We are commencing our study of the tractate Hulin, on page 89b, starting from the words "V'ad etnan koy." The discussion revolves around the koy, an animal described by the Gemara as a safek behemah, safek hayyah—an animal of uncertain status, potentially a domesticated animal or a wild animal. The Gemara states that one may not slaughter a koy on a festival day, Yom Tov. This is because if it were a wild animal, a hayyah, one would be obligated to perform the ritual covering of the blood, kisui hadam. If it were a domesticated animal, a behemah, there would be no such obligation. Since its status is uncertain, the obligation of kisui hadam is also uncertain. The act of kisui hadam, when its obligation is doubtful, does not override the sanctity of Yom Tov. Therefore, one cannot slaughter it on Yom Tov due to the potential need for kisui hadam.
Furthermore, the Gemara adds, "if you slaughtered it, you don't cover its blood." This is because if the koy is, in fact, a domesticated animal, a behemah, there is no requirement for kisui hadam. Covering the blood in such a case would constitute an unnecessary act on Yom Tov, thereby desecrating the day. So, the instruction is: do not slaughter it, but if you do, do not cover the blood, to avoid a doubtful transgression. The Gemara then seeks to clarify the specific scenario of the koy being discussed.
There are two possibilities for the parentage of a koy: either the mother is a wild animal (hayyah) or the father is. If the mother is a hayyah, specifically a deer (tzviya), and the father is a domesticated animal (a goat, tayish), then according to all opinions, one should be permitted to slaughter it on Yom Tov and perform kisui hadam. Why? Because a deer, a tzviya, is definitively a hayyah, and therefore requires kisui hadam. All agree that the offspring inherits genetic material from the mother. The dispute lies in the offspring's relationship to the father. According to the view that disregards the father's contribution, the offspring is entirely a hayyah, like its mother, and thus requires kisui hadam. Even according to the view that considers the father's contribution, the offspring would still be considered partially a tzvi. The Torah's command for kisui hadam, when it mentions tzvi, does not necessarily mean a full tzvi; even a partial tzvi would obligate kisui hadam. Therefore, this scenario cannot be the subject of the dispute, as everyone would agree that kisui hadam is required.
Instead, the case must be the opposite: the father is a tzvi (wild animal), and the mother is a tiyasha (domesticated animal). In this scenario, the Rabbanan (Sages) would rule that one should slaughter it and cover the blood. If one is concerned about the father's contribution, and the father is a tzvi, then the offspring is at least partially a tzvi. If "partial tzvi" obligates kisui hadam, then it should be permitted. However, if the father's contribution is disregarded, then the offspring is entirely a behemah, like its mother, and no kisui hadam is required. The Gemara concludes that the case is indeed one where the father is a tzvi and the mother is a tiyasha, and the Rabbanan are uncertain whether to consider the father's genetic contribution (zera ha'av). If they are concerned about zera ha'av, then the animal would be obligated in kisui hadam. If not, it would be a pure behemah, with no such obligation. This uncertainty is why the Mishnah prohibits slaughtering it on Yom Tov, because of the potential for kisui hadam, which is not permitted on Yom Tov when the obligation is doubtful.
The Gemara further clarifies that the Sages' uncertainty regarding zera ha'av applies only to the male parent's contribution to the offspring. For the female parent's contribution, everyone agrees it applies. The Hachamim (Sages) maintain that there is a doubt regarding the male's contribution, specifically as it relates to the prohibition of "an animal and its offspring" (Oto Ve'et Beno). If one considers the father's lineage, it would be subject to Oto Ve'et Beno. Since there is a doubt (safek), one must adopt the stricter ruling. Therefore, regarding Oto Ve'et Beno, one must be stringent, and regarding kisui hadam on Yom Tov, one must not slaughter the animal, as kisui hadam from doubt does not override Yom Tov.
If there were no doubt about considering the father's lineage, meaning it was definitively disregarded, then the offspring of a tiyasha mother would be a pure behemah, and slaughtering it on Yom Tov would be permitted, with no kisui hadam required. The Mishnah, however, states that one cannot slaughter it on Yom Tov, indicating a doubt. This must align with the Hachamim, who are uncertain about considering the father's lineage. This is in contrast to Rabbi Eliezer, who holds that for a koy, the prohibition of Oto Ve'et Beno does not apply, implying he definitively disregards the father's lineage. Thus, according to Rabbi Eliezer, one could slaughter the koy and its offspring on the same day, as there is no concern regarding the male parent's contribution. The prohibition of Oto Ve'et Beno applies only to a behemah. If the father is a hayyah and his lineage is disregarded, the offspring is a behemah like its mother, and Oto Ve'et Beno would apply. If the father's lineage is considered, it would be a safek.
The discussion shifts to the "gifts to the priest" (matanot kehuna). When an animal is slaughtered, certain parts must be given to the priest (kohen). This law applies only to domesticated animals, behemot, not to wild animals, hayot. The Mishnah states that matanot kehuna must be given for a koy, and also for a kilayim (a crossbreed of a goat and a sheep). However, Rabbi Eliezer states that for a koy, one is exempt from matanot kehuna. What is the basis of this disagreement? If the mother is a tzviya (wild animal) and the father is a tayish (domesticated animal), Rabbi Eliezer would exempt from matanot kehuna. He holds that the requirement for matanot kehuna applies only to a full-fledged "sheep" (seh), not even a partial seh. Since the mother is a hayyah, and he disregards the father's contribution, the offspring is considered a hayyah and thus exempt. Even if the offspring has some contribution from the father (a seh), Rabbi Eliezer holds that "partial seh" is not sufficient to obligate matanot kehuna. The Rabbanan, however, would hold that even a partial seh obligates matanot kehuna, and since the father is a seh, they would require the gifts. However, this is problematic because if the mother is a hayyah, then at least half of the animal is exempt from matanot kehuna. The Rabbanan would then only be able to demand half the gifts, and even that would be subject to the legal principle of "he who seeks to extract money from his fellow must bring proof." So, this scenario cannot be the basis of the dispute.
The case must be the opposite: the mother is a tiyasha (domesticated animal) and the father is a tzvi (wild animal). In this case, the mother is a behemah, which is obligated in matanot kehuna. Therefore, at least half of the animal is definitely obligated. The Rabbanan would say that since the mother is a behemah, the offspring is obligated in matanot kehuna, and they might also be concerned about the father's contribution. So, when the Rabbanan say "obligated," they mean at least half. But why would Rabbi Eliezer say "exempt" if the mother is a behemah? According to Rabbi Eliezer, if the mother is a behemah, the offspring should be a behemah and fully obligated. This reverses the question. The Gemara clarifies that both Rabbi Eliezer and the Hachamim are uncertain about considering the father's lineage. The dispute lies in whether the Torah's requirement for matanot kehuna, which specifies "sheep" (seh), means a full seh or even a partial seh. The Rabbanan say "even a partial seh" (afilu miksat seh), while Rabbi Eliezer says "only a full seh."
Therefore, in the case where the mother is a tiyasha (domesticated animal) and the father is a tzvi (wild animal), everyone agrees there is a doubt about the father's lineage. The Rabbanan hold that "even a partial seh" is obligated, so since the mother is a behemah and there's a doubt about the father's tzvi lineage, they would obligate matanot kehuna for the entire animal, as both a pure behemah and a partial behemah would be obligated. Rabbi Eliezer, however, holds that "partial seh" is exempt. Since the father is a tzvi, and there's a doubt about his lineage, the animal's status becomes "partial behemah." As Rabbi Eliezer exempts "partial seh," he would rule that no matanot kehuna are given. This is because the owner of the animal can claim that perhaps the father's lineage is considered, making it a partial behemah, and thus exempt according to Rabbi Eliezer's view. The Kohen, who seeks to extract the gifts, would have to prove otherwise, which he cannot.
The Gemara then summarizes the entire discussion: everyone agrees that the offspring is definitively related to the mother, and there is a doubt about its relation to the father. The core dispute in all these cases (kisui hadam on Yom Tov, matanot kehuna, and Oto Ve'et Beno) centers on whether "even a partial" animal of a certain type is subject to the relevant halachic rule. Let's revisit the Yom Tov and kisui hadam case: the mother is a tiyasha (domesticated animal), and the father is a tzvi (wild animal). Both opinions agree there's a doubt about considering the father's lineage. A behemah is exempt from kisui hadam, but if the father's lineage is considered, it becomes a hayyah, which requires kisui hadam. The Rabbanan hold that "even a partial tzvi" (miksat tzvi) is obligated in kisui hadam. Therefore, since there's a doubt about the father's lineage, and if considered, it would be a partial tzvi, one cannot slaughter it on Yom Tov, as it might require kisui hadam, which cannot be done on Yom Tov due to doubt. Rabbi Eliezer, however, holds that "partial tzvi" is not obligated in kisui hadam. Thus, even if the father's lineage is considered, it would only be a partial tzvi, and therefore exempt from kisui hadam. Consequently, there is no prohibition against slaughtering it on Yom Tov. This is the fundamental disagreement regarding kisui hadam.
Similarly, for matanot kehuna, the mother is a behemah, and the father is a tzvi. Everyone agrees there's a doubt about the father's lineage. The Rabbanan hold that "even a partial behemah" (miksat behemah) is obligated in matanot kehuna. Since the mother is a behemah, and even if the father's tzvi lineage is considered, it would still be a partial behemah, the Rabbanan rule that matanot kehuna must be given. Rabbi Eliezer, however, holds that "partial behemah" is exempt. Since the father's tzvi lineage, if considered, would make it a partial behemah, Rabbi Eliezer rules that no matanot kehuna are given, based on the principle that the claimant must prove his case.
Finally, regarding Oto Ve'et Beno (an animal and its offspring), which applies only to a behemah. If the mother is a tzviya (wild animal) and the father is a behemah, then if one follows the mother, there is no Oto Ve'et Beno. But if one considers the father's lineage, it would be a behemah, and Oto Ve'et Beno would apply. The Rabbanan hold that "even a partial seh" is subject to Oto Ve'et Beno. Therefore, since there's a doubt about the father's lineage, and if considered, it's a partial behemah, it is forbidden to slaughter them on the same day. However, no lashes (malkut) are administered due to the doubt. Rabbi Eliezer, conversely, holds that "partial seh" is exempt from Oto Ve'et Beno. Thus, even if the father's lineage is considered, it would only be a partial behemah, and therefore not subject to Oto Ve'et Beno. So, according to Rabbi Eliezer, there is no problem with slaughtering them on the same day.
If the mother is a tiyasha (domesticated animal) and the father is a tzvi (wild animal), then the offspring is a behemah from the mother's side. If the father's lineage is considered, it becomes a partial behemah. According to the Rabbanan, it is forbidden to slaughter them on the same day, and lashes are administered, because whether it's a full behemah (from the mother) or a partial behemah (considering the father), they both obligate Oto Ve'et Beno. According to Rabbi Eliezer, if the father's lineage is disregarded, it's a full behemah, and lashes would apply. However, if the father's lineage is considered, it becomes a partial behemah, which Rabbi Eliezer exempts from Oto Ve'et Beno. Since there's a doubt, it is forbidden, but no lashes are administered. In all these cases, the fundamental disagreement is whether "even a partial" animal is subject to the specific halachic rule, with the Rabbanan saying yes and Rabbi Eliezer saying no.
Rav Yehudah then introduces a new point: the koy is a creature unto itself, a unique species. The Sages did not definitively decide if it is a behemah or a hayyah. Rav Nahman, however, states that the koy is an "el habar," a wild ram, and thus a hayyah. Other opinions suggest the koy is a crossbreed of a tayish (goat) and a tzviya (deer). Rabbi Yosef says the koy is a distinct species, while Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says it is a behemah, citing the Bet Dushay family who used to breed them in herds, implying domestication, which is characteristic of a behemah. Thus, there are various opinions on the nature of the koy.
The Gemara then discusses wild goats (izzei devala). Rav Bisera, in the name of Rav Safra, in the name of Rav Amemuna, states that these wild goats are fit to be brought as offerings on the altar (mizbeah). This implies they are considered behemot, as only behemot are brought as offerings. The Torah lists ten kosher animals: three behemot and seven hayot. Since "goat" (ez) is listed among the three behemot, and no separate wild goat is listed among the hayot, it must be that the term ez includes wild goats, making them behemot. The Gemara questions this, suggesting that perhaps the list of hayot is a "specific" (prat) followed by a "general" (klal) rule, which would mean that more hayot exist than explicitly listed, including the wild goat. However, the Gemara rejects this, arguing that if it were a prat u'klal, the Torah would not have needed to list all ten animals. Thus, the list is exhaustive, and since ez is a behemah, wild goats are also behemot. The Gemara then asks if perhaps one of the listed hayot, such as the ako, te'o, or zamir, refers to a wild goat. This would make it a hayyah. Rav Amram permits eating the fat of this wild goat, which is only permitted for a hayyah, not a behemah. This indicates a dispute: one opinion considers it a behemah (fit for offerings), and another considers it a hayyah (fat permitted).
A similar dispute exists regarding the wild ox (shor habar). Rabbi Yosef says it is a behemah, while others say it is a hayyah. The Targum translates te'o (one of the listed hayot) as "tor bala," a wild ox, implying it is a hayyah. However, if te'o is a behemah, then "tor bala" would also be a behemah. The Gemara concludes that there is a dispute as to whether the te'o in the Torah is a hayyah or a behemah, but everyone agrees it is a wild ox. However, regarding the wild goat, everyone agrees it is a behemah. The Gemara again questions this, asking if it could be one of the wild animals (ako, zemer) listed as hayot. This reiterates the ongoing uncertainty about the halachic classification of wild animals.
The discussion shifts to a Mishnah that presents twelve cases involving the slaughter of two animals, either both consecrated (kadashim) or both unconsecrated (hulin), or one of each, either inside or outside the Temple courtyard (Azara). The Mishnah provides the halachic outcome for each scenario. The Gemara aims to demonstrate that this Mishnah cannot follow the opinion of Rabbi Shimon. One case in the Mishnah states that if two consecrated animals (mother and offspring) are slaughtered outside the Azara, the first animal incurs the penalty of karet (spiritual excision) for "slaughtering outside" (shochet chutz). The second animal, being subject to Oto Ve'et Beno (slaughtering an animal and its offspring on the same day), is deemed unfit for the altar. Since it is unfit, slaughtering it outside does not incur the penalty of shochet chutz. Both animals are deemed invalid (pesulim), and both individuals receive lashes (malkut): the first for shochet chutz, and the second for Oto Ve'et Beno. The second does not receive lashes for shochet chutz because it was unfit for the altar on that day.
However, Rabbi Shimon holds that "slaughtering that is not fit for its purpose is not considered slaughtering" (shechita she'eina re'uya lashemesh shechita). According to him, the first animal slaughtered outside the Azara, being subject to shochet chutz, does not make its meat permissible. Therefore, it is not considered a valid act of slaughter (shechita) at all. Consequently, the second animal would not be subject to Oto Ve'et Beno, as the first animal was not truly "slaughtered." Since the second animal is not subject to Oto Ve'et Beno, it remains fit for the altar that day. If it is then slaughtered outside the Azara, it should also incur the penalty of karet for shochet chutz. Since the Mishnah states that the second animal only receives lashes for Oto Ve'et Beno and not for shochet chutz, it cannot follow Rabbi Shimon's view.
The Gemara provides two more proofs. In another case, if two unconsecrated animals (hulin) are slaughtered inside the Azara, both are invalid (pesulim). The first does not incur lashes (though it is forbidden), and the second receives lashes for Oto Ve'et Beno. Again, according to Rabbi Shimon, the first animal's slaughter inside the Azara is not a valid shechita because it does not make the meat permissible. Therefore, the second animal would not be subject to Oto Ve'et Beno, and thus would not receive lashes. This contradicts the Mishnah. A third proof: if two consecrated animals are slaughtered inside the Azara, the first is valid, and the second receives lashes for Oto Ve'et Beno. Here too, Rabbi Shimon would argue that the slaughter of consecrated animals is not considered a valid shechita until the blood is sprinkled, as it does not immediately make the meat permissible. Therefore, the first animal's slaughter would not be a valid shechita, and the second would not be subject to Oto Ve'et Beno, again contradicting the Mishnah.
The Gemara concludes that these proofs are straightforward. The only point of clarification is that one might have thought that the slaughter of consecrated animals is considered a valid shechita even before the blood is sprinkled because it is a necessary step towards making the meat permissible. However, the Gemara states that since the blood is not yet sprinkled, it is not considered a valid shechita at all according to Rabbi Shimon. Therefore, the second animal would not be subject to Oto Ve'et Beno.
Finally, the Gemara addresses a case where two consecrated animals are slaughtered inside the Azara. The Mishnah states that the first is valid, and the second receives lashes for Oto Ve'et Beno. The question is: why does the second animal only receive one set of lashes (for Oto Ve'et Beno) and not an additional set for being slaughtered "before its time" (mekhusar zeman), meaning before it is permitted to be slaughtered that day due to the Oto Ve'et Beno prohibition? The Gemara explains that the Mishnah, in this context of Oto Ve'et Beno, focuses solely on the laws of Oto Ve'et Beno and does not enumerate other external prohibitions. However, the Gemara challenges this by noting that in other cases, the Mishnah does discuss external prohibitions like shochet chutz. The resolution is that when Oto Ve'et Beno applies, the Mishnah does not discuss other prohibitions. When Oto Ve'et Beno does not apply, then other prohibitions are discussed.
Another answer is that slaughtering an animal "before its time" is a transgression of a positive commandment (aseh), not a negative commandment (lo ta'aseh) that incurs lashes. The Torah states that an animal may not be brought as an offering until its eighth day. One verse implies that from the eighth day onward it is accepted, and before that, it is not. This implication from a positive commandment is considered a positive commandment itself. Therefore, slaughtering an animal "before its time" is a transgression of an aseh, for which lashes are not administered. This explains why the Mishnah does not list lashes for mekhusar zeman in the case of the second consecrated animal slaughtered inside the Azara, which is subject to Oto Ve'et Beno and thus cannot be slaughtered on that day. The Gemara then discusses the source for this ruling, citing a contradiction between two verses regarding the timing of offerings. Rabbi Afturiki resolves this by explaining that one verse refers to the sanctification of the animal (which can occur on the seventh night), while the other refers to its acceptance as an offering (which is only on the eighth day). Since this verse is used to resolve this contradiction, it cannot be used to derive the law of mekhusar zeman. Instead, another verse is used to derive that slaughtering an animal "before its time" is a transgression of a positive commandment, thus not incurring lashes.