The Gemara in Ketubot is dedicated by Elliot Shasho in honor of his wife, Esther, and for the merit of his family. Amen; may it be the Divine will. Today’s daf is 18b.
We will begin a few lines from the bottom with a baraita: “The Sages taught: The witnesses are not believed to invalidate their signatures. These are the words of Rabbi Meir. The Sages say that they are believed.”
We learned in yesterday’s Mishnah that there is a document with witnesses whose signatures appear on it, and the witnesses come forward and say, “It is true that we signed the document, but we were coerced.” Even if the coercion involved a threat to their lives, Rabbi Meir says that they are not believed, while the Sages say that they are believed.
We understand the position of the Sages. The witnesses say that somebody threatened them and that this is why they signed the document. They have a valid claim of coercion, and therefore they are able to retract their testimony. According to Rabbi Meir, however, we have to understand why they cannot make this claim even when the coercion involved a threat to their lives. If they say that they were coerced, they are not making themselves wicked. They are saying that they were forced to sign. Why, then, does Rabbi Meir say that the witnesses are not believed?
The Gemara says that, according to the Sages, the reason is that the document was established through their testimony, and it can therefore be undone through their testimony. The witnesses are saying, “Yes, those are our signatures.” Their signatures establish the document; without them, the document would not have verification. Since the document’s entire validity rests on their testimony, they can also say that they signed it under coercion.
We understand that reasoning very well. But what is Rabbi Meir’s reason for rejecting this principle? The Gemara answers that when the witnesses claim that they were disqualified witnesses, there is a strong presumption that the lender exercised due care. Before the lender has witnesses sign a document, he is careful to make sure that the witnesses are valid. He is not going to lend money and then have two relatives, or otherwise disqualified witnesses, sign the document. There is no reason for a lender to throw his money away in that manner.
Therefore, when the witnesses claim, “We were disqualified,” Rabbi Meir can say that the lender certainly checked that they were valid witnesses. We understand why Rabbi Meir does not allow them to invalidate the document in that case. But coercion is different. If somebody put a gun to their heads and told them, “Sign this false document or you will be killed,” why should they not be believed? What does the lender’s due diligence have to do with that?
Reish Lakish says that there is a general presumption that witnesses do not sign a document unless the parties named in it are adults and legally competent, and likewise, people do not prepare a document unless the witnesses signing it are legally competent. This explanation helps us understand why Rabbi Meir does not accept the witnesses’ claim that they were disqualified. The lender would not knowingly use disqualified witnesses.
But the reason we just gave does not apply to witnesses who were coerced. We therefore return to the question: Why should Rabbi Meir say that the witnesses are not believed when they say that they were coerced, even under threat to their lives?
Let us look for a moment at Rashi on the second side of the page. Rashi explains that when the witnesses claim that they were disqualified, Rabbi Meir says: How could they have signed the document if they knew that the parties were legally competent and that the witnesses themselves were valid? In that case, we understand Rabbi Meir’s reasoning. The lender would not sign a document with invalid witnesses.
But what about witnesses who were coerced? If someone held a gun to their heads and said, “Sign this false document or die,” what does Rabbi Meir want from them? Rabbi Meir seems to be saying that they should have allowed themselves to be killed rather than sign a false document. That was also my reaction. The witnesses are saying, “Of course we signed. We were told to sign a false document or we would be killed.” Why should they not be believed?
The answer would seem to be that a witness cannot establish his own wickedness. If he signed the document, he cannot subsequently say, “We signed a false document,” because that would make him a wicked person. But that still does not seem to make sense in a case of coercion. If someone came to ask us, “Rabbi, should I sign this document or should I give up my life?” what would we tell him?
We would tell him to sign and not to give up his life. The reason is simple: We learned that only three prohibitions require a person to give up his life rather than violate them—idolatry, sexual immorality, and murder. Signing a false document is not one of those three. If the person signed, how can we later say that he is not believed because he should have given up his life? That does not make sense. He should be believed, because the law permits him to sign under those circumstances.
It would seem that he has not made himself wicked at all. On the contrary, if he had given up his life in such a case, he might have been acting improperly. Why, then, does Rabbi Meir reject the witnesses’ testimony?
The Gemara answers that although signing a false document is not one of the three cardinal sins, people have such a strong attitude toward falsehood that, in their minds, a person who signs a false document is considered wicked. The perception is that lying is so terrible that a person should give up his life rather than do it. According to that way of thinking, the witnesses are considered wicked for having signed, and a witness cannot make himself wicked through his testimony.
The Gemara rejects that answer as well. Since signing a false document is not one of the three prohibitions for which a person must give up his life, one cannot define the witnesses as wicked merely because they signed under threat. Even if people have that perception, the witnesses are not considered wicked in the legal sense.
We are therefore still left with the question: According to Rabbi Meir, when the witnesses established the document through their signatures, why can they not destroy the document by saying, “We were coerced, even under threat to our lives”?
The Gemara answers that Rabbi Meir’s position follows the view of Rav. Rav teaches that when a borrower admits that he wrote a document, the document does not require further verification. The borrower says, “Yes, I wrote the document, and I borrowed the money, but I already paid it.” This is called an admission regarding a document that he wrote.
In such a case, the lender can use the document to collect without having the signatures independently verified. The borrower himself admits that the document is authentic. That admission is the strongest verification possible. The borrower is believed to say that he paid, but we do not accept that claim. The simplest reason is that if he already paid, why is the lender still holding the document? The fact that the lender has the document in his possession is the strongest indication that the debt was not paid.
Thus, we accept the borrower’s admission that the loan occurred and that the document is valid, but we do not accept his claim that he paid. Since the lender is holding the document, “I paid” is a weak claim.
According to this, Rabbi Meir is discussing a specific case. The borrower admits that the lender lent him the money and that the document is valid, but he claims that he already paid. Since the borrower’s admission has established the document, the witnesses are not needed to establish it. Therefore, the witnesses do not have the ability to say, “We established the document, and we can now undo it.” The document was established by the borrower’s admission, not by their testimony.
Rashi explains that the borrower admits that he wrote the document and that witnesses signed it, but he is not disputing its validity. Since the borrower admits that the document was valid, the lender does not need the witnesses to verify it. Once the borrower says that the document was valid, it is treated as an established document. When he then says, “I paid,” we do not believe him because the document is still in the lender’s hands.
This is the key point. What is the witnesses’ credibility regarding a document that has already been established? Their signatures are no longer needed to create the document. The borrower has already done that through his admission. Therefore, the witnesses cannot claim that their testimony was the basis for the document and that they can now undo it.
Not everyone agrees with this. The Gemara records Rav’s position, and Rav Nachman challenges the way it is being presented. Rav Nachman says, in effect, “You are taking this teaching and presenting it as though everyone agrees with it. In reality, this is the position of Rabbi Meir, while the Sages would say that the witnesses are able to retract their testimony because of the principle that the document was established through them and can be undone through them.”
Rav Nachman objects to presenting an individual opinion as though it were a universally accepted law. If you are quoting Rabbi Meir, say explicitly that it is Rabbi Meir’s position. Do not omit the attribution and cause people to think that this is the consensus.
Rav Nachman is then asked what he himself holds in this matter. Suppose the borrower admits that he wrote the document but says, “I paid.” What do we tell the lender?
Rav Nachman says that we tell the lender, “Go and verify your document, and then come to court.” We follow the position of the Sages. The lender must establish the document independently. Once he verifies it, the borrower no longer has the ability to say that the document was established only through the borrower’s admission and can therefore be undone. The lender verifies the document, and then he can collect.
Until the lender verifies the document, however, the borrower does not have to pay. The responsibility is on the lender to establish the document. Rav Nachman says that this is his practice: When lenders bring documents to court without their witnesses, he tells them to locate their witnesses and have the document verified. Otherwise, even though the borrower admits that he wrote the document, the borrower may claim that he already paid.
Rav Nachman therefore disagrees with Rabbi Meir. According to Rabbi Meir, once the borrower admits that the document is valid, the lender can collect immediately. According to Rav Nachman, the lender must first verify the document.
Rav Nachman explains that the lender is not in danger of losing his claim merely because he must verify the document. The document is in the lender’s possession, but until it is verified, the lender must complete the verification process. Once it is verified, the borrower’s claim that he paid is rejected because the document remains in the lender’s hands.
The Gemara then proceeds to another case: a document of trust. A document of trust is prepared before the loan takes place. For example, a person needs to borrow money quickly. Preparing a document takes time, so the parties prepare the document in advance. The prospective borrower says, “If I need the money, the document is already prepared.” The lender holds the document, but no money has yet been transferred.
Such a document is called a document of trust because the lender is trusted not to use it until he actually lends the money. The lender holds a signed document stating that the borrower owes him money, even though no loan has yet taken place.
Now suppose somebody claims that the document was only a document of trust and that no money was ever lent. The Gemara says that the person making this claim is not believed, but it asks who is making the claim. Is it the borrower who says, “This was only a document of trust,” or is it the lender?
If the borrower is the one making the claim, it is obvious that he is not believed. He has a document with witnesses’ signatures, and the lender is holding it. The borrower cannot simply say that it was a document of trust. What credibility does he have against the document and the lender’s possession of it?
Perhaps, then, it is the lender who says, “This was only a document of trust. I never lent the money.” That would be unusual, because the lender is giving up his own claim. But if he wants to say, “The borrower is correct; this document was never meant to be used because I did not lend the money,” why should he not be believed? He is not trying to collect. He is saying that the borrower owes him nothing.
The Gemara answers that it is also obvious that the lender is believed. He is acting in a way that benefits the borrower and causes himself a loss. The principle is that a person is believed when his claim results in a loss to himself. If the lender wants to be stringent with himself and say that there was no loan, he is believed.
The Gemara therefore suggests that perhaps the statement is referring to the witnesses. The witnesses say, “We signed the document as a document of trust.” If the document had already been verified elsewhere, the witnesses would certainly not be believed. They did not establish the document; it was already established through another source. They have no ability to undo it.
But if the document is being established through their own signatures, perhaps they should be believed. They can say, “We signed this document, but it was only a document of trust.” Since they established it, perhaps they should be able to undo it as well.
The Gemara reviews the possibilities. If it is the borrower, why is there any novelty? He is obviously not believed. If it is the lender, he is obviously believed because he is sacrificing his own claim. If it is the witnesses, why should they not be believed if they themselves established the document?
The Gemara returns to the distinction between a document of trust and the earlier case in which the borrower admitted the document but claimed that he had paid. In the earlier case, the borrower’s claim was “I paid.” That claim is weakened by the fact that the lender is holding the document. If the debt was paid, why does the lender still have the document?
In the present case, however, the borrower is not claiming that he paid. He is claiming that no loan ever took place. Therefore, the fact that the lender is holding the document does not necessarily contradict the claim. The lender could be holding it because it was prepared in advance as a document of trust.
That gives the borrower a somewhat stronger claim. The document may have been prepared, but it was never used for an actual loan. Therefore, perhaps the borrower can say that it is a document of trust. The lender cannot respond, “If you paid, why am I holding the document?” because the borrower is not saying that he paid. He is saying that the loan never happened.
The Gemara gives several approaches to determine who is making the claim and what the law is in each case. One approach is that the lender is saying it was a document of trust, in a case where another person stands to benefit from treating the document as valuable.
For example, Reuven holds a document stating that he is owed one thousand dollars. Reuven himself owes money to Levi and has no cash. Levi wants to collect from Reuven, and Reuven tells him, “There is a document in Shimon’s property that is worth one thousand dollars. You can take that document as payment.” In this case, Reuven’s statement that the document was only a document of trust harms another person. Levi was relying on the document as an asset that could satisfy Reuven’s debt.
The novelty is that a person is not believed to say that a document is worthless when somebody else is relying on its value. Reuven may say that the document is worthless if the only person affected is himself, but when the statement harms another person who was going to use the document to collect, he is not believed.
The Gemara then asks how we know that a debt owed to a person can be transferred directly to that person’s creditor. The source is the law of a person who owes money to another and is himself owed money by a third party. The creditor can go directly to the third party who owes money to the debtor and collect from there.
It does not matter whether the underlying obligation began as a theft, a deposit, or another type of debt. Once the person owes the money, the creditor can collect it directly from the person who owes the debtor.
A second approach is that the witnesses are making the claim. The witnesses say, “We signed the document, but it was only a document of trust.” In that case, we can say that they are not believed because a document of trust is a dangerous document. It is a loaded weapon. The lender could take it out at any time and claim payment from the borrower, even though no money was lent.
Since it is improper to maintain such a document in one’s home, the witnesses cannot say, “We signed a document of trust.” They would be admitting that they participated in preparing a document that could be used improperly. A person cannot make himself wicked through his own testimony.
The witnesses are therefore not believed to say that they signed a document of trust. They are believed that the signatures are theirs, and the document is thereby established, but they are not believed to add that it was a document of trust.
The Gemara then discusses the general prohibition against keeping dangerous or misleading documents in one’s home. Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi says that a person may not keep a paid document in his house. If a debt was paid, the document should be destroyed or otherwise rendered unusable. If the lender dies and somebody finds the paid document, that person might attempt to collect again.
This is based on the verse, “Do not allow wrongdoing to remain in your home.” In the West, in the academy of Rav, they said that the word for “wrongdoing” refers to a document of trust and also to a document of flattery.
A document of flattery is a document prepared merely to make a person appear wealthy. For example, a person wants to project the image that he is rich, so he asks somebody to write a document stating that the person owes him a million dollars. He then walks around with documents showing that people supposedly owe him large sums of money. He wants others to think that he has money spread throughout the marketplace.
That too is dangerous. Somebody might later take the document and say, “You owe me a million dollars.” Therefore, such a document should not be kept in one’s home.
The Gemara discusses three dangerous categories of documents: a document of trust, a document of flattery, and a paid document. According to the view that a paid document is also prohibited, a document of trust is certainly prohibited. A paid document may be found in a lender’s possession for a legitimate reason, because the custom was to retain the document until the final payment was made. The borrower might still owe the scribe or might not yet have completed the payment. But there is no legitimate reason to retain a document of trust.
The custom was that the borrower paid for the preparation of the document. Since the borrower was borrowing money, he was responsible for the scribe’s fee. Sometimes the borrower did not have money to pay the fee, so the lender paid the scribe initially and later collected that amount from the borrower. For that reason, it was not unusual for a lender to retain a paid document temporarily. But if one is prohibited from retaining a paid document even for that reason, he is certainly prohibited from retaining a document of trust.
The Gemara then discusses a Torah scroll, or a biblical book, that has not been checked. Rav Ami says that one may keep it for up to thirty days, but after that, it must not remain in the house. A book containing errors can lead people to read incorrectly and to learn from an inaccurate text.
Rashi explains that this refers to a Torah scroll or a book of the Prophets or Writings that has not been checked for errors. The Gemara notes that the numerical value of the expression “do not allow wrongdoing to remain in your home” is thirty-one, indicating that one may retain the uncorrected book for thirty days but not beyond that.
The discussion then extends to written material generally. The point is that written material can create a problem because people may assume that it is reliable simply because it is written. This includes books that are not appropriate from a religious or ideological standpoint. A person might say, “I do not read that book,” but his children or grandchildren may see it on the shelf and read it. Therefore, material that can lead people astray should not be kept in the home.
Rav Nachman teaches that when witnesses say, “The document was a document of trust,” they are not believed. When they say, “Our words were a declaration of protest,” they are also not believed.
A declaration of protest is different from a document of trust. The witnesses are saying that the transaction written in the document did take place, but that it was carried out under coercion. They are not saying that the document was never a document. They are saying that the document reflects a transaction that should be invalidated because one of the parties was forced to enter into it.
Why should the witnesses not be believed in that case? The document says that the transaction took place, and they signed it. They now come and add an external fact, namely, that the transaction was carried out under coercion. The Gemara says that once they signed the document, they cannot use an oral statement to contradict what they wrote in the document.
Rashi explains that the witnesses signed a document recording a sale, and they now say, “We knew that the seller was being coerced, and he showed us the coercion.” The witnesses are not denying that they signed. They are adding that the sale should not be effective because of the coercion.
They are not believed because a person’s oral testimony cannot overturn the testimony expressed in a document. Once the witnesses signed that the sale took place, they cannot later say that the sale did not take place or that it should be treated as something other than what the document states.
This is the distinction between a document of trust and a declaration of protest. In a document of trust, the witnesses are saying that the document itself was never valid as a document of indebtedness. In a declaration of protest, they are saying that the document was valid and that the sale occurred, but that there was an external circumstance—coercion—that should invalidate it.
In the first case, they are saying that the document was never truly a document. In the second case, they admit that the document was a document and that the sale was a sale. They are merely adding information from outside the document. Once the document has been established, they cannot add that external condition orally.
Not everyone agrees with this conclusion. A declaration of protest may be given to witnesses so that they can record the transaction while protecting the person who is being coerced. A document of trust, however, should not be written because it is an improper document. When witnesses sign a declaration of protest, they are not committing an offense; they are helping the person who is being pressured. When they sign a document of trust, they are participating in the creation of a dangerous document.
Rashi states the distinction clearly: A declaration of protest is given to witnesses so that they can write in the document and thereby remove the effect of coercion. A document of trust, however, should not be written because it is an improper document. If the witnesses signed such a document, they would be making themselves wicked, and a person cannot make himself wicked through his own testimony.
Rav asks Rav Nachman about a related case. The witnesses say, “There was a condition attached to our words.” They admit that they signed the document, but they say that the transaction was subject to a condition that was not written in the document. For example, they say, “The sale was made on the condition that the buyer do a particular thing,” but the buyer did not fulfill that condition.
Can the witnesses add this oral condition after the document was written? This seems different from a document of trust or a declaration of protest. They are not saying that the document itself was false or that it was invalid from the beginning. They are saying that the document is genuine, but that there was an additional condition outside the document.
One possibility is that this is merely another attempt to undo the document. The witnesses are effectively saying that the sale should not take effect, because the condition was not fulfilled. If so, perhaps they should not be believed, just as they are not believed when they say that the document was a document of trust or that the transaction was carried out under coercion.
Another possibility is that they are not uprooting the document at all. They admit that the document is valid. They are adding a separate piece of testimony that the parties agreed to a condition. The document remains a document, but the buyer must fulfill the condition before the transaction can be completed.
Rashi raises this uncertainty. Perhaps the witnesses are not uprooting the document because they admit that the sale was genuine. They are merely saying that there was an additional condition between the parties, and this is a separate testimony. The document is valid in itself, but the condition may later cause the transaction to be reversed if it is not fulfilled.
Alternatively, perhaps the witnesses are still considered to be uprooting the document. Even though they present the condition as something external, the practical result is that the document cannot be enforced. If so, they should not be believed.
The Gemara resolves the issue by saying that when this case comes to court, the parties are told to fulfill the condition. The witnesses are believed that there was a condition. The buyer is told, “Go and fulfill the condition, and then return to court.” The document is not disregarded; rather, the condition is recognized and must be fulfilled.
This also means that if the condition can no longer be fulfilled—for example, the condition involved doing something by a particular date, and that date has already passed—the condition cannot now be fulfilled. The time limitation matters. Once the relevant date has passed, the buyer can no longer satisfy the condition.
It is important to understand that the witnesses must have been involved in establishing the document. If the document had already been verified elsewhere, they could not come and add this condition. But when the document is being established through their own testimony, they have the ability to say that their signatures were subject to a condition.
The Gemara then discusses a case in which one witness says that there was a condition and another witness says that there was no condition. Rav Pappa says that the document is established through the two witnesses who signed it, and the witness who says that there was a condition is only one witness against the other two. Therefore, the condition is not accepted.
The Gemara challenges this reasoning. If that is how we understand the case, then even when both witnesses say that there was a condition, they should not be believed. Once they established the document, they should not be able to come later and undo it. Why is the case of two witnesses who say that there was a condition different?
The answer is that the witnesses are not retracting their original testimony. They are not saying, “We signed a document without a condition, and now we have changed our minds.” They are saying that, from the beginning, they signed the document subject to the condition. Their original testimony was: “This document is valid, but it is valid on the condition that a particular requirement be fulfilled.”
Therefore, when both witnesses say that there was a condition, they are not giving two contradictory testimonies. They are clarifying the nature of their original testimony. They established the document, but they established it with a condition.
In the case of one witness who says that there was a condition and one who says that there was not, the issue is more complicated. Initially, it appears that the document has two witnesses, and one of them is now adding a condition. That witness would then be one against the other witness and against the document itself.
But perhaps the witness who says that there was a condition is not adding something after the fact. He is saying that his signature was always conditional. Without his testimony, there would not be two witnesses establishing the document. Therefore, his statement cannot simply be treated as one witness contradicting two witnesses. His testimony defines the document that he helped establish.
Rashi explains that the witness is effectively saying, “I did not sign an unconditional document. I signed only on the condition that this requirement be fulfilled.” Since his testimony is conditional from the beginning, the document has only one witness establishing an unconditional obligation. The second witness says that the obligation exists only after the condition is fulfilled.
That is why the lender cannot collect immediately. The lender must first fulfill the condition. Once the condition is fulfilled, both witnesses support the existence of the obligation, and the lender can collect. Until then, the lender has not satisfied the terms under which one of the witnesses signed.
This does not mean that the witness is independently obligating the lender to do something unrelated to the document. Rather, the witness is defining the document that he established. The lender has a choice: He can fulfill the condition and then collect, or he can refuse to fulfill it and give up the ability to collect under the document.
Even if the condition is financially significant, the same principle applies. If one witness says that the document is valid only on the condition that the seller return a certain amount of money, while the other witness says that there was no such condition, the document cannot be enforced until the condition is resolved. If the lender wants the benefit of the document, he must satisfy the condition as described by the witness who made his signature conditional.
The document benefits the lender, and the lender therefore has the choice either to fulfill the condition or not to collect. The court is not imposing a new obligation on him independent of the document. It is telling him that the document, as established by the witnesses, is conditional.
We can now review the main cases.
First, if the signatures were verified elsewhere, the witnesses cannot subsequently come and invalidate the document. The document was already established independently of their testimony, so they no longer have the ability to say that it was a document of trust or to add a condition that would undermine it.
Second, if the witnesses themselves are coming to verify their signatures, they have a principle allowing them to explain or qualify what they established. However, they cannot say that the document was a document of trust if doing so makes them wicked, because a person cannot make himself wicked through his own testimony. The same applies when they claim that they signed a false document or otherwise participated in an improper act.
Third, when the witnesses say that the document reflects a transaction carried out under coercion, they are not believed to undo the document. They cannot use oral testimony to contradict the document that they signed, and they cannot make their written testimony meaningless through a later statement.
Fourth, when the witnesses say that there was an external condition, they may be believed because they are not necessarily uprooting the document. They are adding a separate condition to the document. The parties are then told to fulfill the condition, and only afterward can the document be enforced.
Finally, whenever witnesses are believed to add a condition to a document, the condition must be stated at the time of the original testimony. It must be part of the testimony as it is given. If the witnesses first establish the document unconditionally and only later return to add a condition, it is too late. That would be a separate testimony, and they would no longer be able to alter the document that they already established.