The discussion in Gemara Shabbat continues with a dedication for a complete recovery for all those in need among the people of Israel. We resume on the second side of the forty-fifth page, where Abaye poses a challenge to Rav Yosef regarding the laws of handling objects on the Sabbath. Previously, the discussion established that a heavy, sturdy lamp is considered forbidden to handle even according to the lenient view of Rabbi Shimon, because its weight and permanence suggest it has been set aside in a fixed place.
Abaye questions this by citing the case of a Kilat Chatanim, a specific type of bridal canopy bed. This structure is heavy and fixed in its position, yet Shmuel, quoting Rabbi Chiyya, ruled that it is permissible to assemble and disassemble it on the Sabbath. Rashi explains that because the top of this canopy is less than a handbreadth wide, it does not legally constitute a roof or a tent. Therefore, the prohibitions against building and demolishing do not apply. If this heavy, fixed canopy is not considered forbidden to handle, why should a sturdy lamp be any different?
Abaye resolves this by clarifying that the lamp in question is not merely heavy, but is made of individual components. The rabbinic decree forbidding its movement stems from the concern that if the lamp were to fall and come apart, a person might instinctively reassemble it, thereby violating the prohibition of building on the Sabbath. The Gemara then asks why Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish—often referred to as Reish Lakish—was lenient regarding a small lamp. If the concern is reassembly, even a small lamp made of components should be forbidden.
The Gemara explains that the dispute actually concerns a lamp that is not truly made of components but merely has ridges that make it appear as if it were. Everyone agrees that a lamp actually made of components, whether large or small, is forbidden to handle. Similarly, everyone agrees that a large lamp with ridges is forbidden because it is common for large lamps to be made of pieces, and people might confuse the two. The disagreement between Reish Lakish and Rabbi Yochanan is limited to a small lamp with ridges. Rabbi Yochanan maintains a strict decree, fearing people will confuse it with a component-based lamp, while Reish Lakish argues that since small lamps are rarely made of pieces, no such confusion will occur.
This leads to an inquiry into the general consistency of Rabbi Yochanan. It was previously stated that he follows the strict view of Rabbi Yehuda regarding objects set aside. However, Rabbi Yochanan also holds the principle that the law follows an anonymous Mishna. A specific Mishna in Masechet Keilim discusses a traveling box or wagon with a detachable wheel. That text implies that the wheel is only forbidden to move if money was resting on it at the start of the Sabbath. If no money is present, it is permissible to move, even if it had been used for money previously. This lenient stance seems to contradict the strict view attributed to Rabbi Yochanan. Rabbi Zeira resolves this by explaining that the anonymous Mishna must be speaking of a case where there was no money on the wheel even at the onset of the Sabbath at twilight. Thus, Rabbi Yochanan remains consistent with the strict view that if an object held a forbidden item during the twilight period, it remains forbidden for the entire Sabbath.
The Gemara then records that Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi observed Rabbi giving a lenient ruling in the diaspora regarding lamps. The scholars were uncertain if this leniency applied to both large lamps and oil lamps. Various anecdotes follow, illustrating how different sages conducted themselves. Rav Malkia moved an extinguished lamp in the home of Rabbi Simlai, which upset his host who followed the strict view. Similarly, Rabbi Yose Gelilaah moved a lamp in the place of Rabbi Yose beRabbi Chanina, causing similar irritation. Rabbi Abbahu, however, would move a lamp when visiting Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi but refrain from doing so when visiting Rabbi Yochanan. This was not because his own opinion changed, but out of respect for the local authority of Rabbi Yochanan.
Regarding the type of fuel used, Rav Yehuda taught that an oil lamp is permissible to handle once extinguished because it can still be used to hold oil for consumption. However, a lamp used for kerosene or naphtha is forbidden because its foul smell renders it unusable for any purpose. Rabba and Rav Yosef disagree, arguing that even a kerosene lamp is permissible because it can still serve as a cover for another vessel. When Rav Avya visited Rabba with muddy feet and sat on a couch, Rabba, annoyed by the mess, tested him on this ruling. He asked why every rock in a courtyard shouldn't be permissible if the mere potential to cover a vessel is enough to remove the status of being "set aside." Rav Avya brilliantly replied that a lamp is already a vessel by design, and it retains that status even if its primary use is temporarily suspended. A rock, by contrast, was never a vessel to begin with.
Rav Nachman bar Yitzhak praised the divine assistance that allowed Rav Avya to answer so effectively. The Gemara then addresses a deeper contradiction in the logic of Rabbi Shimon. In Masechet Beitzah, Rabbi Shimon is strict regarding a firstborn animal that develops a blemish on a festival, ruling it forbidden because the owner could not have anticipated the blemish or the expert's ruling before the holiday. If Rabbi Shimon is generally lenient about objects that were "set aside" at twilight but became usable later, why is he strict here? The Gemara explains that a person sitting at home anticipates that a lamp will eventually go out, so it is never truly removed from his mind. However, one does not sit and anticipate that a holy animal will develop a permanent blemish and that an expert will be available and willing to rule on it on a holiday. Therefore, the animal is truly set aside.
This logic is further tested against the laws of vows. One may have a vow annulled on the Sabbath if it is necessary for the day's needs. Rami bar Chama asks why this isn't considered "set aside," as one cannot be certain a scholar will be available to annul the vow. The Gemara answers that in the case of a wife's vow, she knows her husband has the power to annul it the moment he hears it, so she never removes the food from her mind. For others, a vow can be annulled by three commoners, making the resolution easily accessible. A firstborn animal, however, requires a highly specialized expert, and such experts generally do not issue rulings on festivals. Thus, the owner gives up hope of using the animal, making it forbidden.
Finally, Abaye asks Rav Yosef why a lit lamp is forbidden to move according to Rabbi Shimon. If the concern is that it might accidentally be extinguished, Rabbi Shimon usually permits an unintentional act. The Gemara establishes a vital rule: if an act would constitute a Torah-level prohibition if done intentionally, Rabbi Shimon forbids it rabbinically even if it is unintentional. If the intentional act would only be a rabbinic violation, he permits it entirely when unintentional. Since extinguishing a flame can be a Torah-level violation, it is forbidden to move the lamp while lit.
The Pnei Yehoshua notes that while he once thought Rabbi Shimon considered all non-constructive labor to be a Torah-level violation, he later retracted this based on other proofs. Rabba offers a final, different reason for the prohibition: the lamp serves as a base for the flame. Since the flame itself is a forbidden object, the vessel holding it becomes a base for a forbidden thing. According to Tosafot, even the lenient Rabbi Shimon agrees that a vessel becomes secondary to the forbidden flame it carries, rendering the entire lamp forbidden to handle as long as it is lit.