The **Mishnah** teaches that if the prescribed measure of **Ketoret**, the incense offering, was deficient—for example, if part of it was burnt or lost—and then brought outside the **Azara**, the Temple courtyard, one is exempt from liability. This is because the offering was lacking its proper measure and therefore not fit for the **Mizbeah**, the altar.
The **Gemara** delves into this ruling, questioning the precise scenario. Does this exemption apply only if the deficiency occurred *inside* the **Azara**, rendering the **Ketoret** unfit before it was even taken out? Or does it also apply if the **Ketoret** was complete and fit while inside the **Azara**, but then became deficient *after* it was taken outside? The **Gemara** considers two possibilities: perhaps once an item leaves the **Azara**, it is automatically disqualified, so any subsequent deficiency is irrelevant. Alternatively, perhaps the deficiency must occur *inside* to exempt one from liability; if it was complete inside and only became deficient outside, one might still be liable.
To address this, the **Gemara** introduces a teaching from **Rabbi El Azar**, who states that one is not liable for bringing a deficient offering outside until the *entire* prescribed amount is brought out. This implies that if any part is missing, there is no liability. However, the **Gemara** immediately rejects this as a proof for the initial question. The question concerns the opinion of the **Rabbis**, who hold that even bringing a *partial* amount outside can incur liability. **Rabbi El Azar**'s view, which requires the entire amount, does not directly address the **Rabbis**' specific scenario where a partial, but deficient, amount is brought out. Thus, the question regarding the location of the deficiency remains unresolved according to the **Rabbis**.
Turning to another case, the **Mishnah** states that one who brings consecrated items, specifically the **Emurim** (sacrificial fats and organs), to the **Mizbeah** while they are still attached to the meat is liable. The **Gemara** questions how this could be, as the meat would interpose between the **Emurim** and the **Mizbeah**, rendering the offering invalid. The **Gemara** offers three answers.
One answer, attributed to **Rabbi Shimon**, suggests that the offering is simply turned upside down, allowing the **Emurim** to directly touch the **Mizbeah**. A second answer, also reflecting **Rabbi Shimon**'s view, explains that when an offering is brought *outside* the **Azara**, the strict requirements of offering it *inside* (such as direct contact with the **Mizbeah**) do not apply. For example, one could place it on a rock outside, and interposition would not be an issue. As **Rashi** clarifies, the issue of interposition (chatzitza) preventing fitness for the altar is relevant *inside* the **Azara**, but not when the offering is brought *outside*. The third answer proposes that meat and **Emurim** are considered "like items," and similar items do not create an interposition between each other.
The **Mishnah** further discusses the **Mincha**, the meal offering. If one brings the **Mincha** outside without first taking the **Komets** (the prescribed handful of flour for the **Mizbeah**), one is liable, as the **Mincha** is not properly prepared for the altar. A more complex case arises if the **Komets** was taken out, but then put back into the main **Mincha** mixture. Even in this scenario, if the entire mixture is then brought outside, one is liable. The **Gemara** asks why this is the case. If the **Komets** is returned to the larger quantity of the **Mincha** (the **Shirayim**, or remainder), shouldn't the majority of the **Shirayim** nullify the **Komets**, rendering it as if no **Komets** was ever taken, and thus the entire mixture unfit?
The **Gemara** resolves this by noting that the Torah uses the term "to sacrifice" (להקטיר) for both the **Komets** and the **Shirayim** (referring to the prohibition of sacrificing the **Shirayim**). This implies that just as one **Komets** does not nullify another **Komets** when mixed, so too the **Shirayim** do not nullify the **Komets**. This reflects a broader principle in the laws of consecrated items (Kadeshim): their components, even when mixed, retain their distinct halachic identities. For instance, on **Yom Kippur**, the bloods of the bull and the goat, though mixed, retain their distinct properties and are not nullified by each other, even if one is present in a larger quantity.
The **Mincha** offering consists of two primary components: the flour (from which the **Komets** is taken) and the **Lebona** (frankincense). Both the **Komets** and the **Lebona** must be offered on the **Mizbeah** to permit the consumption of the remaining **Mincha** by the priests. The **Tanna Kamma** states that if one brings even *one* of these two components outside, one is liable. This is a novel idea, as neither the **Komets** nor the **Lebona** alone is sufficient to permit the **Mincha**. In contrast, **Rabbi El Azar** holds that one is not liable until *both* the **Komets** and the **Lebona** are brought outside.
A scenario where all opinions agree is if one of the components, say the **Komets**, has already been offered *inside* the **Azara**. In this case, the remaining **Lebona** is now considered the *entire* permitting element. If this sole remaining **Lebona** is then brought outside, everyone agrees that one is liable. The **Gemara** then poses an intriguing question from **Rabbi Yitzhak Nefrat**: if only the **Komets** (or **Lebona**) is offered on the **Mizbeah**, does it permit *half* of the **Mincha** for consumption, or does it merely *weaken* the prohibition on eating the **Shirayim**, making the transgression less severe (e.g., exempting from lashes)?
The **Gemara** connects this doubt to the differing views on **Pigul**, a disqualification due to improper intention. **Rabbi Meir** holds that **Pigul** can apply even to a partial item if that partial item has the potential to permit something. The **Rabbis**, however, maintain that **Pigul** only applies if the intention relates to the *entire* item that permits the offering. The **Gemara** questions how **Rabbi Yitzhak Nefrat** could have this doubt, as the outcome seems clear based on whether one follows **Rabbi Meir** (who would say it permits half) or the **Rabbis** (who would say it does nothing). The **Gemara** clarifies that the doubt is specifically according to the **Rabbis** of the **Mishnah**, who state that bringing *half* an item outside incurs liability. This implies that half *does* something; the question is precisely what that "something" is: does it partially permit, or merely weaken the prohibition?
To further explore this, the **Gemara** considers the case of sprinkling the blood of a **Hatat Penimit** (inner sin offering) outside the **Azara**. The primary act of sprinkling for a **Hatat Penimit** involves all four corners of the **Mizbeah**. If one performs only *one* sprinkling outside, is one liable? This, again, hinges on whether a partial act is considered significant. The **Gemara** notes that even **Rabbi El Azar** would agree that a single sprinkling of blood outside can incur liability, because even a single sprinkling has halachic significance in certain contexts, such as when one catches fallen blood and continues the sprinkling. This suggests that even a partial act can be meaningful.
The discussion then shifts to the **Nisuch HaMayim**, the water libation performed on **Sukkot**. **Rabbi Nehemiah** states that one who pours the **Nisuch HaMayim** outside is liable. He holds a similar view regarding the leftover blood of offerings, which is normally poured at the base of the **Mizbeah**; **Rabbi Nehemiah** considers this pouring integral to atonement, and thus pouring it outside incurs liability.
Regarding the **Nisuch HaMayim** itself, **Rabbi El Azar** rules that one is liable for pouring it outside during **Sukkot**. **Rabbi Yudfa**, a sage from Yudefet, explains that **Rabbi Akiva** held that **Nisuch HaMayim** is a Biblical law (Deorayta), derived from the verse "and its libations" (ונסכיה), which implies two libations: one of wine and one of water. The **Gemara** then challenges **Rabbi El Azar**'s ruling based on **Rabbi Akiva**'s derivation. If **Nisuch HaMayim** is derived from the same verse as wine libations, then it should logically follow the rules of wine libations: it should require a measure of three *Lugim* (a specific volume) to incur liability, not just "a little" as implied by the term "Mechag" (from the holiday). Furthermore, it should apply all year round, not just on **Sukkot**.
The **Gemara** resolves this by citing **Rabbi Yohanan** in the name of **Rabbi Nechonya Ish Bekat Bet Hortan**, who states that **Nisuch HaMayim** is a **Halakha LeMoshe MiSinai**—a law given to **Moshe Rabbeinu** at **Sinai** through tradition, not derived exegetically from a verse. Once it is established as a **Halakha LeMoshe MiSinai**, it is not bound by the rules of wine libations. Therefore, it can indeed be "a little" (Mechag) and apply only on **Sukkot**, as **Rabbi El Azar** stated.
This discussion highlights three specific laws that are considered **Halakha LeMoshe MiSinai**: First, the law of **Nisuch HaMayim** itself. Second, the requirement to bring long **Aravot** (willow branches) and lean them against the **Mizbeah**. Third, a specific law concerning the **Shemitah** year: while plowing is generally forbidden a month before **Shemitah**, if one has ten saplings scattered in a field of a certain size (2500 square cubits), it is permitted to plow the entire field, even around the saplings, to prevent them from dying. This exception is also a **Halakha LeMoshe MiSinai**.