The sharp rabbis of Pumbedita said as follows: “Can the burning of the handful establish a disqualification of piggul with regard to the frankincense?” In other words, suppose that, at the time of taking the handful, a person intended to bring the frankincense on the altar outside its proper time.
Here there are two elements that permit the remainder to be eaten: the handful, which permits the remainder of the meal offering, and the frankincense, which also permits the remainder. Normally, when we discuss piggul, the intention is: “I am bringing the handful with the intention of eating the remainder tomorrow.” The handful is the permitting element, and the intention is to eat what it permits outside the proper time.
Here, however, the person is no longer directing his intention toward eating the remainder. He brings the handful on the altar with the intention of bringing the frankincense on the altar tomorrow. Thus, he performs the service of one permitting element with a piggul intention concerning the other permitting element.
What happens when he later brings the frankincense? At the time he brings the frankincense, he is not thinking about the handful. He is thinking that the frankincense will be brought tomorrow. The rabbis of Pumbedita said that this can establish piggul, because the piggul intention existed at the time of the handful, even though no such intention existed at the time of the frankincense.
Let us review the position of the Sages. To establish piggul, one must generally have a piggul intention at both stages. If the person has a piggul intention only at the stage of the handful, then, according to the Sages, it should not be piggul. The Sages would agree in this case, however, because their statement concerns a situation in which the piggul intention was directed toward the remainder. The intention concerning the handful is only half of the process, since the same intention was not present when the frankincense was brought.
Here, by contrast, the frankincense remains where it is. There was no disqualifying intention concerning the frankincense itself. The person performed the service of the handful with an intention concerning another permitting element. If he had brought the handful intending to eat the remainder tomorrow, that would be only half the process, because he had not brought the frankincense with that intention. In the present case, however, he is not discussing the remainder at all. He brought the handful intending to bring the frankincense on the altar tomorrow.
That is the novelty. Once the handful and the frankincense were placed in service vessels, they were in the same vessel or framework. This makes it possible for an intention at one burning to establish piggul with regard to the other burning. Although there are two separate permitting elements here, their placement together makes the case different from the two sheep of the communal offering, which are two permitting elements that remain separate.
Normally, we say that piggul does not apply to a permitting element. With the handful, the piggul concerns the remainder; one does not establish piggul concerning the permitting element itself. Here, however, the intention is directed toward a permitting element. Why? Because everything is in the same vessel and is therefore treated as one unit.
There are two innovations here. First, a person can have an intention concerning the burning of one permitting element before reaching the burning of the other permitting element. Second, although his intention was directed only toward the frankincense, it is treated as though he had an intention concerning the entire permitting element. At the time he placed it on the altar, he performed a service involving both items. Since they were together in the same vessel, an intention concerning the frankincense is treated as an intention concerning the entire item.
Until now, we had said that a piggul intention must concern the remainder, not the permitting element. Here, the intention is to bring the frankincense tomorrow, which is an intention concerning a permitting element, and yet it can establish piggul. That is the first innovation. The second is that, although the intention was directed only toward the frankincense, it is considered as though the person had an intention concerning the entire unit.
Normally, one permitting element cannot establish piggul with regard to another permitting element. The handful is one permitting element, and the frankincense is another. One cannot mix and match them. The case of the two permitting elements represented by the two sheep is proof of that. An intention concerning one permitting element does not establish piggul concerning the other.
Why is this case different? Because the handful and the frankincense are in the same vessel. Although in reality there are two permitting elements, the vessel makes them one unit. Therefore, the person can have an intention that what comes from this unit will be eaten tomorrow. When everything is together, we do not treat it as two separate permitting elements for this purpose. The vessel causes it to be treated as one permitting element.
There is another innovation of the sharp rabbis of Pumbedita, one that is involved in an explicit dispute among the Tannaim at the beginning of the chapter. The Mishnah says that a handful that was removed with the intention of bringing it the following day is disqualified. Rabbi Yosef and the Sages disagree about the precise formulation. Rabbi Yosef says that the handful is disqualified, while the Sages say that the offering is disqualified.
Rabbi Yosef’s position is that one permitting element cannot disqualify another permitting element. The handful cannot be disqualified by another permitting element. The Torah treats the handful as incapable of being disqualified through the intention concerning another permitting element. Everyone agrees that once the relevant items are together in the same vessel, such an intention can work; this earlier position follows the view of the Sages, who emphasize that the items are treated as one unit.
The rabbis of Pumbedita then tried to prove their position from the Mishnah. We already learned this Mishnah: every service of the meal offering, beginning with taking the handful, placing it in a service vessel, carrying it, and burning it, can establish piggul if the intention is to eat or burn the item outside its proper time or place.
The Gemara wants to say that the fourth stage, the burning, is comparable to the first three stages. What do the first three have in common? At the time of taking the handful, placing it in the vessel, or carrying it, the person can have the intention to eat the remainder tomorrow, and the offering becomes piggul. The Mishnah therefore implies that at the time of the burning one can also have the intention to bring the frankincense tomorrow, and that this too should establish piggul.
In other words, at the time of taking the handful, a person may intend either to eat the remainder or to bring the frankincense on the altar tomorrow. The question is whether the same is true at the time of the burning: if he burns the handful with the intention of bringing the frankincense tomorrow, does that establish piggul?
The answer is that the proof is not conclusive. The first three stages involve an intention concerning the remainder or the frankincense, because those stages are not yet the final burning. At the time of the burning, however, only an intention concerning the burning itself may establish piggul. An intention to bring the frankincense tomorrow may not be sufficient.
Thus, perhaps the Mishnah is not proof. When a person brings an item to the altar, an intention concerning the remainder may establish piggul, but an intention concerning the frankincense may not. The rabbis of Pumbedita therefore cannot prove from the Mishnah that the burning of the handful with the intention of bringing the frankincense tomorrow establishes piggul.
Let us return to the position of the rabbis of Pumbedita. They said that the burning of the handful with the intention of bringing the frankincense tomorrow can disqualify the offering. The Mishnah seemed to imply that every one of the stages of the meal offering can establish piggul, and the Gemara attempted to extend the first three stages to the fourth. But the answer was that the first three stages permit an intention concerning the frankincense, whereas at the burning only an intention concerning the remainder may establish piggul.
The distinction is as follows. Even the one who says that half of a permitting element can establish piggul agrees only when the piggul intention is directed toward the remainder. The handful permits the remainder, so an intention concerning the remainder is an intention concerning the item that the handful permits. But one cannot move from one permitting element to another, even if the two are connected. Half of a permitting element can establish piggul only when it is the handful that permits the remainder. If the intention concerning the handful is directed toward the frankincense, that is different.
This leads to a dispute between Rabbi Chisda and Abaye in the name of Rav. Consider the two sheep and the two loaves. If a person slaughtered one of the sheep with the intention of eating it tomorrow, that sheep becomes piggul, but the intention does not affect the second sheep. If he intended to eat the other sheep tomorrow, the same principle applies. This is an intention concerning one permitting element with regard to another permitting element, because both sheep are permitting elements. The sheep that was slaughtered does not permit the other sheep.
That appears to be a classic case in which an intention concerning one permitting element does not establish piggul concerning another. Accordingly, the same should be true of the handful and the frankincense. One could answer, however, that the two sheep are separate permitting elements, whereas the handful and the frankincense were together in the same vessel. Since the latter were joined together, they may be treated as one permitting element. Therefore, the case of the two sheep is not proof against the position of Rabbi Chisda.
Ravina explained this matter to me, and the explanation was so precious that it was as though he had taught me the entire Talmud. The case was: “To eat the remainder tomorrow, with the intention concerning the frankincense.” The question is what the great novelty is in that statement.
If one holds that a single burning of the handful can establish an intention concerning the burning of the frankincense, then the rabbis of Pumbedita could simply have stated that bringing the handful with the intention of bringing the frankincense tomorrow is enough. Why did they present both intentions together—eating the remainder tomorrow and bringing the frankincense tomorrow?
If the innovation is merely that half of a permitting element can establish piggul, they could have said plainly that the handful was brought with the intention of eating the remainder tomorrow. What is gained by adding the second scenario? Conversely, if the innovation is that one can establish piggul through an intention at one burning concerning another burning, they could simply have said that the handful was brought with the intention of bringing the frankincense tomorrow.
The answer is that the intention concerning the remainder spreads throughout the entire meal offering. Once the person has an intention of piggul concerning the remainder, the intention affects the whole permitting element. Since the handful and the frankincense are together, the intention concerning the remainder spreads to the entire unit. It is therefore not merely that one can transfer an intention from one burning to another; rather, the piggul intention applies to the entire permitting element.
Let us review the two innovations. The person brought the handful with the intention of eating the remainder tomorrow and of bringing the frankincense tomorrow. The first innovation is that there is no problem of only half of a permitting element, because the handful itself permits the remainder. The second is that one cannot transfer a piggul intention from one burning to another as two separate services. Instead, because the items are together, the intention spreads through the entire meal offering and applies to all of its permitting elements.
The Gemara then asks about another passage. We learned that one may have a piggul intention concerning anything that is fit to be eaten by a person or burned on the altar. If the intention concerns an item that is not normally eaten, or an item that is not normally burned, does that establish piggul? For example, what if the person had an intention concerning less than an olive-sized portion of the remainder, or less than an olive-sized portion of the handful that was to be placed on the altar outside its proper time or place?
Piggul requires an olive-sized measure. The question is whether one may combine the portion eaten by a person with the portion burned on the altar—whether an olive-sized measure may be formed from both. The teaching says that the matter is comparable: just as an intention concerning food eaten by a person can establish piggul, an intention concerning food burned on the altar can also establish piggul.
The verse uses the language of eating with regard to both the portion eaten by a person and the portion placed on the altar. Why does the Torah describe the altar’s portion with the language of eating? To teach that even if the person’s intention was to eat what belongs on the altar, the offering is still subject to piggul. The Torah used the language of eating to include the altar’s portion.
There is another lesson. Just as eating requires an olive-sized measure, burning on the altar requires an olive-sized measure. The measure that creates liability for eating is an olive-sized measure, and the same measure applies to burning. Thus, if the person has an intention to burn an olive-sized portion of the handful or of the meat tomorrow, that intention can establish piggul.
However, the language still seems to indicate that the intention must concern the ordinary act for that item: what is fit for a person to eat, or what is fit for the altar to burn. The intention cannot simply mix the two. The remainder is fit for a person, and the handful is fit for the altar. The Torah’s use of the language of eating teaches that an item fit for the altar can also be included, and it teaches the measure of an olive-sized portion, but it does not necessarily allow the two forms of consumption to be combined.
Why, then, does the Torah use different expressions? The different expressions teach an additional innovation: even when the intention mixes the two categories—when the person intends to eat what belongs on the altar, or to place on the altar what is meant to be eaten—the intention can still establish piggul. The fact that the Torah uses different words teaches that these mixed cases are also included.
The Gemara then raises a question based on Rabbi Eliezer. If you tell me that an intention concerning what belongs on the altar, with the intention of eating it, is a legitimate piggul intention, then there should be liability for excision. Why is there no liability for excision in that case?
The answer is that there are two possible ways to understand the teaching. One view holds that the mixed case is disqualified by Torah law, while another view holds that it is disqualified only by rabbinic law. If one holds that the derivation establishes a genuine Torah-law disqualification, then there is liability for excision. If one holds that it is only a rabbinic safeguard, there is no liability for excision.
Why would the Sages impose a rabbinic disqualification here? If a priest says, “My intention was to eat the frankincense tomorrow,” the frankincense is permitted in that case. The Sages may have said that the intention should nevertheless disqualify the offering, so that a person would not come to establish piggul in the genuine case in which he intends to place the frankincense on the altar tomorrow. The rabbinic prohibition prevents confusion between the two cases.
We learn this dispute from a baraita. If a person intended to drink the blood tomorrow, or to eat the meat tomorrow, or to bring on the altar tomorrow something that belongs on the altar, the matter is disqualified. Each case involves an act that is not the ordinary way of consumption: blood is not normally drunk, and the portion belonging to the altar is not normally eaten by a person.
Rabbi Yehuda says that the offering is disqualified. What if the person’s intention was not to eat the blood, but merely to leave it until tomorrow? Rabbi Yehuda also says that the offering is disqualified in that case. According to Rabbi Yehuda, the intention to leave the blood until tomorrow is treated like an intention to eat it tomorrow.
Whose view does this represent? It cannot simply be the view of the Sages, because the Sages say that even an intention to eat the blood tomorrow is valid and does not disqualify the offering. Certainly, then, an intention merely to leave the blood until tomorrow should not disqualify it. The teaching must therefore follow Rabbi Eliezer.
Rabbi Eliezer says that an intention to eat the blood tomorrow disqualifies the offering, and Rabbi Yehuda extends that position to an intention merely to leave it until tomorrow. Thus, Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Eliezer agree that both cases are disqualifying. The distinction between them concerns whether there is liability for excision.
Rabbi Yehuda holds that an intention to leave the blood until tomorrow disqualifies the offering, but liability for excision applies only when the intention was to eat the blood. Rabbi Eliezer holds that both intentions—eating the blood tomorrow and leaving it until tomorrow—make the offering disqualified in a manner that carries liability for excision.
It follows that there is a dispute among the Tannaim concerning whether an intention to eat blood tomorrow carries liability for excision. The Gemara says that this dispute may be understood in three different ways.
According to the first explanation, the dispute concerns only whether the offering is valid or disqualified in the case of an intention to eat the blood tomorrow. The opening statement of the baraita—“anything that is normally eaten, with the intention of eating it tomorrow”—is understood according to Rabbi Eliezer and the Sages as referring to the dispute over blood. Everyone agrees that an intention merely to leave the blood until tomorrow does not create a Torah-law disqualification.
According to the second explanation, everyone agrees that an intention to eat the blood tomorrow is not a Torah-law disqualification. The dispute concerns whether the Sages instituted a safeguard in the case of an intention to leave it until tomorrow. Since leaving it until tomorrow will cause the blood to remain overnight, and that is itself a problem, the Sages may have decreed that an intention to leave it until tomorrow should also disqualify the offering.
Rabbi Yehuda would therefore say that anything which, if actually done, would disqualify the offering by Torah law is also disqualified when the person merely forms that intention. If leaving the blood overnight would disqualify it, then intending to leave it overnight is also treated as disqualifying. The first view, by contrast, maintains that we have not found in the Torah a disqualifying intention merely to leave an item overnight. The Torah speaks of an intention to eat, not merely an intention to leave, and therefore such an intention remains valid.
According to the third explanation, everyone agrees that an intention to eat the blood tomorrow is a valid intention for purposes of the discussion, and the dispute concerns whether there is a rabbinic safeguard in the case of an intention to leave it until tomorrow. The Sages do not institute such a safeguard, while Rabbi Yehuda does.
Thus, the three approaches are these: according to one approach, everyone agrees that the intention to leave the blood until tomorrow is valid, and the dispute concerns the intention to eat it; according to another, everyone agrees that the intention to eat it does not create a Torah-law disqualification, and the dispute concerns a rabbinic decree regarding leaving it; and according to the third, the dispute likewise concerns whether such a decree exists, but the underlying treatment of the intention to eat is understood differently.
The central point is that an intention concerning an act that is not the normal manner of consumption may be treated in several ways. It may be entirely valid; it may be invalidated by rabbinic decree because of the possibility of confusion with a genuine piggul case; or it may be treated as a Torah-law disqualification. The baraita and the statements of Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Eliezer are analyzed in order to determine which of these distinctions is intended.