We begin with a straightforward point. In the introduction to today’s Gemara, we saw a major dispute between Rabbah and Rava concerning one specific line of reasoning. The case involved a person bringing a meal-offering baked on a griddle. He says that he is bringing it for the sake of a different type of meal-offering.
One line of reasoning is that his statement is meaningless. As Rashi explains, it is merely empty speech, because he is physically bringing the meal-offering on a griddle. His action speaks much more forcefully than his words, and therefore what he says has no effect.
The other line of reasoning is that precisely because this is such an obvious contradiction—he is bringing one type of meal-offering while explicitly saying that he is bringing another type—his statement can invalidate the offering. The question is therefore whether the thought is worthless or whether it is a disqualifying thought. That was the dispute between Rabbah and Rava: each viewed the matter according to a different line of reasoning.
The Talmud asks what was so obvious to these rabbis. One rabbi looked at the case one way, and the other rabbi looked at it another way. Why should it have been obvious that their reasoning applied here?
Rav Hoshaya presents the precise question. These two rabbis agreed about the basic position of Rabbi Shimon, but they understood its underlying reason differently. One said that the thought accomplishes nothing, while the other maintained that such a thought can be fully disqualifying.
What is Rabbi Shimon’s position in a case of this kind? The answer is that Rabbi Shimon says: A thought that is clearly recognizable as an error does not disqualify the offering; rather, it is disregarded. If the thought is obviously contradicted by the action being performed, it does not invalidate the offering.
Accordingly, in the case of an animal sacrifice, the thought is not significant, because the slaughter itself is the same slaughter. The person is carrying out the correct act, and the mistaken intention is evident as a mistake. By a meal-offering, however, the situation may be different. The thought that he is bringing it for another purpose is not necessarily offset by the physical act, because the meal-offering can be brought for the sake of a different sacrifice without any change in the basic act of bringing it.
That explains why, according to one approach, the thought is meaningless in the case of a meal-offering: Rabbi Shimon’s reason is that an unmistakable error is disregarded. If that is the reason, then the same should apply to an animal sacrifice. The act is the same act, so the thought should be recognized as an error and should not disqualify it.
Alternatively, perhaps Rabbi Shimon’s position is based on a special biblical decree. In principle, the reasoning should be that such a thought is disqualifying, because the person’s stated intention is fundamentally wrong. However, the Torah says, “This is the law of the meal-offering,” teaching that this thought does not disqualify a meal-offering. That decree applies specifically to meal-offerings and not to animal sacrifices.
Thus, the question of Rav Hoshaya was: What is the underlying reason for Rabbi Shimon’s position concerning a meal-offering? Is it that an obvious mistake is disregarded, in which case the same should apply to an animal sacrifice? Or is it based on a special biblical decree that applies only to meal-offerings?
Rav Hoshaya says that we cannot assume that we understand the depth of Rabbi Shimon’s reasoning. Rabbi Shimon appears to say in one place that an incorrect intention does not disqualify an offering, while in another place he says that it does. Rav Hoshaya therefore says that we cannot commit ourselves to a specific explanation of Rabbi Shimon’s position. We do not know his actual reason.
The Gemara’s point is that although Rabbah, Rava, and Rav Ashi offered various answers on the previous page to reconcile the apparent contradiction in Rabbi Shimon, Rav Hoshaya does not accept those explanations. That is why he says that we do not know the reason for Rabbi Shimon’s position.
Let us review the answers one by one. Rabbah’s answer was that a change in the designated owner disqualifies an offering, whereas a change in the type of sanctity does not. Rav Ashi does not accept this answer because of Abaye’s objection.
If Rabbah derives the law of meal-offerings from a comparison with animal sacrifices, then the comparison must be applied consistently. Rabbah brought a comparison from a verse that places meal-offerings and animal sacrifices together. Just as changing the intended owner disqualifies an animal sacrifice, changing the intended owner should disqualify a meal-offering as well.
Abaye responded that once we make this comparison, we must carry it through completely. Just as a change in the intended owner disqualifies an animal sacrifice, so too a change in the type of sanctity should disqualify a meal-offering. Since the comparison connects the two areas, one cannot use it for one law and reject it for the other. Because of Abaye’s objection, Rav Ashi could not accept Rabbah’s explanation.
The next answer was Rava’s. Rava said that when a person brings a meal-offering for the sake of another meal-offering, the statement “This is the law of the meal-offering” teaches that all meal-offerings share the same law. But when he brings a meal-offering for the sake of an animal sacrifice, the situation is different.
However, the Gemara raised a difficulty against Rava’s explanation. If the principle “This is the law of the meal-offering” teaches that all meal-offerings have the same law, then the same principle should apply to a sin-offering. There is a verse that says, “This is the law of the sin-offering,” and Rabbi Shimon holds that if a person owes one type of sin-offering and brings another type of sin-offering instead, the offering is unacceptable. Therefore, the principle cannot simply be that all offerings in the same category are interchangeable. This objection also undermines the explanation.
Rav Ashi offered another answer. He distinguished between a case in which the person explicitly says that he is bringing the meal-offering for the sake of another meal-offering and a case in which he merely says something about the utensil or baking method. In the first case, the statement concerns the meal-offering itself; in the second, it concerns only the vessel.
That explanation also presents a difficulty. When a person brings a dry meal-offering for the sake of a meal-offering that requires mixing, the Sages understood his statement as meaning that he brought one type of meal-offering for the sake of another type of meal-offering. Nevertheless, Rabbi Shimon says that the offering is acceptable. Therefore, we cannot distinguish the cases in the way Rav Ashi proposed.
For that reason, when the Gemara asks what Rabbi Shimon’s underlying reasoning is, the answer is that we do not know. The matters that seemed obvious to Rabbah and Rava in their respective explanations were not obvious to Rav Hoshaya at all.
We now return to our Mishnah. The Mishnah clearly states that when one brings a meal-offering for the sake of another meal-offering, it remains acceptable, although it does not fulfill the owner’s obligation. There are two exceptions: a sin-offering meal-offering and the meal-offering of a woman suspected of infidelity. If either of those is brought with an incorrect intention, it is disqualified.
What is the source for the law of the sin-offering meal-offering? The Torah says that one should not place oil or frankincense on it, and it calls this meal-offering a sin-offering. We already learned in Massechet Zevachim that a sin-offering brought with an incorrect intention is disqualified. Since the Torah calls this meal-offering a sin-offering, the same law applies to it.
The sin-offering meal-offering is brought in certain cases in which a person is liable to bring a sacrifice but cannot afford the required animal. If the person cannot afford the birds either, he brings a meal-offering. The three situations mentioned are a false oath, an oath concerning testimony, and an oath concerning the Temple. The point is that when the Torah requires a sacrifice in those circumstances, the poorest person may bring a sin-offering meal-offering instead.
The other exception is the meal-offering of the woman suspected of infidelity. This is the woman whose husband warned her not to seclude herself with a particular man, after which she secluded herself with him. She must bring the prescribed meal-offering to the Temple, and she cannot bring it for another purpose. That is the law stated in the Mishnah.
The Gemara seeks a source for this second exception as well. A teaching was stated before Rabbi Nachman concerning money that had been designated for the meal-offering of the woman suspected of infidelity. The woman had set aside enough money for that meal-offering, and there was money left over. What should be done with the surplus? The answer was that the surplus money should be used to purchase a burnt-offering, which should be brought as a voluntary offering on the altar.
From this, the Gemara derives a connection between the meal-offering of the suspected woman and a sin-offering. The Torah uses the word “iniquity” in connection with the meal-offering of the suspected woman, and it uses the same word in connection with a sin-offering. Through this verbal analogy, we connect the two.
Just as surplus money designated for a sin-offering is used to purchase a burnt-offering, surplus money designated for the meal-offering of the suspected woman is also used for a burnt-offering. Once the verbal analogy connects the two with regard to the surplus money, the Gemara asks whether it should also connect them with regard to the law of incorrect intention.
Just as a sin-offering brought with an incorrect intention is disqualified, perhaps the meal-offering of the suspected woman brought with an incorrect intention is also disqualified. The Torah does not call it a sin-offering explicitly, but it uses the same word, and that word may establish the same law.
The Gemara challenges this derivation. Perhaps one should not derive the word “iniquity” in one passage from the word “iniquity” in another passage, because in one place the word appears in its possessive form. The Gemara answers that a verbal analogy does not always require the words to be grammatically identical. It gives a classic example in which one verse says that the priest “returns,” while another says that he “comes.” The words are different, but the concepts are sufficiently related for the verbal analogy.
Therefore, the Gemara says, the difference between the forms of the word does not prevent the derivation. We can connect the word “iniquity” in the meal-offering of the suspected woman with the same word used in connection with a sin-offering.
The Gemara then limits the verbal analogy. We use it only for the matter for which it was established. It teaches that surplus money designated for the meal-offering of the suspected woman is treated like surplus money designated for a sin-offering and is used for a burnt-offering. We do not necessarily extend the analogy to the law of incorrect intention.
The Torah contains a special teaching concerning a sin-offering. The verse says, “And he shall offer it,” teaching that the sin-offering must be brought for its proper purpose. An offering brought without that intention is disqualified. That special teaching applies to a sin-offering, but we cannot automatically apply it to the meal-offering of the suspected woman merely because of the verbal analogy.
We therefore seem to return to the original question. The verbal analogy teaches us what to do with surplus money, but it does not necessarily teach that the meal-offering of the suspected woman is disqualified when brought with an incorrect intention. The special law of intention may apply only to an actual sin-offering.
The Gemara answers from another expression used in the Torah. Regarding an ordinary sin-offering, the verse uses the word “it,” teaching that the offering must be brought as it is supposed to be brought. The same expression appears concerning the meal-offering of the suspected woman. The Torah says that this meal-offering is itself the prescribed offering.
That expression teaches that the meal-offering of the suspected woman must be brought as prescribed. Just as the word “it” teaches that a sin-offering brought with an incorrect intention is disqualified, the same expression concerning the meal-offering of the suspected woman teaches that it too is disqualified when brought with an incorrect intention.
The Gemara asks why the same expression is needed concerning a guilt-offering. The Torah also says that a guilt-offering is what it is. Perhaps the word should teach that a guilt-offering must always be brought exactly as prescribed.
The Gemara answers that the verse concerning a guilt-offering cannot be teaching that an incorrect intention disqualifies it, because the verse was written after the relevant stage of the offering had already been completed. Once the blood of a guilt-offering has been sprinkled, its atonement has already been achieved. The verse therefore cannot be referring to an incorrect intention introduced after that point.
The Gemara continues to analyze the word “it” in the case of a guilt-offering. It teaches a different law: a guilt-offering that has been set aside and later replaced can sometimes be redirected to become a burnt-offering. If a person lost his guilt-offering and purchased another one in its place, and then found the original animal, the original animal is no longer used as a guilt-offering. It is given to a shepherd, allowed to develop a disqualifying blemish, sold, and replaced with a burnt-offering.
Two things occurred in that process. First, the original animal was removed from the status of a guilt-offering. Second, it was given over to the shepherd. Once both of those steps have taken place, it is no longer considered a guilt-offering.
If, however, the person brought the original animal to the Temple before it developed a blemish, the law is that it is treated as a burnt-offering. He should not have brought it in that manner, but if he did, it is treated as a burnt-offering because it could potentially have been converted into a burnt-offering after being given to the shepherd.
The proof is the verse that says “it.” Even after the person has purchased a second guilt-offering, the first animal remains a guilt-offering until the person performs the act that removes it from that status, namely giving it over to the shepherd. Until then, it retains its original identity. Once it has been given to the shepherd, it loses that status and can be treated as a burnt-offering.
The same word is therefore used in different places to teach that the offering retains its identity unless the Torah indicates otherwise. In the case of a sin-offering and the meal-offering of the suspected woman, the word teaches that the offering must be brought as prescribed, including the requirement of proper intention.
The Gemara then continues with another statement of Rav: The meal-offering of the Omer brought with an incorrect intention is disqualified. The meal-offering of the Omer is brought on the second day of Passover and permits the consumption of the new grain crop. If it is brought with an incorrect intention, it does not accomplish that purpose. It is not brought onto the altar, and the remainder cannot be eaten.
Normally, with a meal-offering, the handful is placed on the altar and the remainder is eaten by the priests. In the case of the Omer, however, the entire purpose of the offering is to permit something that had previously been prohibited. Since an offering brought with an incorrect intention does not accomplish that purpose, it is unacceptable.
The same principle applies to the guilt-offering of a nazirite who became ritually impure and to the guilt-offering of a person afflicted with skin disease. These offerings are brought to enable a person to enter the next stage of his process. The guilt-offering of the impure nazirite allows him to close out the previous period of nazirite observance and begin a new one; the guilt-offering of the afflicted person allows him to complete the purification process and enter the camp.
Since these offerings serve as prerequisites for a subsequent status, bringing them with an incorrect intention means that they did not serve their purpose. The Gemara has therefore identified three additional meal-offerings or offerings that are disqualified when brought with an incorrect intention, even though the Mishnah mentioned only the sin-offering meal-offering and the meal-offering of the suspected woman.
The Mishnah states that all meal-offerings whose handful was offered with an incorrect intention remain acceptable, although they do not fulfill the owners’ obligation, except for the sin-offering meal-offering and the meal-offering of the suspected woman. If the meal-offering of the Omer is also disqualified when brought with an incorrect intention, why did the Mishnah not mention it?
The Gemara answers that the meal-offering of the Omer is indeed included, but the Mishnah is dealing with a particular category of meal-offerings. First, the Mishnah discusses offerings brought by an individual. The sin-offering meal-offering is an individual’s offering, and the meal-offering of the suspected woman is also an individual’s offering. The meal-offering of the Omer, by contrast, is a communal offering, and the Mishnah is not discussing communal offerings.
There is a second distinction. The Mishnah is discussing meal-offerings that are brought independently. The sin-offering meal-offering and the meal-offering of the suspected woman are not attached to another sacrifice. The meal-offering of the Omer, however, is brought together with animal offerings. Because it is connected with a sacrifice, it does not belong to the category being discussed by the Mishnah.
Rashi explains that the meal-offering of the Omer is brought because of the accompanying offerings. The Mishnah is listing meal-offerings that come on their own, whereas the Omer comes as part of a larger communal offering.
A third distinction is that the Mishnah is discussing offerings whose timing is not fixed. A sin-offering meal-offering is brought when the individual commits the relevant transgression, and the meal-offering of the suspected woman is brought when her circumstances require it. The Omer, however, has a fixed date: it is brought on the sixteenth of Nisan. Since its time is predetermined, it is not included in the Mishnah’s list.
The Gemara then returns to the guilt-offerings of the impure nazirite and the afflicted person. It had said that these offerings, when slaughtered with an incorrect intention, remain acceptable for the altar but do not accomplish their intended purpose. The reason is that the offerings of atonement are treated more leniently than offerings that enable a person to enter a new status.
The Gemara compares this with the Mishnah in Zevachim, which states that all sacrifices slaughtered with an incorrect intention remain acceptable, although they do not fulfill the owners’ obligation, except for the Passover offering and a sin-offering. If the guilt-offerings of the nazirite and the afflicted person are also acceptable on the altar, why were they not listed as exceptions? They should be treated like the other sacrifices that remain acceptable despite an incorrect intention.
The Gemara answers that there is a fundamental distinction between a guilt-offering that brings atonement and a guilt-offering that enables a person to achieve a subsequent status. Some guilt-offerings, such as a guilt-offering for theft or a guilt-offering for misuse of sacred property, come to provide atonement. A guilt-offering of the impure nazirite and a guilt-offering of the afflicted person, however, come to enable the person to proceed to the next stage of the purification process.
When an offering comes to provide atonement, the altar can tolerate its being brought with an incorrect intention. Although it may not fulfill the owners’ obligation, the offering itself remains acceptable. But when the offering is an enabling offering—when its purpose is to permit the person to enter a new status—an incorrect intention means that it has failed entirely. It is not merely unable to fulfill the owner’s obligation; it is not accepted even on the altar.
The Gemara supports this distinction from the laws governing a woman who gives birth. She must bring both a sin-offering and a burnt-offering. The sin-offering in this case serves as an enabling offering, allowing her to partake of sacred food, while the burnt-offering provides atonement.
The Gemara states that if the woman brought the sin-offering and then died, her heirs may bring the burnt-offering. The burnt-offering is the atonement offering, and an atonement offering may still be brought after the person’s death. If, however, she brought the burnt-offering and then died, her heirs may not bring the sin-offering. Since the sin-offering serves as an enabling offering, it cannot be brought after her death.
We therefore see that enabling offerings are treated more strictly than atonement offerings. An atonement offering can be brought even after the person dies, because it can still provide the necessary atonement. An enabling offering, however, cannot be brought after death, because there is no longer a person whom it can enable to enter the next status.
The Gemara cites another example. Among the five sin-offerings that are left to die is a sin-offering whose owner has died. The reason is that an enabling sin-offering cannot be brought after the death of the person for whom it was intended.
The Gemara then challenges this distinction through the case of a pure nazirite. After completing the period of nazirite observance, the nazirite wishes to return to ordinary life—to be permitted to drink wine, cut his hair, and come into contact with the dead. To complete the process, he must bring three offerings: a sin-offering, a burnt-offering, and a peace-offering.
Suppose that he set aside money for these offerings but did not specify which money was for which offering. The law is that one may not derive benefit from the money, because some of it may be designated for a burnt-offering, and a burnt-offering is entirely sanctified to God. However, there is no misuse of sacred property with regard to the animals themselves, because any one of them may become a peace-offering, and a peace-offering is partly the property of the owners.
If the nazirite dies before specifying which portion of the money is for which offering, the money is used in accordance with the laws governing unspecified nazirite funds. It is used to purchase burnt-offerings, and the rest is destroyed. It cannot simply be brought as the offerings for which it was originally intended, because those offerings cannot be brought after the nazirite’s death.
If the money had been specifically designated, the money for the sin-offering is left to die, because the sin-offering cannot be brought after death. The money for the burnt-offering is used to bring a burnt-offering, and misuse of sacred property applies to it because a burnt-offering is entirely sanctified. The money for the peace-offering is used to bring a peace-offering, which is eaten for one day and one night, following the stricter eating period of a nazirite’s peace-offering.
The accompanying bread is not brought in this case, because the bread is placed on the nazirite’s hands, and the nazirite is no longer present. The guilt-offering is not relevant to this case, because the discussion concerns a pure nazirite. A nazirite who became impure would bring a guilt-offering, but a pure nazirite does not.
The Gemara now raises a difficulty. The burnt-offering and peace-offering of a nazirite are enabling offerings: they allow the nazirite to complete the process and return to ordinary life. Nevertheless, after the nazirite dies, the designated money can still be used to bring those offerings. This appears to show that an enabling offering can be brought after death, contradicting the distinction made earlier.
Rav Pappa answers that there is a difference between an exclusive enabling offering and an enabling offering that is not exclusive. In the case of the pure nazirite, any one of the three offerings can help complete the process. The Torah does not specify that only one particular offering is capable of enabling the nazirite to proceed. Therefore, the burnt-offering and peace-offering can still be brought.
By contrast, the guilt-offering of an impure nazirite is the exclusive offering that enables him to begin his new period of nazirite observance. Similarly, the guilt-offering of the afflicted person is the offering that enables him to complete his purification. In those cases, the offering is the exclusive means of achieving the next status, and we have not found that such an offering can be brought after death.
The Gemara cites a teaching that appears to contradict this answer. If the guilt-offering of the afflicted person was slaughtered with an incorrect intention, or if its blood was not placed on the required parts of the afflicted person’s body, the animal may nevertheless be placed on the altar, and the accompanying offerings may be brought. But another guilt-offering is required in order to complete the person’s purification.
This seems to contradict the earlier statement that an enabling offering brought with an incorrect intention is not accepted on the altar. Here, the first guilt-offering was brought incorrectly, yet it is still placed on the altar; only another guilt-offering is required to complete the enabling process.
The Gemara concludes that this is a refutation of that particular answer. The case demonstrates that even when the enabling offering is exclusive, the offering may still be accepted on the altar despite having failed to enable the person. The distinction between atonement offerings and enabling offerings therefore requires further analysis.
The Gemara returns to the earlier case involving the money of the deceased nazirite and clarifies that the peace-offering is eaten for one day and one night, like the peace-offering of a nazirite. The bread is not brought because it is placed on the hands of the nazirite, who is no longer alive.
At this point, the Gemara asks again where we derive that an enabling offering cannot be brought after death when it is the exclusive means of enabling the person. The case of the nazirite does not establish the point, because the burnt-offering and peace-offering are not exclusive; either one can participate in completing the process.
The case of the afflicted person appears to show the opposite, since the improperly performed guilt-offering is still placed on the altar. The Gemara therefore leaves this matter as a difficulty, and the discussion continues from there.