We are on page 17, and we will begin ten lines from the wide margin, with the words “the priest.” The Moed Katan discusses a priest who belonged to one of the priestly watches, whose week of service ended during the intermediate days of the festival. Since he had been unable to shave during his week of service, he was permitted to shave during the intermediate days of the festival.
The Gemara asks: What exactly is the case? If his week of service ended on the day before the festival, and the festival began on Sunday, he could have shaved on Friday. We learned that members of the priestly watch were permitted to shave on Thursday and Friday of that week. If so, there would be no reason to permit him to shave during the intermediate days of the festival, because he had an opportunity to shave beforehand.
The Gemara answers that the case is one in which his week of service ended during the festival itself. For example, the first day of the festival was Thursday. Normally, he would have been able to shave on Thursday, but that day was the festival. Since he had no opportunity to shave before the festival, he is permitted to shave during the intermediate days.
The Gemara then asks why this case was not mentioned in our Mishnah. Our Mishnah listed various people who may shave during the intermediate days of the festival, but it did not mention a priest in this situation.
The Gemara answers that our Tanna follows the opinion cited in Ta’anit: Three times a year, during the three pilgrimage festivals, all the priestly watches served together. They divided the festival offerings among themselves and shared in the distribution of the showbread. Consequently, a member of that watch is not considered to have completed his service during the festival. He is still serving as part of the general group of priests. Since his priestly service has not technically ended, he does not receive this special permission to shave. Our Tanna therefore did not include the case of a priest who may shave during the intermediate days of the festival.
The outside Tanna, however, maintains that even though he participates with the other priestly watches during the festival, his individual watch has technically ended. Since his service ended on Thursday and he had been unable to shave before the festival, he may shave during the intermediate days.
The Sages taught: All those whom we mentioned as being permitted to shave during the intermediate days of the festival are also permitted to shave during their mourning period. This includes a person who emerged from prison or captivity, or anyone else who was prevented from shaving for one of the reasons mentioned in the Mishnah. If he then entered a period of mourning, he may shave because he did not have an opportunity to do so beforehand.
But another teaching states that a mourner may not shave. Rav Chisda said in the name of Rav Shila that the two teachings are referring to different cases. The leniency applies when one period of mourning immediately follows another. A person had already entered one period of mourning and was therefore unable to shave. Before he had an opportunity to shave, a second period of mourning began. In that situation, if his hair became excessively long, he may cut it during the second period of mourning.
This is also taught explicitly: When one period of mourning follows another, and the person’s hair has become excessively long, he may cut it with a razor rather than scissors, and he may wash his clothing with water.
The Gemara challenges this explanation. If the teaching is referring specifically to one period of mourning following another, why does it say, “All those whom we mentioned are permitted to shave”? Even an ordinary person whose periods of mourning follow one another would be permitted to cut his hair. The additional circumstances—being released from prison or captivity, for example—would not be necessary.
The Gemara answers that the teaching had already been stated in a different form. In an ordinary case of consecutive periods of mourning, a person may cut his hair with a razor and may wash his clothing with water, but only in an unusual manner. He may not use scissors in the normal way, and he may not wash the clothing with detergent. In the case of someone who was prevented from shaving because of circumstances beyond his control, and who then entered another period of mourning, the leniency is greater: he may use scissors and may wash his clothing even with detergent.
Rav Elazar derives from this that an ordinary mourner may not wash his clothing even with water. Since the teaching went out of its way to permit washing with water in the case of consecutive periods of mourning, this indicates that ordinary mourning prohibits even that form of washing.
The Sages taught: Just as we said that one may not shave during the intermediate days of the festival, one may not cut one’s nails during the intermediate days either. Rabbi Yehudah says that the nails may be cut. Similarly, just as we said that a mourner may not shave during the period of mourning, he may not cut his nails during mourning. Rabbi Yosei says that the nails may be cut.
Rabbi Yehudah is stringent in both cases, while Rabbi Yosei is lenient in both cases. Ulla said that the halachah follows Rabbi Yehudah with regard to mourning, so a mourner may not cut his nails. With regard to the intermediate days of the festival, however, the halachah follows Rabbi Yosei, and one may cut one’s nails.
Shmuel said that the halachah follows Rabbi Yosei in both cases: one may cut one’s nails during the intermediate days of the festival and during mourning. This follows the general principle that in matters of mourning, the halachah follows the lenient opinion.
There was an incident involving Pinchas, the brother of Shmuel. Someone had died, and Pinchas was sitting in mourning. Shmuel came to visit him and saw that his nails had become very long. Shmuel asked him, “Why have you not cut your nails?” Pinchas replied, “If you were the mourner, would you be so lenient as to cut your nails during mourning?”
It turned out that Pinchas’s words were an example of the principle that there is a covenant associated with the lips: words that come out of a person’s mouth can have consequences. Someone died in Shmuel’s presence, and Shmuel himself became a mourner. Pinchas then came to visit him and saw that Shmuel’s nails had become long. Pinchas cut his own nails and threw them toward his brother’s face in anger.
Shmuel said to him, “Do you not know the principle that there is a covenant associated with the lips?” You said that if I were a mourner, I would cut my nails, and now the same situation happened to me.
Rabbi Yochanan derives this principle from Abraham’s words to his young men before the binding of Isaac: “Remain here with the donkey; I and the lad will go there, we will worship, and we will return to you.” Abraham’s intention was not necessarily that Isaac would return, since he expected Isaac to be offered on the altar. Nevertheless, the words “we will return” emerged from his mouth, and those words had significance.
The Gemara initially explains that Shmuel had thought the leniency applied only to fingernails, because the hands are visible and it is unpleasant to leave the nails long. He thought that toenails, which are generally not seen, might remain uncut. Rabbi Anan said that he learned from Shmuel that this distinction is incorrect. There is no difference between fingernails and toenails.
Another teaching states that it was permitted to cut nails during mourning, but only in an unusual manner. Using ordinary scissors is prohibited. How, then, should the nails be cut? They may be bitten off.
Rav Shimon bar Abba said: I was once in the study hall with Rabbi Yochanan, and he cut his nails with his teeth. He then spit them out and threw them onto the floor of the study hall. The Gemara derives three laws from this incident. First, it is permitted to cut one’s nails during the intermediate days of the festival. Second, cutting one’s nails with one’s teeth is not considered disgusting. Third, it is permitted to throw the nails onto the floor of the study hall.
The Gemara challenges this last point from another teaching: Three statements were made concerning nails. One who buries them is righteous. One who burns them is especially pious. One who throws them away is wicked, because perhaps a pregnant woman will walk over them and suffer a miscarriage.
How, then, could Rabbi Yochanan throw his nails onto the floor of the study hall? The Gemara answers that pregnant women do not ordinarily enter the study hall, so there was no concern in that location.
The Gemara asks further: Perhaps someone would sweep up the nails and throw them into the street, where a pregnant woman could walk over them. The answer is that once the nails have been moved from the place where they initially fell, they no longer retain the power to cause harm. The concern exists only where the nails originally landed.
A group of scholars once came before Rabbi and asked him whether it was permitted to cut their nails during the intermediate days of the festival or during mourning. He told them that it was permitted. Rav said that if they had also asked about trimming their moustaches, he would have permitted that as well. Another version states that they did ask about the moustache, and Rabbi permitted it.
The reason for this additional leniency is that the hair interfered with eating. They could not eat properly without trimming it, and therefore they were permitted to do so.
Rav Safra said in the name of Rav that a moustache may be trimmed from one side of the mouth to the other, along the entire length from which a person eats. Rav Nachman qualified this and said that only the portion that interferes with eating may be trimmed. He added that in his own case, any hair on the moustache bothered him, and therefore he was permitted to trim the entire moustache.
Rav Safra also transmitted a teaching in the name of Rav concerning Pharaoh. Pharaoh was described as a very short man, whose height was one cubit, whose beard was one cubit, and whose private organ was a cubit and a half. This was understood as fulfilling the verse, “A lowly person I will bring upon you.”
Rav Safra further said in the name of Rav that Pharaoh was a sorcerer. This is indicated by the verse in which God tells Moses to say to Pharaoh, “Behold, he is going out to the water.” Pharaoh went to the water in the morning in order to perform his magic there.
We return to the earlier discussion concerning washing clothing during mourning. Tosafot asks: Why was it necessary to derive from the case of consecutive periods of mourning that an ordinary mourner may not wash clothing with water? It is obvious that all forms of labor are prohibited during mourning, and laundering is a form of labor.
Tosafot answers that the teaching may be excluding laundering from a later list of prohibited activities. If laundering were not mentioned, one might mistakenly think that washing clothes with water is permitted, because washing with water alone is not the ordinary method of laundering. The teaching therefore tells us that even washing with water alone is prohibited.
Alternatively, the novelty may be that the mourner may not wash the clothing himself, or that he may not have someone else wash it for him. Another possibility is that the phrase “washing with water” teaches that even water alone is prohibited. We already know that laundering with detergent is prohibited because it is a form of labor; the novelty is that even washing with water, which is not the usual method, is also prohibited for an ordinary mourner. The only case in which water is permitted is when one period of mourning immediately follows another.
Shmuel said that the halachah follows Rabbi Yosei in both matters. Cutting nails is permitted during the intermediate days of the festival and during mourning, although the two cases may involve different levels of leniency.
Elsewhere, Shmuel said that the halachah follows Rabbi Shimon ben Gamliel in a dispute concerning an eruv, because Rabbi Shimon ben Gamliel is the lenient opinion. The Gemara asks why Shmuel needed to say both that the halachah follows Rabbi Shimon ben Gamliel and that the halachah follows the lenient opinion. Once he stated that the halachah follows the lenient view, it would have been obvious that it follows Rabbi Shimon ben Gamliel.
The Gemara answers that the additional statement was necessary because another authority had ruled that the halachah follows Rabbi Yehudah. One might have thought that Shmuel also agreed with Rabbi Yehudah in this matter. Shmuel therefore emphasized that the halachah follows the lenient opinion.
The Gemara asks why Shmuel needed to make this statement here. We already know that Shmuel generally rules according to the lenient opinion in matters of mourning. The answer is that this was not an across-the-board rule in every area. Since there were several authorities who disagreed in this matter, Shmuel had to state explicitly that here too the halachah follows Rabbi Yosei.
The Gemara returns to the principle that words can have consequences. Tosafot asks why the proof was brought from Abraham’s positive statement, “We will return,” rather than from a negative statement that also came true. Tosafot notes that the prophets sometimes used language comparing the Jewish people to Sodom, and God then used that same language. This would seem to demonstrate that a negative expression can also have consequences. Tosafot leaves the matter unresolved and asks why the example of a positive statement was chosen.
Tosafot also discusses the instrument used to cut nails. The term used in the Gemara appears to refer to a specific nail cutter. The fact that the Gemara says that this instrument is prohibited indicates that it is distinct from other tools, such as scissors. The use of one’s teeth, by contrast, is a special and unusual method.
The Gemara had ruled that cutting nails during the intermediate days of the festival follows Rabbi Yosei and is permitted. Tosafot asks: If Rabbi Yosei says simply that cutting nails is permitted, why did Rabbi Yochanan cut his nails with his teeth instead of using a nail cutter?
Tosafot answers that perhaps Rabbi Yochanan held like Rabbi Yehudah, who is stringent, or perhaps he was more stringent during the intermediate days of the festival than the basic halachah requires. Alternatively, he may have believed that mourning is more stringent than the intermediate days of the festival, and therefore he used an unusual method.
Rav Sheshet said that activities permitted during the intermediate days of the festival are prohibited during mourning. This would explain why Rabbi Yochanan used his teeth: he accepted the more stringent approach with regard to mourning.
Tosafot then discusses whether cutting one nail with another is considered an unusual method. Pulling one nail off with another, creating a small ridge and breaking it away, is not the normal manner of cutting nails. With regard to Shabbat, such an action would not constitute the ordinary form of cutting. Tosafot cites the discussion in the chapter dealing with one who begins an activity and explains that because this is an unusual method, it is considered a change in the manner of cutting. The same would apply to the intermediate days of the festival.
Tosafot records that Rabbi Shimon bar Avraham permitted women to cut two nails during the intermediate days of the festival. It appears that women may even cut their nails in the ordinary manner, since nail cutting contributes to a woman’s appearance. The discussion of the intermediate days lists cutting the nails and cutting the hair among the forms of adornment that are permitted.
Tosafot also mentions a passage in the Jerusalem Talmud, although it is uncertain how the two sources should be reconciled. The discussion concerns a woman’s hair and other forms of adornment, including rouge and depilatory treatment used to remove hair from the body. The permission concerns hair that interferes with her appearance or causes discomfort, not necessarily the hair of the head.
There is also a distinction between the first seven days of mourning and the period after the seven days. During the first seven days, a nail cutter is prohibited, but cutting in an unusual manner may be permitted in the appropriate case. After the seven days, the restriction may be more limited. Tosafot discusses whether the teaching that prohibits nail cutting refers specifically to the first seven days or to the entire thirty-day period.
One interpretation is that even Rabbi Yosei, who is lenient regarding nail cutting, would prohibit using a nail cutter during the first seven days, just as a person may not shave normally during the intermediate days of the festival. Another interpretation is derived from the incident involving Shmuel, who cut his nails with his teeth. That incident indicates that even the lenient opinion permits nail cutting during mourning only in an unusual manner.
According to this approach, during the first seven days nail cutting is permitted only through a change in the normal method, such as using one nail to remove another. During the subsequent period, it may be permitted even with the ordinary instrument. The discussion leaves the precise halachic application for further examination.
We now continue with the Mishnah’s discussion of laundering. The following people are permitted to wash clothing during the intermediate days of the festival: one who came from overseas, one who was released from prison, one who emerged from captivity, and one who has only a single garment. These people were unable to launder their clothing beforehand, or they have no alternative clothing to wear.
The Gemara asks why the Mishnah chose this example. Rabbi Yirmiyah answers that the case teaches that even if a person has two garments, and both are dirty, he may wash them if he came from overseas and had no opportunity to do so before the festival. Ordinarily, a person with two garments is not permitted to launder them during the intermediate days, because he could have washed one before the festival. But in this case, since he was away, he may wash both if he needs both of them during the festival.
The special novelty is the case of someone who has only one garment. Even if he had been able to wash it before the festival, he may wash it during the intermediate days, because he has nothing else to wear. A person who has two garments, however, may wash them only when he needs both of them for the festival and was prevented from laundering them beforehand.
The discussion then turns to certain garments and cloth items that become dirty frequently. These include napkins and cloths used by barbers to catch hair. Since such items constantly become soiled through their ordinary use, it may be permitted to launder them during the intermediate days. The discussion considers whether this applies to all such garments and whether the material affects the ruling.
There was an attempt to bring proof from people who were washing items in Tiberias. The response was that one cannot prove a halachic practice merely from seeing people do something. Perhaps they were acting improperly, or perhaps the circumstances were different. A story is not proof unless the halachic correctness of the practice is established.
The term used for some of these items may refer to buckets or containers, as Rashi explains. Tosafot challenges the proposed resolution: the fact that an answer can be given to the Mishnah’s omission does not mean that the story itself is necessarily accurate. One may answer the Mishnah and still challenge the reliability of the account that was used to support the answer.
The next Mishnah lists documents that may be written during the intermediate days of the festival. These include marriage documents, bills of divorce, receipts, wills, gifts, and documents establishing a prosbul. A prosbul transfers debts to the court so that they may be collected even after the Sabbatical year, when ordinary personal debts are canceled.
The list also includes documents assessing property for the purpose of dividing an estate, marriage-support documents in which a man undertakes to support his wife’s daughter from a previous marriage, documents verifying the performance of chalitzah, and documents recording a minor girl’s refusal of a levirate marriage. It includes documents dividing an inheritance among heirs, judgments of the court, and governmental documents or enactments.
A receipt records that a borrower has repaid a loan. A will is written by a person who is seriously ill and wants to transfer his assets to particular recipients. Documents assessing property are needed when heirs divide an estate, so that each receives an equitable share. A marriage-support document records a man’s undertaking to support his wife’s daughter. A document of chalitzah verifies that the ceremony was performed and that the woman is free to marry. A document of refusal records the action of a minor girl who does not wish to remain in a marriage arranged for her.
Shmuel said that a person may betroth a woman during the intermediate days of the festival, because perhaps someone else will come first and marry her. The concern is that another man may take the woman before he has the opportunity to betroth her. For the same reason, the Sages permitted a person to complete other matters during the intermediate days when delaying could cause an irreversible loss.
The Gemara attempts to bring proof from the Mishnah’s reference to a marriage document. Perhaps the document mentioned there is a betrothal document, which would support Shmuel’s ruling. The Gemara rejects this proof. The document may instead be the financial agreement made between the two families before the marriage. The two sides would agree how much each family would provide, and only afterward would they perform the betrothal. The document therefore need not be a document of betrothal itself.
Rashi explains that these financial commitments could become binding even without a formal act of acquisition. The parents received benefit from the expectation that their children would marry, and that benefit created a form of commitment. Since each side received a benefit and made the commitment wholeheartedly, it could function like an act of acquisition, even though it was not a formal acquisition.
The Gemara brings another Mishnah as a possible proof. The Mishnah says that a man may betroth a woman during the intermediate days, but he may not marry her and consummate the marriage. This wording seems to indicate that betrothal is permitted. The Gemara responds that the Mishnah may be teaching this by way of all the more so: if the more significant act of marriage and consummation is prohibited, it is obvious that betrothal, which is a lesser act, is permitted only in the circumstance described.
Another source states that a man may betroth a woman during the intermediate days, but may not marry her. The source also says that a woman may perform the levirate marriage ceremony, but may not consummate it. The reason is that we do not combine one joy with another. Even though betrothal is permitted, the full marriage ceremony is not performed during the festival.
The Gemara then questions Shmuel’s stated reason: perhaps a rival will precede him. Elsewhere, Rabbi Yehudah said in the name of Shmuel that every day a heavenly voice announces that a particular woman is destined for a particular man, and that a particular property is destined for a particular person. If the match is already determined, how can another person precede him?
The Gemara answers that another person may precede him through prayer. Prayer can overturn the decree. A different man may pray intensely that he should marry this woman, or he may pray that she should die before marrying someone else. The concern is therefore that another person’s prayers may alter what had been destined.
There was a person who prayed that a particular woman should marry him. Rabbi heard him and told him not to pray in that manner. If she was destined for him, no one could take her away. If she was not destined for him, his prayers would only lead to disappointment and could cause him to lose faith when he did not receive what he wanted.
The man continued praying, saying either that he should die before seeing her marry someone else, or that she should die before marrying another man. Rabbi told him that he should not pray this way. This is the concern mentioned by Shmuel: someone else’s prayers may intervene and prevent the match.
Rav said in the name of Rabbi Reuven ben Itzterobili that the fact that a person’s spouse is determined by Heaven is evident from the Torah, the Prophets, and the Writings.
From the Torah, this is shown by the words of Laban and Bethuel: “The matter has come from the Lord.” Although they were not presented as great believers, they were forced to acknowledge that Isaac’s marriage to Rebecca had been arranged by God.
From the Prophets, it is shown by the account of Samson, who wanted to marry a woman from the Philistines. The verse says that his parents did not know that the matter came from God. From the Writings, it is shown by the verse, “A house and wealth are an inheritance from fathers, but an intelligent wife is from the Lord.” A person may inherit a house and money from his parents, but a wise wife comes from God.
Everything is ultimately from God, but the providence involved in finding a spouse is often more visible to people than the providence involved in other areas of life. People frequently perceive the Divine direction more clearly in the circumstances through which they meet and marry their spouse.
Rabbi Reuven ben Itzterobili also taught that a person is not suspected of wrongdoing unless he has committed some aspect of that wrongdoing, thought about committing it, or saw someone else commit it and was pleased rather than protesting.
If a person is suspected of an offense, perhaps he committed the complete act, or perhaps only part of it. Alternatively, he may have contemplated committing it. Even the thought can lead people to suspect him. If he did not commit the act and did not contemplate it, perhaps he saw someone else commit it and failed to rebuke him. His silence indicates that he was not sufficiently disturbed by the offense.
The Gemara challenges this teaching from the tribes of Israel, who expressed suspicions concerning God. Surely God had not done what they were suggesting. The Gemara answers that they knew their suspicions were unfounded, but they expressed them in order to provoke Him.
The verse says that they gathered against Moses and Aaron. Rabbi Shmuel bar Yitzchak teaches that they warned their wives to remain faithful and not to be secluded with Moses. They suspected Moses of an illicit relationship, even though there was no basis for the suspicion. Their conduct was motivated by hatred and provocation rather than by a legitimate concern.
Rabbi Yosei said that he wished people would suspect him of something he had not done, because their suspicion would provide atonement for him. Being accused of an offense that one did not commit can serve as a form of suffering and atonement.
Rav Pappa said that he had been suspected of an offense even though he had not committed it. The Gemara asks how this can be reconciled with the teaching that a person is not suspected unless he has some connection to the offense.
The Gemara distinguishes between a rumor that stops and a rumor that does not stop. A rumor that spreads for a short time and then disappears may be false. But if it continues, it may indicate that the person has some connection to the offense, whether through the act itself, through a related act, or through thoughts about it.
The Gemara asks what qualifies as a rumor that does not stop. Abaye said that his foster mother taught him that in a city where people are known to engage in wrongdoing, a rumor generally continues for at least a day and a half. Therefore, a rumor that persists for a day and a half is considered one that does not stop.
This applies only when the rumor continues steadily and does not weaken in the interim. If it diminishes and later returns, the legal status may be different. Even when a rumor weakens, however, the weakening must not have resulted from fear of the person being discussed. If people stopped speaking because they were afraid of retaliation, the rumor is still considered active.
Furthermore, all of these rules apply when the person has no known enemies. If he does have enemies, they may be deliberately keeping the rumor alive, and therefore the continued rumor is not proof that he committed the offense.
Rashi explains that a rumor that stops is one that ceases entirely, while a rumor that does not stop resembles an ongoing suspicion. If it weakens and then begins again, it may be considered renewed rather than continuous. The discussion examines various examples of rumors that weaken, return, or continue because of external pressure.
Tosafot returns to the Mishnah’s list of documents that may be written during the intermediate days of the festival. These documents are permitted because they concern matters that could otherwise be lost. A person might die before giving a gift or completing a transfer of property. Witnesses or court officials might die, or the opportunity to preserve the transaction might disappear. Since delaying could result in an irreversible loss, the documents may be written during the intermediate days.