periods of forgetting divide the liability.
Similarly, if he eats two different types of forbidden fat during two separate periods of inadvertence, he brings two sin offerings. The periods of inadvertence themselves certainly divide the liability.
The Gemara then asks about a case in which the person eats two different prohibited substances during one period of inadvertence. What divides the liability in that case? The fact that the substances have different names is not always enough. If a person eats forbidden fat from two different species, the prohibition is still fundamentally the prohibition against eating forbidden fat. Why should the different species create two sin offerings when the person never remembered the prohibition in between?
The Gemara answers that different names can divide the liability when one object carries two distinct prohibitions. For example, a person might eat sacrificial meat that is both forbidden fat and leftover sacrificial meat. He can then be liable for the prohibition against forbidden fat and for the prohibition against eating sacrificial meat after its permitted time. These are two separate prohibitions, even though they apply to the same piece of food.
The Gemara brings a teaching concerning one who eats the forbidden fat of an animal carcass. He is liable twice: once for eating forbidden fat and once for eating a carcass. If he eats the forbidden fat of sacrificial animals, he is also liable twice: once for eating forbidden fat and once for eating sacrificial food.
Rabbi Judah says that one who eats the forbidden fat of sacrificial animals is liable three times. One liability is for eating sacrificial food, and the other two are for the two separate prohibitions of forbidden fat that Rabbi Judah derives from two different verses. This provides a case in which one act of eating creates two liabilities for forbidden fat, in addition to the liability for eating sacrificial food.
When this teaching was discussed in the Land of Israel, the scholars asked why it was necessary to use Rabbi Judah’s case of sacrificial fat. Why not give a simpler example based on Rabbi Ishmael? If Rabbi Ishmael says that the fat of an ox, sheep, and goat creates three separate liabilities, then one could say that a person ate the fat of an ox and the fat of a sheep during one period of inadvertence and should bring two sin offerings.
The answer is that Rabbi Ishmael’s statement was made only with respect to lashes. He does not necessarily say that the different species create separate sin offerings. As we explained, because all three species are included in one verse, even Rabbi Ishmael agrees that only one sin offering is brought. Therefore, Rabbi Ishmael cannot provide the required example. Rabbi Judah’s teaching is necessary because he derives two separate prohibitions from two separate verses, and the case involves distinct prohibitions applying to the same food.
The Gemara ultimately explains that the case of two sin offerings is when the person eats one prohibited substance in two different portions or dishes, and the law is that separate portions divide the liability. Just as separate periods of inadvertence divide liability, so too separate containers or portions can divide liability according to the relevant opinion.
The Gemara returns to Rabbi Judah’s teaching. The underlying source is a verse that places forbidden fat and blood together: “You shall not eat any fat or any blood.” Rabbi Judah says that just as forbidden fat creates two liabilities in the case of sacrificial food, blood should also create two liabilities when it is the blood of sacrificial animals, even though the Torah does not repeat the word “blood” in the same manner.
The Sages disagree. In their view, blood creates only one liability. Rabbi Judah challenges them: if the Torah placed forbidden fat and blood together, and forbidden fat creates two liabilities, blood should also create two.
The Sages answer that there is no need to derive this from the comparison between fat and blood. Just as Rabbi Judah found two verses concerning forbidden fat, there are also two verses concerning blood. Therefore, one can establish the relevant prohibition directly from those verses, without using the comparison.
The Gemara then explains that Rabbi Judah’s comparison is still necessary. One might have thought that blood is excluded from the law of sacrificial misuse, because the Torah explicitly excludes blood from certain laws. Once blood is excluded from one area, one might also have assumed that it is excluded from the law that a non-priest may not eat sacrificial food. The comparison between blood and forbidden fat teaches that just as a non-priest is prohibited from eating sacrificial fat, he is also prohibited from eating sacrificial blood.
According to the Sages, however, the comparison serves a different purpose. It teaches that the measures of forbidden fat and blood are treated similarly with respect to combining different substances.
Forbidden fat is unique in that it is distinct from the ordinary flesh of the animal. The flesh is permitted, while the fat is prohibited, and the two do not combine to complete the minimum measure for liability. If a person eats half the required amount of forbidden fat and half the required amount of ordinary flesh, the two are not combined.
The comparison teaches that blood is treated in the same way. Even though blood is prohibited in animals that are not suitable for sacrifice as well, blood and flesh do not combine to complete the minimum measure for liability. If a person eats half the required amount of blood and half the required amount of flesh, the two substances are treated separately.
The Gemara asks whether this comparison can also teach the law concerning the blood of creeping creatures. The blood of a creeping creature is not prohibited because it is blood in the same sense as the blood of an animal; it is prohibited because it is part of the creeping creature. Perhaps, then, the blood of a creeping creature should combine with the creature’s flesh, since both are prohibited under the same general prohibition.
The Gemara answers that the blood and flesh of a creeping creature do combine. The comparison between forbidden fat and blood applies where the blood is a separate prohibition from the flesh. In the case of a creeping creature, the blood is prohibited as part of the creature itself, and therefore the two may combine to complete the required measure.
The Gemara asks whether this is the source for the law that the flesh and blood of a creeping creature combine with respect to ritual impurity. The answer is no. That law is learned from another source. The present comparison is needed specifically for the laws of eating. One might have thought that the comparison applies only to ritual impurity, while the flesh and blood of a creeping creature would not combine for purposes of eating. The verse therefore teaches that they do combine in the context of eating as well.
Ravina summarizes the principle: the blood and flesh of a snake combine because the blood is not treated as a separate prohibition from the flesh. The blood and flesh of a creeping creature likewise combine because the prohibition applies to the creature as a whole. However, when blood is a distinct prohibition from the flesh, as in the case of ordinary animals, the two do not combine.
The essential distinction is whether the blood is separated from the flesh as an independent prohibition. Where the blood and the flesh are governed by separate prohibitions, they do not combine. Where the blood is prohibited only as part of the same creature, they do combine.