We begin our study with a passage from Gemara Megilah, specifically on Daf Het. This section of the Gemara, known as the "End Bens," compares similar items and then highlights their differences. We start with a Mishnah on Zayin Amud Bet, which states, "There is no real difference between a Festival and Shabbat." The only distinction, it claims, is that on a Festival, it is permissible to prepare food.
Tosafot immediately questions this, asking, "How can one say that the meaning is there is no forbidden labor on Shabbat that is not forbidden on a Festival?" Regarding labor, a Festival and Shabbat are equal; whatever is forbidden on Shabbat is forbidden on a Festival, "except for food preparation alone." This means that labors related to preparing food are permissible on a Festival. However, Tosafot points out that there are certainly other differences between them, such as the punishment for desecrating Shabbat being stoning, which is not the case for a Festival. Therefore, the Mishnah must only be comparing differences related to food preparation. This refers to preparatory actions, not just the actual cooking, but things like sharpening a knife, which are called "preparations for food."
It seems that regarding Shabbat and a Festival, even these preparations for food are equal, meaning they are forbidden even on a Festival. This is not in line with Rabbi Yehuda's opinion. A Brita states that the only difference between a Festival and Shabbat is the cooking of food, the preparation of food. Rabbi Yehuda holds that even the preparations for food are permissible, not just the cooking itself. The verse states, "for yourselves," which Rabbi Yehuda interprets as "for all of your needs," including these preparatory actions. The Rabbis, however, interpret "for yourselves" as "not for idolaters" or "not for dogs."
The Gemara further clarifies Rabbi Yehuda's position. It depends on the type of preparatory action. If a preparation could have been done before the Festival, it should have been. However, certain preparations, like sharpening a knife that became blunt on the Festival itself, could not have been done beforehand. In such a case, according to Rabbi Yehuda, it would be permissible to prepare the knife on the Festival. But if the knife was already blunt before the Festival, one should have fixed it beforehand. Thus, there are preparations that could have been handled before the Festival, which are forbidden on the Festival, and preparations that could only be done on the Festival, which are permissible.
To review the dispute: According to the initial opinion of the Sages, preparations for food are entirely forbidden on a Festival; only the actual making of the food itself is permissible. According to Rabbi Yehuda, preparations that could not have been done before the Festival are permissible on the Festival.
Tosafot adds a crucial distinction. While the Gemara seems to imply that actual food preparation is permissible on a Festival, even if the food could have been made before, the issue of doing preparations before the Festival only applies to "preparations for food" (utensils, fixing a knife, etc.). However, there are certain food preparations that are forbidden even on a Festival. For example, making cheese is forbidden on a Festival and incurs lashes. Why? The Sages only forbade "preparations for food," not the actual making of food. The answer lies in whether the food would spoil or become less edible if made the day before. If so, everyone agrees it can be made on the Festival. However, if the food is better when made the day before, like certain cheeses, then it is forbidden to make it on the Festival. This is similar to the "preparations for food" where there is no difference in quality if done before the Festival.
The Mishnah then states, "There is no difference between Shabbat and Yom Kippur." The only difference is that if a person performs forbidden labor on Shabbat, they are liable for stoning, whereas on Yom Kippur, they are liable for excision (karet). This means the punishment for Yom Kippur is by Divine hands, and for Shabbat, it is by human hands. However, regarding monetary payment for damages, both seem equal.
This refers to the law of "one who is liable for death penalty or excision is exempt from monetary payment." For instance, if someone lights their friend's field on fire on Shabbat, they are liable for making a fire and also for damages. However, since they are liable for stoning, the more severe punishment, they are exempt from monetary payment. The Gemara suggests that Yom Kippur is the same: if one makes a fire and burns a field, they are liable for excision, which would exempt them from monetary payment.
The Gemara explains that just as on Shabbat, one is liable for stoning and thus exempt from payment, and instead receives lashes, so too, lashes exempt one from excision. This is based on the verse, "Lest your brother be embarrassed in front of your eyes," referring to punishment in a court. Once the criminal is embarrassed by receiving lashes, they are exempt; they are "back to being your brother again." This is the opinion that lashes can exonerate a person from excision.
Rabbi Hanan states that his colleagues, Rabbi Hanan ben Gamaliel's colleagues, dispute this. A Mishnah states, "There is no difference between Yom Kippur and Shabbat, except that the intentional transgression on Shabbat is by human hands, and on Yom Kippur, it is excision." The Gemara asks a question on Rabbi Hanan ben Gamaliel: if lashes can exempt one from excision, then even on Yom Kippur, there is an element of punishment by human hands. So why does the Mishnah state that Yom Kippur's punishment is solely by Divine hands?
The Gemara offers two answers. First, Rav Nahman states that the author of the Mishnah is Rabbi Yitzchak, who holds that lashes cannot be given in cases of excision. Rabbi Yitzchak derives this from the fact that while all forbidden relations are generally included in the prohibition of excision, the Torah specifically repeats the prohibition of relations with one's sister, stating it is punishable by excision, not lashes. Thus, Rabbi Yitzchak believes there are no lashes in cases of excision, and therefore, the Mishnah's statement about Yom Kippur's punishment being solely Divine stands.
The Gemara offers a second answer: Even if the Mishnah follows the opinion of the Rabbis, who hold that one can receive lashes for excision, the Mishnah is referring to the primary punishment. The primary punishment for Yom Kippur is by Divine hands (excision). While it is possible to receive lashes and be exempt from excision, that is not the normal case. The Mishnah discusses the primary punishments, not secondary or exceptional circumstances. Therefore, the dispute of Rabbi Hanan ben Gamaliel's colleagues is not necessarily a direct contradiction to our Mishnah.
Tosafot disagrees with Rashi's interpretation of the verse regarding relations with one's sister. Rashi understands that the repetition of excision for relations with one's sister is to teach that it is punishable by excision, not lashes. Tosafot argues that all forbidden relations are generally punishable by lashes. The repetition of excision for relations with one's sister, which is not a general prohibition, comes to teach that the punishment for all these relations is excision, not lashes.
The Mishnah continues, "There is no difference between a person who makes a vow (neder) not to benefit from his friend, and one who makes a vow not to benefit from his friend's food." What is the practical difference? If one vows against general benefit, they cannot trespass on their friend's property or borrow their lawnmower, as these are forms of benefit. However, if the vow is only against food-related benefit, trespassing or borrowing a lawnmower would be permissible, as these are not food benefits. Rashi clarifies that this applies where lawnmowers are typically lent for free. If they are rented, borrowing for free would be a food benefit, as the saved money could buy food.
The Gemara asks: what about vessels used to make food, such as a cooking pot or a grinder? These would be forbidden even to one who vowed against food-related benefit. The Gemara then questions whether trespassing is truly considered a benefit, as people are not particular about it, assuming no damage is done. The Gemara responds that even if people are not particular, once a vow is made, it is binding. Tosafot explains that this applies to places where these vessels are not rented for money. If they are rented, borrowing them for free would be forbidden even for a food-related vow, as the saved money could buy food. However, for food vessels themselves, even if taken for free, they are forbidden because they are inherently food-related.
The Gemara then discusses the concept of "chazakah" (presumptive ownership). If someone performs an action on another's property without contest, it can establish ownership. However, this only applies to actions that people normally contest. If the owner is indifferent to the action, it doesn't prove ownership. For example, leaving an animal in a partner's field is not a "chazakah" because partners are not particular about such things. But the Mishnah implies that people are particular about trespassing. The Gemara answers that the Mishnah is referring to trespassing in a valley, where even non-partners are not particular. If it were trespassing into a house, everyone would be particular, and it would be forbidden.
Next, the Mishnah discusses vows (nedarim) and donations (nedavot). If a person makes a vow to bring an offering (korban ola), and designates an animal for it, and the animal dies or is lost, they must replace it. This is a neder, meaning the obligation is "on me." However, if they make a donation to the Beit HaMikdash and designate an animal, and it dies or is lost, they are not obligated to replace it. This is a nedavah, meaning the obligation is "on the animal." Both are equal regarding the obligation to pay within a certain time, such as the three pilgrimage festivals.
How do we know this distinction? When bringing an offering, the verse states that one "will sprinkle the blood and bring it, and then receive atonement." This implies that atonement is only achieved when the offering is brought, meaning if the designated animal is lost, another must be brought. This applies to a neder, where the obligation is "on me." For a nedavah, where it is "on the animal," there is no obligation to replace it. The phrase "it is on me" signifies a neder, while "this is" (referring to the animal) signifies a nedavah. The phrase "it is on me" implies the responsibility is on the person, not necessarily on the animal itself.
Tosafot asks why the Mishnah omits a major difference between nedarim and nedavot: one cannot use tithe money (maaser) for a neder, which is an obligation, but one can use it for a nedavah, which is a donation. Tosafot offers several answers. One is that the Mishnah is discussing a scenario where the animal has already been designated. Another answer is that the Mishnah simply omitted this distinction. Tosafot then proves from Masechet Ta'anit that a Mishnah can indeed omit a distinction, even if it is the only other distinction. Thus, even though our Mishnah uses the phrase "there is no difference," it can still omit the distinction regarding tithe money.
The Mishnah then states, "There is no difference between a zav who has two emissions and one who has three." A zav is a man who has had a seminal emission. The only difference is that after three emissions, he must bring an offering. However, regarding the severe impurity (tumah) they both have, which renders anything they sit or lie on impure, and the requirement to count seven clean days (nikiyim), they are equal. How do we know this? A Brita states that Rabbi Simai says the Torah mentions a zav with two emissions is impure, and then a zav with three emissions is impure. Since one cannot reach three emissions without having two, the repetition of impurity for three emissions must be to add something: the offering.
The Gemara considers an alternative interpretation: perhaps two emissions imply impurity but no offering, and three emissions imply an offering but no impurity. This is rejected because one cannot have three emissions without having two, so if two emissions cause impurity, three must as well. Another possibility is that both bring an offering, and the only difference is the level of impurity. This is also rejected based on the verse, "and he shall make atonement for himself before the Lord for his emission," from which we learn that "some zavim bring an offering, and some do not." This implies that not all zavim bring an offering, so both cannot bring one.
Therefore, it must be that a zav with three emissions brings an offering, and one with two does not. We have two sources for this: Rabbi Simai's derivation from the repetition of impurity, and the derivation from "for his emission." Both are necessary. Rabbi Simai's derivation alone might lead one to think that perhaps two emissions have no impurity and three have impurity, or that both bring an offering and the only difference is the level of impurity. The phrase "for his emission" teaches that not all zavim bring an offering. Conversely, if we only had "for his emission," we wouldn't know which zavim bring an offering; Rabbi Simai's derivation clarifies that it is the zav with three emissions.
The Gemara then discusses another interpretation of "for his emission": "When the zav becomes clean from his emission." This teaches that the zav begins counting his seven clean days immediately when the emissions stop, without needing to immerse in a ritual bath (mikveh) first. Another derivation from "for his emission" teaches that a zav can immerse in a mikveh to become pure from his zav impurity, even if he is simultaneously afflicted with leprosy (tzara'at). This allows him to at least become pure from the severe impurity of the zav, even though he remains impure from leprosy. Rashi explains that this refers to a case where he is cured of his leprosy but needs to undergo the two immersions for leprosy. The first immersion for leprosy can also count for the zav, even though he still has a week of leprosy impurity ahead.
The Gemara then states that the juxtaposition of "counting" with "emission" teaches that even a zav with two emissions must count seven days. The Gemara questions why this needs a verse, as such a severe impurity would surely require seven days. It then brings the case of a zavah (a woman with abnormal uterine bleeding). If she sees for one day, she only waits one day against it and then immerses; she does not need seven clean days. This shows that not all severe impurities require seven days. Therefore, the verse is needed to include a zav of two emissions in the requirement of seven clean days.
This leads to a contradiction: one "for his emission" teaches that not all zavim bring an offering (excluding the zav of two emissions from the offering), while another "for his emission" includes the zav of two emissions in the seven-day count. The Gemara answers that the verse is phrased in a way that allows for both inclusion and exclusion. The phrasing "from his emission" (mizobo) is extra, and this extra word is used to include the zav of two emissions in the seven-day count. If the Torah had not said anything, we might have thought a zav of two emissions does not need seven clean days, similar to a zavah of one day.
Finally, the Mishnah states, "There is no difference between a quarantined leper (metzora musgar) and a confirmed leper (metzora muhlat)." A metzora musgar is quarantined for observation, while a metzora muhlat is confirmed to have leprosy. The difference is that a metzora muhlat, upon becoming pure, must tear his clothes, grow his hair, and bring birds and shave. A metzora musgar who becomes pure does not need to bring birds or shave. Both, however, must be sent out of the camp (mahaneh), outside the city wall, and are subject to all the laws of leprosy impurity.
How do we know this? The verse states, "And the priest shall declare him pure from his affliction." This refers to a metzora musgar who, after a week of quarantine, is found to be fine. The verse implies he is already pure, meaning he never had to tear his clothes or grow his hair. The purity is retroactive. The Gemara compares this to a zav, where "and he shall be pure" means he is pure going forward, even if he becomes impure again later that day. Similarly, for the metzora, if the priest declares him pure, he is pure at that moment, even if the leprosy returns later that day. Anything he touched in between is not rendered impure.
The question remains: how do we know a metzora musgar does not have to tear clothes and grow hair? This is derived from the verse, "The leper in whom the affliction is," referring to a metzora muhlat, whose leprosy is intrinsic to his body and must disappear for him to be cured. This type of leprosy requires tearing clothes and growing hair. However, for a metzora musgar, the impurity is dependent on days, not the disappearance of the affliction itself. If the signs do not grow after seven days, he is pure, even if the affliction is still present. This type does not require tearing clothes or growing hair.
The verse states that the leper "must be sent out of the camp." Does this apply only to a metzora muhlat? No, because the verse uses the word "all" (kol), which includes the metzora musgar in the requirement to be sent out of the camp. But if "all" includes the metzora musgar for being sent out, why doesn't it include him for bringing birds and shaving? The Gemara answers that the verse states, "The priest shall go outside the camp, and behold, the affliction of leprosy has been healed." This implies that only leprosy that requires healing brings an offering. A metzora musgar's purity is not dependent on healing; it is dependent on the passage of days. Therefore, he does not bring an offering.