The Eddie B. Sit edition and audio series of the Talmud Bavli Masechet Chulin has been dedicated by our good friend Mr. Joey Jamal and his wife in honor of their son Jack's engagement to Shirley Sutton. With the help of God, may they marry at an auspicious and successful time. Through the merit of the study that we will engage in over the next several months in Masechet Chulin, may they experience much joy, peace in the home, prosperity, and all blessings. Amen. Today, we study Daf Yud Bet, which is dedicated for the elevation of the soul of Avraham ben Ester and Rabbi Moshe ben Nuna. May the soul of the Holy One rest upon them in the Garden of Eden. Amen. This Daf Yud Bet is also studied for the complete recovery of Sarah bat Chavah. Please God, heal her, both in spirit and body, and heal all the sick among the people of Israel. And let us say Amen. This Daf Yud Bet is also studied for the success of Yaakov ben Yosef.
We begin today's Daf on Yud Bet Amud Rishon, and we are four lines down. Rav Nachman said in the name of Rav: If one saw a person slaughtering an animal, if he saw him from beginning to end, it is permissible to eat from his slaughtering. If not, it is prohibited to eat from his slaughtering. The Gemara asks about the situation: Does the person know what he is doing or not? The Gemara states, “Heichi dami?” If you know that he is knowledgeable in the laws of slaughtering, why do you need to watch him? We rely on the fact that he knows what he is doing. But if you know that he does not know anything about the laws, it is obvious that you need to watch him. Rather, we are dealing with a case where you do not know if he is knowledgeable or not. The Gemara suggests: “Let us say that the majority of those who are found slaughtering are experts.” This is a general rule we have: the majority of people who find themselves doing slaughtering are assumed to be competent. Otherwise, why would they be slaughtering? Therefore, we do not understand this case. If the person knows what he is doing, why do you need to watch him? If he does not know what he is doing, of course, you need to watch him. If you do not know, then you can rely on the majority.
The Gemara continues: “Did we not learn: If you found a slaughtered chicken in the market, or if he told his agent to go and slaughter for him, and he found it slaughtered, you assume it is slaughtered correctly.” This is based on the principle that the majority of people who are found slaughtering are experts. Therefore, we say that if you have a doubt about the status of the person, you should be able to eat from it because you go after the majority.
The Gemara clarifies that the case Rav Nachman is speaking about is where you know that he does not know the laws. The Gemara states: “Of course you need to watch him.” For example, if you saw that he slaughtered one sign correctly, you might think that since he did the first sign well, he will finish it correctly. The Gemara teaches us that this is not the case; he may have gotten lucky. You must watch him from beginning to end. Even if he did well on the first sign, you cannot assume he knows what he is doing. Rashi explains that the conclusion is that if you do not know who the slaughterer is, you cannot eat the meat unless you check him. Why? Because the majority of those who are found slaughtering are competent and expert.
Now there is a question among the Rishonim regarding when we say that the majority of those who are found slaughtering are experts. Some say this applies only when the slaughterer is not in front of us. If the slaughterer has gone home and you have the piece of meat, you can rely on the majority. However, if the slaughterer is in front of you and you do not know if he is knowledgeable, you cannot eat unless you check him. This is a significant distinction. Even though we generally rely on the majority, there is a minority that is not knowledgeable. Since the animal started with a status of prohibition, you want to take it out of that status based on the majority, but there is a significant minority to consider. Therefore, if the person is in front of you, do not just assume he is competent; you must ask him and test him.
The Gemara presents a further question. Rav Dimi bar Yosef asked Rav Nachman: What if a person tells his agent to go slaughter for him, and he finds it slaughtered? The answer is that you can assume it is slaughtered correctly. However, if he tells his agent to go take terumah or maaser, and he finds that it has been done correctly, what is the ruling? Why should it be any different from slaughtering? The Gemara responds that you cannot assume it has been done correctly. The reason is that you cannot assume that an agent executes his mission, and if he does not, someone else may have done it without permission, which is problematic.
The Gemara continues to explore this distinction. If you say that an agent does not execute his mission, then you cannot assume that the slaughtering was done correctly either. The Gemara concludes that there is a technical problem with terumah: if the agent did not do it, someone else must have done it, and that person does not have the right to take terumah without the owner's consent. This is not the case with slaughtering, where we can assume that someone competent did it.
The Gemara then brings a proof from a case where a person lost his goats and chickens and found them slaughtered. Rabbi Yehuda prohibits their consumption, while Rabbi Chanina ben Rabbi Yosi HaGlili permits it. Rabbi states that Rabbi Yehuda is correct when the meat is found in the garbage dump, as that suggests it might be a neveilah. Rabbi Chanina, however, permits it when found in the house, where it is normal to keep meat. The Gemara concludes that their argument centers on the assumption that the majority of those who are found slaughtering are experts.
The Gemara resolves that there is no actual disagreement; everyone agrees that the majority of those who are found slaughtering are experts. The disagreement arises when the meat is found in the garbage of the house versus the public garbage dump. Rabbi Yehuda assumes that people will throw a neveilah in their house garbage, while Rabbi Chanina does not. Therefore, the majority rule applies only in certain contexts.
The Gemara then returns to the Mishnah, which states that a deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor cannot slaughter, as they might mess up. The language of the Mishnah indicates a future possibility of messing up, rather than stating that they already messed up. The Gemara concludes that this implies you cannot give them animals to slaughter even under supervision, because they might ruin it. The Gemara continues to clarify this point and discusses the implications of supervision.
The final discussion revolves around the necessity of intention in slaughtering. The Gemara concludes that even if the slaughter was performed without intention, it remains valid, as demonstrated by the case of someone who threw a knife that accidentally slaughtered an animal. The conclusion is that intention is not a requisite for valid slaughter. The halacha follows Rabbi Natan, who teaches that even without intention, the slaughter remains kosher.
In summary, the discussions in this Daf illustrate the intricate balance between the assumptions we can make regarding competence in slaughtering and the need for vigilance in ensuring that the laws of kashrut are upheld. The distinctions made throughout the text highlight the importance of understanding the context and the conditions under which certain halachic rulings apply. As we engage in this study, may we deepen our understanding and appreciation for the complexities of these laws.