The Gemara in Beitzah, page 37, is dedicated to the success of Shmuel ben Yehudit and his family. We begin on page 37, first side, at the top line: "One may not perform Chalitzah or Yibbum."
The Mishnah teaches that performing Chalitzah (the ceremony of releasing a childless widow from levirate marriage) or Yibbum (levirate marriage itself) is forbidden on Shabbat and on a Festival. The Mishnah classifies these acts as "reshut," meaning voluntary, not in the category of a mitzvah. This categorization seems counterintuitive, as both Chalitzah and Yibbum are indeed mitzvot. The Gemara therefore asks why the Mishnah labels them as voluntary rather than as a mitzvah.
The Gemara answers that the Mishnah refers to a specific scenario: when there is an older brother. In such a case, the primary obligation to perform Yibbum rests upon the oldest brother. Since the younger brothers are not primarily obligated, their performance of Yibbum is considered "reshut," a secondary, voluntary act, not the core mitzvah.
The Gemara then asks for the reason behind forbidding these "reshut" acts on Shabbat and a Festival. The answer is a rabbinic decree (gezeirah) that one might come to write a document. For instance, just as it was stated previously that courts are not allowed to convene on these days due to the concern that they might write a legal judgment (P'sak Din), similarly, one is not allowed to betroth a woman (kiddushin) on these days, lest they come to write a betrothal document (shtar). In the case of Chalitzah, there is a concern that one might write a document (shtar) as proof that the Chalitzah was performed, permitting the woman to marry. For Yibbum, the concern is that one might write a marriage contract (Ketubah). Thus, all these activities are subject to a gezeirah lest one come to write.
The Mishnah continues, stating that certain "mitzvah" items are also forbidden on Shabbat and a Festival. These refer to various forms of consecrating items to the Temple (Beit HaMikdash). The reason these are forbidden is that they resemble a transaction, transferring money or objects from oneself to the sacred domain (Kodesh). This looks like business, and therefore it was forbidden.
It was also stated that one is not allowed to separate priestly gifts (terumah) or tithes (ma'aser). The Gemara clarifies that this prohibition is well-known. The novelty of the Mishnah, however, is that even if one's intention is to give the separated portion to the Kohen (priest) on that very day, it is still forbidden. One might have thought this would be permissible, as it doesn't appear to be for one's own benefit (tikkun) but rather for the Kohen's benefit, enabling the Kohen to enjoy the produce on the Festival. Rashi explains that even if one has no intention to eat the fruits oneself, and only wishes to give the tithe so the Kohen can benefit, it is still forbidden. This teaches that even in a case where it doesn't necessarily look like a tikkun (rectification for one's own produce), it remains forbidden.
This prohibition applies only to things that could have been done the day before. However, for something that became obligatory on the day itself, such as separating challah from freshly baked dough (since baking is permitted on a Festival), the rule changes. In such a case, one cannot be told they should have taken challah yesterday, as there was no dough then. Therefore, if the obligation arises today, one is permitted not only to separate the challah but also to give it to the Kohen.
The Gemara then discusses the Mishnah's categorization of forbidden activities. It mentioned "Shavut" (rabbinically forbidden acts), "Reshut" (voluntary acts, sometimes quasi-mitzvah), and "Mitzvah" (actual mitzvot). The Gemara questions why the Mishnah calls certain items "Reshut" when they are forbidden on Shabbat and a Festival, which makes them "Shavut" (rabbinically forbidden). Similarly, even "Mitzvah" items are also "Shavut" if they are forbidden. Why then distinguish between them?
Rabbi Yitzchak responds that the Mishnah employs a literary device called "lo mebaya ka'amar" (it is not necessary to state). The Mishnah is building a logical progression: it is not necessary to state that a regular rabbinically forbidden item (Shavut) is forbidden. But even a "Reshut" item, which is a quasi-mitzvah, is subject to the rabbinic prohibition of Shavut. And not only that, but even a full "Mitzvah" item is also subject to Shavut. The common denominator is that they are all forbidden. All these things are forbidden even on a Festival, and a fortiori on Shabbat.
The Mishnah states that the only difference between Shabbat and a Festival is the preparation of food (ochel nefesh). The Gemara asks if this is true, presenting a contradiction from another Mishnah (on page 12) which states that one may lower produce through a skylight on a Festival due to potential loss (hefsed) from rain, but not on Shabbat. This shows that there are other differences besides food preparation.
The Gemara resolves this by explaining that our Mishnah, which implies that rabbinic prohibitions apply even where there is a monetary loss, follows the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, who is stringent and does not waive rabbinic prohibitions (tircha) on a Festival even in the face of monetary loss. Therefore, our Mishnah would forbid lowering fruits on a Festival. The Mishnah on page 12, which allows lowering fruits due to monetary loss, follows the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua.
The Gemara then brings a Braitah to illustrate the dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua. The Torah forbids slaughtering an animal and its offspring on the same day (Oto Ve'et Beno). If a mother and child animal fall into a pit on a Festival, one cannot slaughter both. Taking both out would involve unnecessary effort (tircha) for the animal that cannot be slaughtered. Rabbi Eliezer rules that one may only take out one animal to slaughter it, and the other must be left in the pit and fed there. He does not permit taking both out, even to prevent a loss. Rabbi Yehoshua, however, permits a stratagem: one takes out the first animal with the intention to slaughter it, then changes one's mind, and then takes out the second animal with the intention to slaughter it. This way, both are taken out, and one can choose which to slaughter, thereby avoiding monetary loss. This demonstrates that Rabbi Yehoshua is lenient regarding effort on a Festival when there is a monetary loss, while Rabbi Eliezer is stringent.
The Gemara asks who says that this dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua regarding "Oto Ve'et Beno" is the same as their dispute regarding lowering fruits through a skylight. Perhaps Rabbi Eliezer was stringent only in the animal case because there was an option to feed the second animal in the pit, thus avoiding loss. But regarding fruits, where there is no such option and rain would destroy them, perhaps even Rabbi Eliezer would be lenient. Conversely, perhaps Rabbi Yehoshua was lenient only in the animal case because a stratagem (ha'aramah) was possible. But in the case of fruits, where no such trick is available, perhaps Rabbi Yehoshua would be stringent.
Rav Papa resolves the contradiction by stating that there is no question. The Mishnah that forbids lowering fruits follows the opinion of Beit Shammai, and the Mishnah that permits it follows the opinion of Beit Hillel. We find their dispute in a Mishnah on page 12. Beit Shammai says one may not carry a child, a lulav, or a Torah scroll into the public domain on a Festival. Beit Shammai was stringent regarding carrying in the public domain, only permitting it for food preparation (ochel nefesh). Carrying these items is not for food. Beit Hillel, however, permits it, holding that since carrying for food preparation is permitted, carrying for non-food purposes is also permitted (Mitoch Shehutra Hotza'ah). The Gemara explains that if one follows Beit Shammai, who considers carrying in the public domain forbidden by Torah law on a Festival, then there is a concern that handling items (moving them within a private domain) might lead to carrying them into the public domain. Thus, if Beit Shammai is strict on carrying, they would also be strict on handling items that are muktzah (forbidden to move) on a Festival, such as fruits on a roof, because the rabbinic prohibition of muktzah is linked to the concern of carrying. Conversely, Beit Hillel, who is lenient regarding carrying, would also be lenient regarding moving muktzah items.
The Gemara then questions this connection: who says that Beit Shammai, who is strict on carrying, is also strict on muktzah, which is only a rabbinic prohibition? The Gemara answers that the entire reason for the rabbinic decree of muktzah is the concern that one might come to carry the item. Therefore, if Beit Shammai holds that carrying is forbidden by Torah law on a Festival, it logically follows that they would also forbid moving muktzah items, as the two prohibitions are intrinsically linked. Rashi clarifies that certain items, like vessels for eating, are permitted to be moved because otherwise, one could not enjoy the Festival. But the general decree of muktzah is based on the concern of carrying. Hence, if one is stringent about carrying, one will be stringent about muktzah.
Therefore, the Mishnah that forbids throwing muktzah fruits from the roof through the skylight follows Beit Shammai's opinion, as Beit Shammai is stringent about carrying (a Torah prohibition) and thus also about the effort involved in moving muktzah items (a rabbinic prohibition). The Mishnah that is lenient regarding carrying would also be lenient regarding moving these items.
We now turn to the next Mishnah, which discusses the laws of eruvin, specifically regarding the Sabbath boundary (techum Shabbat). A person is restricted in how far they may walk on Shabbat and a Festival (2,000 cubits from the city boundary). This restriction also applies to their animals and vessels. The precise boundary depends on where the person or their possessions were at the onset of Shabbat or the Festival. For example, two cities 3,000 cubits apart: a person from each city can establish an eruv techumin at the edge of their respective city, allowing them to travel 2,000 cubits beyond. This would create a shared area of 1,000 cubits in the middle where both are permitted to travel.
The Mishnah states: "Animals and vessels take on the status of their owners." This means that wherever the owner is permitted to travel, e.g., within 2,000 cubits of their city, their animals and items can also travel. If the owner did not establish an Eruv Techumin, the default is 2,000 cubits from the city. If an Eruv Techumin was made, the items can be moved 2,000 cubits from the location of the eruv. Rashi explains that without an Eruv Techumin, one gets 2,000 cubits in all directions from the city. If an Eruv Techumin is placed 1,000 cubits outside the city, one can travel 2,000 cubits from that point. If an Eruv Techumin is placed to the north, for instance, 2,000 cubits outside the city, the owner gains 4,000 cubits to the north but cannot travel at all to the south. The animals and vessels follow the owner's eruv.
The second law in the Mishnah states that if one gives their animals to their son or a shepherd on a Festival, the animals do not acquire the boundary of the son or shepherd. Instead, they retain the boundary of the owner, because at the onset of the Festival, they were still in the owner's possession. Therefore, they can only be transported within the owner's boundary.
The Mishnah continues: "Unique tools for one of the brothers in the house are like his feet; those not unique are like the shared area." This refers to brothers who have inherited their father's possessions but have not yet divided them, living together and using the vessels jointly. If a particular vessel is consistently used by one brother, it follows his boundary (raglayim), and can only be moved within his permissible range. However, if the vessels are not designated to any one brother, they can only be moved within the common area where all brothers are permitted to travel. Rashi illustrates this with Reuven and Shimon, brothers. If Reuven establishes his Eruv Techumin 2,000 cubits to the north, he gains 4,000 cubits to the north but cannot move even one step to the south. If a shared vessel is involved, it is restricted. Even Reuven, who made the eruv, can only go 2,000 cubits to the north because the other brothers did not make an eruv, thus limiting the shared vessel. Conversely, Reuven's eruv to the north prevents the shared vessel from being moved even one step to the south by the other brothers.
The Mishnah then discusses borrowing: "One who borrows a vessel from a friend on the eve of a Festival, it follows the borrower." Since the vessel was borrowed before the Festival and was in the borrower's possession, it follows the borrower's boundary. However, if one borrows it on the Festival itself, it follows the lender's boundary, as it entered the Festival in the lender's possession.
The last case in the Mishnah: "A woman who borrowed spices (tavlinim), water, or salt from a friend on a Festival (for cooking or dough), it follows the boundary of both of them." This means the items can only be moved within the common area where both the borrower and lender are permitted to go. The reason is that at the onset of the Festival, these ingredients were in the lender's possession. However, since they are mixed into the borrower's dough or food, which was in the borrower's possession, a combination of ownership exists. Thus, the common area is the only permissible range. Rabbi Yehudah, however, exempts water, stating that "water has no substance (ein bo mamash)." He argues that water, once mixed into dough, is negligible and does not limit the borrower's boundary. It is absorbed and loses its distinct identity, so the entire mixture is considered to belong to the borrower. Rashi clarifies that this applies to water absorbed into dough or a thick porridge, not to soup or coffee where the water retains its form. Similarly, if salt crystals are thick and visible, they would still limit the movement, but if absorbed, they would not.
The Gemara asks: "Is our Mishnah not in accordance with Rabbi Dosa?" A Braitah states that Rabbi Dosa says: "If one buys an animal from a friend on the eve of a Festival, even if the seller did not hand it over, it follows the buyer." The sale is considered final, and the animal follows the buyer's boundary. Similarly, if the seller gave the animal to a shepherd who watches it for the buyer, it follows the shepherd's boundary. This contradicts our Mishnah, which states that if an animal is given to a shepherd on a Festival, it follows the owner's boundary, not the shepherd's. The Gemara resolves this by saying there is no contradiction. Rabbi Dosa's ruling applies when there is only one shepherd in the city, so it is known beforehand that the animal would go to him. In such a case, the animal follows the shepherd's boundary. Our Mishnah, however, refers to a situation with two or more shepherds, where it is not known to which shepherd the animal would be given. Therefore, it follows the owner's boundary.
The Gemara then states that our Mishnah is precise in this interpretation, as it says: "If he gave it to his son or to a shepherd." The Mishnah presents two options, implying uncertainty as to who would receive the animal. This indicates that we are dealing with a scenario where there could be multiple "shepherds" (his son acting as one, or an official shepherd). Since there's doubt, it follows the owner's boundary. If there were only one shepherd, it would follow the shepherd's boundary, as the intention would be clear. The Gemara then reiterates the question: what if there is only one shepherd? Our Mishnah says it follows the owner. The Gemara answers again that our Mishnah refers to a case with two shepherds, and since there is no clear pre-Festival commitment, it follows the owner's boundary.
A Braitah states: "Two individuals who borrowed a shirt jointly on the eve of a Festival, one intending to wear it for morning prayers at the study house (Beit HaMidrash) and the other for evening prayers at a party. If the study house is to the north and the party to the south, and one established an Eruv Techumin to the north and the other to the south, the shirt is limited by the common area." This means the shirt can only be moved within the area where both partners are permitted to go. For example, if one partner's eruv allows him to go 1,000 cubits north and the other's allows him 1,000 cubits south, the shirt can only be moved within that 1,000-cubit range in both directions from the city. Neither partner can reach their intended destination with the shirt because their respective eruvin restrict each other. The Braitah adds: "And if they placed the eruv 2,000 cubits away," meaning fully committing their boundary to one direction, then they cannot move the shirt at all, not one cubit north or south, because each partner's eruv entirely restricts the other's movement in the opposite direction.
The Gemara then discusses a case: "It was stated: Two partners who bought a barrel of wine and an animal on the eve of a Festival." They intend to slaughter the animal on the Festival and enjoy meat and wine. One opinion (Rav) says that the barrel of wine is permissible for each partner to move their share according to their own boundary. However, the animal cannot be divided, and thus can only be moved within the shared boundary. Another opinion (Shmuel) says that even the barrel of wine, being jointly owned, can only be moved within the common area.
Rashi explains the first opinion: each partner's share of the wine is subject to their own eruv. Shmuel, however, questions this: when the wine is divided on the Festival, who says that the part one receives was already designated as "their part" from the eve of the Festival? If one does not hold of "Bererah" (retroactive selection), then it's possible one might end up with the friend's share, which is not covered by one's own eruv. Therefore, Shmuel says the wine cannot be divided and moved beyond the shared area.
The Gemara asks: If Rav holds of Bererah, meaning that the part of the wine one receives on the Festival is retroactively considered their designated part from the eve of the Festival, why does he distinguish between wine and an animal? If Bererah applies, then the same should apply to the animal: whatever portion of the animal one receives should retroactively be considered their part from before the Festival, and thus covered by their eruv. Conversely, if Rav does not hold of Bererah for the animal, why does he hold it for wine?
The Gemara answers that Rav does hold of Bererah, allowing the division of wine on a Festival, with each partner taking their share according to their eruv. The distinction for the animal is due to a concept called "Yenikat Eivarim" (the limbs nourish each other). While an animal is alive, all its parts mutually benefit each other. Therefore, until slaughter (shechita), the animal cannot be considered as distinct, separate parts belonging to different owners. Unlike wine, where one's portion does not affect the other's, the living animal's limbs are intrinsically connected and jointly owned. Thus, going into the Festival, the animal is a mixed, undivided entity, and one cannot retroactively claim a specific part as "theirs" from before the Festival. Therefore, the animal is limited to the shared boundary.
The Gemara then asks Rav: "If you are concerned about 'Yenikat Eivarim' for the laws of boundaries (techumim), why are you not concerned about it for the laws of muktzah?" If the animal's limbs are intertwined, then each partner's portion should be muktzah to the other, as it is not their designated part. Since the animal is not considered muktzah in its entirety, why should it be restricted by techumim due to "Yenikat Eivarim"? Rav remained silent. Rashi explains that if one part of the animal is muktzah to me (because it belongs to my partner), and all parts are intertwined, then the entire animal should be muktzah. But it is not. So if one is concerned about "Yenikat Eivarim" for techumim, one should also be concerned for muktzah. Some explain Rav's silence as agreement with the question, meaning he conceded that if Bererah applies, it should apply to the animal for both muktzah and techumim. Others suggest his silence meant the answer was obvious, or that he was weak. It is possible that muktzah is a rabbinic prohibition, while some aspects of techumim might be from Torah law, leading to greater stringency for techumim.
Rabbi Yochanan says: "There is no Bererah." Rashi clarifies that if one holds of Bererah, everything is permissible. If not, then both the wine and the animal are restricted to the shared area. The Gemara then asks: "Does Rav Oshaya indeed hold of Bererah?" A Mishnah in Oholot discusses a house containing a corpse (met) with many doors, where it is not yet decided through which door the corpse will be removed. All vessels (kelim) under the thresholds of all doors become ritually impure (tamei), because the door through which the corpse will eventually exit renders everything under it impure. Since the exit is not yet determined, all doors are potentially the exit. However, if one door is opened after the death, that door and its threshold become impure, and the others remain pure. If the person removing the corpse decides to use a specific door or a window of a certain size (4x4 cubits), even if not yet opened, this decision is sufficient to save the other doors from impurity. The Mishnah states this decision must be made before the death of the corpse. If the decision is made after the death, it is too late, and all doors are impure. However, Beit Hillel says that even if the decision is made after the death, it saves the other doors. Rav Oshaya explains Beit Hillel to mean that this decision saves only the vessels placed under the doors from that point forward, but not those already there when the person died. This implies that Rav Oshaya does not hold of Bererah, because if he did, the decision made later should retroactively designate that door as the intended exit from the moment of death, thus saving all vessels. The Gemara therefore concludes: "Switch it around: Rav Oshaya says there is no Bererah, and Rabbi Yochanan says there is Bererah."
The Gemara then questions Rabbi Yochanan's position (that there is Bererah) from the case of brothers dividing an inheritance (Yerushah). When brothers divide an inheritance, it is considered as if each one "bought" their share from the other. This is because at the time of death, it is not known which specific part of the inheritance was destined for each son. Therefore, the division is treated like a sale. If it's a sale, then in the Jubilee year (Yovel), real estate must return to its original owner. If Rabbi Yochanan held of Bererah, we would say that the part each brother received was retroactively his from the time of the father's death, making him the original owner, and thus it would not return in Yovel. But since the fields do return in Yovel, it implies there is no Bererah, and the division is treated as a purchase. This contradicts Rabbi Yochanan's stance that there is Bererah. The Gemara answers that Rabbi Yochanan holds that there is no Bererah for Torah laws (De'oraita), such as the return of fields in Yovel. However, for rabbinic laws (De'Rabbanan), such as the laws of techumim regarding partners and their wine or animal, he would hold of Bererah. This allows for a reconciliation: Rabbi Yochanan can maintain that when partners divide the wine and animal, there is Bererah because techumim is a rabbinic prohibition, and therefore they can take their share wherever their personal boundary permits. This concludes the discussion for today.