The Abby B Set edition of the audio series of the Talmud Bavli, specifically Masechet Kiddushin, is graciously sponsored by our good friend Mr. Chaimy Dana, שמרהו וחייהו, in honor of his wife דינה בת רבקה, and for many years of שלום בית, success, livelihood, and all good things, including health, happiness, and nachat from the children, along with all the blessings, אמן. Today’s Daf, Daf Mem Gimmel, is being studied לעילוי נשמת זקניה יוסף בן שרה and הדסה זקניה בת שרה, as well as for the memory of אברהם בן אסתר, whose souls may rest in the Garden of Eden, אמן. We also dedicate today’s Daf for a complete recovery for משה בן דינה, אסרה בת חנה, שרה ראומה בת רחל, and חיים ציון בן אסתר. May it be the will of God that they have a full recovery, both of the soul and the body, and we say, וכן יהי רצון ונאמר, אמן.
We begin today’s Daf on Mem Bet Amud Sheni, starting right from the line that reads ונילף מינה. We are currently exploring the principle of אין שליח לדבר עבירה, which translates to "there is no agent for a transgression." This principle indicates that while one can appoint a שליח to perform various tasks on their behalf, such as לקדש אשה (betrothing a woman), delivering a גט (divorce document), taking תרומה (offering), or participating in a קרבן פסח (Paschal sacrifice), one cannot send a שליח to commit an עבירה (transgression). If a שליח commits a transgression, they are guilty, and the principle emphasizes that one cannot absolve themselves by claiming they were merely following orders. In cases of transgression, the concept of שליחות (agency) does not apply.
The Gemara provides a rationale for this principle, citing the phrase דברי הרב ודברי התלמיד, דברי מי שומעין. This means that when God commands us not to commit a transgression, we must prioritize His word over that of a human sender. Thus, the Gemara concludes that there is no agency for a transgression, with one noted exception: the case of מעילה (misappropriation). If a משלח (sender) instructs a שליח to buy something without realizing that the funds are from הקדש (holy property), and the שליח proceeds to make the purchase, the בעל הבית (owner) commits the transgression of מעילה, even though the שליח acted incorrectly. In this scenario, we say there is indeed agency for a transgression.
The Gemara then poses the question: why not extend the rule of מעילה to other cases, concluding that just as there is agency in the case of מעילה, there should be agency for transgressions in general? This leads to the concept of בנין אב, a principle that allows us to apply a learned concept to other similar situations. However, the Gemara counters this assertion by stating that the cases of מעילה and agency are derived from two distinct verses, and when two verses teach the same concept, we cannot learn from them to other cases.
In exploring the concept of שליחות יד, the Gemara presents the case of a שומר חינם (unpaid guardian) who claims that an item was stolen. If the guardian wishes to absolve themselves of liability, they must swear that they did not mishandle the item. The oath states, "if I did not send my hand to damage my friend's belongings." The Gemara discusses the implications of this oath, noting that if the guardian mishandled the item, they are liable even if the item was stolen under circumstances beyond their control. The discussion raises the question of whether a mere thought to damage is sufficient to establish liability. Beit Shammai argues that even a thought to damage is enough to incur liability, while Beit Hillel counters that actual damage is necessary.
The debate continues as Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel discuss the implications of the verses regarding the guardian's liability. The Gemara examines the nuances of the verses, noting that when the Torah states על כל דבר פשע, it implies that any wrongdoing, even in thought, can lead to liability. However, Beit Hillel maintains that the guardian must have physically damaged the item to be held accountable. The Gemara further explores the implications of the verses, emphasizing the distinction between intention and action.
As the discussion unfolds, the Gemara references the principle of שני כתובים הבאים כאחד, which posits that when two verses convey the same idea, they cannot be used to derive additional laws. The Gemara reiterates the exception of מעילה and the concept of agency in this context. It concludes that while there are cases of agency for transgressions, the general rule remains that one cannot appoint a שליח to commit a transgression.
The Gemara then transitions to the case of a קרבן that is slaughtered outside the designated area of the Temple, emphasizing that the individual who performs the act bears the responsibility, not any agent. This reinforces the principle that אין שליח לדבר עבירה, as the person performing the act is the one who incurs guilt.
In conclusion, the Gemara reflects on the broader implications of these discussions, emphasizing the importance of understanding the nuances of agency and transgression within the framework of halachic principles. The principles discussed serve as a guide for navigating complex halachic situations, reinforcing the importance of intention and action in the realm of Jewish law.