We are beginning approximately five lines below the Tosafot. There are several interpretations of the Mishnah, so let us briefly review what we have learned.
In the Mishnah, Rabbi Hananiah Segan HaKohanim says that if two pieces of sacrificial meat became impure, one piece through a Torah-level impurity and the other through a rabbinic-level impurity, they may be brought together and burned, even though doing so increases the impurity of one piece through contact with the other.
Rabbi Meir then says that from these words—we are not certain exactly which words, and this itself is subject to dispute—one learns that ritually impure terumah and ritually pure terumah may be burned on the eve of Pesach. Rabbi Yosef disagrees and says that they may be burned only separately, if at all. Thus, in the various ways of interpreting the Mishnah, the question was: What exactly is the teaching that we derive from Rabbi Hananiah Segan HaKohanim?
We are now discussing another interpretation. Rabbi Hananiah Segan HaKohanim says that the dispute concerns the seventh hour. The dispute is whether impure terumah and pure terumah may be burned together on the eve of Pesach. Rabbi Meir says that they may be burned together, while Rabbi Yosef says that they may not be burned together.
According to this interpretation, however, the dispute exists only during the sixth hour, when the prohibition against eating leaven is still rabbinic. During the seventh hour, when the prohibition has become a Torah-level prohibition, even Rabbi Yosef agrees that they may be burned together. This is a significant innovation.
The reasoning is that during the sixth hour, both the impurity and the prohibition are rabbinic. In the seventh hour, however, the prohibition is from the Torah. Once the prohibition has reached that level, there is no longer a distinction between the two kinds of impurity, and everyone agrees that the items may be burned together.
Rabbi Yochanan says that Rabbi Yosef’s position must be understood in this way. How did Rabbi Yosef interpret the Mishnah? Rabbi Yosef answered Rabbi Yochanan that the Mishnah of Rabbi Hananiah Segan HaKohanim is discussing a case in which one piece of sacrificial meat has a Torah-level impurity and the other has a rabbinic-level impurity.
We have encountered this possibility before: one piece of meat became impure on a Torah level, while the other became impure through a derivative impurity that is only rabbinic. Rabbi Hananiah Segan HaKohanim nevertheless permits burning the two pieces together.
What, then, does Rabbi Meir mean when he says that we learned this from the words of Rabbi Hananiah Segan HaKohanim? Since you are telling me that the entire dispute concerns the sixth hour, and the prohibition during the sixth hour is only rabbinic, where did Rabbi Meir learn that a rabbinic prohibition allows one to burn these items together?
If the impurity of the meat in the Mishnah were a Torah-level impurity, how could Rabbi Meir derive a law concerning the sixth hour, when the prohibition is only rabbinic? It must be that the impurity discussed by Rabbi Hananiah Segan HaKohanim is also rabbinic. Therefore, Rabbi Hananiah permits burning a Torah-level impurity together with a rabbinic-level impurity, and from there Rabbi Meir teaches that during the sixth hour, when the prohibition is rabbinic, pure terumah and impure terumah may also be burned together.
According to Rabbi Yochanan, then, the entire dispute concerns the sixth hour. From the words of Rabbi Hananiah Segan HaKohanim we learn that even during a rabbinic period one may burn these items together. Why? Because the impurity of one of the pieces is rabbinic, and the prohibition of the sixth hour is also rabbinic.
Rabbi Yochanan is therefore reading the Mishnah as follows: Rabbi Hananiah Segan HaKohanim is discussing rabbinic impurity and a rabbinic prohibition. From this we learn that just as one may burn two pieces of meat together when one has a rabbinic impurity, so too one may burn terumah and impure terumah together during the sixth hour, when the prohibition is rabbinic. Before the sixth hour, however—during the fourth or fifth hour—one may not do so.
The reason is that the sixth hour is permitted only because a rabbinic prohibition is already in effect. If one came to burn the items earlier, perhaps the reason for permitting them to be burned together would be that they will ultimately be destroyed anyway. But once we say that the permission is specifically connected to the rabbinic prohibition, it applies only during the sixth hour.
Rabbi Yochanan’s interpretation is therefore that the Mishnah discusses rabbinic impurity and a rabbinic prohibition. Rabbi Yosef responds that this is indeed the comparison: the Torah-level impurity and the sixth-hour prohibition are parallel to the rabbinic impurity and the rabbinic period mentioned in the Mishnah.
Rabbi Yosef says that if one learns the Mishnah from Rabbi Yehoshua, however, the conclusion would be different. Rabbi Yehoshua’s reasoning is that since the item will ultimately be destroyed, one may burn the two items together even before the sixth hour. According to that approach, the restriction to the sixth hour would not be necessary.
Rabbi Yosef therefore says that once the Mishnah limits the dispute to the sixth hour, it must be understood according to Rabbi Hananiah Segan HaKohanim’s case. Rabbi Abaye responds that Rabbi Yochanan is correct: the dispute concerns the sixth hour, but during the fourth and fifth hours one may not burn the items together.
Rabbi Yochanan teaches the Mishnah as follows: Rabbi Hananiah Segan HaKohanim is discussing a case involving a Torah-level impurity and a rabbinic-level derivative impurity. From his words we learn that they may be burned together. The dispute concerns the sixth hour, while in the seventh hour everyone agrees that they may be burned together.
The Gemara brings a proof for Rabbi Yochanan. We already encountered a case involving piggul, leftover sacrificial meat, and ritually impure meat. These three items have one thing in common: all of them must be burned. The School of Shammai says that they may not be burned together, while the School of Hillel says that they may be burned together.
Rabbi Yosef brought this dispute between the School of Shammai and the School of Hillel in support of his position against Rabbi Meir. What does this teaching demonstrate? The School of Hillel permits burning these items together because each of them is prohibited on a Torah level: piggul is prohibited by the Torah, leftover sacrificial meat is prohibited by the Torah, and impure meat is prohibited by the Torah.
However, the School of Hillel would not permit burning together something that is prohibited only rabbinically, such as leaven during the sixth hour. This appears to show that a Torah-level prohibition allows the items to be burned together, whereas a rabbinic prohibition does not.
Accordingly, Rabbi Yosef’s position would be that the sixth hour is prohibited, but the seventh hour is permitted. During the seventh hour, the prohibition against leaven has become a Torah-level prohibition, just like the three items mentioned by the School of Hillel, and therefore they may be burned together.
The Gemara rejects this proof. Those cases are different because piggul and leftover meat also have a rabbinic impurity associated with them. As we learned, the Rabbis decreed that one who touches piggul or leftover sacrificial meat becomes impure through his hands. Thus, two things are present: the items are prohibited on a Torah level, and they also have an additional rabbinic impurity.
That additional rabbinic impurity may be the reason the School of Hillel permits them to be burned together. We cannot derive from that case that something that is entirely ritually pure may be burned together with another item during the seventh hour. The proof therefore fails.
The Gemara brings another proof for Rabbi Yochanan, who clearly maintains that the dispute exists only during the sixth hour, while during the seventh hour even Rabbi Yosef agrees that the items may be burned together.
The proof concerns a spoiled loaf of leavened bread. The bread became so spoiled that it is no longer fit for human consumption, although a dog could still eat it. It remains subject to the impurity of food if it has the measure of an egg, because it was originally fit for human consumption and is still fit for some form of consumption. It has not entirely lost the status of food.
The teaching says that if this spoiled bread became impure, it may be burned together with leaven that is also impure on the eve of Pesach. Even if the spoiled bread had a status of pure terumah, it may be burned together with the impure leaven.
According to Rabbi Meir, there would be no need to give this particular example. In Rabbi Meir’s view, even ordinary leaven may be burned together with impure leaven on the eve of Pesach. The fact that the teaching specifically discusses spoiled bread indicates that it follows Rabbi Yosef’s position.
What, then, is the teaching saying? Rabbi Yosef says that one may not burn pure and impure leaven together on the eve of Pesach. The answer is that spoiled bread is no longer fit for human consumption. During the seventh hour, ordinary leaven is likewise no longer fit for consumption, because eating it is prohibited. Since both are no longer fit for human consumption, one may burn them together.
The analogy, then, is between the seventh hour and spoiled bread. Both are not fit for human consumption, and therefore they may be burned together with impure items. This supports Rabbi Yochanan’s explanation that Rabbi Yosef agrees during the seventh hour.
The Gemara rejects this proof as well. Spoiled bread is considered like ordinary earth. It is not merely bread during the seventh hour that one may not eat; it has become fundamentally spoiled and is no longer considered bread in the same way. Once it has reached that condition, it may be permissible to burn impure spoiled bread together with pure spoiled bread. That does not prove that ordinary bread may be burned together during the seventh hour.
We now return to the question: According to this interpretation, Rabbi Meir learned his law from Rabbi Hananiah Segan HaKohanim. Rabbi Hananiah was discussing rabbinic impurity, and from there Rabbi Meir learned that just as two items with rabbinic impurity may be burned together, so too items may be burned together during the sixth hour, when the prohibition is rabbinic.
But if that is the explanation, what role does Rabbi Yehoshua play in the Mishnah? Rabbi Yosef says that Rabbi Yehoshua and Rabbi Yosei are more lenient and permit the items to be burned separately—or, according to the relevant reading, permit the two types of terumah to be burned together. If the entire derivation comes from Rabbi Hananiah Segan HaKohanim, how do we understand the additional statement of Rabbi Yosef?
The answer is that Rabbi Yosef first says that Rabbi Meir learned the law from Rabbi Hananiah Segan HaKohanim. Rabbi Hananiah’s case corresponds to the sixth hour, because both involve rabbinic impurity or a rabbinic prohibition. Rabbi Yosef then adds that there is another teaching involving Rabbi Yehoshua that might appear to support a similar conclusion, but the comparison is not complete.
We have already encountered Rabbi Yehoshua in the case of the vat. There was pure terumah on top and impure non-sacred produce at the bottom. Rabbi Yehoshua permitted a person to take an impure vessel and scoop out the pure terumah in order to save it before it fell into the impure non-sacred produce.
Although using an impure vessel causes the terumah to become impure through contact, Rabbi Yehoshua permitted this because otherwise the terumah would be lost entirely. The impure non-sacred produce below would cause the terumah to become unusable. From this case one might think that Rabbi Yehoshua permits one to cause impurity directly when doing so prevents a greater loss.
One might therefore attempt to apply Rabbi Yehoshua’s ruling to the case of leaven and say that one may burn pure and impure leaven together. Rabbi Yosef rejects that comparison. Rabbi Yehoshua was lenient in the vat case only because there was a question of uncertain impurity and the alternative was the loss of the terumah. His leniency cannot automatically be extended to a case involving definite impurity.
The Gemara explains that even if one wishes to derive a principle from Rabbi Yehoshua, the most one can say is that he is lenient in a case of doubtful impurity—where it is uncertain whether the item is impure or pure. That is comparable to other cases in which Rabbi Yehoshua permits one to uncover or handle an item because its status is uncertain. It does not establish a general permission to create definite impurity.
Rabbi Yehoshua also discusses a barrel in a house. If the barrel was in a concealed or protected place, and it is uncertain whether someone touched it, the ruling is different from the case in which one acts directly to save an item from being lost. This is a case of doubtful impurity, not a case of definite impurity. The style of the Mishnah is therefore understood carefully: Rabbi Hananiah discusses rabbinic impurity, from which Rabbi Meir derives the law of the sixth hour, while Rabbi Yehoshua’s case involves a separate leniency connected to doubt and loss.
At this point, the Gemara returns to the disagreement over the nature of the impurity caused by liquids. The Mishnah discusses a case in which a sheretz touched a liquid, and that liquid then touched sacrificial meat. The question is whether the meat became impure on a Torah level or only on a rabbinic level.
This is the underlying dispute. Does a liquid have the ability to transmit impurity on a Torah level, or only through a rabbinic decree? Rabbi Meir holds that impurity transmitted through liquids is only rabbinic. If so, the piece of meat in the Mishnah has only rabbinic impurity, and Rabbi Meir can compare it to the sixth hour, whose prohibition is also rabbinic.
Rabbi Yosei, however, holds that liquids can transmit impurity on a Torah level. According to him, when the liquid became impure and then transmitted impurity to the meat, the meat has a Torah-level impurity. If so, how can one derive the law of the sixth hour from this case, when the prohibition during the sixth hour is only rabbinic? That is the source of the dispute.
The Gemara brings a related teaching. Liquids can become subject to a doubtful impurity. For example, if there is a doubt whether an impure person touched the liquid, the liquid is treated as impure. Everyone appears to agree that liquids can receive a Torah-level impurity. There are two separate questions: whether liquids can receive impurity, and whether they can transmit impurity to something else.
Regarding receiving impurity, the teaching appears to say that liquids can receive impurity on a Torah level. If there is a doubt about impurity in a private domain, the item is treated as impure. Thus, the liquid itself can be considered impure. The question is whether it can then make another item impure.
Rabbi Elazar appears to say exactly what Rabbi Meir says. In both cases, the liquid itself has an uncertain impurity, while the item it touches remains pure when the impurity is uncertain. Rabbi Yehudah is more stringent and says that the item contacted by the liquid is also treated as impure.
Rabbi Yosef and Rabbi Shimon say that food becomes impure. This reflects the position that the impurity of liquids can transmit impurity to food on a Torah level. According to that view, the doubtful impurity of the liquid is a Torah-level doubt with regard to the food, and the food is therefore treated as impure.
What does this prove? It shows that Rabbi Yosef holds that liquids can transmit impurity to food on a Torah level. In the case of our Mishnah, the sheretz touched the liquid, and the liquid touched sacrificial meat. If the liquid has a Torah-level impurity, the meat can also become impure on a Torah level.
Rabbi Elazar challenges this reasoning. The case brought as proof involves a doubt: there is a doubt whether the liquid became impure. When a doubtful impurity then touches another item, the ruling may be stringent because of the special laws of doubtful impurity. That does not necessarily prove that certain impurity transmitted through liquid is Torah-level impurity.
This is why Rabbi Elazar says that the comparison is not valid. One is attempting to derive the law of burning leaven during the sixth hour from a case involving the transmission of impurity. Rabbi Elazar agrees that the items may be burned together during the seventh hour, when the prohibition is Torah-level, but he does not agree that the sixth hour can be inferred from the case of the meat.
The Gemara then examines whether Rabbi Elazar himself maintains that liquids have a Torah-level impurity. Rabbi Elazar had said that liquids could become impure and could transmit impurity. Does he maintain that they possess Torah-level impurity in every respect?
The Gemara brings the testimony of Yosef ben Yo'ezer concerning the liquids found in the Temple courtyard. Yosef ben Yo'ezer testified that those liquids were pure. The question is what exactly this means. Does it mean that the liquids themselves are pure, or only that they do not transmit impurity to other items?
If the liquids themselves are pure, then this would suggest that the impurity of liquids in general is only rabbinic. The Rabbis decreed impurity upon liquids outside the Temple, but they did not apply that decree to the liquids in the Temple courtyard. If the impurity were Torah-level, the Sages could not simply suspend it in the Temple.
Rabbi Elazar’s position appears to be that the liquids in the Temple are pure with regard to transmitting impurity to others, but they may still have a status of impurity in themselves. According to that understanding, Yosef ben Yo'ezer’s testimony does not prove that liquids themselves are entirely pure.
Rav, however, understands Yosef ben Yo'ezer differently. When Yosef ben Yo'ezer testified that the liquids in the Temple were pure, he meant that they were pure even in themselves. If so, Rav would hold that liquids ordinarily have only a rabbinic impurity. In the Temple, where the Rabbis did not enact their decree, the liquids are entirely pure.
This creates a difficulty. Earlier, Rabbi Meir said that a doubtful liquid is impure, while another item touched by it is pure. Rabbi Elazar appeared to agree with him. If Rabbi Elazar maintains that liquids have no Torah-level impurity, why would he agree that the liquid itself is impure?
The Gemara explains that the disagreement concerns two separate matters: the impurity of the liquid itself and the ability of the liquid to transmit impurity to another item. A teaching may indicate that a liquid can itself become impure, while another teaching concerns whether that impurity can be transmitted. The two issues cannot be collapsed into one.
The Gemara therefore teaches that there is a dispute both about the impurity of liquids themselves and about their ability to transmit impurity to other items. This distinction is important for understanding the Mishnah, because the case there involves a sheretz touching a liquid and the liquid then touching sacrificial meat.
If the meat is considered impure on a Torah level, that affects whether it may be burned together with pure terumah during the sixth hour. If its impurity is only rabbinic, then Rabbi Meir can compare it to the rabbinic prohibition of the sixth hour. That is the practical consequence of the dispute.
The Gemara then states the matter explicitly. There was a dispute in the Temple concerning the testimony of Yosef ben Yo'ezer that the liquids in the Temple courtyard were pure. Rav and Shmuel differ over the meaning of the word “pure.” Rav says that the liquids themselves were completely pure. Shmuel says that they were pure with regard to transmitting impurity, but they could still have impurity in themselves.
Rav explains that the liquids in the Temple were completely pure because the impurity of liquids is rabbinic. The Rabbis enacted the decree concerning liquids outside the Temple, but they did not apply it to liquids in the Temple courtyard. Thus, the liquids there were pure both in themselves and with regard to transmitting impurity.
Shmuel, however, holds that the liquids were pure only with regard to transmitting impurity to others. The Rabbis did not suspend the impurity of the liquids themselves, but they did not apply the decree concerning the transmission of impurity within the Temple courtyard.
The Gemara explains that according to Rav, the decree concerning the impurity of liquids was enacted only outside the Temple. In the Temple courtyard, the liquids are pure. According to Shmuel, the decree concerning the liquids themselves applies even there, but the additional decree concerning their ability to transmit impurity does not.
This means that if one maintains that the impurity of liquids is Torah-level, then the liquids would retain that impurity even in the Temple. That would not be negotiable. If one maintains that their impurity is rabbinic, then the Rabbis could refrain from applying the decree in the Temple courtyard.
So far, we have not seen an opinion that says that the impurity of liquids themselves is entirely Torah-level in every respect. We have seen a dispute about the distinction between the liquids themselves and their ability to transmit impurity. Rabbi Yehudah is the one who appears to take the more stringent position regarding the effect of doubtful impurity.
We now turn to another question. Did Shmuel actually say that the liquids in the Temple were impure in themselves but unable to transmit impurity to others? The Gemara asks this because another verse appears to indicate that liquids can transmit impurity to sacrificial meat.
The verse says that if something impure touches sacrificial meat, it becomes impure. The phrase “anything impure” is interpreted to include liquids. Thus, one might understand the verse as teaching that liquids have the ability to transmit impurity to sacrificial meat.
If that is so, what level of impurity does the liquid have? The liquid is treated like a secondary level of impurity. A secondary level cannot ordinarily create a third level of impurity in ordinary food, but it can affect sacrificial meat, which has additional laws of impurity.
The objection is that if the verse explicitly calls the liquid impure, this appears to establish that it has the ability to transmit impurity. How, then, can Shmuel say that the liquids in the Temple are pure with regard to transmitting impurity?
The Gemara answers that the verse must be interpreted carefully. The word “impure” may refer to the level of impurity relevant to the sacrificial meat, not necessarily to a general Torah-level status of the liquid itself. The same terminology can be used in different contexts, and one must determine whether the verse is describing the liquid itself or its effect on sacrificial meat.
The discussion then turns to a vessel that became impure through contact with a sheretz, while a liquid or food was inside it. The point is that the liquid may play a role in establishing the food’s susceptibility to impurity without the liquid itself necessarily being the source of a Torah-level transmission of impurity.
Rav explains that the verse is discussing preparation for impurity rather than the independent impurity of the liquid. Food that was dry would not become susceptible to impurity through the vessel. If there was water in the vessel, however, the water could prepare the food to receive impurity.
The liquid therefore makes the food susceptible to impurity, but this does not necessarily mean that the liquid itself has a Torah-level impurity that is being transmitted. The verse is teaching the law of preparation, not necessarily the independent status of the liquid.
There is a further question. The Torah already says that food upon which water falls becomes susceptible to impurity. Why would another verse be needed to teach the same law?
The answer is that the two verses teach two different cases. One verse concerns water that is detached from its source and placed in a vessel. The other concerns water that remains attached to its source, such as water in a spring or in the ground. Both kinds of water can prepare food to receive impurity, so both verses are necessary.
If we had only the verse concerning water in a vessel, we might say that such water has significance because a person deliberately collected it and placed it in a vessel. It has become important through human action. But water that remains attached to its source might not be considered significant in that way. The second verse teaches that attached water can also prepare food for impurity.
Conversely, if we had only the verse concerning water that remains attached to its source, we might think that only such naturally significant water can prepare food. The verse concerning detached water teaches that water placed in a vessel also has this capacity.
The Gemara brings another teaching: “A spring and a cistern are pure.” This appears to mean that water attached to the ground is pure, whereas detached water can become impure and can transmit impurity.
One might understand the verse as referring to an impure person who immerses in a spring or cistern. The person becomes pure because the water is a valid immersion medium. If the water were removed from its source, it would no longer purify him.
However, that is not necessarily evidence that the water itself has a Torah-level impurity. The teaching may concern the purification of the person rather than the independent status of the water. The fact that water attached to its source purifies a person does not prove that detached water has the ability to transmit impurity as an independent liquid.
The Gemara then returns to the teaching from the Temple. It asks whether liquids in the Temple are merely pure themselves or whether they also lack the ability to prepare food for impurity.
Rabbi Yosef ben Rabbi Hanina says that the liquids in the Temple are not only pure themselves; they do not have the ability to prepare food to receive impurity. If liquid in the Temple falls on fruit, the fruit does not become prepared for impurity.
This creates a difficulty. Earlier, we learned that detached water can prepare food for impurity on a Torah level. If so, how could the Rabbis suspend this law in the Temple courtyard? The impurity of liquids may be rabbinic, but the ability of water to prepare food for impurity is a Torah-level law.
The answer is that the statement about liquids in the Temple concerns a particular category of liquid. The seven liquids that can prepare food for impurity include blood. The question is what kind of blood is included in that category and whether sacrificial blood is treated as a liquid that can prepare food.
One might attempt to derive that sacrificial blood is included among the liquids that prepare food because the Torah compares blood to water. Perhaps only blood that falls naturally to the ground is considered like water and can prepare food, while sacrificial blood that is caught in a vessel is treated differently.
There is a separate question regarding blood that fell onto the floor. That is not the present issue. The discussion concerns blood that is caught initially in a vessel during the slaughter of a sacrifice.
Another possibility is that sacrificial blood is not included because it is not treated like ordinary water. It is collected in a vessel and used for a sacrificial service; it is not discarded in the same manner as water. Therefore, perhaps it does not have the status of one of the liquids that prepare food.
The Gemara challenges this reasoning. What about the blood that flows at the time of slaughter? During slaughter, there is an initial gush of blood. That blood is called the blood of the slaughter. The priest does not necessarily catch every drop of that initial flow in the vessel, yet one might still think that it should have the status of blood and therefore be capable of preparing food for impurity.
The answer is that not every red liquid emerging from an animal is called blood for this purpose. The Torah’s definition of blood is connected to the life of the animal. Blood is called blood when the life-force departs with it.
The initial fluid that flows from the animal, known as the blood of secretion, is not the blood through which the life departs. The life does not leave through that initial flow. Therefore, it is not considered blood in the Torah’s sense and is not one of the seven liquids that can prepare food for impurity.
The practical point is that the red material seen immediately when an animal is slaughtered is not necessarily halachic blood. This is true even with regard to an ordinary animal, not only with regard to sacrificial animals. The novelty concerning sacrificial blood relates to the blood that is genuinely the blood of the life-force, which emerges later and is collected for the sacrificial service.
Even that blood, however, does not necessarily prepare food for impurity in the Temple. It is not treated like ordinary liquid that spills and is discarded. It is collected in a vessel and used for a specific purpose.
The discussion returns to the distinction between the initial flow and the later blood. The initial flow is not called blood because the life-force has not yet departed through it. The later blood is called the blood of the life-force because the life departs through it.
The verse says that the life of the flesh is in the blood. Only the blood through which the life departs has that status. The initial blood of secretion does not have the status of blood in this respect and therefore does not prepare food for impurity.
This explains why the initial flow is not considered one of the seven liquids. Since it is not halachic blood, it cannot prepare food for impurity. The later blood, which is genuine blood, would ordinarily have the capacity associated with blood, but sacrificial blood has additional restrictions because it is collected and used for the sacrificial service.
The Gemara also discusses the view of Rabbi Yehoshua in this connection. Rabbi Yehoshua says that water does not purify the initial flow of blood because that flow is not genuine blood. Since the initial flow does not contain the blood through which the life departs, it does not have the status of blood for the relevant laws.
Thus, the principle is that genuine blood has the status of one of the liquids that can prepare food for impurity, while the initial flow does not. The issue is not simply whether the substance is red or whether it emerges from the animal. The determining factor is whether the life-force departs through it.
This completes the connection back to our Mishnah. The entire dispute depends on whether the liquid that touched the sacrificial meat has a Torah-level status and whether it can transmit impurity. If its status is only rabbinic, Rabbi Meir can compare it to the rabbinic prohibition of the sixth hour. If its status is Torah-level, that comparison does not work, and one may burn the items together only when the prohibition itself has reached a Torah level, during the seventh hour.