The **Talmud Bavli**, **Masechet Chullin**, is dedicated in honor of Jack's engagement to Shirley Sutton. May they enjoy much gratification, peace, prosperity, and all blessings.
Today's study begins with a quote from our **Mishnah**, which discusses the prohibition of the sciatic nerve. The **Mishnah** states that this prohibition applies to both kosher and non-kosher animals. **Rabbi Yehuda** argues that the sciatic nerve was forbidden from the time of **Yaakov Avinu**. In those days, before the laws of kashrut were given, people ate non-kosher animals, yet the sciatic nerve was still forbidden. This, he argues, proves that the prohibition applies even to non-kosher animals.
The Sages, however, counter this claim. They assert that the sciatic nerve was truly forbidden starting at **Sinai**. The reason it is associated with **Yaakov Avinu**'s story is that **Moshe Rabbeinu**, when writing the Torah, anchored the prohibition to that narrative to provide a reason for its observance. Thus, the prohibition did not take effect until **Sinai**, at which point only kosher animals were permitted for consumption. Therefore, the sciatic nerve prohibition would only apply to kosher animals.
A teaching further supports this, stating that the term "children of Israel" (Bnei Yisrael) appears in connection with the sciatic nerve prohibition only from **Sinai** onwards. This implies that the prohibition began at **Sinai**. However, the question arises: if the prohibition was received at **Sinai**, why does the Torah link it to **Yaakov Avinu**'s encounter with the angel? The answer is that the Creator linked the prohibition to that event to provide its narrative origin.
**Rava** then raises a question. When the children of **Yaakov Avinu** went down to Egypt to greet **Yosef**, the Torah refers to them as "children of Israel." This occurred before the giving of the Torah (Matan Torah). Since **Yaakov Avinu**'s name was changed to Israel after his fight with the angel, it is fitting to call his descendants "children of Israel" at that point. However, regarding the sciatic nerve, the verse states "therefore the children of Israel do not eat," implying a post-Matan Torah context. If the term "children of Israel" already applied before **Matan Torah**, why would the prohibition of the sciatic nerve only begin at **Sinai**?
The response is that the Torah was not given in intervals, with different commandments starting at different times. The giving of the Torah was a singular event. The reference to "children of Israel" when they went to Egypt is an arbitrary point in history; it is neither the time of the sciatic nerve incident nor the time of **Matan Torah**. Therefore, the prohibition of the sciatic nerve began definitively at **Sinai**, where it was established that only kosher animals would be consumed. Thus, according to the Sages, the prohibition applies only to kosher animals.
We now turn to the prohibition of a limb torn from a live animal (eiver min hachai). We question to which animals this law applies. It certainly applies to kosher animals. However, there is a dispute: **Rabbi Yehuda** maintains that the law of a limb from a live animal applies to both kosher and non-kosher animals, while the Sages hold that it applies only to kosher species. Both derive their opinions from the same verse: "Be strong, do not eat the blood, for the blood is the life force." This verse is understood as a prohibition against eating from an animal while its life force is still within it.
The dispute lies in the interpretation of this verse. **Rabbi Yehuda** understands the verse to teach that any animal whose blood is forbidden is also subject to the prohibition of a limb from a live animal, and since the blood of all animals is forbidden, the prohibition applies to all. The Sages, however, interpret "do not eat the meat as long as the life force is still in it" to mean that once the life force departs (i.e., after proper ritual slaughter), the meat becomes permissible. This implies that the prohibition of a limb from a live animal applies only to animals that can *become* permissible through ritual slaughter, which are kosher animals.
The **Gemara** asks **Rabbi Yehuda**: why does he need a specific derivation from the verse about blood to include non-kosher animals in the prohibition of a limb from a live animal? Why not simply say that the prohibition of a limb from a live animal is an additional prohibition that applies even to an animal that is already forbidden as non-kosher? After all, the animal was non-kosher from birth, and the prohibition of a limb from a live animal comes later when a limb is torn. Furthermore, **Noach** was given the commandment not to eat a limb from a live animal, and it did not distinguish between kosher and non-kosher animals.
The **Gemara** clarifies that the teaching about the prohibition of a limb from a live animal applying to all animals, including non-kosher ones, is indeed derived from the verse given to **Noach**. This is the opinion of **Rabbi Yehuda**. However, his colleague, **Rabbi Elazar**, who shares the same stance that the prohibition applies to all animals, does not derive it from the verse given to **Noach**. Therefore, **Rabbi Elazar** requires the derivation from the verse about blood.
The **Gemara** then addresses a general rule: once something is forbidden, another prohibition typically does not apply to it unless the second prohibition is more stringent. In the case of a non-kosher animal, it is already forbidden. **Rabbi Yehuda** holds that the prohibition of a limb from a live animal is a more stringent commandment, as it was given to **Noach** before **Matan Torah**, and it applies universally without distinguishing between kosher and non-kosher. Thus, for **Rabbi Yehuda**, the prohibition of a limb from a live animal does apply to a non-kosher animal. However, **Rabbi Elazar** does not accept the principle that a prohibition applies on top of another prohibition, even if it is more stringent, unless a specific verse indicates otherwise. Therefore, **Rabbi Elazar** needs the verse about blood to teach that the prohibition of a limb from a live animal applies even to non-kosher animals.
A third opinion states that the prohibition of a limb from a live animal applies only to domesticated animals, not to wild animals or birds. The reasoning given is that sacrificial offerings are brought only from domesticated animals, implying a distinction in their halachic status. However, this raises a question regarding birds, which are also brought as offerings, albeit through a different method of slaughter (melikah).
**Rav Gidal** in the name of **Rav** states that this dispute, concerning which animals the prohibition applies to, is specific to Jews. For non-Jews, the prohibition of a limb from a live animal applies to all types of animals, whether domesticated or wild, kosher or non-kosher. This is a stringency applied to non-Jews regarding this particular prohibition.
**Rav Shizbi** teaches that for non-Jews, the prohibition of a limb from a live animal applies to both kosher and non-kosher animals. For example, if a non-kosher bird (of tameh) is still alive and a limb is torn from it and eaten, the non-Jew is liable. However, a Jew who eats a limb from a non-kosher bird is not liable for lashes. This is because the ritual slaughter of a non-kosher bird does not purify it. The **Gemara** clarifies that ritual slaughter cannot purify a non-kosher bird. The discussion here is about a Jew eating a non-kosher bird from which a limb was torn while it was alive. The **Mishnah** states that a Jew is not liable for lashes in such a case.
The **Gemara** then explains that if a Jew slaughters a kosher animal, even if it is still twitching, it is permitted to eat. One might think that this permission also extends to a non-Jew who slaughters a kosher animal. However, for a non-Jew, ritual slaughter does not purify the animal, and therefore, if it is still twitching, it remains forbidden as a limb from a live animal. This shows that for non-Jews, the prohibition of a limb from a live animal applies even to non-kosher animals, as the discussion includes non-kosher animals.
The **Mishnah** states that a Jew who eats a limb from a non-kosher bird is not liable for lashes. This implies that the prohibition does not apply to non-kosher animals for a Jew. However, the latter part of the **Mishnah** implies that if a non-Jew slaughters an animal and it is still twitching, it is forbidden. This suggests a contradiction between the first part (Rishah) and the latter part (Seifa) of the **Mishnah**. We resolve this by stating that the Rishah refers to a Jew, for whom the prohibition of a limb from a live animal does not apply to non-kosher animals. The Seifa refers to a **Ben Noach** (non-Jew), for whom the prohibition of a limb from a live animal *does* apply to non-kosher items, and thus, ritual slaughter does not purify it if it is still twitching.
**Rav** states that for the prohibition of a limb from a live animal, the minimum measure for liability for lashes is an olive-sized amount (kezayit). **Rav Amram** challenges this from the **Mishnah** we just discussed: if a Jew eats a limb from a non-kosher bird, he is not liable for lashes. This implies that even if he ate an olive-sized amount, he would not be liable. But if the measure for liability is an olive-sized amount, then if he ate an olive-sized amount from a non-kosher bird, he should be liable for something else (e.g., for eating a non-kosher item), not specifically for a limb from a live animal.
The **Gemara** explains that when we say "no lashes," it means specifically no lashes for the prohibition of a limb from a live animal. The question is still valid: why would the **Mishnah** specify "no lashes" if the measure was an olive-sized amount, as one would expect lashes for eating an olive-sized amount of a forbidden item? **Rav Nachman** explains that the term "any amount" (mashu) of meat, in this context, refers to a piece that includes meat, sinews, and bones, which together constitute an olive-sized amount. So, even if the meat itself is less than an olive-sized amount, if the entire piece torn off (meat, sinews, bones) reaches an olive-sized amount, one is liable. However, for a non-kosher bird, even if one eats an olive-sized amount of such a "package," one is not liable for the prohibition of a limb from a live animal because the primary prohibition is that it is a non-kosher bird.
The **Gemara** then discusses the case of eating a whole live bird. If one eats a whole live bird, even a tiny one, one is liable for any amount (kol shehu), because it is considered a complete creature (beriah). However, if the bird dies (becomes a carcass), the measure for liability is an olive-sized amount. **Rav**'s statement that an olive-sized amount is required for a limb from a live animal seems to contradict the idea of "any amount" for a complete live creature. The **Gemara** reconciles this by reiterating that when **Rav** said "olive-sized amount," he meant a piece that, when combining meat, bones, and sinews, reaches an olive-sized amount. This applies to a limb torn from a live animal. But for eating a whole live creature, it is "any amount."
The **Gemara** brings another case: if one takes a kosher bird that does not have an olive-sized amount of meat (e.g., a very small bird) and eats it whole, **Rabbi Yehuda** exempts him from lashes. This is because **Rabbi Yehuda** holds that the prohibition of a limb from a live animal applies only if a limb is *torn off*, not if the entire creature is eaten whole. **Rabbi Shimon**, however, says one is liable. His logic is that if one is liable for a small limb (less than an olive-sized amount) when torn off, then certainly one should be liable for eating the entire creature, even if it is small.
If one chokes a bird and then eats it, it becomes a carcass (nevelah). For a carcass, everyone agrees that one is liable only if they eat an olive-sized amount. This is because the prohibition of a carcass explicitly requires an olive-sized amount. The **Gemara** then explains that the entire dispute between **Rabbi Yehuda** and **Rabbi Shimon** revolves around whether the limbs of a live bird are considered separate limbs (ivarim) while it is alive. One opinion holds that since birds are eventually cut into pieces, their limbs are considered separate even while alive. The other opinion holds that since they are not cut while alive, the limbs are not considered separate, and thus, eating the whole bird is not considered eating a "limb."
However, the **Gemara** points out that everyone agrees that if a limb is torn off, an olive-sized amount is required. This contradicts the earlier statement that **Rabbi Shimon** would hold one liable for less than an olive-sized amount for a whole bird, based on a *Kavah Chomer* from a torn limb. **Rav Nachman** again clarifies that when "any amount" of meat is mentioned, it refers to a piece that, when combined with sinews and bones, reaches an olive-sized amount. So, the rule is always that the total "package" must be an olive-sized amount.
The **Gemara** then challenges this from the latter part of the **Mishnah** about the *klanita* bird. If one chokes a *klanita* bird and eats it, one is liable for an olive-sized amount. But a *klanita* is a non-kosher bird, so it is already forbidden. Why would the **Mishnah** specify an olive-sized amount for a carcass of a *klanita*? This implies that the rule of an olive-sized amount applies even to a non-kosher bird, which seems to contradict the idea that for a non-kosher bird, the prohibition of a limb from a live animal does not apply to a Jew, or that it's always an olive-sized amount for a carcass.