Rava says, LeRava mana amina de-reicha lav milta hi (I derive from this that smell is not significant). Rav Mari says that this is a dispute among the early sages, amar Rav Mari kitna'ei (as a dispute among tannaim), on samech zayin amud bet. He says again, amar Rav Mari kitna'ei: harodeh pat chamah, a person takes hot bread out of the oven, unetanah al pi hachavit, and puts it on top of a barrel of wine of Terumah (heave offering).
There are three opinions. Rabbi Meir forbids it, meaning that the bread becomes Terumah, and non-priests cannot eat it. Bottom line, it drew the smell of the wine of Terumah, and therefore it is Asur (forbidden) to non-priests. Rabbi Yehudah permits it. Why? He says that smell does not prohibit it. Rabbi Yose permits it when the bread is wheat. He makes a Chidush (novel insight): if it was placed on a barrel of wine and the bread was wheat, it does not draw the smell. But he forbids it when the bread is barley, because barley absorbs it.
Mai lav beha kamipalgei? Here is the Machloket (dispute): one sage holds that smell is significant, and the other holds that smell is nothing. That is the dispute there. Does the smell of the Terumah prohibit it or not? Is smell significant or not? That is yesterday’s Sugya (Talmudic discussion).
According to Rava, who says that smell is not significant, the only way to explain this dispute is as a dispute among the early sages. Certainly, it is a dispute among the early sages: Rabbi Meir says that smell is significant, which is why the bread becomes forbidden, while Rabbi Yehudah says that smell is not significant. He follows Rabbi Yehudah’s opinion.
But according to Abaye, who comes along and says that smell is significant, do we have to say this is a dispute among the early sages? Do we have to say that the dispute is between the early sages and that one must therefore say he follows only one opinion? Or can we frame the dispute differently and say that it is accepted by all?
What did Abaye say? He said that smell is significant. Abaye says: No. Was it not stated about that Mishnah that Rabbah bar bar Chanah said in the name of Resh Lakish: if we are talking about hot bread placed on an open barrel, everyone agrees that it is forbidden. There is no question about it; it will certainly be forbidden, because the smell of the wine goes into the bread, and everyone agrees that smell is significant in that case.
With cold bread and a sealed barrel, everyone agrees that it is permitted, because nothing goes in. So where is the dispute? It is only in the case of hot bread and a sealed barrel, or cold bread and an open barrel. The dispute is whether it draws the smell or not. Rabbi Yehudah says it does not go in, and therefore it is permitted. Rabbi Yose says that even in such a case, wheat is one way and barley is another: wheat does not draw it, but barley does. But everyone agrees that smell is significant.
So the Gemara says, veha didi nami: the case in which I forbade the smell is like hot bread on an open barrel. That is the case we discussed on yesterday’s page, Bat teiha (when he opened the hole): he opened the hole in the barrel, and the smell of the wine came out. That case is similar to hot bread on an open barrel, and there is no dispute there; everyone should agree in such a case.
Bottom line, we have a dispute, and a dispute between Abaye and Rava. According to Rava, it could be a dispute among the early sages. According to Abaye, it is not necessarily a dispute among the early sages: everyone could hold that smell is significant, and they argued only in a specific case that has one of two properties—an open barrel or hot bread. In that case, we can discuss whether it is forbidden or not. But ordinary smell is permitted.
How will Abaye explain the earlier case of Bat teiha? We have to explain that it has the law of hot bread and an open barrel; it has the same potency. Abaye says that smell is significant, so why does the Gemara say that everyone agrees about Bat teiha? We have to say that it is talking about a case like hot bread and an open barrel.
Zeh hakelal: kol shebahana'ato benoten ta'am. We know that anything forbidden for benefit is forbidden when it imparts taste. If there is no benefit—meaning that you do not taste it—then, as we said, the vinegar that fell into the cracked legumes is nullified in taste, and therefore there is no problem.
Rabbi Yehudah said in the name of Shmuel, hachi hilcheta: that is the halachic ruling. The rule is that if it imparts a defective taste, it is permitted; if it imparts a good taste, it is forbidden. It says, she'eino says hachi hilcheta denoten ta'am lifgam mutar. Therefore, we said in the Mishnah that vinegar ruins the cracked legumes, so they are not forbidden. But, veshivcho tzenon: put it in a radish, and it will be enhanced, so it will be forbidden. Obviously, we are talking about forbidden vinegar.
Rav Yehudah said in the name of Shmuel: they taught this only when it fell into hot cracked legumes. We are talking about forbidden vinegar that fell into the legumes; they are hot, and therefore it spoils them. But if it fell into cold cracked legumes—this is what Rashi said: cold, not “radish”—then they are cold. They enhance it, and therefore it will be forbidden.
Now suppose the cold cracked legumes were subsequently heated. They then become defective: na'asah kemi shehishbi'ach ulevasof pagam. It started out enhanced, and then, when he heated it, it became defective. What is the law? It is forbidden. Once it became enhanced, it remains forbidden, even though later it became defective.
When Ravin came from Eretz Yisrael (Land of Israel), he said in the name of Rabbah bar Chanah, in the name of Rabbi Yochanan, that they taught this only when it fell into hot cracked legumes, making it defective. But if it fell into cold cracked legumes, it became enhanced; then, if they heated it, it became as something that was enhanced at first and defective afterward, and it is forbidden. When Rav Dimi came, he said the same thing. They used to do this on the eve of Shabbat in Tzippori. They would put vinegar into cold cracked legumes, and they would become enhanced. They called it Shachlayim (cress), and, I guess, they would heat it over Shabbat and call it Shachlayim. There we go: every Gemara has its Shachlayim, back to the cress. We see that cracked legumes basically get better when cold, and therefore we prohibit them.
Resh Lakish said, regarding the defective taste they spoke about, that they are not talking about someone saying, “This pot needs salt,” or “It has too much salt,” or “It needs seasoning.” That does not make it defective. “It needs more salt,” “It needs more pepper,” “Too much salt,” “Not enough pepper”—that does not make it defective. It would still be considered an enhanced taste, just missing some seasoning.
Rather, it is when nothing is missing and it is inedible because of this—not because of any missing ingredient. It has all the ingredients, and still you cannot eat it. If it is missing salt, add salt. If there is too much salt, you ruined it, but that does not make it defective. If it is prepared correctly and is still inedible, that is considered defective.
Rashi says, vehirtichan lo sheyomeru chumra hu: that is a stringency. That is, the dish does not become defective because of something else. If it is missing salt, that does not make it defective, or if there is too much salt. If it became defective because of something else, we do not attribute the defect to the prohibition, and it is forbidden.
So in that case, we do not attribute the defect to the prohibition, and therefore we still prohibit it. We are not going to say that it is defective and permit it because it is missing salt. On the contrary, we will say that it is not defective, and therefore it is forbidden, because it is still imparting a taste. Even though right now it does not taste good, we do not attribute the defect to the prohibition and say that the defect comes from the salt. A lack of salt does not make it defective. What has to make it defective? The prohibition. The prohibition—the vinegar—caused the defect.
There is more salt, so someone could always attribute it to that; he will not attribute it to the prohibition. It will be forbidden, because he says that really it is enhanced. Why does it not taste good? Salt. Salt does not make it defective. The prohibition has to make it defective. When everything is equal—the salt is the right amount, and so on—and it still does not taste good, then there is nothing else to attribute it to. Then I will attribute it to the prohibition. Once I attribute it to the prohibition, that makes it defective.
“They would not forbid it?” No. On the contrary, they would forbid it. They would forbid it because they are not going to say that it is defective; you do not attribute the defect to the prohibition. You are not attributing it to the prohibition; you are saying the reason it does not taste good is that there is no salt.
Look at Rashi: ela eizo ta'am lifgam shemutar kol shelo chasera shum tikun ve'einah ne'echelet mipnei zeh kelomar issur zeh pogem ta'amo. The only thing you can attribute it to is the prohibition itself. De'einah ne'echelet lav davka: what does “inedible” mean? It does not mean that it is literally inedible; it just means that it does not have a good taste. Dekheivan difgimata purta kari lah einah ne'echelet. This is very important in Rashi. You do not have to spit it out. You taste it and say, “Well, it doesn’t taste so good.” Even if you swallowed it, that does not mean it is not defective.
Some say, ika de-amrei, that Resh Lakish said: the defective taste they spoke about is not a case where we say that this pot needs salt, or has too much salt, or needs seasoning. Rather, now it has become defective. This sounds like a leniency. What does Rashi say? Ika de-amrei, ha de-Reish Lakish lekula: this statement of Resh Lakish is lenient.
What is the leniency? We do not say, “It is the salt.” We do not attribute the defect to the salt, and we do not say, “If the salt had been in there, the prohibition would not have caused the defect; the salt would have undone the defective taste of the prohibition and improved it.” We do not attribute it to the lack of salt; rather, we attribute it to the prohibition. If the prohibition’s taste makes it defective now, as it is, it is defective and permitted.
So it is lenient. If it is missing salt and does not taste good, we do not say, “If there had been salt in it, it would be okay.” Bottom line, there is a prohibition in it and it does not taste good; because of that, it is a leniency. As long as there is a prohibition in it and it is defective, you attribute the defect to the prohibition, and bottom line, it will be permitted.
“Right, even if you added some salt, but right now it doesn’t taste good?” I am not attributing it to the lack of salt; I am attributing it to the prohibition itself. That is what he says here. Rashi says that the salt would undo the defective taste of the prohibition. Even if you add salt, it might undo the defect. I do not care about that. Bottom line, Ba'asher hu sham (as he is there): taste good, taste bad, it is all good. Tremendous leniency.
“Even if it is just neutral?” What is it right now? “Put salt in it; it will neutralize it.” That is what I am saying: it is bland. Bland is not defective. Bland food is not defective. Correct: blandness took away the bitterness, the sourness, or whatever it may be. That is not defective. It has to be spoiled in order to be forbidden. As long as it does not spoil it, we have a problem. To be permitted, yes. Then the prohibition—if it is bland, you can still eat it. As long as you can still eat it, you are benefiting from the prohibition. It is edible, and there is a prohibition in there.
“I see what you’re saying. Does it have to be tasty, or does it have to be neutral—the borderline?” Edible means edible. What is a good taste? A good taste is something you can eat. Does it taste great? Does it taste bad? That is an arbitrary question.
Ta shema (come and hear): Rabbi Abbahu said in the name of Rabbi Yochanan that these laws, when we are talking about prohibited food mixed with permitted food and you cannot separate the items, are as follows: Kol sheta'amo umamasho asur velokin alav, vezehu kezayit bichdei achilat peras (Anything with taste and substance is forbidden, and one is liable to lashes; this is an olive-sized amount eaten within the time it takes to eat half a loaf).
That is the famous law we learned in Masechet Nazir (Tractate Nazir) as well. Whenever you have both taste and substance—for example, a piece of prohibited food mixed into a permitted dish—the prohibited substance is there. It is forbidden. The piece in the dish is imparting a taste; obviously, you taste the prohibition. If you ate from the dish—for example, string beans, rice, or some other pareve item—and the prohibited item was put in it, one is liable to lashes. How do you get lashes if he only tasted the taste? “This is an olive-sized amount within the time it takes to eat half a loaf.” If you ate an olive-sized amount within a certain required measure called Achilat peras, then that is considered liable to lashes.
As long as you ate an olive-sized amount within the time it takes to eat half a loaf, as we will see in a minute, that is the case. Let’s read Rashi. Very good. Rashi says: Kol sheta'amo umamasho lokin alav, vezehu kezayit bichdei achilat peras. Ve'al kegon zeh ne'emar shi'ur kezayit be'achilat peras halachah leMoshe miSinai, she'im yesh yesh keshi'ur peras shel tavshil (a law given to Moses at Sinai). Here is the answer: if you have an olive-sized amount of the prohibition in that quantity, and you ate it within the time it takes to eat half a loaf, you have an olive-sized amount of the prohibition within that measure.
There is more of the other food, more spread out; it does not matter. That is still the prohibition for which you get lashes. Rashi says, she'im yesh bikshi'ur pras shel tavshil kezayit min ha'isur, lokin alav: within the amount of a half-loaf of the dish, there is an olive-sized amount of the prohibition, and one is liable to lashes. Even though the olive-sized amount of prohibition was not eaten all at once, you ate it in seven minutes, as I said. It does not matter; you ate it within the threshold of the time it takes to eat half a loaf.
How long is that? The time it takes to eat half a loaf of bread, whatever kind of bread, with relish. Keivan de'eino shoheh ba'achilato misheyatchil le'ochlo ad sheyigmor ela kedei achilat pras: because the time from when he begins eating until he finishes is only the time it takes to eat half a loaf, the eating joins together, and he is liable.
But if, within the amount of a half-loaf of the dish, there is not an olive-sized amount of the prohibition, and it takes so long to eat the olive-sized amount—more than the time it takes to eat half a loaf—then it is like two separate acts of eating, on two days, and one is not liable to lashes. It may still be forbidden, but there will be no lashes.
“We hold that…” No: “taste and substance” means that the prohibition is in there and gives taste, as opposed to—“No, my point is that if there is a prohibition in there that does not give taste, maybe there are no lashes. You have to have the prohibition in there giving taste. You taste the prohibition as well.” Let’s say it is some sort of bone or something prohibited, but it does not give taste, such as sinews or the sciatic nerve. If sinews impart taste, it could be that they do not prohibit it; perhaps you have to eat—how would you measure it? Maybe you would measure a quarter-log, a liquid measure, instead of a dry measure.
“And the rabbis established the time it takes to eat half a loaf…” That is the famous Gemara: the measure for the time spent eating. The time it takes to eat half a loaf applies to an olive-sized amount of leaven on Passover—or matzah on Passover—and to all the different laws involving eating. Whenever we say “eating,” it is the time it takes to eat half a loaf. What is that? It is half a loaf used for an eiruv techumin.
They measured a loaf as one-third of a kav. In Masechet Sukkah (Tractate Sukkah), we learned these measures. There is half the measure for a house afflicted with a biblical skin affliction: three loaves to a kav, so half of that measure is one and a half. The amount of time it takes to eat half of the measure we just mentioned is the amount of time required to enter the house of a person with a biblical skin affliction. When you enter the house for a certain amount of time, the person becomes ritually impure.
It says, veha'ochel babayit be-bayit yechabes begadav, and the Sages measured the time spent there as the time it takes to eat. As it was taught: “One who eats in the house and one who sleeps in the house”—I only know about one who sleeps and eats; what about one who neither eats nor sleeps? The verse says, “He shall wash his clothes,” which includes him. The explanation is that even if you did not touch it and only stood there, the verse’s mention of eating teaches us something. Sleeping gives the measure for a person who sleeps; how much is the measure of eating? The time it takes to eat half a loaf, which is four eggs.
Basically, it is half the measure, and that is considered eating four eggs’ worth of bread. How long does it take to eat four eggs’ worth of bread? How many eggs are in a kav? Twenty-four. So a loaf is eight, and half of that is four. That is a half-loaf. The measure is eight eggs, and the time it takes to eat half a loaf is half that amount, four eggs. We measure that in time: how long it takes a person to eat four eggs’ worth of wheat bread in a normal way, which is basically eight ounces of bread.
The halachic decisors dispute this; it ranges from two minutes to ten minutes. On Yom Kippur, in Masechet Sukkah, it is between three and four. “Yes, Rav Ashi said three.” Right, it is a dispute among the early sages. If we say three, that is how we got four. “Yes, six or eight.” That is the dispute there.
So now you have between two and ten minutes. We are stringent both ways. For eating on the night of Passover, we try to eat within four minutes, as I said earlier. On Yom Kippur, we tell you to spread the olive-sized amount over ten minutes. If a person has to eat on Yom Kippur, we say that perhaps the time it takes to eat half a loaf is ten minutes. If you eat within four minutes, you have eaten an olive-sized amount on Yom Kippur. So we are stringent that way and take the longer opinion for the time it takes to eat half a loaf. We tell the person to eat an olive-sized amount, as long as he does not eat it over more than ten minutes. Eat it, wait ten minutes, eat another one, and wait again.
“Unless you can’t wait ten minutes, then the more—” The more you make the separation. Those are the cases. “Right, you torture the guy. It’s more torture.” But okay, that is only if the person—
The Gemara says, like ta'amo velo mamasho (it has taste but no substance; it is forbidden, but one is not liable to lashes). What is the case? Ta'amo velo mamasho. The doctor said, let’s say it was a liquid. Milk fell into a meat pot—or perhaps forbidden fat. The fat melts there, so you do not have substance, though of course you have taste; you do not have an actual physical entity. The Gemara says it is forbidden, but you do not get lashes for it. Even if you ate an olive-sized amount of the prohibition within the time it takes to eat half a loaf, there is no substance.
“And if he added…” But let’s say you added the prohibition to the permitted food. A defective taste is permitted. So you do not get lashes? “A liquid can’t do that?” Correct. Look at Rashi: Ta'amo velo mamasho kegon chalav shenafal lekedera o chelev shenafal venimo'ach. How do I know the first one is milk and the second one is forbidden fat? I do not have vowel marks in my Rashi. The second says that the fat fell in and melted. Milk does not melt in this way; forbidden fat does. She'ein mamasho ba'ayin: its substance is not visible.
Ve'im riba ta'am nifgam. Harei ba kulam mashma, that even if it became defective because of something else—let’s say you put something else in and it became defective—if the prohibition helped increase the defect, then you can use the prohibition to add to the defect, and it will be permitted.
Normally, if you left it as it is, it could be forbidden to eat because there is a taste of forbidden fat or milk. As long as you ate an olive-sized amount within the time it takes to eat half a loaf, it would be forbidden, but you would not get lashes. That is “taste but no substance”: it is forbidden to eat any of the mixture, and one is not liable to lashes, even if he ate an olive-sized amount of the prohibition within the time it takes to eat half a loaf.
Rashi says in Chullin that this is because, by Torah law, taste is not like substance. The Torah forbade eating the actual item itself, but not the taste of the item. Taste is not forbidden. Here there is no item, only taste, so you will not get lashes because the liquid dissolved into the food. The whole mixture contains only the taste of the prohibition, and that is not by Torah law but by rabbinic law.
“Do we learn from the purging of Midian that they koshered the pots? Isn’t that where we learn it from?” The point is that you are not going to get lashes. Taste is forbidden by Torah law, but not under the prohibition that incurs lashes—I mean, taste is not forbidden by Torah law, and that is why you are not going to get lashes. Why did they have to perform the purging of gentile vessels in the first place? On the face of it, it was defective. We said no: it must have been talking about the utensils they used that day on the way back from the war.
So you are asking why one would have to kosher them by Torah law if taste is not forbidden by Torah law. Good question. Tosafot argues and says no: there, taste is like substance and is forbidden by Torah law. Where is that Tosafot? It is the passage beginning “Rabbi said,” but I think it is in Chullin (Tractate Chullin), page ninety-eight. We will look at it now.
Tosafot says, “Rabbi Yochanan said: anything with taste and substance is forbidden and one is liable to lashes; taste without substance is forbidden, but one is not liable to lashes.” Rashi explains in the chapter of the sciatic nerve that here taste like substance is not by Torah law. He explains it as milk falling into meat, or fat falling in and melting, so that the substance is not visible. But this does not seem right, even according to Rashi’s explanation that taste like substance is not by Torah law: the Torah forbade it through cooking, as is clear from the passage about a drop of milk in the chapter “All the Meat.”
That is the first point. Do not tell me “meat and milk.” Meat and milk—that is the Torah’s novel point! When you create this mixture called meat and milk, it becomes forbidden. That is the prohibition itself. The Torah forbade it through cooking, meaning that the items become mixed. Furthermore, one who eats meat and milk eats the substance of the prohibition. You are eating the substance! Once you have created a new prohibition, that is the new prohibition. It is not considered merely the taste of milk in the meat. You have created a new entity called meat and milk; that is considered substance, as we say in the chapter “All the Meat.”
Rather, the example needs to be forbidden fat that melted and was absorbed into the meat. It became mixed in; there is only taste, and taste is not by Torah law. Where does Rashi know that it is not by Torah law? Abaye concluded that “taste without substance” is by Torah law. If you were to say that it is rabbinic, why would we not learn it from meat and milk? Because it is a novel case. If it is a novel case, it could be that even without taste it is still so; that suggests that elsewhere it is only rabbinic, while meat and milk is by Torah law.
Although we hold like Rabbi Yochanan, this is what it seems to say in the chapter “All the Meat,” in the discussion of a drop of milk: Abaye says that taste without substance is by Torah law, and Rava says that the Torah forbade it through cooking. It follows that Rava holds that taste without substance—that is, taste like substance—is not by Torah law, and the ruling follows Rava over Abaye.
Furthermore, in the chapter of the sciatic nerve, regarding the cooked foreleg, it is talking about offerings. “There is no nazirite,” and this is a permitted item from within a prohibition, which the verse permitted by cooking the foreleg with the ram. Rava said that this was necessary only for taste like substance, and that it is forbidden in sacred offerings. Only with sacred offerings; perhaps with ordinary food it would be permitted. “Whatever touches its flesh shall become holy.” Regarding the cooked foreleg, it is permitted; since Rava says that it is forbidden in sacred offerings, it seems that with ordinary food it is permitted.
“It calls it the purging of idolaters.” That is Barry’s question: what about the verse concerning the purging of idolaters, where the Torah commanded them to purge the vessels of Midian even though they had only taste in them? There is the question. On the face of it, if you say taste like substance is rabbinic, and offerings are different, there were no offerings in the purging of Midian. Why did they have to kosher the pots when they came back from Midian?
So you hear what Tosafot says? We do not learn from there. It is a novel case: even after a day’s use, it is impossible that the taste was not slightly defective, and nevertheless the Merciful One forbade it. That shows that it is a novel case. The vessels of Midian were a one-time case; do not bring a proof from them.
And even though we learned in Masechet Pesachim (Tractate Pesachim) about the grape extract, fine: taste like substance is not by Torah law. That is basically Rashi; Tosafot is justifying Rashi’s view. He has proofs from Abaye, and proofs from the Gemara about offerings: only by korban mechushash, but not by chullin. So he has a proof. Do not ask from the purging of Midian; that was a separate novel case. Maybe it means that because they worshipped idolatry, Hashem wanted to make a special separation from their pots; it was a one-time case. Alternatively, with ordinary pots that have a prohibition in them, by Torah law you do not have to kosher them, because there is only taste. That is Tosafot explaining the view of Rashi. He just does not like the first example. He says to leave out meat and milk and use forbidden fat. I do not know why Rashi put in meat and milk, because it does not fit his model. Forbidden fat works. “Camel’s milk?” Okay, that would not be by Torah law. Very good. But the point is that this is the view of Rashi.
Tosafot says, “No, velo nir'eh lerabi lerabeinu lerabeinu Tam.” Rabbi Yochanan holds like Rabbi Akiva and the sages who learn taste like substance from the purging of idolater’s vessels. They do learn it from there. “And you did not say that it is merely an allusion?” The Gemara asks back and forth: what is the grape extract needed for, if not that permitted food combines with prohibited food? You see the debate going back and forth: “We need it for this; we need it for that.” It sounds like these are actual Torah derivations.
They learned from it that permitted food combines with prohibited food, for which one is liable to lashes, when he soaked his bread in wine. We learned this in Masechet Nazir, 35, 36, and 7. The sages derive taste like substance from it. Fine. Then it continues. Why does the Gemara say it only about an offering and not ordinary food? He answers that question.
“And this case of taste without substance is discussing a same-type mixture, which is nullified in the majority by Torah law; the mixture is rabbinic. A same-type mixture is by Torah law according to the sages, but by rabbinic law it requires sixty. It says taste without substance to teach us that even so it is forbidden, and also to show their power. It uses this case because it is a clear rule that does not need explaining if he does not recognize it.”
So according to Tosafot, what comes out? There is a major dispute among the Rishonim (medieval authorities). Is this a Torah prohibition? According to Tosafot, it is. Then why do you not get lashes? The Gemara says, “Taste without substance is forbidden, but one is not liable to lashes,” even if he ate an olive-sized amount within the time it takes to eat half a loaf. What do you mean? According to Tosafot, it is by Torah law, and he ate the prohibition.
He says that is right: according to their view, taste like substance is a Torah prohibition, and they explain Rabbi Yochanan’s words in other ways. There are those who interpret it differently. Let’s look at this carefully; it is worth our time. If you say taste like substance is by Torah law, why is one not liable to lashes?
Look at what he says. We will go one step at a time. He says: “Anything with taste and substance is forbidden, and one is liable to lashes. Taste and substance: one is liable to lashes; this is an olive-sized amount within the time it takes to eat half a loaf. Taste without substance is forbidden, but one is not liable to lashes.” The later authorities have written at length about Rabbi Yochanan and about the laws of mixtures in Yoreh De'ah, based on these two lines.
The dispute here is about Rabbi Yochanan: what does “taste and substance” mean, and what does “taste without substance” mean? Why is one liable to lashes for taste and substance, but not for taste without substance? Let’s go slowly. Rashi explains our discussion: “Taste without substance” means milk that fell into a pot, or fat that fell in. “Taste and substance” means a prohibited item in a vegetable dish, for example, which did not dissolve there. That would be called taste and substance.
Why, then, are there no lashes for taste without substance if it is forbidden? Rashi explains in Chullin that taste like substance is only rabbinic. That is a novel point: by Torah law, one is forbidden to eat only the substance of the prohibition, but the taste of a prohibited item is only forbidden by rabbinic law. Therefore, there are no lashes for taste without substance, because there is no substance of the prohibition, only its taste.
It follows from Rashi that fat melted into a mixture is considered only its taste, even though it is in there. Once it is dissolved, it is the taste of the prohibition, even though the substance of the fat has melted. It is definitely in there. The later authorities wrote at length about this, and some wrote that a scribal error entered Rashi’s text, and they read “milk that melted.” Then you are stuck, because Tosafot removed the milk example, and this other view removes the forbidden-fat example. Basically, they have removed all of Rashi’s cases.
Now for the explanation of Rashi’s view, according to Ran: “Taste and substance” means actual substance of the prohibition. There is actual prohibited substance in the dish. Therefore, Rabbi Yochanan said that if a person ate an olive-sized amount of the actual prohibition within the time it takes to eat half a loaf, he is liable, because he ate an olive-sized amount of the prohibition.
“Taste without substance” means that there was no actual substance of the prohibition in the mixture, only its taste. Therefore, he is not liable, because the law of taste like substance is only rabbinic. According to this explanation, “taste without substance” means that he ate an olive-sized amount of the actual substance of the prohibition. This means that when the Gemara says “taste without substance,” he ate an olive-sized amount of the substance of the prohibition, and therefore he is liable.
According to this explanation, we learn a novel point from Rabbi Yochanan: even though most of the mixture is permitted, the prohibited substance is not nullified in the majority. Therefore, if he ate an olive-sized amount of the prohibition, he is liable. Even though there is a majority of permitted food, the actual prohibited substance is not nullified in the majority. If he ate an olive-sized amount of the prohibition within the time it takes to eat half a loaf, he is liable by Torah law.
But we need to understand why the prohibition is not nullified in the majority. You want to tell me that he ate an olive-sized amount within the time it takes to eat half a loaf and is liable by Torah law? What happened to the majority? If it is a majority, we say that it is nullified in the majority by Torah law.
If the law of taste like substance is by Torah law, as Tosafot says, one could explain that it is not nullified in the majority because it imparts taste, and anything that imparts taste is not nullified in the majority. If you say taste is by Torah law, you cannot nullify the taste in the majority; you taste it, so it is as if it is there. But according to Rashi, our question is this: Rabbi Yochanan holds that the law of taste like substance is only rabbinic. Why should this prohibition not be nullified in the majority? Forget about lashes; it still says it is forbidden. Why is it forbidden? The medieval or later authorities ask why it should be forbidden. Why not say it is nullified in the majority?
“But if the rabbis are making a decree, what is it? What happened to nullification in the majority? It’s like the question of the four cups: if you say it is nullified, you nullify the whole thing. If you say it is nullified in the majority, then you have the law of taste like substance.”
Nachalat David explains that according to Rashi, we learn this law through logical reasoning. Since the taste is perceptible, it gives importance to the actual substance of the prohibition, so it is not nullified in the majority. The fact that you can taste it, even though it is dissolved, is enough for us not to say that it is nullified in the majority.
Even though, by Torah law, taste is not like substance, that is only about whether the taste itself is considered a prohibited item that can prohibit the permitted food. Nevertheless, taste is significant and gives importance to the substance of the prohibition, so the prohibition is not nullified. According to Rashi, the words of Rabbi Yochanan teach three novel points. First, in a case of taste and substance, if he ate an olive-sized amount of the prohibition, he is liable, and the substance of the prohibition is not nullified in the majority. That is the case where it is actually there. As long as you can taste it, it does not remove the majority.
Next: taste is not like substance except by rabbinic law. Therefore, if he did not eat an olive-sized amount of the actual substance of the prohibition, he is not liable, even though the prohibition imparted taste throughout the mixture.
Beit Yosef explains Rashi’s view in our discussion according to the view of Rambam. If a prohibition was mixed into permitted food—for example, fat melted into permitted food—and there was enough of the prohibition that, by eating the mixture, one could eat an olive-sized amount of the prohibition within the time it takes to eat half a loaf, then in that case the prohibition is not nullified in the majority. If he ate an olive-sized amount of the prohibition within that time, he is liable.
But if, by eating the mixture, it is not possible to eat an olive-sized amount of the prohibition within the time it takes to eat half a loaf—for example, because it dissolved or there is not enough of it—then the prohibition is nullified in the majority. When there is no olive-sized amount within the time it takes to eat half a loaf, nullification in the majority applies. Even though the prohibition imparted taste throughout the mixture, it prohibits only by rabbinic law, because according to Rashi the law of taste like substance is only rabbinic.
Beit Yosef explains that according to Rambam, Rabbi Yochanan’s words are understood as two cases: taste and substance, and taste without substance. Actual substance of the prohibition was mixed into the permitted food. The difference between the two cases is the measure of the prohibition. If the measure is an olive-sized amount within the time it takes to eat half a loaf, that is called “substance.” If it does not reach that measure, it is called “taste without substance.” It is the same case, the same piece of meat that fell in. If you can eat an olive-sized amount within the time it takes to eat half a loaf, it is called “taste and substance.” Below that threshold, it is called “taste without substance.”
We do not have to change the example from forbidden fat to milk. It is the same piece of non-kosher meat that fell into the string beans. If, when you eat the mixture, you can eat an olive-sized amount within the time it takes to eat half a loaf, that is “taste and substance,” and there are lashes. It is the same case, but if there is not enough to eat an olive-sized amount within that time, it is “taste without substance.” In that case, you do not get lashes, even though the item is still in there and you ate it. “Yes, but those are not Rashi’s examples.” Right, the Rambam understood the case differently from Rashi’s examples.
“Taste and substance,” according to this, means a large enough measure of the prohibition in the mixture that it is possible to eat an olive-sized amount within the time it takes to eat half a loaf. If he ate an olive-sized amount of the prohibition within that time, he is liable. “Taste without substance” means that there is a small measure of the prohibition, so that it is not possible to eat that amount. Then it is nullified in the majority, and there is no Torah prohibition, so one is not liable to lashes. As for the taste of the prohibition, Rashi holds that taste is only rabbinic. Then we can move on: taste like substance is only rabbinic.
Beit Yosef writes that Rambam’s view is also Rashi’s view. Good! How did he fit that into Rashi’s cases? That is for the halachic decisors to work out. Here, Rambam is talking about fat that melted into a mixture. That is one of the two cases. Rambam writes that if there is enough fat in the mixture to eat an olive-sized amount within the time it takes to eat half a loaf, then he is liable. From this, Beit Yosef understands that this is Rashi’s view: if an olive-sized amount of melted fat was mixed into the food in that measure, he is liable. Although Rashi used the example of not being liable, that was talking about a case that did not have the right measure. If the same melted fat had the right ratio, he would be liable.
That is the Rambam. It is a very important view. “Only, there was never actual substance in the item according to Rashi, because it was just milk and melted fat that went in.” No, we did not discuss that. The milk case is a problem. The forbidden fat was melted. Fine—but put it all together: if he ate an olive-sized amount, eat the rice! All that melted material is in there. If you put it together, it will make an olive-sized amount. It is melted in there, somewhere; I taste it. Add up all that flavor, little by little.
According to the second view of Rabbi Yochanan, no: if I ate the whole bowl, it will never combine, because there is so little in it. That is called taste, and it is nullified in the majority. Taste by Torah law, therefore no lashes. That is this scholar’s view.
Now let’s go to Rabbeinu Tam, because we saw Tosafot. Let’s get Rabbeinu Tam, so we have at least two ways to understand the discussion. I think Mishmeret haKodesh also gives the Rambam’s view. We will look at it in a moment.
By the way, we did this discussion with Rabbi Max for four months. This Tosafot takes a month to do with all the views. When you try to do the daily page, you get the views clear again. This is the basis of the laws of mixtures, this teaching of Rabbi Yochanan. Everything pivots on how to understand Rabbi Yochanan.
Rabbeinu Tam explains that according to Rabbi Yochanan, taste like substance is by Torah law. What is taste like substance? When permitted food receives the taste of a prohibition, the permitted food becomes prohibited. This is called “prohibition absorbed in other prohibitions.” I have rice, and rice is permitted. Once the prohibition gives taste to the rice, the rice is now considered prohibited. We do not say that the rice is permitted but has the taste of a prohibition in it. No! The rice itself suddenly becomes prohibited.
“Chazak uvaruch (well done and blessed)!” Very good. Even if he ate an olive-sized amount of the permitted food alone—a measure of rice—he is liable. Therefore, it is impossible to explain “taste without substance” as meaning that there was no actual prohibition in the mixture. Who cares? Even without actual substance in the mixture, as long as there is taste in it, if you ate an olive-sized amount of rice, according to Rabbeinu Tam you are liable. The permitted food becomes prohibited.
That is the difficulty Tosafot has: if the prohibition turns the permitted food into prohibited food, how can the Gemara explain “taste without substance”? There is taste; if there is taste, that is substance! Taste is substance! So how can he explain the second case? Ein lo kin'ah: even when a prohibition gives only taste to permitted food, the permitted food becomes prohibited, and there is liability for eating it. That is Rabbeinu Tam’s difficulty with himself.
The distinction Rabbi Yochanan makes between taste and substance and taste without substance is not about a mixture of different types. If it is different types—rice with meat—you are stuck: the meat makes the rice forbidden, whether there is substance or only taste, because the prohibition imparts taste to the permitted food. Rather, it is a mixture of the same type. Listen: same type with same type. Meat with meat. The prohibition tastes the same as the permitted food; the prohibition does not impart a distinct taste. It is the same taste, since the tastes of the prohibition and the permitted food are equal.
The law of a same-type mixture is this: by Torah law, the prohibition is nullified in the majority. There is a great rule: a same-type mixture is nullified in the majority by Torah law. The Sages came along and said it needs sixty, and so on, but by Torah law it is nullified in the majority.
This is how they explain Rabbi Yochanan’s words. “Taste and substance”: in the first case, a same-type mixture was made, and the prohibition is recognizable. You can see the prohibition in the mixture, and because of that it is not nullified in the majority. When do we say that a same-type mixture is nullified in the majority by Torah law? When the prohibition is mixed in and you cannot see it. But if you can see the prohibition, we do not say that it is nullified in the majority; something recognizable among the other items is not nullified in the majority.
Now we have a case: a same-type mixture, and the prohibition is recognizable. By Torah law there is no nullification in the majority. If you ate from the prohibition—if you began eating and ate an olive-sized amount within the time it takes to eat half a loaf—you are liable, because the prohibition was not nullified in the majority. Simple.
“Taste without substance” means that the prohibition is not recognizable in the mixture. Therefore, by Torah law, it was nullified in the majority. This is only if it is the same type. That is why he removed the meat-and-milk example. “Yes, yes.” Therefore, one is not liable because it is nullified in the majority, although it is forbidden rabbinically.
So this is a remarkable dispute between Rambam and Tosafot. Rambam’s case is different types, the ordinary case as we understood it. What does he hold? Start with this: the Torah did not prohibit taste. Get that clear. The Torah did not prohibit taste. Taste is prohibited by rabbinic law; taste like substance is rabbinic. That is the view of Rambam and Rashi.
So what does “taste and substance” mean? You ate an olive-sized amount of the prohibition within the time it takes to eat half a loaf. Even if the forbidden fat was in the bowl, if you ate enough rice within that time that an olive-sized amount of the fat was in it, that is “taste and substance,” and one is liable. Suppose it is “taste without substance,” the same case, but there was less fat. I can eat rice within that time and taste the fat—I am eating rice, jambalaya, and I taste the fat—but I did not eat an olive-sized amount of the fat within the time it takes to eat half a loaf. It is a rabbinic prohibition; one is not liable. That is the view of Rambam.
He does not change the case. “Taste and substance” versus “taste without substance” basically means: is there an olive-sized amount within the time it takes to eat half a loaf, or is there not? If there is, that is called substance. If there is not, there is no substance. We are not necessarily discussing taste; it is the same case, just a time measure.
Tosafot is a different world. If it is a mixture of different types, as Rambam says, the taste will prohibit the rice. Even if you eat an olive-sized amount of rice—forget about an olive-sized amount of the prohibited food—you are liable to lashes from the first spoon of rice. That is the view of prohibition absorbed in other prohibitions? Yes, Rabbeinu Tam. It is the famous view of Rabbeinu Tam. Actually, it is Rabbeinu Ephraim who says prohibition absorbed in other prohibitions.
So according to Rabbeinu Tam, suppose you have rice and pork falls into it. You are eating, and the person ate two spoonfuls. According to Rabbeinu Tam, he is liable. “What? I didn’t eat an olive-sized amount of the prohibition!” Yes, you did: the rice is prohibited. When the rice becomes forbidden through the taste of the prohibited food, it itself becomes prohibited. There is the rule that a prohibition is absorbed in other prohibitions.
So that could be the case: with taste and substance, or without substance, you will always have a Torah prohibition according to Tosafot. He says, “No, no, no. You have a Torah prohibition only because it is a same-type mixture.” Once you enter a same-type mixture, the tastes are the same, and we introduce nullification in the majority.
When do we introduce nullification in the majority? It depends. In the first case, it fell into the mixture and is recognizable. If it is recognizable, you cannot say it is nullified by Torah law. What happens then? He ate it. If he ate an olive-sized amount within the time it takes to eat half a loaf, he is liable, because he ate an olive-sized amount of the prohibition. In the second case, “taste without substance,” it is still a same-type mixture, but it is not recognizable and was nullified in the majority. It does not matter whether he ate an olive-sized amount within that time; bottom line, it is nullified in the majority. That is how Tosafot understand it. That is why it is a rabbinic prohibition, and why there are no lashes.
We will put Rashi together with Rambam, as Beit Yosef understood it, and put Tosafot—the sage Rabbeinu Tam—on the other side. Let’s see one more thing. By the way, he counts seven different ways of understanding Rabbi Yochanan here. There is also—right, because a mixture of different types is always forbidden. Rambam says different types—yes, you have to know what Rambam holds about types.
Let’s go one more step. Rashi said at the top of page seventy-two, column two, that a case of taste without substance is, for example, milk that fell into a meat pot. You do not see the milk; it gets mixed in. Rashi explains that milk fell into a meat pot and only its taste remained. That is a novel point. We call that meat and milk. “No, no, there are two cases. Rashi brought milk and then forbidden fat.” The question of Tosafot is very strong: if you call it taste whenever forbidden fat falls into milk, and taste is only rabbinic, how can you have meat and milk? On the face of it, meat and milk turns into milk.
According to what Rashi explained in Chullin, one is not liable to lashes for taste without substance because taste like substance is from the words of the Sages. It follows that milk that fell into a meat pot and imparted taste to the meat is only forbidden rabbinically. This is a great novel point. Tosafot challenge Rashi from an extended Gemara in Chullin, which makes clear that even if taste like substance is not by Torah law, nevertheless the taste of milk in meat is forbidden by Torah law. That is the novel point of meat and milk: when the two items are mixed together, they form a single entity.
This is required by the fact that the Torah forbade meat and milk only when the two types are cooked together. Why is cooking them together forbidden? Because it imparts taste. Why is meat and milk forbidden cold? Because the milk does not impart taste to the meat when cold. Why did the Torah prohibit it through cooking? Because cooking imparts taste. So you see that the Torah prohibits the taste of meat and milk. The Torah’s concern with taste is clear from its requiring cooking: when the two types cook together, they impart taste to each other. It is difficult, then, to say as Rashi does that milk that imparts taste to meat follows the law of taste like substance and is only forbidden rabbinically.
Gentlemen, this is the question of the day. One answer, which I think Ezra brought to our attention from Chatam Sofer, is that we are talking here about camel’s milk. Salam! Rashi does not mean the prohibition of meat and milk, which would be a Torah prohibition, but the milk of a non-kosher animal that fell into a pot of meat. That is Chatam Sofer. Since we are dealing with the prohibition of a non-kosher animal—Chatam Sofer saw things we did not see.
Chatam Sofer offered another answer. I have seen his grave several times. I was in Pressburg; I went with the Rebbetzin last year on the trip. Unbelievable. We went underneath the ground. There is a picture of me and the Rebbetzin praying over Chatam Sofer. A beautiful moment.
Chatam Sofer also brought the Slav, who was a rabbi there. There is a new possibility: even though everyone agrees that the prohibition of meat and milk has taste like substance by Torah law, there is a question about the meat. That is by Torah law, and all that. But with the absorption of milk entering meat, or the absorption of meat entering milk, it was not innovated that taste like substance is by Torah law.
What does that mean? The point is not the milk itself entering the meat, or vice versa. The case is absorption. What is absorption of milk? You have a piece of meat, and milk gets mixed in and disappears. Where is the milk now? It is absorbed in the meat. “I’m sorry, what is the first case? What case are we talking about?” It is a mixture. “Maybe it’s a piece of cheese?” A pot. Again, the novel point is not the milk itself that entered the meat. “What’s special about this day?” Not at all; someone just put it in. “Maybe a slice of cheese on top of the meat.” Exactly. But the point is absorption: meat absorbed into milk. There, he says, the Torah did not innovate that taste like substance is by Torah law.
What does that mean? Chatam Sofer writes that Rashi does not mean that milk fell into a pot of meat, Heaven forbid. “But if milk fell into the meat—” No. Rather, as the doctor said, it fell into a vegetable dish. It fell into a dish of vegetables. Then you cooked the vegetables with meat, and the absorption from the vegetables went into the meat. “Same as a pot.” No, he says that is not taste like substance.
“Which one again?” You cooked vegetables with milk. The vegetables are milky. Now you put in the meat. “Oh, so the absorption from the vegetables—” We do not have the Torah’s innovation of taste like substance by Torah law in meat and milk, because it is not direct; it is a step removed. The taste has to come out of the vegetable. He says that when the vegetables were cooked with the meat, there was only absorption in the vegetables, not the actual substance. In this case, the Torah did not innovate taste like substance by Torah law.
So Chatam Sofer had to put a lot of qualifications into this Rashi: either milk means camel’s milk, or “dish” means a vegetable dish. But they are going out on a limb not to make Rashi contradict the plain meaning of the Torah about meat and milk.
“Isn’t it the same as a milk pot? We are saying it is like flavor transferred twice, isn’t it?” No, it is not a pot. “But it is flavor transferred twice from a prohibition.” Correct. “Why does he have to jump to a vegetable? Why not just say the pot became meaty or milky, and they cooked the food inside it? Let’s say you have a meat pot.” Because then you have to worry about a defective taste after twenty-four hours. “There is no defective taste in food.” What about it? We are already going to say that according to Rashi this is only rabbinic. “Correct. A gentile’s vessel is already rabbinic.” Correct. In a pot, it starts immediately. In food, there is no defect; it is not defective. That is right.
Anyway, a nice little review of some of this discussion. That is Daf Yomi (daily page). “What did you say to the kids?” Tomorrow is another day, boys. Sure. That is a good way to start Elul (month of Elul): we are studying properly.
“What’s the matter? If the pot is cold, then it will also be cold.” The pot is cold. “Yeah, it’s cold. What’s the problem?” Exactly. “No problem at night.” No, then what would be forbidden at all? And the Gemara tells me it is cold? Well, what is the Hava amina (initial supposition)? It is cold; we eat it. “No, that’s not relevant. There the question is why it is forbidden, and the taste is—”
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