This is the Eri B. Sitt Edition, an audio series on the Talmud Bavli, Massechet Bava Batra. This tractate, the longest in the Talmud by page count, has been dedicated by our good friend and pioneering student in the Daf Yomi shiur, Adam Azra, for the success of his dear children: that they should grow up to bring him satisfaction, that they should have wisdom, understanding, and knowledge, and that they should be a source of pride to him, his wife, and his entire family. Amen.
We are beginning with a question in the Gemara: “The borrower came after the due date and said, ‘I paid you before the due date.’ What is the law?”
We learned in yesterday’s Gemara that a person does not ordinarily pay a debt before it is due. For example, if someone borrowed money for six months and came after three months claiming, “I already paid you,” he is not believed merely because he is making that claim before the due date. He would have to take an oath and bring proof or witnesses. However, if he comes after the six months have passed and says, “I already paid you,” he is believed. Once the loan is due, a borrower is believed to say that he paid it.
The case before us is different. The borrower comes after the loan is due and says, “I paid you before the due date.” There are two sides to the question. On the one hand, there is a legal presumption that people do not pay early, so perhaps he should not be believed. On the other hand, he has a stronger claim available to him. If he wanted to lie, he could simply have said, “I paid you now,” meaning that he paid on time. Since he is instead saying, apparently truthfully, “I paid you early,” perhaps that gives him credibility.
That is the migo argument: if he wanted to lie, he could have made a better claim. The question is whether a migo can overcome a legal presumption. We have a presumption that people do not pay early, but we also have the migo: “Why should I lie? If I wanted to lie, I could have said that I paid on time.” Which one prevails?
Listen again to the case: the lender comes after the due date and says, “Pay me my money.” The borrower responds, “What are you talking about? I paid you early.” The question is whether the presumption that people do not pay early is outweighed by the fact that, if he had wanted to lie, he could have made a more advantageous claim by saying, “I paid you on time.” Or do we say that people do not pay early, and a migo cannot replace the presumption and make him believed?
The Gemara now returns to the proofs from the Mishnah, which we already studied yesterday.
The first proof is based on the statement that a person is presumed to have given payment until his fellow proves that he did not pay. The case in the Mishnah is that a wall separating two courtyards collapsed. Reuven rebuilt the wall, and Shimon must of course partner with him because the wall separates their courtyards. Reuven then tells Shimon, “Pay me your share of the wall,” and Shimon responds, “I already paid you.” The Mishnah says that Shimon is believed until Reuven brings proof that he did not pay.
The Gemara asks: What is the case in the Mishnah? If it is speaking about a situation in which the wall has already been built and Reuven comes afterward demanding payment, while Shimon says, “I paid you when the payment was due,” that is obvious. It is the ordinary case of one person saying, “You owe me one hundred,” and the other replying, “I already paid you.” The second person is believed because he is denying the entire monetary claim. He is not admitting that he still owes anything.
Therefore, the Mishnah must be referring to the case in which Reuven comes after the payment is due and Shimon says, “I paid you early, before the due date.” Since the Mishnah says that Shimon is believed, this appears to prove that the migo overcomes the presumption. Shimon could have claimed, “I paid you on time,” but instead he made the less plausible claim that he paid early, and nevertheless he is believed.
The Gemara answers that this is not a proof. The payment for the wall is due with every row that is built. Each time another row is added, payment for that row becomes due. Therefore, there is no situation in which Shimon can say that he paid before the due date. Every row has its own due date. Consequently, the Mishnah is not discussing the issue of a borrower who claims to have paid early, and it cannot resolve our question.
The Gemara brings another proof from the Mishnah. Reuven built a wall four cubits high and extended it beyond that. Shimon is obligated to contribute only for the first four cubits. If Shimon later builds a corresponding wall alongside Reuven’s extended wall, he benefits from the extension and must pay for it as well. When Reuven calls upon him to pay for the extension, Shimon says, “I already paid you.” The Mishnah says that Reuven must bring proof that Shimon did not pay.
The Gemara again asks what the case is. If it is speaking about a time when the extension was already built and Shimon says, “I paid you when the payment was due,” that is simply the ordinary law: when one person says, “You owe me money,” and the other says, “I paid you,” he is believed. Therefore, the Mishnah must be speaking about a later stage, after the extension was built and after Shimon built his supporting wall alongside it. Reuven then comes and says, “Pay me,” and Shimon answers, “I paid you early, before the payment was due.” Yet the Mishnah says that Shimon is not believed. This would seem to prove that even though he has a migo—he could have claimed that he paid on time—he is nevertheless not believed because of the presumption that people do not pay early.
The Gemara answers that this case also does not prove anything. Shimon may never have expected the Sages to obligate him to pay in the first place. It is not obvious to everyone that when one person builds an extension and the other person builds a corresponding wall, the second person is obligated to contribute to the first wall. Moreover, even when the payment is technically due, he may not have to pay until a rabbinical court rules that he is obligated.
Thus, even if Shimon comes after the relevant time and says, “I paid before the due date,” he has a migo: he could have said, “I paid on time.” Nevertheless, he is not believed in this case because he may not have thought that he would have to pay at all. Once again, there is no proof from the Mishnah regarding the relationship between a migo and a legal presumption.
Rav Acha then presents another case. A person comes to his fellow and says, “You owe me one hundred. My money is in your possession.” The other person agrees, and he admits this in the presence of witnesses. The claimant then says, “Please give it to me.” The other person replies, “I already gave it to you.” In that case, he is exempt. Why? Because he is denying the entire present claim. The claimant says, “You owe me one hundred,” and he answers, “I already paid you.” This is the ordinary case in which a person who claims to have paid is believed.
The Gemara then presents a second formulation: the next day, the defendant says, “You have nothing in my possession.” What does that mean? The Gemara will explain those words.
On Sunday, the person admitted in the presence of witnesses that the other person had one hundred in his possession. On Monday, he says, “You have nothing in my possession.” The Gemara asks: What does this mean? Does it mean that he is saying, “I already gave it to you,” and therefore that he is believed? Or does it mean that he is saying, “There was never anything of yours in my possession at all”?
If the statement means, “I paid you on time,” then it is the first case. He is believed because he is denying the entire claim. But if the statement, “You have nothing in my possession,” means, “I paid you before the due date,” then the Gemara says that he is obligated to take an oath. This would appear to prove that although he has a migo—he could have claimed that he paid on time—the legal presumption that people do not pay early is stronger, and he is not believed without an oath.
The Gemara rejects that proof as well. The statement may mean that there was never a loan at all. On Sunday, the person admitted, “Yes, there was a loan. You have one hundred in my possession.” On Monday, he says, “What are you talking about? There was never any such loan.”
What does it mean to say, “There was never any loan”? The Gemara explains that whenever a person says, “I never borrowed,” it is as though he is also saying, “I never paid.” Obviously, one cannot pay back money unless one borrowed it first. Therefore, “I never borrowed” necessarily implies, “I never paid you.”
Since there were witnesses that on Sunday he admitted owing the money, and on Monday he says, in effect, “I never paid you,” he remains obligated. The issue is not that he explicitly said, “I did not pay.” Rather, that is the necessary implication of his statement that there was never a loan. His own testimony establishes that there was a loan, and his later statement establishes that he never paid it.
If, on Monday, he had said explicitly, “I paid you,” he would have been believed, even though the loan had been made in the presence of witnesses. There is a general rule that when a loan is made with witnesses, the borrower does not ordinarily have to repay in the presence of witnesses. Therefore, if he says, “I paid you already,” he is believed. But in this case he did not say, “I paid you.” He said, “There was never any loan.” Since that statement implies that he never paid, he is obligated based on the combination of his two statements.
The Gemara therefore fails to prove whether a migo overrides a legal presumption. The question remains unresolved.
In practice, the general rule is that in a monetary case involving uncertainty, the defendant takes a rabbinic oath in order to protect himself, and then he is believed. Therefore, in the practical case of a person who comes after the due date and says, “I paid before the due date,” the Sages would impose a rabbinic oath upon him. Once he takes that oath, he is believed and is exempt. The fact that the Sages require an oath means that, after the oath, they accept his claim.
We now turn to a new subject in the Mishnah. Reuven built a wall four cubits high and extended it beyond that. Shimon is not required to pay for the extension at first; he is obligated only for the first four cubits. But if Shimon later builds another wall that corresponds to Reuven’s wall, then Shimon benefits from the extension, because he can place roofing over the area. He must therefore pay for the extension as well.
Rav Huna says that if Shimon built a wall seven cubits high alongside a wall that was ultimately intended to be ten cubits high, Shimon must pay for the entire wall, not merely for the seven cubits that he built. Why? Once he began building above four cubits, it is assumed that he intends to continue until he reaches the full height. Why else would he build a seven-cubit wall in front of a ten-cubit wall? A roof cannot be placed properly in that position. It is reasonable to assume that he intends to add the remaining three cubits later. Therefore, he must pay immediately for the entire extension.
Rav Nachman disagrees. He says that Shimon pays only for the portion from which he actually benefits. If he built seven cubits, he pays for seven cubits, but not for the additional three. His argument is that it is not certain that Shimon will eventually build higher. What benefit would he gain by doing so? We will see the continuation of this discussion.
Rav Huna, however, concedes the law in the case of a corner structure and an attachment. At the corner of his house, a person may build a small structure that projects outward parallel to part of the dividing wall. In such a case, even Rav Huna agrees that the neighbor pays only for the portion of the wall that actually corresponds to the attachment.
The reason is that this type of structure is not normally enlarged. Since it is in an awkward space at the corner of the house, it is certain that the person will not eventually make use of the entire extension. Therefore, if he built an attachment corresponding to six cubits of the wall, he pays for six cubits and not for anything beyond that. This is the case of the corner attachment in which Rav Huna agrees that we do not assume he will continue building higher.
What is the case of a wooden support placed in the wall? Suppose a person wants to place beams across his courtyard. He does not want to rest the beams directly on the stone wall, because the stones can cause the wood to deteriorate. Therefore, he first places a long piece of wood along the top of the wall and then places the beams on top of that wooden support. This is one method.
If he does not have a long, thick piece of wood, he makes holes in the stone wall and inserts small pieces of wood into those holes. He then places the beams into the holes so that they rest on the wood rather than directly on the stone. In this way, the beams are protected from becoming damaged.
Rav Nachman agrees that when the person places beams on the wall or makes holes in the wall for the beams, he must pay for the entire relevant portion. Once he has done this, it is obvious that he intends to make use of the full height. Why else would he make holes in the wall or place supports for beams? He clearly intends to build and use the entire structure.
The basic dispute is therefore as follows: Rav Huna holds that whenever it is reasonable to assume that the person will eventually build higher, he must pay for the entire wall even before he completes it. Rav Nachman holds that in general, a person pays only for what he has actually built and used. However, Rav Huna agrees that in the case of a corner attachment, where the person is clearly not going to enlarge the structure, he pays only for the portion corresponding to the attachment. Rav Nachman agrees that when the person has placed beams on the wall or made holes to receive beams, it is obvious that he intends to use the entire structure, and he must therefore pay for the full relevant portion.
Rav Huna then presents another law concerning windows. Reuven builds a wall separating two courtyards. Shimon extends the wall beyond four cubits, and the windows or holes in the wall face Reuven’s side. These are not necessarily windows intended for light. They may be openings designed to receive beams, so that Shimon can place beams through the holes and support them in the wall.
One might think that the fact that the openings face Reuven’s side proves that Reuven participated in the construction. Reuven might say, “Why else would there be openings on my side? I must have contributed to the wall, because the openings were made so that I could place beams in them.” The law is that Reuven cannot make this claim merely because the openings are on his side. Their presence is not proof that he contributed to the wall.
Shimon can respond, “I made those openings myself. I anticipated that eventually you might want to build another wall alongside mine, and I prepared the openings in advance so that you would be able to place beams across them. I did not want my wall to be damaged later when you came to make the openings.” Since people sometimes prepare a wall in advance for a possible future use, the openings do not establish that the neighbor contributed to the construction.
We now proceed to another group of cases involving established rights of use between neighbors. If one person has been permitted to make a particular use of his neighbor’s property and the neighbor does not object, that silence may establish a right of use. However, permission for one use does not automatically establish permission for a different use. Each use must be judged independently.
Rav Nachman says that if a person established a right to rest narrow rafters on his neighbor’s wall, this does not automatically give him the right to place thick, heavy beams there. The heavy beams may cause damage to the wall. The fact that the neighbor permitted the narrow rafters does not prove that he permitted the heavier beams.
However, if the person established a right to place the thick beams on the wall, he certainly has the right to place the narrow rafters there as well, because the narrow rafters cause less damage. Once he has established a right to use the wall for this purpose, the lighter use is included within the heavier use. Thus, the broader right includes the more limited right, but the limited right does not necessarily include the broader one.
Rav Nachman gives another example. Suppose a person’s roof allows rainwater to drip into his neighbor’s courtyard. If the neighbor never objected, the person establishes a right for the water to drip across the entire length of the roof, so that the entire courtyard becomes wet. This is called dispersed runoff.
If the person established a right for the water to pour into one particular spot—for example, through a gutter or drainpipe—he automatically has the right to allow the water to drip across the entire length of the roof. If the neighbor tolerated water falling throughout the courtyard, he certainly will not object when the water is concentrated in only one place. Concentrating the water in one spot causes less damage than dispersing it over the entire courtyard.
The reverse, however, is not true. If the person established a right to have the water pour into one specific spot, he does not automatically establish a right to let the water drip across the entire length of the roof. The dispersed runoff wets the entire courtyard and may cause greater damage. Thus, permission for the more damaging use is not necessarily implied by permission for the more limited use.
There is an additional discussion regarding a sukkah whose roof is made from willow branches. Even if a person has a right to allow runoff from an ordinary roof to enter the neighbor’s courtyard, that right may not include allowing rainwater to drip from a sukkah roof made from willow branches. The reason is that the rainwater becomes excessively concentrated. A large amount of water may fall from such a roof in one area, making the courtyard unusable.
Rabbi Yosef disagrees and says that even in the case of a sukkah, the established right to allow runoff remains valid. Whether the roof is an ordinary roof or a sukkah roof, once the person has established a right for the water to enter the courtyard, he may continue doing so. A case actually came before Rabbi Yosef, and he permitted the runoff from the sukkah as well.
The Gemara then discusses the rights of a tenant. A person rents a room in a large house with many rooms. What rights does the tenant acquire to use the other parts of the property? In the old buildings, there were projections from the walls called ledges or projecting beams. People would store items on them or beneath them.
The tenant may use the projecting beams and the recesses in the wall up to four cubits from his room. Whatever is within four cubits of the room is considered available for his use. He may also use the thickness of the wall and the top ledge of the wall, if that is the local practice. If people do not ordinarily store things there, then the tenant may not do so merely because he rented the room.
However, the section of wall facing the garden beside the reception hall is not included. In the old buildings, a reception area might have had a small garden next to it, with grass and other decorative features. That area was designed for aesthetics, not for storage. The tenant may not hang or place objects there.
Rav Nachman himself says that the tenant may use even the wall facing the garden or reception area. However, he may not use the area behind the apartments. The rear area is considered a separate expansion, whereas the area in front is considered part of the courtyard. Rav says that the tenant may use even the rear expansion. These are the different opinions regarding the scope of a tenant’s rights.
Ravina discusses a beam placed across a hut for shade. A person has a hut, and a beam extends across it and rests on his neighbor’s wall. The neighbor does not object. How long must the beam remain there before the silence establishes a right to leave it permanently?
If it remains for up to thirty days and the owner does not object, that does not establish a right. The person cannot say, “It was there for thirty days, and the owner said nothing, so he must have given me permission.” Thirty days are insufficient. But if it remains for more than thirty days and the owner does not object, then the silence can establish a right to use that area of the wall.
In the case of a sukkah built for the mitzvah, seven days are insufficient to establish such a right. Since the mitzvah of sukkah lasts for seven days, the owner may reasonably assume that the structure will be removed afterward. However, once the seven days have passed and the owner still does not object, a right may be established, because in earlier times people sometimes left their sukkot standing throughout the year.
Rashi explains that once the holiday has ended, the owner should have protested and said, “Take it down.” The fact that he did not protest indicates that he is allowing the person to leave it there for the long term. This is different from an ordinary hut built for shade, for which thirty days are required before silence establishes a right.
If the beam was cemented into the neighbor’s wall rather than merely resting on it, a right is established immediately. The owner would not normally allow another person to cement a beam into his wall without permission. Therefore, if he saw it happen and did not object, even after one day the silence establishes the right. This applies whether the structure is an ordinary hut or a sukkah.
The Gemara then discusses two houses on opposite sides of a public thoroughfare. Each house has a rooftop, and the owners use the rooftops for work. The owners require privacy so that one cannot see what the other is doing. The law is that each person builds half a wall on his own roof, with the two half-walls extending in opposite directions and overlapping slightly. This prevents either neighbor from looking directly into the other’s rooftop area.
One neighbor begins from the northern side and builds half a wall toward the south. The other begins from the southern side and builds half a wall toward the north. They extend the walls slightly beyond the halfway point so that there is no direct line of sight between them. They do not need to build a full wall, because that would be unnecessarily expensive and would place too much weight on the roof.
The Gemara asks why it is necessary to teach this law specifically when there is a public thoroughfare between the two houses. Even if there were a private domain between them, the two rooftop owners would still require privacy.
The Gemara answers that one of the owners might argue, “Why should I contribute to the wall? You would have had to build it anyway to protect yourself from the people in the public thoroughfare.” The other owner can respond that the people in the public thoroughfare are not the same as the neighbor. The public can see him only during the day, when they happen to look up. They cannot see what he is doing while seated on his roof. In addition, they must make a conscious effort to look at him.
The neighbor, however, can see him both during the day and at night. He can see him even when he is seated, and he does not need to make a special effort. He merely has to look over at the neighboring roof. Therefore, the wall is needed to protect against the neighbor as well, and the neighbor must contribute. Each person builds half a wall, with a slight overlap, so that neither one can look directly into the other’s rooftop area.
The Gemara asks why this law needed to be stated. It seems obvious that each neighbor should build half a wall on the opposite side, because that is the most practical way to prevent the damage of being watched.
The Gemara answers that the case is one in which one neighbor already built his half of the wall. His neighbor might then say, “You already began the work yourself. Finish the rest of the wall on your own roof, and I will pay you for what you built.” The neighbor who began the construction might prefer to place the entire wall on the other person’s roof and offer to reimburse him.
The novelty of the law is that the neighbor may not force the other person to build the entire remaining wall on his own roof. The reason is that a heavy wall would damage the roof. The same reason that one person does not want the full weight of the wall on his roof applies to the other person as well. Therefore, each must build half of the wall on his own roof, with the walls overlapping slightly.
Rav Nachman, in the name of Shmuel, discusses a roof adjacent to a courtyard. In this case the roof is not across the street; it is next to the courtyard. The owner of the roof must build a wall four cubits high so that he cannot look down from the roof into the courtyard.
Between one roof and another roof, however, no four-cubit wall is required. Rashi explains that people regularly work in a courtyard, so the owner of the roof must protect the courtyard from the damage of being watched. A roof, by contrast, is not used constantly. When a person goes onto his roof and sees that his neighbor is there, he can refrain from working or move away. Since the roof is not a permanent place of activity, it is easier to avoid the problem.
One might ask how this differs from the earlier case of two rooftops separated by a public thoroughfare, where each person must build a half-wall. The answer given by the commentators is that the distance between the rooftops makes it difficult for one person to realize that the other is present. He may be working without noticing that his neighbor is watching him. When the roofs are adjacent, however, each person can easily see the other. He can take precautions and stop working when necessary.
Rav Nachman himself holds that even between two adjacent rooftops, a four-cubit wall is not required. He says that a wall of ten handbreadths is sufficient. The Gemara asks what such a wall accomplishes.
If the purpose is to prevent one neighbor from seeing the other, ten handbreadths are not enough. If the purpose is to establish that the neighbor is trespassing when he climbs over, perhaps ten handbreadths are still unnecessary. Even a few stakes or pegs would indicate that the owner does not want anyone crossing over.
The Gemara answers that stakes would not be sufficient, because a person who crossed them could offer an excuse. He could say, “An object of mine fell onto your roof, and I crossed over only to retrieve it.” A wall of ten handbreadths is different. Once there is a substantial wall, the person can no longer offer such an excuse easily. Climbing over it clearly indicates trespassing.
Another possibility is that the wall is intended to keep animals from entering the roof. But even for that purpose, a small fence or a few stakes might be sufficient to prevent animals from jumping over. The Gemara therefore returns to the explanation that the ten-handbreadth wall is meant to establish that anyone who crosses it is trespassing.
Why is it necessary to establish that the person is a trespasser? The commentators explain that by allowing the person an easy way to enter and steal, the owner is being damaged. If there were no wall, the owner might be afraid to leave objects on his roof or to work there, because the neighbor could enter and take them. The neighbor is therefore considered like a person causing damage. The wall protects the owner’s ability to use his roof normally.
The Gemara then raises a question concerning a courtyard that is above a roof. The courtyard is on a higher level, while the roof is lower. The law stated is that the owner of the courtyard does not have to do anything for the owner of the roof. The Gemara asks whether this means that he does not even have to contribute to a ten-handbreadth wall.
It is understandable that he would not have to contribute to a four-cubit wall, since the owner of the roof does not use his roof regularly and can be careful when he goes there. But why should he not at least contribute to a ten-handbreadth wall, as in the case of two adjacent rooftops?
Rashi explains that the owner of the courtyard does not have to build a wall because the use of the roof is not permanent. The owner of the roof can be careful when he goes up and can notice whether anyone is watching him from the courtyard. He does not use the roof often enough for this to be considered a significant burden.
Nevertheless, the owner of the roof must build a partition to protect himself from the owner of the courtyard. The owner of the courtyard is constantly using his courtyard. It would be unreasonable to require him to stop working whenever the owner of the roof appears. The responsibility is therefore placed on the owner of the roof to build a partition so that he does not cause the owner of the courtyard a problem.
Even though the owner of the roof is lower than the courtyard, he may use the wall of the courtyard as a partition because the difference in elevation is less than four cubits. It is not such a great distance that the wall of the courtyard cannot serve as protection.
The commentators explain that when the source says that the owner of the courtyard does not have to do anything, it means that he does not have to contribute to a four-cubit wall. He nevertheless must contribute to a ten-handbreadth wall, which prevents the owner of the roof from being considered a trespasser when he climbs over. Thus, the owner of the courtyard does not have to pay for the full wall, but there is still a requirement for a smaller wall to establish the boundary.
We now come to one more case before proceeding to the next page. There are two courtyards next to each other, one higher than the other. Since a courtyard is a permanent place of use, issues of privacy arise between the neighbors.
Rav Huna says that the lower neighbor builds the wall from his side upward until he reaches the ground level of the higher courtyard. The higher neighbor then continues the wall from that point upward. In other words, the lower neighbor pays for the portion from the lower ground level up to the level of the upper courtyard, and the higher neighbor pays for the portion above that.
The lower neighbor cannot build his wall only up to the level of his own courtyard, because he must protect himself from the higher neighbor’s ability to look down. Once the wall reaches the level of the higher courtyard, the higher neighbor takes responsibility for the remainder of the wall. The upper neighbor does not have to pay for the lower portion simply because his courtyard is higher.
Rav Chisda disagrees and says that the two neighbors share the cost of the entire wall, from the bottom to the top. The upper neighbor cannot say, “I will build only the portion beginning from my own level.” He must participate in building the wall from the bottom upward.
A teaching is brought in accordance with Rav Chisda: when two courtyards are one above the other, the neighbors share the entire wall. The upper neighbor cannot say that he will build only from his own level upward. He must help build the lower portion as well.
What is the reasoning behind these opinions? Rav Huna maintains that each person pays for his own area. The lower neighbor needs the lower portion of the wall to protect himself from the upper neighbor’s ability to see into his courtyard. Once the wall reaches the level of the upper courtyard, the upper neighbor must pay for the wall above that point, because that is the area from which he benefits.
Rav Chisda reasons that the upper neighbor also benefits from the lower portion. Without the lower wall, he could not build the upper wall properly. He wants the lower wall because it provides the foundation for the wall that he will build above it. Therefore, he must participate in the cost of the entire wall.
Another way to understand the distinction is that if the two courtyards were at the same level, the wall would simply be placed between them and the cost would be divided. Here, however, one courtyard is lower. The lower neighbor must build upward until he reaches the upper level. Rav Huna says that the upper neighbor pays only for the wall on his own level; Rav Chisda says that because he also needs the lower section as the foundation for his wall, he shares in the whole cost.
The earlier teaching is brought as support for Rav Chisda. The final case of the teaching had stated that the owner of the courtyard does not have to do anything for the owner of the roof. Rav Chisda explains that this does not mean that no wall at all is required. It means only that the owner of the courtyard does not have to contribute to a four-cubit wall. He must still contribute to a wall of ten handbreadths, which is sufficient to establish the boundary and prevent the other person from being considered a trespasser.
That concludes this section. Baruch Adonai le’olam. Amen.