The Eddie D. Sitt edition, an audio series of the Talmud Bavli, presents a dedicated exploration of Masechet Zevachim, generously dedicated by our dear friend and student of the Shiur Daf Yomi, Binyamin HaKohen, affectionately known as Benny C. May he, with the help of b'ezrat Hashem, achieve success and prosperity. Moreover, as he is a Kohen, may he merit to serve in the Beit HaMikdash alongside other Kohanim when Mashiach arrives, in the merit of his dedication to this Masechet, which specifically discusses the avoda of the Kohanim in the Beit HaMikdash concerning the Korbanot.
Today, we embark on a new chapter, starting from the Mishna that states, "All those disqualified who slaughtered, their slaughtering is valid" (kol hapsulim sheshachatu shechitatan keshera). The act of slaughtering, or shechita, is deemed valid, as supported by a verse. The slaughtering of a korban is valid even when performed by non-Kohanim (keshera b'zarim), by women (u've'nashim), by Canaanite slaves (u've'avadim), and even by those who are impure (u'vitemei'im). This includes even a korban chatat, which is a korban of the highest sanctity, known as kodshei kodashim. However, they must not touch the meat (u'vilvad shelo yihiyu temei'im nogim b'vasar).
This raises a question: how can an impure individual perform slaughtering without touching the meat? If they touch the knife, the knife becomes impure, thus rendering the meat impure as well. The Mishna introduces a novel concept: women can perform shechita, which is indeed a significant innovation. Non-Kohanim can also perform shechita, which is another novel ruling. A Canaanite slave can also perform shechita, and an impure person can do so as well. However, how is this possible? Rashi addresses this by explaining that the impure person must have become impure due to contact with a sheretz, which does not render utensils impure (she'eino metamei keli d'lav avi hatumah hu). Thus, if the impure person became impure through a sheretz, they do not have the status of an avi hatumah and therefore do not render the knife impure.
There are two concerns to consider: first, the impure person must not touch the meat, and second, they must not touch the knife. The Mishna emphasizes the prohibition against touching the meat, but Rashi raises the concern regarding the knife. If the impure person touches the knife, it would seemingly transmit impurity to the meat. Thus, Rashi explains that the impurity in question is that of a sheretz, which does not have the capacity to render utensils impure. While a sheretz is an avi hatumah, it only renders a person a rishon l'tumah, which does not affect utensils. Hence, the concern of touching the knife is mitigated.
Furthermore, Rashi clarifies that the Mishna does not explicitly mention the knife, focusing solely on the prohibition against touching the meat. The Mishna states that their slaughtering is valid, indicating that the case refers to a slaughterer who is a rishon l'tumah but does not render the knife impure. If an impure person who is an avi hatumah were to perform the slaughtering, they would indeed render the knife impure, complicating the situation further. Hence, Rashi elucidates that the slaughterer must be using a knife that is not susceptible to impurity, such as one made from a long hollow reed, which is not considered a utensil.
As the discussion continues, the Gemara notes that if all these impure individuals can perform shechita, then their thoughts during the service can disqualify the korban (hem poslin be-machshava). This follows the reasoning that anyone capable of performing the service, if they harbor bad thoughts during the service, such as thoughts outside of their time or place, will invalidate the korban. The Mishna further states that if they received the blood incorrectly, they must return it to a valid individual, as the act of transferring the blood must be done by a Kohen.
In the case where a valid Kohen received the blood and then handed it to a disqualified person, the blood must be returned to a valid Kohen. The Mishna raises the question of whether the disqualified individual is handing it to a valid Kohen behind him or in front of him. This raises a debate regarding whether stationary transfer is considered valid. If one holds that stationary transfer is valid, then handing it to a Kohen in front is acceptable. Conversely, if one holds that it is not valid, then the blood must be returned to the Kohen behind him, who will then walk it to the mizbeach.
The Gemara continues with various scenarios regarding the handling of blood. If a Kohen receives the blood in his right hand and then transfers it to his left hand, which is invalid, he must return it to his right hand. The Mishna states that even if the blood was spilled on the floor, as long as it was initially collected in a valid vessel, it is permissible to pick it up from the floor. The Mishna also addresses instances where the blood was poured incorrectly, indicating that if there is still blood from the animal, they can return to collect more and rectify the situation.
The Gemara discusses the implication of the Mishna concerning the slaughtering performed by a zar (non-Kohen). It questions whether the term "slaughtered" implies that it is only valid post-factum (bedi'avad) or if it can be done lechatchila. The Gemara asserts that a zar is indeed capable of performing shechita lechatchila, as indicated by the verse "and he shall slaughter." The Mishna confirms that a zar is valid for slaughtering, and thus the Gemara concludes that the use of "slaughtered" is not limiting the validity to post-factum cases.
Ultimately, the Gemara emphasizes that while a tamei individual can perform shechita, it is not preferred lechatchila due to the potential for contact with the meat. The discussion highlights the distinctions between cases of shechita performed by various individuals, clarifying the halachic implications and the importance of maintaining purity during the sacrificial process. Each ruling underscores the delicate balance between the roles of Kohanim, the requirements of shechita, and the conditions under which sacrifices are accepted.