The **Talmud Bavli** delves into a discussion concerning the goat of a **Nasi**, specifically its place of slaughter. A verse teaches that the goat of a Nasi, like all sin-offerings, must be slaughtered in the north, the same area where burnt-offerings are slaughtered. Since all sin-offerings are slaughtered in the north, the Gemara questions the purpose of the word "it" in the verse referring to the Nasi's goat. If all sin-offerings are subject to this rule, what specific exclusion is "it" meant to convey?
The Gemara initially suggests that the word "it" comes to exclude the goat of **Nachshon ben Aminadav**. Nachshon ben Aminadav brought an offering on the inauguration of the **Mishkan**, and one might have thought his goat, being similar to a regular sin-offering, would also need to be slaughtered in the north. This similarity could be drawn from the requirement of leaning (placing hands on the animal) for both. However, the Gemara refutes this, stating that the requirement for leaning for Nachshon ben Aminadav's goat is itself a point of contention. Some hold it is not required, while others, like **Rabbi Yehuda**, learn from a verse that leaning is needed even for a goat brought for idolatry if the **Sanhedrin** erred in permitting a prohibition that was truly idolatry, and a communal leader brought this offering. Thus, according to Rabbi Yehuda, just as Nachshon ben Aminadav's goat requires leaning, one might mistakenly infer it also requires slaughter in the north. The word "it" would then exclude Nachshon ben Aminadav's goat from the northern slaughter requirement.
However, **Rabbi Shimon** disagrees, holding that such an offering does not require leaning, and therefore no inference for northern slaughter would be made. So, according to Rabbi Shimon, the word "it" would have no exclusionary purpose in this context. **Rav Zutra** further challenges Rabbi Yehuda, arguing that even if leaning is inferred, northern slaughter is not. Rabbi Yehuda's inclusion only extended to leaning, not to the location of slaughter. Therefore, the word "it" still seems superfluous even according to Rabbi Yehuda.
The Gemara then proposes that one might have derived the northern slaughter for Nachshon ben Aminadav's goat through an a fortiori argument: just as other sin-offerings require northern slaughter, and Nachshon's goat is also a sin-offering, it too should require northern slaughter. This is a paradigm inference. But then, if northern slaughter can be learned from a paradigm, why isn't leaning also learned from a paradigm? The Gemara explains that Nachshon ben Aminadav's offering was a one-time offering, not a generational offering. Laws of a one-time offering cannot be derived from generational offerings. Therefore, a specific verse was needed for leaning, and similarly, northern slaughter cannot be derived from a paradigm. This brings us back to the original question: if northern slaughter cannot be inferred for Nachshon ben Aminadav's goat, what does the word "it" in the verse exclude?
Another suggestion for the word "it" is that it refers to the offering itself being in the north, but not necessarily the slaughterer. The slaughterer could stand elsewhere and use a long knife to reach the northern side of the **Mizbe'ach**. However, the Gemara rejects this, stating that this principle is already known from a verse regarding the burnt-offering. Therefore, the word "it" in the context of the Nasi's goat cannot be teaching this.
The Gemara then suggests the word "it" excludes a bird-offering from being slaughtered in the north. One might have thought bird-offerings also require northern slaughter, especially considering that while a non-priest can slaughter a bird-offering, it still requires a priest to perform the receiving of its blood. However, the Gemara refutes this by pointing out a stringency unique to animal offerings: they must be slaughtered with a utensil, unlike bird-offerings. This distinction prevents a direct comparison, so a bird-offering would not be inferred to require northern slaughter.
The Gemara then proposes that the word "it" excludes the **Pesach** offering from northern slaughter. A comparison might be drawn from a burnt-offering, which is entirely consumed on the Mizbe'ach and requires northern slaughter. However, this comparison is flawed because the burnt-offering has the unique stringency of being entirely consumed, which the Pesach offering does not share. One might also try to infer it from a **Korban Chatat** or a **Korban Asham**, but these also have unique stringencies, such as their high level of sanctity or specific timeframes, which the Pesach offering lacks. Thus, there is no clear a fortiori argument to compel northern slaughter for the Pesach offering, making the word "it" still seem superfluous.
The Gemara returns to the initial answer: the word "it" teaches that the offering itself must be in the north, but not the slaughterer. When challenged that this is already known, the Gemara clarifies that the verse regarding the burnt-offering, which teaches that the slaughterer need not stand in the north, refers to the act of slaughter. The word "it" in the context of the Nasi's goat, however, comes to teach a precise implication: not only must the receiving of the blood be done in the north, but the one receiving the blood must also be standing in the north. This is a distinct requirement from the slaughterer's position. This interpretation is based on a specific textual exposition of the word "it" in the verse, though not all Sages accept this particular exposition of "it" for the receiver of the blood.
The discussion then shifts to a **Mishnah**, which states that one who makes dough leavened, or shapes it, or bakes it, is liable to receive lashes if the dough becomes leavened (chametz) during these stages. If it becomes leavened, one is liable for baking it, and for shaping it, as shaping involves two stages: the initial formation and the final placement in the oven. The final placement in the oven is considered the completion of the shaping. The Gemara clarifies a previous discussion where baking was called an "individual action." This means that if someone else shaped the dough and then this person baked it, they are liable for both the baking and the completion of the shaping, incurring two liabilities. If the same person performed both, they are liable for the initial shaping and then for the baking, which also constitutes the completion of shaping, leading to two liabilities.
We learned in a **Baraita** that a **Bichor**, a firstborn pure animal, must be given to a priest. If it develops a blemish, the priest may slaughter it anywhere and eat it as non-sacred meat. However, one is forbidden to intentionally inflict a blemish on a consecrated animal. This applies to any offering: "do not inflict any blemish upon it." What if an animal has excessive blood and will die unless some blood is let out? One cannot cut its ear or any part that would cause a permanent blemish, even to save its life. While the animal may already have a blemish (the excessive blood), one cannot intentionally add another blemish. However, the **Hachamim** permit bloodletting even in a place that creates a blemish, provided the animal is not then eaten outside **Yerushalayim**. This is a rabbinic decree, lest people intentionally blemish animals to eat them as non-sacred meat. **Rabbi Shimon** goes further, allowing bloodletting even if it causes a blemish, and permits eating the animal anywhere, provided it was truly in danger of death. **Rabbi Yehuda**, however, holds that one may not perform bloodletting at all, even in a place that would not cause a blemish, out of concern that in their haste to save the animal, people might inadvertently create a blemish in a prominent place like the eye.
The Gemara then asks about one who leavens dough that is already leavened. Since anyone who contributes to the leavening process is liable, if someone kneaded dough and it became leavened, and then another person shaped it while it was already leavened, the second person is also liable. This is derived from the double negative in the verse, "do not make it leavened" and "do not bake it leavened," indicating that each stage of the process can incur liability even if the dough is already leavened. This is analogous to the dispute regarding inflicting a blemish after an animal already has one, but in the case of leavened dough, everyone agrees that one is liable for further leavening actions.
Similarly, the Gemara discusses castration after castration, or other forms of mutilation after initial mutilation. If one person castrates an animal, and another person further mutilates the same area, is the second person liable? The Gemara notes that the verse states an animal must be "unblemished" (tamim). This refers to an animal that was fit for an offering but later developed a blemish. If an animal is born with a blemish, it never had sanctity, and one can inflict further blemishes on it. **Rashi** explains that an animal born with a blemish is like "mere wood" and has no sanctity at all. Therefore, one does not need a verse to permit inflicting a blemish on it; it's not even an offering.
The Gemara clarifies that the verse allowing blemishes refers to an animal that was consecrated while unblemished, then developed a blemish, and was subsequently redeemed. After redemption, such an animal is subject to restrictions: it cannot be sheared or used for labor. One might have thought that inflicting a blemish on it is also forbidden. The verse comes to teach that it is permissible to inflict a blemish on such an animal. This is because once it is redeemed, it is no longer intended for the **Mizbe'ach**. However, this is according to Rabbi Yehuda. The Gemara asks **Rabbi Meir**'s position: a **Bichor** is intrinsically sacred from birth. If it develops a blemish, why can't one inflict a further blemish, like in the eye? Rabbi Meir holds that because a Bichor is born with sanctity, it retains a certain stringency even after developing a blemish.
The **Hachamim** interpret the word "all" in the verse "do not inflict any blemish upon it" to mean that even if an animal already has a blemish, one cannot inflict another. This implies that one is liable not only for direct actions that cause a blemish but also for actions that indirectly lead to a blemish. For example, one cannot place a fig cake on an animal's ear, because a dog might come and bite the ear, causing a blemish. This teaches that one is liable even for causing a blemish indirectly. Blessed is the Lord.