The Mishnah presents three cases concerning betrothal. In the first case, a man tells his friend, "Go betroth this woman for me." The friend goes and betroths the woman to himself. The Mishnah rules that the woman is betrothed to the friend. The Gemara later clarifies that the friend is considered a deceiver for taking the woman for himself, but the betrothal is nonetheless valid.
The second case involves a man who tells a woman, "You are betrothed to me after thirty days." If another man comes and betroths her within those thirty days, the woman is betrothed to the second man. This is because the first betrothal is not effective until after the thirty days have passed. If this woman were a Bat Yisrael and the second man was a Kohen, she would be permitted to eat Terumah with him, as it is a fully valid marriage.
The third case is similar, but with a crucial difference in the man's stipulation. He tells the woman, "You are betrothed to me retroactively from now, to take effect after thirty days." If another man betroths her within these thirty days, the Mishnah states that she is "betrothed and not betrothed," meaning she is in a state of Safek Kiddushin to both men. Consequently, if she wishes to remain married to one, the other must issue a divorce. If she wishes to marry a third person, both men must issue her a divorce. The practical implication of this Safek Kiddushin is significant: a Bat Yisrael in this situation, if betrothed to a Kohen, cannot eat Terumah. Similarly, a Bat Kohen, who normally eats Terumah in her father's house, would be prevented from doing so, as she might be married to a Yisrael.
The Gemara begins its analysis with the first case of the Mishnah, where a man tells his friend to betroth a woman for him, and the friend betroths her to himself. The Gemara states that the friend is a deceiver, as he was entrusted to act on behalf of another but acted for himself. The betrothal is valid, but the act is improper. The Tanna of the Mishnah also agrees that this is an act of trickery. The Gemara notes that our Mishnah refers to the friend as a "Haver" (friend), whereas an earlier teaching referred to such an agent as a "Shaliach" (emissary). The Gemara asks why there is a difference in terminology.
The Gemara explains that the difference in terminology highlights a difference in the sender's reliance. If the sender explicitly designates someone as a , there is a greater expectation of fidelity. If the then betroths the woman to himself, he is considered a deceiver because the sender relied on him as a clear to perform his service. However, if the sender merely tells a (friend) to do it, perhaps he doesn't place the same level of reliance on him. The Gemara concludes that even if he uses the term , if the friend takes the woman for himself, he is still considered a deceiver in the context of betrothal.
The Gemara then explores another related case: if a man tells his , "Go betroth this woman for me in place A," and the betroths her in place B. In such a scenario, the betrothal is not valid because the sender specified a particular place. The Gemara asks if the distinction between and applies here. If the sender used the term , one might argue that he didn't expect his friend to exert himself to go to place B, implying his intention was strictly for place A. But if he used the term , he might be implying, "You are my , exert yourself wherever she is." The Gemara concludes that even if the term is used, if a specific place is named, the betrothal must occur in that place for it to be valid.
The discussion continues with a case where a man sent his to betroth a woman for his son, but the betrothed her to himself. This betrothal is valid, but it is considered an improper act. The Gemara asks why the didn't return to inform the son that the woman was unwilling to be betrothed to him. The answer is that the feared that in the interim, someone else would betroth her, and he didn't want to lose her. He therefore immediately betrothed her to himself.
A similar incident is recounted involving Rabbi Bar Bar Chanah. He gave money to Rav and asked him to buy a specific piece of real estate. Rav went and bought it for himself. The Gemara questions this, as it seems to be an improper act. The explanation is that the land belonged to powerful men who respected Rav, but would not have sold it to Rabbi Bar Bar Chanah. Rav, fearing that the land would be lost if he returned to inform Rabbi Bar Bar Chanah, purchased it for himself. He should have gone back and told Rabbi Bar Bar Chanah that they were not selling it to him. But again, the concern was that someone else would buy it in the interim.
Another story involves Rav Gidal, who was interested in a certain piece of land. Rabbi Abba, seeing Rav Gidal's interest, went and bought the land himself. Rav Gidal was upset and complained to Rabbi Zeira. Rabbi Zeira said he would rebuke Rabbi Abba when he visited on the holiday. The Gemara compares this to a poor man reaching for a cake, and someone else grabbing it. Such an act warrants rebuke. Rabbi Abba, however, claimed he didn't know Rav Gidal was interested; he saw the field for sale and bought it. To resolve the dispute, Rabbi Abba offered to sell the field to Rav Gidal. But Rabbi Abba then stated he could not sell it, as it was the first piece of real estate he had ever bought, and selling one's first acquisition is considered a bad omen. Instead, he offered it as a gift. Rav Gidal refused to accept it as a gift, as it is not good to accept gifts. Since neither wanted to keep the field, they declared it Hefker, leaving it for the Sages. This field became known as "the field of the Rabbis."
The Gemara returns to the second case of the Mishnah: a man tells a woman, "You are betrothed to me after thirty days." If no one else betroths her within those thirty days, the Gemara asks about the ruling. It concludes that she is betrothed to the first man. The Gemara then raises a question: what if the money she received for the betrothal is gone after thirty days? Does the betrothal still take effect? The Gemara explains that this case is not like a loan (Malveh) or a deposit (Pikadon). With a Malveh, the money immediately becomes hers, so a betrothal using it is invalid. With a Pikadon, the money remains the giver's, and a betrothal is valid only if a Perutah of the deposit remains. In our case, when the man gave the money, he explicitly stated it was for betrothal, even if delayed. Therefore, it is considered her money for the purpose of betrothal, and even if it is spent, the betrothal remains valid after the thirty days.
The Gemara then considers a scenario where no one else betroths her in the interim, but the first man retracts his offer within the thirty days. Can he do this? Rabbi Yochanan says he can retract, while Resh Lakish says he cannot. Resh Lakish maintains that a verbal statement (Dibbur) cannot nullify a physical act (Maaseh). Since the man gave her money, which is a physical act of betrothal, he cannot verbally retract it. Rabbi Yochanan argues that since the betrothal is not yet in effect, it is still a matter of verbal commitment, and one verbal statement can nullify another.
The Gemara raises a challenge against Resh Lakish from the laws of Terumah. If a man appoints a to take Terumah for him and then nullifies the appointment before the takes the Terumah, the Terumah is not valid. This seems to be a case where a verbal nullification works. Resh Lakish responds that in the Terumah case, the nullification is effective because the principal did not merely speak, but rather went and took the Terumah himself, which is a physical act that overrides the verbal appointment. Thus, it's not a verbal statement nullifying a verbal statement, but a physical act nullifying a verbal statement.
Another challenge against Resh Lakish comes from the laws of divorce. If a man gives a Get to a to deliver to his wife, and then catches up to the and tells him, "The Get I gave you is nullified," the Get is indeed nullified. This appears to be a verbal statement nullifying a physical act (the giving of the Get to the ). Resh Lakish responds that giving a Get to a is not considered a complete physical act until the wife receives it. Until then, it's still in the realm of verbal instruction, so one verbal statement can nullify another.
The Gemara then challenges Rabbi Yochanan, who holds that a verbal statement can nullify another verbal statement, even in the betrothal case. The challenge comes from the laws of Tumah (ritual impurity). A vessel becomes susceptible to Tumah only when its craftsman finishes it and has the intention (Machshava) that it is complete. However, to remove it from this state of susceptibility, a physical act of change is required, not merely a change of intention. This suggests that a Machshava cannot undo a Machshava, which is analogous to a Dibbur not undoing a Dibbur. Rabbi Yochanan responds that the Machshava regarding Tumah is different because it is considered like a physical act. This is derived from a verse concerning liquids that cause susceptibility to Tumah, which implies that a person's willing intention for water to be on a fruit is considered as if he physically put it there. Therefore, in Tumah, Machshava has the status of a Maaseh, and a verbal statement (or Machshava) cannot nullify a physical act (or a Machshava that functions as one).
The Gemara then presents a different understanding of the dispute between Rabbi Yochanan and Resh Lakish, as taught by Rav Zvid. This version applies their dispute to a case where a woman appointed a to accept betrothal for her, and then she herself accepted betrothal from another man. The question is whose betrothal is valid, depending on which occurred first. If she did not betroth herself, but merely changed her mind and told her to stop, Rabbi Yochanan says she can retract, while Resh Lakish says she cannot. Rabbi Yochanan argues that since her appointment of the was verbal, her retraction can also be verbal. Resh Lakish maintains that once she appointed the , it's an established act, and a verbal retraction is insufficient; a physical act would be needed.
The Gemara then reiterates the previous challenges against Resh Lakish. The Terumah case, where a verbal nullification of a is effective, is brought up again. Abaye answers that Resh Lakish would say that in the Terumah case, the principal's nullification was not merely verbal but involved a physical act of taking the Terumah himself. The challenge from the Get case is also brought up again, where a husband can verbally nullify a Get given to a . Resh Lakish's answer is that until the Get reaches the wife, it is still considered a verbal matter, not a completed physical act. However, a final challenge is posed against Resh Lakish from the Get case: if the woman appointed a to accept betrothal for her, and then she verbally retracts, Resh Lakish says she cannot. But in the Get case, a verbal nullification of the is effective. This is a clear case of a verbal statement nullifying a verbal statement, and Resh Lakish has no answer. Therefore, the Gemara concludes that Resh Lakish's position is refuted in practice (Mufrach Beilcheta), and the Halakha follows Rabbi Yochanan.
The Gemara then states that the Halakha follows Rabbi Yochanan, meaning that a woman can retract her appointment of a to accept betrothal. This implies that even in the first case of the Mishnah, where the man gave her money for a betrothal that was to take effect after thirty days, she could still retract. Although the money was physically given, the betrothal itself was pending, making it akin to a verbal commitment that can be verbally nullified.
The Gemara then introduces a related dispute between Rav Nachman and Rav Sheshet concerning a Get. If a man sends a with a Get for his wife and then nullifies the 's mission, can that same Get be reused later for the same woman? Rav Nachman says it can be reused, while Rav Sheshet says it cannot. The Gemara asks how Rav Nachman can say it can be reused, as this implies that a verbal nullification of the does not nullify the Get itself, which seems to contradict the idea that a verbal statement can nullify another verbal statement. The Gemara explains that Rav Nachman distinguishes: the husband nullifies the 's agency, not the Get itself. The Get remains valid, but the is no longer authorized to deliver it. The Gemara clarifies that the initial assumption was that by canceling the 's mission, the husband was implicitly canceling the Get's validity, particularly its "Lishmah" (for her sake) status, which is essential for a valid Get. However, Rav Nachman holds that the Get's Lishmah is not retroactively affected by the cancellation of the 's mission.
Finally, the Gemara returns to the third case of the Mishnah: a man says, "You are betrothed to me retroactively from now, to take effect after thirty days." If another man betroths her within those thirty days, the Mishnah states she is "betrothed and not betrothed." Rav says that she remains in this state of Safek Kiddushin forever, even after the thirty days, because the second man's betrothal is also pending indefinitely. Shmuel, however, says that the second man's betrothal is only valid until the thirty days pass, at which point the first man's betrothal takes effect retroactively from day one, nullifying the second betrothal entirely. The Gemara asks Rav Yosef to clarify how the second betrothal could simply "break" without a Get. Rav Yosef explains that Rav's ruling of the second betrothal breaking only applies to the case where the first man stipulated "retroactively from now, to take effect after thirty days." In this specific case, if the first man's betrothal takes effect after thirty days, it retroactively makes the woman betrothed to him from day one, thereby negating any intervening betrothal.
The Gemara explains Rav's Safek (doubt) in the case of "from now and after thirty days." Rav is unsure if this is a condition (Tnai) – meaning the betrothal is from now, but contingent on the thirty days passing – or a retraction (Hazara) – meaning the man initially said "from now" but then retracted to "after thirty days." If it's a condition, then the betrothal is effective from now, and any intervening betrothal is invalid. If it's a retraction, then the betrothal only takes effect after thirty days, and an intervening betrothal is valid. Shmuel, on the other hand, is certain it is a condition, so the first man's betrothal is definitely from now, and the second betrothal is nullified after thirty days.
The Gemara then states that the dispute between Rav and Shmuel mirrors a dispute between the Rabbis and Rabbi Meir concerning a Get. If a man gives his wife a Get "from today and after death," the Rabbis say it is a Safek Get (Get and not Get), while Rabbi Meir says it is a valid Get. The Rabbis are in doubt whether the man meant "from today" (making it a valid Get) or if he retracted and meant "after death" (making it an invalid Get, as a Get cannot be given after death). Rabbi Meir holds that he certainly meant "from today," making it a valid Get. The Gemara equates Rav with the Rabbis and Shmuel with Rabbi Meir. The Gemara asks why it was necessary to state this dispute in both the laws of Get and Kiddushin. It answers that in a Get, where the man is trying to sever the relationship, one might assume he is more likely to retract. In Kiddushin, where he is trying to establish a relationship and wants it to take effect as quickly as possible, one might assume he is less likely to retract. Therefore, both cases were needed to clarify the scope of their opinions. Furthermore, in the Get case, the option of "after death" is not viable, so Rabbi Meir might readily conclude he meant "from today." But in Kiddushin, both "from now" and "after thirty days" are viable options, so it's not as clear. Thus, the specific rulings in both contexts are necessary.