We begin today’s page on 42b, at the words “Rav Ashi said,” approximately ten lines down. Let us first review the Gemara. We learned in the Mishnah that, in the case of the red heifer, while the animal is alive it is not susceptible to the ritual impurity of food. Once it is slaughtered, however, it becomes susceptible to that impurity.
Rabbi Shimon disagrees. He says that the animal does not require a period during which it is fit for consumption in order to be considered food. Since, after it has been slaughtered, it is possible to redeem it, it is considered as though it has already been redeemed. One can say, “I can redeem it because I can obtain another animal,” and remove its sanctity. It is therefore treated as ordinary food, and it can become susceptible to the ritual impurity of food. That was Rabbi Shimon’s position.
We then said that just as Rabbi Shimon holds that anything destined to be redeemed is considered as though it has already been redeemed, he also holds that anything destined to have its blood sprinkled is considered as though the blood has already been sprinkled.
Consider the following case. An animal is alive, and therefore it is obviously not susceptible to the ritual impurity of food. It is then slaughtered as a sacrifice. Suppose that the meat becomes leftover because the time during which it may be eaten has passed—for example, the night has passed. Is this meat susceptible to ritual impurity?
We explained that the answer depends on whether there was an opportunity for the blood to be sprinkled. If the meat became leftover before the blood could be sprinkled—for example, the animal was slaughtered immediately before sunset, so there was no practical opportunity to sprinkle the blood—then it never had a period during which it was fit for the priests, and it is not susceptible to the ritual impurity of food. If, however, the animal was slaughtered in the middle of the day, then even if the blood was not actually sprinkled, there was potentially an opportunity to do so. Since the blood could have been sprinkled and the meat could thereby have become permitted to the priests, it is considered as though the blood had been sprinkled, and the meat is susceptible to the ritual impurity of food.
That is how we explained the baraita. When the baraita speaks of the blood having been sprinkled or not having been sprinkled, it does not necessarily mean that the act was physically performed. It means that there was either a potential opportunity to sprinkle the blood or no such opportunity. If there was such an opportunity, it is treated as though the blood had been sprinkled; if there was not, it is not treated that way. With that explanation, everything fit together.
Rav Ashi offers a different answer. He says that we do not have to interpret the baraita as referring to an animal slaughtered immediately before sunset, where there was no time to sprinkle the blood. We can understand the words literally. In the case of redemption, no physical action is necessary; one can redeem an item through a verbal declaration. Therefore, even if the redemption was not actually performed, it can be treated as though it had been performed. Sprinkling the blood, however, requires a physical action. One must actually sprinkle the blood. Therefore, we should not say that an animal destined to have its blood sprinkled is considered as though the blood had already been sprinkled.
According to this explanation, when the baraita says that the blood was sprinkled, it means that it was actually sprinkled, and when it says that it was not sprinkled, it means that it was not sprinkled. It is not referring to an animal that was merely fit or destined for the sprinkling of its blood.
The Gemara raises a difficulty from a Mishnah in Meilah. The Mishnah states a general principle: Any item that had a period during which it was permitted to the priests, and subsequently became disqualified, is not subject to the prohibition of misappropriating sacred property. Once an item was legally available for the priests to benefit from, even if it later became prohibited, there is no misappropriation. By contrast, if it never had a period during which it was permitted to the priests, it remains subject to misappropriation.
The Mishnah gives several examples. If sacrificial meat remained overnight, it had previously been permitted to the priests and then became disqualified. If it became ritually impure, it had previously been permitted and then became disqualified. If it left the Temple courtyard, it had previously been fit for the priests and then became disqualified. In all these cases, because there was a period during which the priests were permitted to benefit from the item, there is no misappropriation afterward.
The Mishnah then gives a case in which there was never a period during which the priests were permitted to benefit: an animal that was slaughtered outside the proper time or outside the proper place. If, at the time of slaughter, the person had an improper intention, the sacrifice was disqualified from the outset. Similarly, if the blood was sprinkled by someone who was disqualified from performing that service, there was no valid period during which the sacrifice was permitted to the priests.
The Gemara asks: When the Mishnah says that meat that remained overnight had a period during which it was permitted to the priests, what exactly is the case? We might have thought that the entire sacrifice remained overnight—the meat as well as the blood—and that the blood was never sprinkled. If so, where was the period during which the priests were permitted to benefit from it? The answer would have to be that, since the blood could have been sprinkled, anything destined to have its blood sprinkled is considered as though the blood had already been sprinkled.
This would contradict Rav Ashi. Rav Ashi said that sprinkling requires an actual act, and we do not treat an act that could have been performed as though it had been performed.
Rav Ashi answers that the Mishnah is not speaking about a case in which the blood remained overnight. It is speaking about a case in which the blood was actually sprinkled and only the meat remained overnight. The phrase “it remained overnight” refers to the meat. The blood had already been sprinkled, and the meat had therefore become permitted to the priests. It subsequently remained overnight and became disqualified. That is why there is no misappropriation.
At first, we misunderstood the case and assumed that everything had remained overnight, including the blood. In reality, only the meat remained overnight. The blood had already been sprinkled, so there truly was a period during which the meat was permitted. Consequently, the Mishnah does not prove that anything destined to have its blood sprinkled is treated as though the sprinkling had actually taken place.
The Gemara raises a further question concerning the wording of the Mishnah. If the case is one in which the blood was actually sprinkled, the Mishnah should say, “Any item that has a period during which it is permitted to the priests.” Why does it use the past tense—“Any item that had a period during which it was permitted”? The wording seems to suggest that the issue is whether the item ever had such a period, rather than whether it is presently permitted.
According to the explanation that the blood was actually sprinkled, the Mishnah should have said simply that an item with a period of priestly permission is not subject to misappropriation, while an item without such a period is subject to misappropriation. Why does it say “had”—as though the relevant fact is that there was once a period of permission?
One could respond that the wording is appropriate because the case of meat that remained overnight is precisely a case in which the meat was once permitted and then became prohibited. Nevertheless, the Gemara understands the wording as suggesting that perhaps the entire case is one in which the blood had not yet been sprinkled, but there was nevertheless an opportunity to sprinkle it. That would again imply that something destined for sprinkling is treated as though it had already been sprinkled, which is the difficulty against Rav Ashi.
Rav Ashi therefore says that we must distinguish between the laws of ritual impurity and the laws of misappropriating sacred property. Previously, he was speaking about the ritual impurity of food. The Mishnah in Meilah is speaking about misappropriation, and the two areas operate according to different principles.
The prohibition of misappropriation depends on sanctity. If an item possesses sanctity, there can be misappropriation; if it no longer possesses sanctity, there is no misappropriation. Once the sanctity has been removed, it does not return. Therefore, if an item had a period during which it was permitted to the priests, the sanctity relevant to misappropriation has been removed, and the prohibition does not return later when the item becomes disqualified.
In that context, one can say that once an animal is destined to have its blood sprinkled, it is treated as though the relevant sanctity has already been removed. The issue is whether the item is still sacred for purposes of misappropriation. If there was a period during which it could have become permitted to the priests, there is no misappropriation. The Mishnah is therefore concerned with whether the sacrifice had a period of priestly permission, even if that period is no longer present.
Ritual impurity of food follows a different logic. It depends on whether the item is food. The question is not whether the item can potentially become food, but whether it is presently considered edible. Once the blood has been sprinkled, the meat is edible and can become susceptible to the ritual impurity of food. If the blood has not been sprinkled, the meat is not presently edible for this purpose.
Therefore, with regard to ritual impurity, we cannot say that anything destined to have its blood sprinkled is considered as though the blood has already been sprinkled. One must ask whether the blood was actually sprinkled. With regard to misappropriation, however, the question is whether the item still possesses sanctity. Once there was a period during which the priests were permitted to benefit from it, the relevant sanctity has been removed, and the misappropriation prohibition does not return.
This is the distinction Rav Ashi is making. With regard to misappropriation, the principle concerns sanctity: does the item still possess the sanctity that generates misappropriation, or not? With regard to ritual impurity, the principle concerns food: is the item presently edible, or is it not? We cannot say that meat is presently food merely because the blood might eventually be sprinkled. We must know whether the blood was actually sprinkled.
The Gemara then raises another question from a Mishnah in Keritot. The Mishnah discusses someone who brings an uncertain guilt offering, an offering brought when a person is unsure whether he committed a transgression that would require a sin offering. Until he determines whether he sinned, he brings this offering in order to protect himself in the interim.
If he later discovers that he did not sin, and he discovers this before the animal has been slaughtered, the animal may be returned to the pen with the other ordinary animals. There is no problem, because the animal has not yet been slaughtered. The person discovered before the slaughter that he had not committed the transgression, so the animal can be returned and grazed.
There is also a view that a person may voluntarily bring an uncertain guilt offering every day. According to that view, one does not need to know that he committed a transgression. A person may assume that he must have committed some transgression of which he is unaware and bring such an offering daily.
The Mishnah continues: If the person discovered that he had not sinned only after the animal had been slaughtered, the blood is poured out, the meat may not be given to the priests, and the meat must be burned in the place designated for burning disqualified offerings. This is referring to the stage before the blood was sprinkled.
The Mishnah adds that even if the blood is already in the service vessel, the offering is nevertheless continued. One proceeds with it rather than simply discarding it. What is the logic of this ruling?
Rabbi Yosef and Rabbi Shimon explain it with the principle that anything destined to have its blood sprinkled is considered as though the blood has already been sprinkled. Once the blood is in the service vessel, it is treated as though it has already been placed on the altar, and the offering is continued.
But this creates a difficulty. Earlier, Rav Ashi rejected the principle that anything destined for sprinkling is considered as though it had been sprinkled. Yet here Rabbi Yosef and Rabbi Shimon appear to be relying on precisely that principle.
The Gemara answers that this is not necessarily the reason for Rabbi Yosef’s ruling. Rabbi Yosef may hold a different principle: Service vessels sanctify even disqualified items. Although this uncertain guilt offering became disqualified once the person discovered that he had not sinned, the service vessel sanctifies it. Since it is in the service vessel, it is treated as sanctified even for purposes of being brought upon the altar.
According to this explanation, the offering is continued not because it is considered as though its blood had already been sprinkled, but because the service vessel has the power to sanctify a disqualified item. We initially thought that the reason was that anything destined for sprinkling is considered as though it had been sprinkled. The Gemara clarifies that this is not necessary. The service vessel itself creates the relevant sanctity.
It is important that this is not a case in which the offering was disqualified from the very beginning. When the animal was brought, it was fit. Only afterward did the person discover that he had not committed the transgression. This is therefore a particular category of disqualification, and Rabbi Yosef holds that the service vessel sanctifies an item in such a case and allows the procedure to continue.
Rav Ashi then raises a difficulty against this distinction from the case of the red heifer. Rabbi Shimon said that the red heifer is susceptible to the ritual impurity of food. But if Rabbi Shimon holds that anything destined to be burned is treated as though it has already been burned, why is the red heifer considered food? At this point, it is destined to be burned. If it is treated as though it has already been burned, it should be nothing more than ashes, and ashes are not food.
Let us return to the case of the red heifer. It is standing on the arrangement of wood and is destined to be burned. According to the principle that anything destined to be burned is treated as though it has already been burned, it should already be considered burned. If so, it should be merely ashes. How, then, can it be susceptible to the ritual impurity of food?
The answer is that the special sanctity of sacred matters prepares the item to receive ritual impurity. Even though the red heifer is not ordinarily considered food at that point, the sanctity associated with it gives it the status necessary to become susceptible to impurity. The sanctity itself creates this legal status.
The Gemara then asks how far this principle extends. It is understandable that the red heifer can be considered susceptible to the ritual impurity of food when impurity comes into contact with it. But does it also receive the status of a first-degree source of impurity, capable of rendering another item impure? Is it itself merely susceptible to impurity, or can it actually transmit impurity to other items as well?
This is similar to the question raised by Reish Lakish concerning dry flour from a meal offering. The flour was supposed to be mixed with oil, but some of the flour remained dry and never came into contact with the oil. Normally, for flour to become susceptible to impurity, it must come into contact with one of the seven liquids. Oil is one of those liquids.
The question is whether the dry granules are nevertheless considered susceptible to impurity because they are part of a sacred meal offering. Does the sanctity of the offering prepare even the dry flour to receive impurity, despite the fact that it never touched the oil? And if the flour becomes impure, does the impurity remain limited to the flour itself, or can it render other items impure as a first- or second-degree source?
From the case of the red heifer, it appears that the sanctity of sacred matters does more than merely make an item susceptible to impurity. It may also give the item the status of impurity that can affect other items. If so, the case of the red heifer would answer Reish Lakish’s question concerning the dry flour.
The Gemara responds that the cases must be distinguished. The impurity associated with leftover sacrificial meat and with the red heifer is a rabbinic enactment based on the principle that the sanctity of sacred matters prepares an item to receive impurity. In those cases, the Sages can establish that the item is susceptible to impurity and can transmit impurity to others.
Reish Lakish’s question, however, concerns a situation in which the impurity would be of Torah origin. The question is whether the principle that the sanctity of sacred matters prepares an item to receive impurity applies on the Torah level, and whether it extends to making that item a first- or second-degree source capable of rendering other items impure.
With regard to a rabbinic enactment, the Sages can establish the appropriate safeguards for sacred matters. The question is different when one seeks to derive a Torah-level law from this principle. Do we say that the sanctity of sacred matters creates only susceptibility to impurity, or does it also create a full status of impurity that can continue through additional stages?
For example, suppose the dry flour became impure even though it had never touched the oil. If it is considered a first-degree source of impurity on the Torah level, then it can render terumah or other sacred food a second-degree source of impurity. That food would then be disqualified and would have to be burned. If, however, the flour’s status is only rabbinic, the terumah would be disqualified only by rabbinic law, and it would not necessarily have to be burned.
The same question applies to sacred food. If the item is considered a first-degree source, it can render another sacred item a second-degree source, and the subsequent item may need to be treated accordingly. If the status is only a rabbinic impurity, the practical consequences are different.
Everyone agrees that, on a rabbinic level, the sanctity of sacred matters can create this status. The question concerns the Torah level. When the Sages say that the sanctity of sacred matters prepares an item to receive impurity, do they mean that the item merely becomes susceptible to impurity, or that it actually becomes impure in a way that can render others impure as well?
That is the unresolved point in the discussion. In the case of the red heifer, the Sages can impose the impurity because of the special concern for sacred matters. In the case of the dry flour, however, Reish Lakish is asking whether the same principle applies as a Torah law and whether the impurity can proceed from one degree to the next.
Thus, the distinction remains between the two systems. In the laws of misappropriation, the central issue is whether the item retains sanctity. Once there was a period during which it was permitted to the priests, the misappropriation prohibition does not return. In the laws of ritual impurity, the central issue is whether the item is presently considered food and whether it can actually transmit impurity. Potential future permissibility is not enough.
With regard to the blood of a sacrifice, we therefore do not say, for purposes of ritual impurity, that anything destined to have its blood sprinkled is automatically considered as though the blood had already been sprinkled. For misappropriation, however, a sacrifice that had a period during which it was permitted to the priests is no longer subject to misappropriation, because the relevant sanctity has been removed and does not return.