The EB Sit edition, an audio series of the Talmud Bavli, presents a discussion on Masechet Kiddushin. This session has been generously sponsored by our good friend Mr. Chaimy Dana, may he be protected and live long, in honor of his wife Bina bat Rivka, wishing her many years of shalom bayit, success, livelihood, and all good things: health, happiness, and nachas from the children, along with all blessings, amen. Today's daf, Daf Samech-Chet, is also being sponsored for the elevation of the souls of my grandfather Yosef ben Salman and my grandmother Yafa bat Sarah, may their souls be bound in the bond of life, amen. Additionally, today's daf is sponsored for the complete recovery of Moshe ben Dina Sarah and Rachel bat Rina, may it be Your will, and we say amen.
We find ourselves in the discussion on Daf Samech-Chet Amud Rishon, where we are currently examining the statement of Rav Aha bar Yaakov. The focus of our inquiry is to establish the principle that regarding any prohibition of kares, kiddushin is not effective. This means that in cases of issur kares, kiddushin does not take effect. We previously established this proof from the case of achot isha, where just as achot isha is a prohibition of kares and kiddushin does not take effect, as the verse states, lo tikach, indicating that there is no kicha in such instances.
The same applies to all those liable for keritos, where kiddushin is not effective. However, a question arose regarding niddah, which also carries a prohibition of kares. Why is it that in the case of niddah, kiddushin does take effect? This is because niddah has a specific verse that states, u-tehi niddatah alav. In response, Rav Aha bar Yaakov presents a new proof using a kal va-chomer argument from yevamah. If we consider the case of yevamah, which is under a strict prohibition, it states in the Torah, lo tihyeh eshet ha-met, indicating that it is forbidden for a yevamah to marry someone else. Therefore, kiddushin does not take effect in such a case.
This prohibition is a strict lav, and thus, if kiddushin does not take effect in the case of yevamah, all the more so it should not take effect in cases of those liable for mitot and keritos. The Gemara questions this reasoning, asking why we are only focusing on those liable for keritos and not extending this to all lavin. Should we not also conclude that all prohibitions of lav would also result in kiddushin not taking effect, leading to the offspring being considered mamzerim?
Rav Pappa responds that we cannot extend this to all lavin because the prohibitions of lavin are explicitly stated in the Torah. For example, the verse, ki tihyen le-ish shtei nashim, indicates that a man can have two wives, one beloved and one hated. The beloved wife is considered legal because her marriage is valid, while the hated one is not, as it involves a prohibition of lav. The Torah acknowledges both the beloved and the hated, affirming that kiddushin takes effect in cases of lavin.
However, Rabbi Akiva holds that kiddushin does not take effect in cases of lavin, raising a challenge regarding how he interprets the verse of ki tihyen. If he believes that kiddushin does not take effect in all lavin, how does he reconcile it with the verse? The Gemara clarifies that Rabbi Akiva accepts that there is an exception for a kohen gadol marrying a be'ulah. This is a unique case where kiddushin is effective, even though it is a prohibition of lav.
The discussion continues as the Gemara examines the implications of these rulings. Rabbi Yeshbab challenges Rabbi Akiva, questioning how he can impose such strict rulings that lead to so many mamzerim within the Jewish community. There are two interpretations of Rabbi Yeshbab's statement: one suggests he is reacting to Rabbi Simai's interpretation of Rabbi Akiva, while the other posits that he is addressing Rabbi Akiva directly, arguing against the strictness of his approach.
The Gemara concludes that while Rabbi Akiva maintains that kiddushin does not take effect in all lavin, there are exceptions, particularly regarding a kohen gadol and a be'ulah. This leads to further exploration of the implications of kiddushin in various contexts, including the case of a shifchah or a goyah, where kiddushin is not effective, and the child follows the status of the mother.
In summary, the discussion emphasizes the importance of understanding the distinctions between different types of prohibitions and their implications for kiddushin. The careful analysis of these cases reveals the intricate nature of Jewish law and the need for precise interpretation of the Torah's teachings.