The Eddie B. Sitt Edition and Audio Series of the Talmud, Zevahim, has been dedicated by our good friend and student of the daily Talmud class, Binyamin Cohen, whom they call Benny C. May he have success and prosperity. Since he is a priest, may he merit, when the Messiah comes, to serve in the Temple together with the other priests. It is especially fitting that he dedicated this tractate, which discusses the service of the priests in the Temple and the sacrificial offerings.
We are beginning with the Mishnah. The Mishnah discusses all the offerings mentioned in the previous Mishnah: sin offerings, bird sin offerings, and bird burnt offerings, including all the cases in which the offerings were brought with different intentions.
The Mishnah teaches that if someone eats these birds, they do not have the status of an improperly slaughtered carcass. In all the cases we learned, the bird underwent pinching, even when the pinching was not appropriate for the type of offering it was intended to be. For example, one may have brought a sin offering but performed the pinching as though it were a burnt offering, cutting both signs. Although that pinching is not valid for the type of offering intended, and the offering is disqualified, it is still sufficiently considered pinching that the bird does not receive the status of an improperly slaughtered carcass.
Once the bird does not have that status, a person who eats it does not become impure by eating it. One might have thought that since the pinching was not valid for the offering’s intended purpose, the bird should be considered an improperly slaughtered carcass. The Mishnah therefore teaches that the pinching is nevertheless sufficient to prevent that status.
The Mishnah presents another novelty: there is liability for misusing sacred property in these cases. If someone benefited from the offering unintentionally, he must bring the appropriate offering for that misuse. The question is why there should be such liability. We have a general principle that with regard to an offering that eventually becomes permitted for the priests to eat, there is no liability for misuse of sacred property. I understand why this applies to a burnt offering: a burnt offering is placed entirely on the altar, and the priests have no permission to eat it. Therefore, there is liability for misuse.
But a sin offering is not placed entirely on the altar. After the blood is sprinkled and the other procedures are performed, the priest eats the meat. Why, then, should there be liability for misuse in the case of a sin offering?
The law is that when the priests are permitted to eat the offering, there is no liability for misuse. In the cases under discussion, however, the offering was disqualified because the wrong intentions or procedures were used. Once the sin offering becomes disqualified, the priests are no longer permitted to eat it. Since there is no permission for the priests to eat it, there is liability for misuse. That is the basic principle: a burnt offering never becomes permitted for the priests, and the sin offering in these cases is not permitted for them because it was performed incorrectly. Therefore, there is liability for misuse.
The one exception is the case of a sin offering that was performed correctly. If one brought a sin offering, sprinkled its blood below the midpoint of the altar, had the correct intention for a sin offering, and performed the procedure of a sin offering, then there is no liability for misuse. Why? Because the priests eat a properly performed sin offering. This follows the rule that whenever an offering eventually becomes permitted for the priests, there is no liability for misuse.
That is the only case in the Mishnah in which the priests eat the offering: when the sin offering was performed correctly. How is a sin offering performed correctly? Its blood is sprinkled below the midpoint, the intention is for a sin offering, and the procedure is that of a sin offering. When the bird is pinched, only one of the signs is cut; the head is not removed. The blood is then sprinkled, and the remaining blood is squeezed out.
A bird burnt offering that was performed below the midpoint is not valid, because it should have been performed above the midpoint. If it was performed with the procedure of a sin offering and with the intention of a sin offering, the question is whether there is liability for misuse.
Rabbi Eliezer says that there is liability for misuse. His reasoning is that, ultimately, the offering was consecrated as a burnt offering. Since it was designated as a burnt offering, its law is that of a burnt offering. A burnt offering is not permitted for the priests, and therefore it is subject to the laws of misuse.
Rabbi Yehoshua says that there is no liability for misuse. Ultimately, it was brought as a sin offering, and a sin offering is permitted for the priests. Since the priests are permitted to eat it, there is no liability for misuse.
This is a fundamental dispute. Rabbi Eliezer asks: What was the offering designated to be? It was designated as a burnt offering. Do not focus only on how it was ultimately brought; since it was consecrated as a burnt offering, and a burnt offering is not permitted for the priests, there is liability for misuse. Rabbi Yehoshua says that we look at how it was actually brought. It was brought as a sin offering, and a sin offering is normally permitted for the priests. Therefore, there is no liability for misuse.
The Gemara goes back and forth through the rest of the Mishnah, with each side attempting to prove its position. Rabbi Eliezer says that when a sin offering is brought in the ordinary manner, there is no liability for misuse because it is permitted for the priests. However, when a sin offering is brought with the intention of a burnt offering, there is liability because it is no longer permitted for the priests. A burnt offering, when brought with its proper intention, has liability for misuse because the priests cannot eat it. Certainly, then, when its designation is changed, there should still be liability for misuse.
Rabbi Yehoshua rejects this argument. When a sin offering is changed to a burnt offering, it is being changed to something that has liability for misuse. A burnt offering is subject to that liability. But in the case of a burnt offering changed to a sin offering, it is being changed to something that generally has no liability for misuse, because a sin offering is eaten by the priests. Therefore, the comparison is not valid.
Rabbi Eliezer offers another proof. The Mishnah discusses a case in which an offering of the highest sanctity was designated with the intention of a lesser sacred offering. A lesser sacred offering does not have liability for misuse throughout the entire animal, and yet the offering of the highest sanctity still has liability for misuse. This demonstrates that the law does not always follow what the offering was changed into; it follows what the offering was originally.
Rabbi Yehoshua responds that this case is different. In the case of a lesser sacred offering, part of the offering remains subject to liability for misuse. The portions placed on the altar are still subject to that liability, even though the portions eaten by the priests are not. Thus, one is moving from an offering with full liability for misuse to an offering with partial liability. But in the case of a burnt offering changed to a sin offering, one is moving from an offering with liability for misuse to something that is entirely permitted for the priests. The sin offering has no portion that remains subject to that liability in this context.
The Mishnah then presents another example. An offering of the highest sanctity was slaughtered in the south, even though it should have been slaughtered in the north, and it was designated with the intention of a peace offering. The offering of the highest sanctity was changed in both its location and its intention, yet there is still liability for misuse. Rabbi Eliezer says that this proves his principle: the offering retains the status with which it began.
Rabbi Yehoshua responds that this case is also different. Although the offering was slaughtered in the wrong place and with the wrong intention, the actual procedure of slaughtering was unchanged. It was still performed in the same manner as the procedure of the original offering. Therefore, it may retain the status of the original offering.
In the case of the bird burnt offering, however, not only was the location changed and not only was the intention changed; the procedure was also changed. A bird burnt offering requires both signs to be cut, whereas the procedure of a bird sin offering requires only one sign. Perhaps when the location, intention, and procedure are all changed, the offering loses its original status.
Rabbi Eliezer responds that even if an offering of the highest sanctity was slaughtered in the south with the intention of a peace offering, it should retain the status of an offering of the highest sanctity and there should be liability for misuse. Rabbi Yehoshua answers that in the case of the offering of the highest sanctity, the procedure itself remained unchanged. In the case of the bird burnt offering, everything changed: the location, the intention, and the procedure. A burnt offering was brought below the midpoint with the intention of a sin offering and with the procedure of a sin offering. That is why the two cases cannot be compared.
Rabbi Eliezer remained silent and did not respond to Rabbi Yehoshua’s last answer. The Gemara understands from this that Rabbi Eliezer accepted Rabbi Yehoshua’s reasoning. When he did not answer, it indicated that he understood and accepted the distinction.
Rabbi Yehoshua used to say that when a bird burnt offering is slaughtered below the midpoint with the intention of a sin offering, and only one sign is cut, it assumes the law of a sin offering. Since a sin offering is performed below the midpoint and with the cutting of one sign, the bird receives the status of a sin offering, and there is no liability for misuse.
The Gemara then asks: If this is the principle, why should the opposite not also be true? Suppose a bird sin offering is performed above the midpoint with the intention of a burnt offering. A burnt offering is performed above the midpoint, so perhaps the sin offering should become a burnt offering.
The Gemara answers that this case is different because the procedure is changed. When one begins to pinch the first sign of a bird, the offering should already begin to receive its relevant status. If a sin offering is being pinched above the midpoint with the intention of a burnt offering, then the procedure is one of a sin offering being performed with the intention of another offering. Such an offering becomes disqualified. Therefore, by the time the second sign is cut, it is already too late to say that the bird should become a valid burnt offering.
The distinction is that a burnt offering brought below the midpoint with the procedure and intention of a sin offering can be treated as a sin offering for purposes of liability for misuse. But a sin offering brought above the midpoint with the intention of a burnt offering becomes disqualified as soon as the first sign is cut. It cannot later become a valid burnt offering.
The Gemara brings a further discussion from the Mishnah. When the Mishnah says that this is the law, it might mean that the case presented in the Mishnah is the only case under discussion: a burnt offering that was brought below the midpoint with the intention of a sin offering. If so, perhaps the principle does not apply in the reverse case of a sin offering brought above the midpoint with the intention of a burnt offering.
The Gemara rejects this limitation. The statement can be understood as applying to all the cases in the Mishnah, including the reverse cases. In principle, a burnt offering can become a sin offering in the relevant sense, just as a sin offering can become a burnt offering in the relevant sense. The question is what that change accomplishes. The Gemara explains that the change affects the law of liability for misuse; it does not necessarily mean that the offering becomes valid for fulfilling the original obligation.
We now turn to Massechet Kinim, which is a very complicated tractate of Mishnayot. The word refers to pairs of birds. The entire tractate discusses situations in which people must bring certain birds as offerings, the birds become mixed up, and the priest brings them anyway. The Mishnah determines which offerings are valid, which are invalid, how many additional birds must now be brought, and which offerings can still fulfill the original obligations. It is almost like a series of mathematical equations using birds as the variables.
The Gemara wants to challenge Rabbi Yehoshua from Massechet Kinim. We are trying to establish that Rabbi Yehoshua is the author of that Mishnah. Rabbi Yehoshua said that when a burnt offering is brought below the midpoint with the intention and procedure of a sin offering, it receives the status of a sin offering for the laws of misuse. The Gemara will cite a case from Massechet Kinim that appears to show otherwise.
Consider a woman who gives birth. She must bring two birds: one sin offering and one burnt offering. Suppose the sin offering of one woman becomes mixed up with the burnt offering of another woman, and the priest brings the birds without asking whose birds they are. If he brings both above the midpoint, one of them will be valid and one will be invalid, because a sin offering brought above is not valid. If he brings both below the midpoint, again one will be valid and one will be invalid, because a burnt offering brought below is not valid.
If he brings one above and one below, the problem is that we do not know which bird he brought where. The sin offering may have been brought above and the burnt offering below. In that case, neither offering is valid. The Gemara asks: According to Rabbi Yehoshua, if a burnt offering brought below with the intention of a sin offering becomes a sin offering, why does the burnt offering in this case not become a sin offering? Why does the Mishnah say that the offering is invalid rather than allowing the burnt offering to assume the status of a sin offering?
The Gemara answers that Rabbi Yehoshua’s principle applies when one person’s offering is brought in the wrong place. A person’s burnt offering may become that same person’s sin offering for the relevant purpose. But in this case there are two women. One woman’s burnt offering cannot become the other woman’s sin offering. It is one person’s burnt offering being changed into someone else’s sin offering, and that is not permitted.
The Gemara brings another case. Two women each have obligations involving two sin offerings and one burnt offering, or one sin offering and two burnt offerings, and their birds become mixed together. Three pairs of birds are brought to the Temple. In the first pair, the designation is made clearly: one bird is designated as the sin offering of one woman and the other as the burnt offering of the other woman. The second pair is left undesignated. In the third pair, one bird is designated as a sin offering and the other as a burnt offering, but the owners are not specified.
Suppose the priest brings all six birds above the midpoint. The burnt offerings are valid, but the sin offerings are not, because a sin offering brought above is invalid. If he brings all six below the midpoint, the sin offerings are valid, but the burnt offerings are not.
When the birds are divided, the birds that were left entirely undesignated can be distributed among the women. But the birds that were explicitly designated as a sin offering and a burnt offering are doubtful. Perhaps the bird that was supposed to be brought above was brought below, and perhaps the bird that was supposed to be brought below was brought above. Since the priest does not know which bird was brought in which place, the designated birds cannot be relied upon.
The Gemara again asks according to Rabbi Yehoshua: If the burnt offering was brought below, why does it not become a sin offering? Why are the birds not counted? The Gemara answers that Rabbi Yehoshua’s principle was stated only where one person’s offering was brought incorrectly. Here, the offerings of two different people were mixed together, and one person’s offering cannot become the other person’s offering.
The Gemara then seeks to establish that Rabbi Yehoshua is in fact the author of Massechet Kinim. It brings cases involving a woman who must bring a sin offering and a burnt offering after giving birth, and who also voluntarily accepts upon herself an additional pair of birds. The additional pair is a voluntary offering, and therefore both are burnt offerings. Altogether, she must bring three burnt offerings and one sin offering.
Suppose she gives the priest four birds, all of the same species, and the priest brings two above the midpoint and two below. The two brought above can serve as burnt offerings. Of the two brought below, one can serve as the sin offering, but the other is not valid as a burnt offering. Therefore, she must bring another burnt offering.
If all the birds are of the same species, it is clear which species the additional burnt offering must be. But suppose she had the option of bringing either turtledoves or young doves, and the four birds included two of each species. She does not remember which species she had designated for her voluntary offering. Since she does not know whether the voluntary offering was to consist of turtledoves or young doves, she must bring one burnt offering of each species to resolve the doubt.
The reason is that the sin offering and the burnt offering associated with the obligation must be of the same species. If the sin offering that was brought below was a turtledove, the corresponding burnt offering must also be a turtledove. If the sin offering was a young dove, the corresponding burnt offering must be a young dove. Since no one knows which species was used for the valid sin offering, one must bring a burnt offering of each species.
The Gemara brings a further case in which the woman does not remember which species she had designated for her voluntary offering, and the priest also brought the birds in a way that leaves a doubt about which birds fulfilled which obligations. The woman must bring additional birds to cover every possibility. Some birds are required for the voluntary offering, because perhaps she had designated turtledoves; others are required because perhaps she had designated young doves. Additional birds are required to match the species of the sin offering associated with her obligation.
The point of these cases is that the final number of birds can exceed the number she would have needed from the beginning. Initially, she had an obligation to bring only a limited number of offerings. Because the birds were mixed up and the procedures were performed without proper clarification, she may now have to bring additional offerings to resolve every doubt.
The Gemara then discusses a woman who accepts a voluntary offering together with her obligatory offering. She intends them to be brought together as one large offering. The preferred order is to bring the voluntary pair first and the obligatory offering afterward, so that the two voluntary birds and the obligatory offering are treated as one sequence. Even if the obligatory offering is brought first and the voluntary offering afterward, as long as they are brought consecutively, the sequence may still be considered connected.
Suppose she brings four birds, all of one species, and the priest brings two above and two below. One bird above can serve as a burnt offering and one bird below can serve as the sin offering. The second bird above can serve as another burnt offering, but the second bird below cannot serve as a burnt offering. Since the voluntary offering may have been of either turtledoves or young doves, she must bring two birds of each species to resolve that doubt, and she must also bring an additional burnt offering to connect the obligatory offering to the rest of the sequence.
If the original four birds included two turtledoves and two young doves, and the priest brought one of each species above and one of each species below, then the obligatory offering is covered in the sense that either pair can provide a matching sin offering and burnt offering. However, it remains uncertain which species was designated for the voluntary offering. Therefore, she must bring two additional turtledoves and two additional young doves for the voluntary offering, as well as one turtledove and one young dove to match the burnt offering associated with the obligatory offering. In total, she must bring six additional birds.
The Gemara then gives the most complicated case. The woman does not remember what she designated, does not know which birds she gave the priest, and the priest also does not know what he did. Perhaps he brought all the birds above, in which case the burnt offerings are valid but there is no valid sin offering. Perhaps he brought them all below, in which case the sin offering may be valid but there are no valid burnt offerings. Perhaps he brought some above and some below.
In this case she must bring four additional birds for the voluntary offering, because she does not know whether she had designated two turtledoves or two young doves. She must also bring two birds for her obligatory offering, one turtledove and one young dove, so that every possible situation is covered.
Why are two birds required for the obligatory offering? Perhaps one of the original birds brought below was a valid sin offering. If so, the new burnt offering must match its species. Since we do not know whether that valid sin offering was a turtledove or a young dove, one must bring a burnt offering of each species. But perhaps all the original birds were brought above, in which case there was no valid sin offering at all. Therefore, she must also bring a new sin offering. That sin offering will establish which species is needed for the corresponding burnt offering.
Rabbi Eliezer ben Azariah says that two sin offerings must be brought. He does not accept the idea that a new sin offering can retroactively determine which of the original burnt offerings was appropriate. He requires two sin offerings so that both possible species are represented and matched with the two burnt offerings.
Ultimately, this is an example of how a person who began with a relatively small obligation can end up needing to bring many more offerings because of uncertainty. A person may begin with only a few offerings, but once the birds are mixed up and it is unclear what was designated or what was done, every possibility must be addressed.
The Gemara compares this to a ram. A ram makes one sound from its mouth, but from its different body parts one can make several instruments. Two trumpets can be made from its horns, flutes from its legs, a drum from its hide, strings for an instrument from its intestines, and other instruments from its various parts. One animal can therefore produce many different sounds. Similarly, one original obligation can, because of multiple uncertainties, result in the need for many offerings.
This establishes that Rabbi Yehoshua is the authority behind the discussion in Massechet Kinim. Once we know that, the Gemara returns to the apparent contradiction. Rabbi Yehoshua says that a burnt offering brought below the midpoint with the intention and procedure of a sin offering receives the law of a sin offering for purposes of liability for misuse. Yet in Massechet Kinim, a burnt offering brought below is treated as invalid and does not become a sin offering.
The Gemara answers that Rabbi Yehoshua never said that the burnt offering becomes a sin offering in every respect. He said only that it is treated like a sin offering with regard to liability for misuse. It is not subject to that liability in the same way as a burnt offering, but that does not mean that it fulfills the obligation of a sin offering.
Thus, the apparent contradiction is resolved. The discussion in the Mishnah concerns the law of misuse of sacred property. The discussion in Massechet Kinim concerns whether the offering fulfills the person’s obligation. Rabbi Yehoshua can maintain that a burnt offering brought below with the intention and procedure of a sin offering has the status of a sin offering for purposes of misuse, while still holding that it is not a valid sin offering and does not fulfill the required offering.