Today’s study is dedicated in memory of Nishmat Avraham ben Einstein. We begin with today’s daf, on page 18b, after the statement of Amar Mar. The Tosafot, eighteen lines from the top, explain that this passage of the Gemara proceeds like a back-and-forth exchange. Each rabbi must account for the verses cited by the other rabbi: What does he do with that verse, and what does the other rabbi do with this verse? The discussion moves back and forth until each verse has been properly assigned.
Amar Mar asks: From where do we know that someone who eats leavened bread after midday on the eve of Passover violates a prohibition? We learned above that someone who eats leavened bread on the eve of Passover violates a negative commandment. The novelty is that this prohibition applies even before Passover itself begins. How do we know this? The verse says, “You shall not eat leavened bread with it.”
That verse is referring to the time when one brings the Passover offering. When the Passover offering is brought on the eve of Passover, one may not eat leavened bread with it. That prohibition has already been established. It teaches that at the time of slaughtering the Passover offering, leavened bread is forbidden.
Rabbi Shimon said to Rabbi Yehuda: How can you derive the prohibition from that verse? It has already been stated, “You shall not eat leavened bread with it; for seven days you shall eat it with unleavened bread.” The Torah juxtaposes leavened bread and unleavened bread to teach that the prohibition against leavened bread applies at the time when there is an obligation to eat unleavened bread—during the seven days of Passover—not on the eve of Passover. Rabbi Shimon therefore does not accept the connection to the Passover offering as the source of the prohibition on the eve of Passover.
The Gemara asks: What does Rabbi Yehuda respond to Rabbi Shimon? Rabbi Yehuda says that the verse is not coming to teach that the prohibition against leavened bread begins only when there is an obligation to eat unleavened bread. The prohibition actually begins on the eve of Passover. Rather, the juxtaposition teaches that the obligation to eat unleavened bread applies in future generations as well.
One might have thought that the obligation to eat unleavened bread applies only when there is a Passover offering, because the verse says, “With unleavened bread and bitter herbs shall they eat it.” Since the unleavened bread is mentioned in connection with the Passover offering, perhaps today, when there is no Passover offering, there is no obligation to eat unleavened bread. The Torah therefore juxtaposes unleavened bread with leavened bread: Just as the prohibition against leavened bread applies throughout the generations, even when there is no Temple and no offering, so too the obligation of unleavened bread applies throughout the generations.
There are other verses that mention unleavened bread, but Rashi explains that those verses are not the subject here. This discussion concerns the unleavened bread of the first night. The other verses say that one may eat unleavened bread for seven days, but they do not necessarily establish an obligation to eat it. They may simply be teaching that one may eat unleavened bread rather than leavened bread.
The obligation derived by Rabbi Yehuda from the first verse is therefore an obligation on the eve of Passover, while Rabbi Shimon derives from the juxtaposition of leavened bread and unleavened bread that the obligation continues for future generations. Rabbi Shimon responds that if the verse is intended to teach that the obligation of unleavened bread applies even today, that can be derived from another verse: “In the evening you shall eat unleavened bread.”
That verse appears to be extra. The verse concerning the Passover offering already says, “With unleavened bread and bitter herbs shall they eat it.” Why would the Torah also need to say, “In the evening you shall eat unleavened bread”? Rabbi Shimon understands this additional verse as teaching that the obligation to eat unleavened bread applies even when there is no Passover offering.
Rabbi Yehuda must explain that verse differently. He says that “In the evening you shall eat unleavened bread” teaches that even a person who was ritually impure or who was on a distant road and therefore could not bring the Passover offering must nevertheless eat unleavened bread.
One might have thought that since such a person is exempt from the Passover offering, he is also exempt from unleavened bread and bitter herbs. The verse therefore teaches that the two obligations do not necessarily go together. Even when there is a Passover offering, a person who is exempt from bringing it because he is impure or because he is on a distant road is still obligated to eat unleavened bread.
Rabbi Shimon says that a separate verse is not necessary to teach this. A person who is impure or on a distant road is no worse than an uncircumcised person or a foreigner. An uncircumcised person may be legitimately unable to circumcise himself, for example, because his brothers died as a result of circumcision. Such a person may not eat from the Passover offering. A “foreigner” in this context does not mean a non-Jew; it refers to someone whose actions are foreign and who conducts himself in violation of the commandments.
The Torah says, “No uncircumcised person shall eat of it.” The word “of it” teaches that the uncircumcised person may not eat from the Passover offering, but he may eat the other foods associated with the night, including unleavened bread and bitter herbs. If an uncircumcised person and a foreigner, who are exempt from the Passover offering, are nevertheless obligated to eat unleavened bread, then certainly a person who is impure or on a distant road is also obligated to eat it.
Rabbi Yehuda responds that both verses are necessary. The Torah wrote one verse concerning the uncircumcised person and the foreigner, and another verse concerning the person who is impure or on a distant road. Even if one could have derived one category from the other, the Torah nevertheless wrote both verses. Since those verses are accounted for in their own contexts, the verse stating, “For seven days you shall eat it with unleavened bread,” remains available to teach that the obligation of unleavened bread applies in the present time.
There are many verses concerning unleavened bread, but the verses that speak about eating unleavened bread for seven days do not necessarily establish a mandatory obligation to eat it throughout those seven days. Their point may simply be that one should not eat leavened bread: If one wants to eat, one may eat unleavened bread, rice, potatoes, or something else. The Torah is not necessarily giving a required menu for all seven days. The central point is the prohibition against leavened bread.
The verse, “In the evening you shall eat unleavened bread,” is different. It refers specifically to the first night, when there is an obligation to eat unleavened bread. That is why the obligation of unleavened bread is limited to the first night, even though the Torah speaks about eating unleavened bread for seven days. Thus, the two opinions are as follows: Rabbi Yehuda derives the obligation in the present time from the juxtaposition of leavened bread and unleavened bread, while Rabbi Shimon derives it from the verse, “In the evening you shall eat unleavened bread.”
We now begin a new section of the Gemara, which asks: Who is the author of our Mishnah? This will lead to a major and difficult novelty. Our Mishnah discusses leavened bread that remained after Passover. It states that leavened bread belonging to a Jew that remained after Passover is forbidden for benefit, while leavened bread belonging to a non-Jew that remained after Passover is permitted for benefit.
Let us review the wording of the Mishnah. It says that leavened bread belonging to a non-Jew that remained after Passover is permitted for benefit, while leavened bread belonging to a Jew that remained after Passover is forbidden for benefit.
The Gemara asks a straightforward question: Who is the author of this law? If you say that it is Rabbi Yehuda, there is a difficulty. Rabbi Yehuda said that leavened bread is forbidden at three different times: on the eve of Passover, during Passover, and after Passover. He brought three verses to establish these three prohibitions. When Rabbi Yehuda says that leavened bread is forbidden after Passover, he does not distinguish between leavened bread belonging to a Jew and leavened bread belonging to a non-Jew. He simply says that leavened bread is forbidden.
It therefore cannot be Rabbi Yehuda, because the Mishnah permits the leavened bread of a non-Jew after Passover. Perhaps the Mishnah follows Rabbi Shimon. Rabbi Shimon says that there is no biblical prohibition against leavened bread after Passover. But this also presents a difficulty, because Rabbi Shimon permits even the leavened bread of a Jew after Passover, whereas the Mishnah says that the leavened bread of a Jew is forbidden for benefit.
Perhaps the Mishnah follows Rabbi Yosef HaGelili. He holds that one may benefit from leavened bread even during Passover itself. If so, the Mishnah certainly could not follow him, because the Mishnah says that the leavened bread of a Jew is forbidden after Passover.
The Gemara gives several answers. The first answer is given by Rabba bar Yaakov, who says that the Mishnah follows Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Yehuda derives a connection between the prohibition against possessing leavened bread and the prohibition against eating it. Just as the prohibition against possessing leavened bread applies only to one’s own leavened bread, and not to leavened bread belonging to another person or to the Temple treasury, so too the prohibition against eating applies only to one’s own leavened bread.
According to this interpretation, one may possess the leavened bread of a non-Jew or consecrated leavened bread, because it does not belong to him. The same distinction applies to eating. The Torah prohibition against eating applies to one’s own leavened bread, but not to leavened bread that belongs to a non-Jew or to the Temple treasury.
This is a remarkable novelty. According to this view, one could technically eat the leavened bread of a non-Jew on Passover, and one could eat consecrated leavened bread, because the prohibition of eating parallels the prohibition of possession. Just as the Torah says, “No leaven shall be found in your houses,” meaning your own leaven, so too the prohibition against eating applies only to your own leaven.
The Gemara therefore says that the Mishnah should really have stated that the leavened bread of a non-Jew is permitted to be eaten, not merely that it is permitted for benefit. However, since the Mishnah is discussing the leavened bread of a Jew, which is forbidden for benefit after Passover, it uses the same expression when speaking about the leavened bread of a non-Jew. Technically, the leavened bread of a non-Jew would be permitted even for eating.
This raises a practical difficulty. What case could there be of a person eating the leavened bread of a non-Jew on Passover? If the non-Jew gives it to him, it becomes his property. Tosafot discusses how one could construct such a case—for example, a non-Jew is physically holding the food while allowing the Jew to eat it, or a case in which the Jew must replace something that was taken. The point is that the Jew is eating the non-Jew’s leavened bread without acquiring ownership of it.
The first answer therefore understands the Mishnah according to Rabbi Yehuda, but with the distinction that Rabbi Yehuda’s prohibition applies only to one’s own leavened bread. The prohibition of possession and the prohibition of eating are linked: Just as only one’s own leavened bread is prohibited to possess, only one’s own leavened bread is prohibited to eat.
The Gemara then discusses the status of consecrated property. If a person sanctifies an animal, it is considered his offering, but once it becomes consecrated it belongs to the Temple treasury. This raises the question of whether consecrated leavened bread is regarded as belonging to him for purposes of the prohibition. The Gemara will return to this question when it discusses the prohibition of misappropriating consecrated property.
A second answer is that the Mishnah follows Rabbi Shimon. Rabbi Shimon holds that, biblically, leavened bread that remained after Passover is permitted. The prohibition against benefiting from the leavened bread of a Jew is a rabbinic penalty. The Rabbis penalized a Jew who violated the prohibitions of seeing and possessing leavened bread during Passover. Although the biblical prohibition has ended once Passover is over, the Rabbis said that he may not benefit from the leavened bread he retained.
According to Rabbi Shimon, the leavened bread of a non-Jew is permitted after Passover because the non-Jew was not subject to the prohibitions of seeing and possessing it. The leavened bread of a Jew, however, is forbidden as a rabbinic penalty. The Jew who left his cake in the refrigerator throughout Passover, did not sell it, and did not nullify it, cannot come after Passover and benefit from it. The Rabbis do not allow a person to profit from his violation.
The language of the Mishnah, which cites the verse “It shall not be seen with you,” can be understood according to this answer as referring to the reason for the rabbinic penalty. Since the Jew violated the prohibition of “It shall not be seen with you,” the Rabbis prohibited him from benefiting from the leavened bread after Passover. The verse is not itself the source of the post-Passover prohibition; it explains why the Rabbis imposed the penalty.
The Gemara asks how the Mishnah can be explained according to Rabba’s interpretation. Rabba says that the post-Passover prohibition is rabbinic, and that the verse is cited only to indicate the reason for the penalty. This fits the Mishnah’s statement that the leavened bread of a Jew is forbidden because of the prohibition, “It shall not be seen with you.”
According to Rabbi Yaakov bar Acha, however, the prohibition against the leavened bread of a Jew after Passover is biblical. Why, then, does the Mishnah cite the verse “It shall not be seen with you,” when Rabbi Yehuda’s three verses concerning the eve of Passover, Passover itself, and after Passover do not include that verse?
Rabbi Yaakov bar Acha answers that the verse is not explaining the second law of the Mishnah, concerning the leavened bread of a Jew after Passover. It is explaining the first law, concerning the leavened bread of a non-Jew. Why is the leavened bread of a non-Jew permitted for benefit after Passover? Because the verse says, “It shall not be seen with you”—your leavened bread may not be seen, but the leavened bread of another person may be seen. The Mishnah places the verse at the end, but it is actually referring to the first case.
This interpretation is consistent with the earlier derivation: Just as the prohibition of possession applies only to one’s own leavened bread, so too the prohibition of eating applies only to one’s own leavened bread. According to that approach, the leavened bread of a non-Jew would technically be permitted even during Passover, although the question of consecrated property and the prohibition of misappropriating consecrated property remains.
The Gemara then presents a related dispute concerning a person who ate the leavened bread of a non-Jew after Passover. Rabbi Yehuda says that he receives lashes, while Rabbi Yaakov bar Acha says that he does not. The dispute reflects the same underlying issue.
According to Rabbi Yehuda, the prohibition of leavened bread applies equally to leavened bread belonging to a Jew and leavened bread belonging to a non-Jew. The distinction between ownership and eating does not exclude the non-Jew’s leavened bread from the prohibition of eating. Therefore, someone who eats it after Passover violates the prohibition and receives lashes.
According to Rabbi Yaakov bar Acha, however, the connection between possession and eating teaches that only one’s own leavened bread is included in the prohibition. Since the leavened bread of a non-Jew is not subject to the prohibition of possession, it is also not subject to the prohibition of eating. The practical difference is whether a person who eats the leavened bread of a non-Jew after Passover receives lashes.
The Gemara then retracts the earlier assumption. Perhaps Rabbi Yehuda does not permit the leavened bread of a non-Jew after Passover. The conclusion may be that Rabbi Yehuda holds that leavened bread that remained after Passover is forbidden, whether it belonged to a Jew or to a non-Jew.
This discussion leads to the case of consecrated leavened bread. If a person eats consecrated leavened bread on Passover, does he violate the prohibition of misappropriating consecrated property? There are those who say that he does, and there are those who say that he does not.
At first glance, the question is difficult. On Passover, the consecrated leavened bread has no usable value. If no one may eat it and no one may benefit from it, what has the person taken from the Temple treasury? He has taken something that cannot be used.
One answer is that the consecrated leavened bread will have value after Passover, according to the opinion that leavened bread becomes permitted after Passover. Although it has no value at the moment he eats it, it will eventually become valuable. The question is whether that future value is sufficient to constitute misappropriation now.
A second answer is that even if the person is liable to the spiritual punishment of excision for eating leavened bread on Passover, he may still be obligated to repay the value of the consecrated property. Alternatively, the principle that one who is subject to a more severe punishment is exempt from a monetary payment may exempt him from repayment. The question is whether that principle applies when the more severe punishment is excision imposed by Heaven rather than a punishment imposed by a court.
The principle is illustrated by the teaching of Rabbi Nechunya ben HaKanah. He compares the laws of Yom Kippur to the laws of Shabbat. If a person lights a fire on Shabbat and burns another person’s field, he is liable to the death penalty for desecrating Shabbat and is exempt from paying for the field. Rabbi Nechunya ben HaKanah says that Yom Kippur is treated similarly. If a person performs forbidden labor on Yom Kippur, he is liable to excision, and that liability exempts him from monetary payment for damage caused at the same time.
According to this principle, someone who eats consecrated leavened bread on Passover may be exempt from repaying the Temple treasury because he is subject to excision for eating leavened bread. One opinion may hold that excision does not exempt a person from monetary payment, while another opinion may hold that the principle of exemption applies even to excision.
The first explanation of the dispute is therefore that everyone agrees that eating consecrated leavened bread on Passover is prohibited. The dispute is only whether the punishment of excision exempts the person from monetary liability. One side says that he must repay the consecrated property; the other applies the principle that the greater punishment exempts him from the lesser monetary obligation.
The Gemara then asks who is represented by the anonymous opinion that says there is no misappropriation. Rabbi Yochanan identifies it as the opinion of Rabbi Nechunya ben HaKanah. Rabbi Nechunya ben HaKanah compares Yom Kippur to Shabbat: Just as a person who damages property while violating Shabbat is exempt from monetary payment because he is liable to death, so too a person who damages property while violating Yom Kippur is exempt because he is liable to excision.
There is also a second interpretation, presented by Rav Yosef. He discusses a person who redeems consecrated property that has developed a blemish. For example, a consecrated animal develops a permanent defect and must be redeemed. After the redemption, the animal may be slaughtered and eaten, but certain benefits remain prohibited, such as using its wool, its milk, or other products of the animal.
This raises a separate question: May one redeem the consecrated animal in order to give its meat to dogs? There is a dispute about whether consecrated property may be redeemed for the purpose of feeding animals. According to the opinion that permits it, the meat has monetary value because it can be given to dogs. According to the opinion that does not permit it, the meat has no usable value for purposes of redemption.
Rav Yosef applies that dispute to consecrated leavened bread on Passover. Suppose one cannot eat the consecrated leavened bread because it is Passover, but he wishes to redeem it and feed it to dogs. The opinion that says there is misappropriation holds that one may redeem consecrated property for such a purpose. Since the leavened bread has value as food for dogs, the person has taken something of value from the consecrated property.
The opinion that says there is no misappropriation holds that one may not redeem consecrated property merely to feed it to dogs. Therefore, at the time the person ate the consecrated leavened bread, it had no monetary value, and no misappropriation has occurred.
Rashi offers an interpretation based on Rabbi Shimon, who holds that leavened bread after Passover is permitted for benefit. Even though the consecrated leavened bread cannot be eaten during Passover, it will have value after Passover. Rav Yosef’s answer can therefore be understood as dealing with the question of whether an item that will eventually become monetary property is regarded as having value now.
According to this approach, the opinion that says there is misappropriation regards future value as sufficient. Although the leavened bread has no value during Passover, it will become valuable afterward. The opinion that says there is no misappropriation does not regard future value as present monetary value. At the time of the act, the consecrated leavened bread could not be used, and therefore nothing of value was taken.
The Gemara then presents a further interpretation. Perhaps the discussion is not according to Rabbi Shimon, but according to Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Yehuda holds that leavened bread is forbidden for benefit even after Passover. If so, the consecrated leavened bread has no value, neither during Passover nor afterward. According to Rabbi Yehuda, there is no future value that can create misappropriation.
According to Rabbi Shimon, however, leavened bread becomes permitted after Passover. The consecrated leavened bread therefore has future value, and the question is whether that future value is considered monetary property now. The dispute is not necessarily about whether future value can ever be considered monetary property; it may be a dispute about whether this particular item is destined to become valuable.
A fourth interpretation involves a retraction by Rabbi Yaakov bar Acha. Earlier, Rabbi Yaakov bar Acha seemed to say that leavened bread belonging to a non-Jew may even be eaten on Passover, because the prohibition of eating parallels the prohibition of possession. Now, however, the discussion concerning consecrated leavened bread demonstrates that the matter is more complicated.
According to this interpretation, the dispute between the opinions that say there is misappropriation and those that say there is not is based on the positions of Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon. Rabbi Yehuda holds that leavened bread is forbidden for benefit after Passover, so the consecrated leavened bread has no value at all. Rabbi Shimon holds that it becomes permitted after Passover, so it has future value.
The Gemara challenges this explanation. Rabbi Yaakov bar Acha himself had connected the prohibition of eating to the prohibition of possession. Since consecrated leavened bread is not subject to the prohibition of possession, it should also be permitted for benefit. Why, then, would the consecrated leavened bread be considered without value even according to the position that otherwise permits the leavened bread of a non-Jew?
The Gemara answers that Rabbi Yaakov bar Acha retracted his earlier position. The baraita is not discussing whether consecrated leavened bread may be eaten. Everyone agrees that eating it is prohibited. The dispute is whether there is monetary liability for taking it, and whether an item that may eventually become valuable is presently regarded as property.
A fifth interpretation says that everyone agrees that an item that will eventually become monetary property is considered property. The dispute is whether the consecrated leavened bread in this case will actually become valuable. Rabbi Yehuda holds that since leavened bread is forbidden for benefit after Passover, this consecrated leavened bread will never have value. Rabbi Shimon holds that leavened bread becomes permitted after Passover, so the consecrated leavened bread will become valuable and is therefore considered property.
The Gemara then explains that the dispute may be between Rabbi Yosef HaGelili and the Sages. Rabbi Yosef HaGelili holds that leavened bread is permitted for benefit even during Passover. According to him, the consecrated leavened bread has value because it can be used for benefit, even though it cannot be eaten. The Sages hold that leavened bread is forbidden for benefit during Passover, so the consecrated leavened bread has no value at that time.
According to Rabbi Yosef HaGelili, one may have benefit from the leavened bread of the Temple treasury—for example, by using it in a way that does not involve eating it. Therefore, if someone takes consecrated leavened bread, he has taken something of value and has committed misappropriation. According to the Sages, there is no permitted benefit from leavened bread on Passover, so the consecrated leavened bread has no value and there is no misappropriation.
This is the most lenient position discussed in the sugya. According to Rabbi Yosef HaGelili, leavened bread is permitted for benefit even on Passover. A person may technically take leavened bread and feed it to his dogs, provided that he does not eat it. The only prohibition would be eating the leavened bread itself. The Sages, however, do not accept that distinction and prohibit benefit from leavened bread during Passover.
Thus, the discussion has considered several possibilities: the dispute may concern whether excision exempts a person from monetary payment; whether consecrated property may be redeemed for the purpose of feeding dogs; whether future value is regarded as present value; whether the discussion follows Rabbi Yehuda or Rabbi Shimon; whether Rabbi Yaakov bar Acha retracted his earlier position; or whether the dispute is between Rabbi Yosef HaGelili and the Sages concerning whether one may benefit from leavened bread during Passover.
The central question throughout is not whether eating consecrated leavened bread is permitted. That act is prohibited. The question is whether the person has taken something of monetary value from the Temple treasury, and therefore whether he is liable for misappropriation or for repayment. Every interpretation addresses that question from a different angle: present value, future value, permitted benefit, redemption for dogs, or the relationship between a prohibition of possession and a prohibition of eating.