The Eri B. Sitt Edition, an audio series on the Talmud Bavli. We are going to learn all of this in the merit of Chaim ben Simcha, that he should have a complete recovery, and in honor of the sponsor and his family, that they should have success, health, happiness, wealth, and honor from now and forever. Amen.
This is page fifteen. We begin with Yosef ben Sabut.
There are two different prohibitions and two different names. One is called piggul, and the other is called notar. They are not connected. The Gemara says: a sheretz and an animal carcass, an animal carcass and human flesh, or an animal carcass and flesh from a corpse—do these combine with one another to impart impurity? They do not combine, even for the less severe form of impurity that they share.
Let us say that one does not have a complete measure of an animal carcass or a complete measure of a sheretz. We will not combine them, even to join them for the weaker impurity that both can impart. One of them has a stronger form of impurity, while the other has a weaker form. One might have thought that they should at least combine for the weaker impurity, but they do not.
Only items whose impurity is the same and whose required measure is the same combine. A sheretz and an animal carcass do not have the same measure: the measure for a sheretz is the size of a lentil, whereas the measure for an animal carcass is the size of an olive. Moreover, an animal carcass and flesh from a corpse have the same measure, but their impurities are not the same. An animal carcass imparts impurity until evening, whereas flesh from a corpse imparts impurity for seven days. Therefore, these items cannot combine even for the less severe impurity among them.
One might still have argued that the animal carcass and the flesh from the corpse should combine to impart some form of impurity. The Gemara teaches that this is not so. Since the measures are not equal in the case of a sheretz and an animal carcass, and since the type of impurity is not the same in the case of an animal carcass and flesh from a corpse, they do not combine. The rule is that both the measure and the type of impurity must correspond.
That was the first ruling concerning piggul and notar: piggul and notar do not combine. The Rabbis taught that when a person touches them, he can become impure. That is the established law. We are not now going to say that if a person has half the required measure of one and half the required measure of the other, they will combine. Even on the rabbinic level, we do not extend the combination that far.
With regard to eating, however, piggul is prohibited by the measure of an olive, and notar is likewise prohibited by the measure of an olive; eating that measure makes a person liable for lashes. In this context, they do combine, because a verse connects them with one another.
It is taught that the verse says, “It shall not be eaten, because it is holy.” The word “holy” is written in connection with notar. The verse teaches a prohibition against eating any sacred food that has become invalid. It does not apply only to notar; it applies to any sacred item, including piggul. Since the verse connects all sacred foods with regard to the prohibition of eating, piggul and notar combine for the prohibition of eating.
That combination is rabbinic with regard to impurity. The Rabbis instituted the impurity, and Rabbi Yitzchak extends the rabbinic enactment in this way.
We now come to food that became impure as a primary source of impurity. It touched a sheretz or an animal carcass, which are primary sources of impurity, and therefore the food became a first-degree source of impurity. Alternatively, we have food that became impure through a secondary source of impurity, so that the food became a second-degree source.
Do these foods combine with one another to impart impurity? In the case of food, we combine them to the measure of an egg, because food becomes capable of imparting impurity at that measure. Thus, first-degree food and second-degree food combine to produce the next level of impurity. Food that is a first-degree source can combine with food that is a second-degree source in order to render other food a third-degree source.
There are several laws for which food combines to reach the measure of an egg. First, if a person eats half the measure of an egg of impure food, his body becomes impure through eating. If he eats another half, the two amounts combine. The full measure is the size of four eggs, and half of that is the size of two eggs. That measure is called the impurity of the body.
The same applies to the food required for a Shabbat boundary. If a person needs a boundary arrangement in order to travel beyond the place where he is otherwise permitted to walk on Shabbat, he places food at that location. The required amount is food sufficient for two meals. Different foods can combine in order to reach the required measure.
Food also combines to reach the measure of an egg for the impurity of food. For food to become capable of imparting impurity, the required measure is the size of an egg, and all foods can combine to reach that measure.
On Shabbat, the measure for a meal is the size of a dried fig. Therefore, all foods can combine to reach that measure. On Yom Kippur, the measure that makes a person liable for eating is the size of a large date, and all foods can combine for that purpose as well.
All liquids combine with one another. The measure for impure liquids that imparts impurity to the body is a quarter of a log. With regard to drinking on Yom Kippur, the measure is a cheekful. All liquids combine to reach the required measure.
Why does a first-degree food source combine with a second-degree food source in order to produce a third-degree source? The reason given is that it is possible for a second-degree source to produce a first-degree source. A second-degree source is connected to a first-degree source in the sense that there is a case in which a second-degree source can produce a first-degree source. Therefore, the two are sufficiently similar to combine.
The challenge is: where do we ever find a second-degree source producing a first-degree source? That is not normally possible. The answer is that the second-degree source originated from a first-degree source. The source of the second-degree impurity is a first-degree impurity, and therefore the two are considered related. The first-degree impurity within the history of the second-degree source brings them close enough to combine.
Rav Ashi says the same idea in different words: a first-degree and a second-degree source, with regard to producing a third-degree source, are considered to be from the same family. The first-degree source and the second-degree source came from the same original impurity. They are therefore treated as members of the same household, so to speak, and can combine.
We now come to the next teaching. Orlah refers to the fruit of a tree during its first three years. It is prohibited to eat and prohibited to derive benefit from. A mixed vineyard refers to wheat or vegetables that grew in a vineyard, where the two were planted or grew in close proximity to one another. Such produce is also prohibited to eat and prohibited to derive benefit from.
The fruit of orlah and the produce of a mixed vineyard combine with one another to reach the measure of eating that makes a person liable for lashes. Rabbi Shimon says that they do not combine.
Rabbi Shimon maintains that any amount of a prohibited substance is sufficient to make a person liable for lashes. If so, there is no need for a combination to reach the measure of an olive. What, then, does the teaching mean when it says that they do not combine? It means that they do not need to combine. One should read it as saying that a combination is not necessary, because according to Rabbi Shimon, even the smallest amount of prohibited food makes a person liable for lashes.
We now turn to different garments. Depending on what a garment is made of, it must have a particular size in order to receive impurity. The required size also depends on the type of impurity under discussion. Some garments require one handbreadth by one handbreadth, others three by three, four by four, five by five, or six by six. We are going to discuss how garments with different required measures combine in order to receive impurity.
The teaching lists a garment, a sack, leather, and a mat. A garment refers to something made of wool or linen. A sack is made of goat hair. Leather is skin, and a mat is made from reeds. Each of these has a different required measure for receiving impurity.
A garment can receive impurity even when it is only a small piece, but its standard measure is three fingerbreadths by three fingerbreadths. A sack requires four handbreadths by four handbreadths. Leather requires five handbreadths by five handbreadths, and a mat requires six handbreadths by six handbreadths. Each one has a different measure.
The teaching then discusses combinations: a garment with a sack, a sack with leather, and leather with a mat. When items have different required measures, they combine according to the larger measure. For example, if one has an item requiring five handbreadths and another requiring six handbreadths, they combine to reach the measure of six handbreadths. The larger measure requires more material, so until the combined material reaches that larger measure, it does not receive impurity.
Rabbi Shimon asks: what is the reason? Earlier, we learned that items whose measures are different do not combine. Here, however, the teaching says that items with different measures do combine.
The answer is that there is one type of impurity for which all of these materials have the same measure: the impurity of sitting. If an impure person, such as a zav or a zavah, sits on an object, the object receives the impurity associated with sitting. For that impurity, all of these materials require the same measure—one handbreadth by one handbreadth.
Since we have found one type of impurity for which they all have an equal measure, they can combine for other types of impurity as well. For example, they can combine with regard to impurity from a corpse or impurity from a sheretz, even though those types of impurity may ordinarily have different measures. The fact that they share an equal measure for the impurity of sitting is sufficient to show that they can combine.
There is another law concerning a piece of one of these materials that is cut in order to lie on it like a mat. What is its measure? The measure for a bed or similar object is three handbreadths by three handbreadths. The measure for sitting is one handbreadth by one handbreadth. What is the measure for holding something?
The measure for holding is the smallest possible measure. Rabbi Yitzchak said in the name of Rabbi Yannai that this refers to the type of small piece used by a weaver. When people used to weave, they would place a small piece of material over a finger so that the needle would not prick them. Thus, the measure for holding is merely enough to cover the finger.
There was also a small piece used when cutting figs. The juice or honey that comes out of the figs would soil the hands, so a person would cut a small piece of cloth and place it over the hands like a glove. It was only large enough to cover the hands and keep them from becoming dirty. That is the meaning of the measure for holding. The commentators explain that it was a small piece used when cutting figs, so that the juice would not get onto the hands.
We now begin the fifth chapter. The teaching begins: a person who benefited from sacred property to the value of a perutah is liable for misuse of sacred property, even if he did not diminish its value. It is not necessary for the value of the sacred property to decrease by a perutah. As long as the benefit he received was worth a perutah, he is liable. This is the opinion of Rabbi Akiva.
The Sages say that with any item that normally depreciates through use, a person is not liable until he has diminished the value of the item. With an item that does not depreciate through use, however, he is liable as soon as he derives benefit worth a perutah.
For example, a person takes a necklace and places it around his neck, puts a ring on his finger, or drinks from a golden goblet. These objects do not depreciate when used in this way. Drinking from a golden cup does not diminish its value, and putting on a ring or a necklace does not diminish its value. Therefore, once the person derives benefit worth a perutah, he is liable.
In contrast, if he wears a garment belonging to sacred property, the garment wears out through use. If he covers himself with a sacred cloak, or uses a sacred axe, each use causes depreciation. In such cases, liability applies only once he has diminished the value by at least a perutah.
The same distinction applies to an animal. While the animal is alive, even if it develops a blemish, it still has a value and can be redeemed. If a person benefits from it, the benefit may reduce the amount for which it can be redeemed. Therefore, liability depends on the depreciation.
Once the animal has died, however, it cannot be redeemed. Since there is no longer any possibility of redeeming it, the depreciation does not affect the sacred property in the same way. Therefore, after the animal dies, liability begins as soon as the person benefits, whether or not the animal’s value has been diminished.
Rabbi Akiva agrees with the Sages regarding an item that depreciates through use. In that case, he agrees that the person is not liable until the item has been diminished. The disagreement concerns an item that does not depreciate through use. Rabbi Akiva says that the person is liable as soon as he derives benefit worth a perutah, whereas the Sages distinguish between different types of items.
The Gemara asks: in what case do they disagree? If they agree that when an item depreciates through use, liability requires depreciation, and if they agree that when an item does not depreciate through use, the benefit itself creates liability, what is the disagreement in the teaching?
The answer concerns a garment. One possibility is an outer garment, such as an overcoat, rather than an undershirt. Another possibility is a middle garment, worn over one garment and under another. There is also a very fine linen garment that is normally worn beneath the outer garment but above the garment worn directly on the body.
Such a fine garment is expensive and delicate. Although it can become worn out easily when it is used, people do not wear it frequently because they do not want to damage it. Therefore, it may take a very long time before the garment actually depreciates by a perutah. The question is whether it is considered an item that depreciates through use, even though the depreciation occurs only after a long time and the garment is not worn often.
The conclusion is that since these garments will eventually depreciate through use, they have the status of an item that depreciates. Therefore, the person is not liable until he has diminished their value by at least a perutah. The fact that the depreciation takes a long time does not change the law.
The teaching then says that every person who benefits from sacred property is included, whether he is an ordinary individual, the king, or the anointed priest. Normally, an ordinary person, a king, and the anointed priest bring different offerings because of their different statuses. With regard to misuse of sacred property, however, the word “person” includes all of them equally.
What does the word “misuse” mean? It means a change in use. The item was designated for sacred purposes, and the person changed its use by treating it as ordinary property. That is misuse.
The same word is used in the verse concerning a woman who has been unfaithful to her husband: “If any man’s wife goes astray and commits treachery against him.” She has changed her relationship from her husband to another man, and that change is described as misuse. The word is also used regarding the Jewish people abandoning God and worshiping foreign gods. They changed their allegiance, and that too is described as misuse.
Can a person be liable for misuse if he diminished the value of sacred property but did not benefit from it? Or can he be liable if he benefited from it without diminishing its value? What about a person who benefits from sacred property while it is still attached to the ground?
For example, suppose a person sends an agent to commit misuse with sacred property. The agent carries out the action. Is the agent liable, as is normally the case when a person sends an agent to perform a prohibited act, or does the liability remain with the sender?
Ordinarily, if a person sends an agent to perform a transgression, the transgression is attributed to the sender, not to the agent. The agent can say, “I merely followed your instructions.” The rule is that the responsibility falls upon the person who sent him. We must determine whether misuse of sacred property follows the same model.
The teaching uses a comparison between misuse and the prohibition of eating sacred produce. The same expression of sin appears in connection with both. Just as the prohibition involving sacred produce applies only when a person both diminishes its value and benefits from it, so misuse requires both diminution and benefit.
Normally, diminishing the value of sacred produce involves eating it. The person who eats it is the one who benefits from it, and the diminution and benefit occur at the same time. The benefit must come from an item that is capable of being diminished by that benefit, and the person who caused the diminution must be the person who received the benefit.
Therefore, if one person causes the diminution and another person receives the benefit, the liability does not fall in the ordinary manner. Both elements must be present in the same person: he must diminish the sacred property and benefit from that diminution.
For example, one person takes a sacred axe and cuts down his friend’s tree. The axe is damaged through the cutting, so the sacred property has been diminished. But the person who cut down the tree does not own it, so he did not receive the benefit of the tree. The owner of the tree received the benefit because his tree was cut down, but he did not diminish the value of the sacred axe. Since the diminution and the benefit occurred to different people, neither one is liable for misuse in this manner.
The diminution and the benefit must also occur at the same time. Suppose a person uses a sacred axe to cut down his own tree. He benefits from the cutting, and the benefit is worth a perutah, but the axe is not damaged at that time. Later, he damages the axe. The benefit and the depreciation occurred at separate times, so he is not liable for misuse.
The same principle applies to the requirement that the sacred property be detached from the ground. Sacred property that is still attached to the ground is an exception to the ordinary rule. In the case of an agent sent to misuse sacred property, however, the sender is liable. The rule that a person’s agent acts on his behalf applies here as well, just as it does with regard to separating sacred produce.
We now learn that the initial comparison teaches only the case of food, because the example involves eating and benefiting from food. How do we know that a person is also liable when he benefits from an item that does not normally depreciate through use? The verses seem to teach liability when benefit causes diminution, but what about an item where the benefit does not diminish the value?
Furthermore, how do we know that two people can combine their benefits? Suppose one person eats half the required amount and gives the other half to his friend, who eats it. How do we know that the two acts of eating combine to create liability, even though neither person ate the entire amount?
How do we know that one person’s benefit and his friend’s benefit can combine? How do we know that two separate acts of eating can combine when one occurred in the morning and the other later? These questions concern whether separate benefits can be joined for purposes of misuse of sacred property.
The answer considers the possibility of a person benefiting from sacred property today and another person benefiting from it much later. Perhaps even a significant delay would not prevent the benefits from combining. The same principle might apply whether the two acts were performed by the same person or by two different people.
There is also a question concerning sacred property used for another sacred purpose. For example, birds are brought as offerings by a zav or a woman who has given birth. A person takes money from sacred funds and uses it to purchase those offerings. The money is sacred, and the offerings are also sacred. How do we know that misuse applies when sacred property is used to acquire other sacred property?
This case differs from sacred produce. When sacred produce is taken, its sanctity is removed because it is being used for an ordinary purpose. Here, however, sacred money is used for another sacred purpose. We must determine at what point the misuse takes effect.
One possibility is that it takes effect when the person purchases the offerings. Another possibility is that it takes effect only after the entire process has been completed—after the offerings have been brought and their blood has been sprinkled. Merely purchasing the offering may not yet complete the process.
There is a disagreement regarding the point at which the misuse occurs. According to one view, the act of purchasing the offering with sacred funds is sufficient. According to another view, liability does not take effect until the offering has gone through the required process, including the sprinkling of its blood.
Everyone agrees that sacred property used for another sacred purpose can create liability for misuse. The question is when that liability begins. The teaching now returns to the statements of the earlier authorities and explains each part of the discussion in order.