The Eli B. Sitt Edition and Audio Series of the Talmud Bavli, Tractate Chullin, has been dedicated by our good friends Mr. Joey Jamal and his wife in honor of their son Jack’s engagement to Shirley Sutton. May they build a faithful home at an auspicious time and be blessed with the blessing of Torah study. Through our study of Tractate Chullin over the next several months, may they enjoy much satisfaction, peace, prosperity, and every blessing. Amen.
This study is also dedicated for the speedy recovery of Rabbi Yaakov Ben Yosef and the boy Yehuda. May he be safe and well and return to the community.
We begin today on page seven, nine lines from the bottom, with the words “With what does the dispute revolve?” There is a dispute between Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Ishmael regarding whether the Israelites were permitted to eat ordinary meat in the wilderness.
According to Rabbi Akiva, they were permitted to eat ordinary meat in the wilderness. This was called meat eaten out of desire. The laws of ritual slaughter had not yet applied, so they could kill the animal in whatever manner they wished. Once they entered the Land of Israel, however, the laws of ritual slaughter took effect.
According to Rabbi Ishmael, the laws of ritual slaughter applied from the beginning. The Israelites were not permitted to eat ordinary meat in the wilderness. If someone wanted to eat meat, it had to be the meat of a sacrifice. Only when they entered the Land of Israel did God permit them to eat ordinary meat. That is the dispute between Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Ishmael.
What is the root of this dispute? Rabbi Akiva maintains that ordinary meat was never prohibited. Therefore, the only thing that changed between the wilderness and the Land of Israel was the manner in which the animal was killed. Rabbi Ishmael maintains that killing an animal without ritual slaughter was certainly never permitted. According to him, that was not an available option. Rabbi Akiva, however, says that killing an animal without ritual slaughter was permitted in the wilderness, whereas Rabbi Ishmael says that it was certainly prohibited.
Rashi asks how we should understand the verse. The verse states that when the Israelites enter the Land of Israel, a person may eat meat whenever he desires it. This teaches that one should not eat meat gluttonously or without reason. A person should eat it when he genuinely desires it, but otherwise he should not consume meat merely out of gluttony. The verse is not coming to permit ordinary meat; it is simply teaching the proper circumstances in which to eat it.
Rashi then explains that ordinary meat had never been permitted without ritual slaughter. The verse concerning entry into the Land of Israel was coming only to permit meat eaten out of desire. The Sefat HaTzadik, in the book called Echad—not in the section dealing with entering the Land of Israel, but in his discussion of cooking meat—explains that although the verse says, “You shall slaughter,” making it sound as though ritual slaughter began only in the Land of Israel, that is not what the verse means. It is simply describing the normal procedure: when one enters the Land of Israel and eats meat, one must perform ritual slaughter. It does not mean that ritual slaughter began only then. The words “you shall slaughter” are merely describing the ordinary manner of preparing meat.
There are other possibilities as well. The verse may be discussing certain offerings that became invalid and were therefore redeemed. In that case, the verse is telling us to slaughter them and eat them, but not to use their shearings. Alternatively, it may be dealing with a different matter altogether. In any event, ritual slaughter was certainly practiced throughout that earlier period.
The Gemara now raises several questions. It says that a verse in the wilderness clearly indicates that ritual slaughter was practiced there. The answer is that the verse was referring to offerings. Rabbi Akiva also agrees that offerings required ritual slaughter.
Rabbi Ishmael is then challenged from another verse in the wilderness: “Will sheep and cattle be slaughtered for them?” This verse clearly speaks about slaughtering sheep and cattle in the wilderness. How can Rabbi Ishmael maintain that ordinary meat was not eaten there?
The answer is that because killing animals without formal ritual slaughter was the practice in the wilderness, the Torah referred to it as slaughtering. In other words, what the Israelites called slaughtering in the wilderness was actually killing the animal without the later procedure of ritual slaughter. Thus, when the verse says that the sheep and cattle would be slaughtered, it is referring to the method practiced in the wilderness.
We have a Mishnah that discusses a related matter. If a person performed ritual slaughter, but the animal became a carcass during the process, or if he killed the animal without ritual slaughter, or if he pierced it, pulled out its identifying organs, or otherwise removed them without performing proper ritual slaughter, he is exempt from the obligation to cover the blood.
The Mishnah includes several methods of killing the animal without proper slaughter: piercing it, pulling out the identifying organs, or tearing them away. In all such cases, the person is exempt from the obligation to cover the blood.
This seems to support Rabbi Ishmael, because according to him, killing an animal without ritual slaughter was never an acceptable method. Therefore, there is no obligation to cover the blood. But according to Rabbi Akiva, why should a person who kills the animal without ritual slaughter be exempt? Since this method was valid at one point—namely, in the wilderness, when it was the accepted method of killing animals—it should generate an obligation to cover the blood. Even though the method later became prohibited, it had once been legitimate. Why, then, is there no obligation to cover the blood?
The answer is that the Mishnah is derived from the verse, “When an animal that may be eaten is slaughtered and its blood is poured out, you shall cover it.” The obligation to cover the blood applies only to something that can be eaten. If the act of killing produces an animal that is not fit to eat, there is no obligation to cover the blood.
There is an opinion that if a person performs ritual slaughter and the animal is found to be a carcass because it has a fatal defect, he is still obligated to cover the blood. At least in that case, a proper act of ritual slaughter took place, even though the animal was not fit to eat. Here, however, the animal was a carcass from the outset, because it was killed without ritual slaughter.
According to Rabbi Akiva, one might have argued that in the wilderness the Israelites did cover the blood of animals killed in this manner, because killing without ritual slaughter was then valid. Why should that practice not continue after the method became prohibited? The answer is that the verse specifies that the obligation applies to an animal that may be eaten. Once this method of killing became prohibited, the resulting animal was no longer considered a valid slaughtered animal, and there was no obligation to cover its blood.
The Gemara then explains the verse in another way. When the Jewish people would enter the Land of Israel, they would be able to eat cattle and sheep in a state of ritual impurity, just as they had eaten deer and gazelle in the wilderness. When a person eats ordinary meat that is not a sacrifice, he does not have to be ritually pure. The verse is saying that just as the Israelites ate deer and gazelle in the wilderness without concern for ritual impurity, so too, when they entered the Land of Israel, they would be able to eat cattle, sheep, and other animals without concern for those laws.
Rashi explains that in the wilderness they ate deer and gazelle in a state of ritual impurity. The novelty is that when they entered the Land of Israel, they would now be required to slaughter the animal properly, but they should not think that this requirement meant the animal had to be eaten in a state of ritual purity. Just as they had eaten deer and gazelle in the wilderness without concern for ritual impurity, they could eat ordinary meat in the Land of Israel without that concern.
Why does the verse mention deer and gazelle? Those animals could not be brought as sacrifices. They were simply ordinary animals that the Israelites ate in the wilderness. Therefore, when the Israelites entered the Land of Israel and the Torah told them that ritual slaughter was required, it was not changing the rule regarding ritual purity. It was only changing the method of slaughter.
This explanation works well according to Rabbi Akiva. According to Rabbi Ishmael, however, deer and gazelle also seem to present a difficulty. If Rabbi Ishmael maintains that the Israelites did not eat ordinary meat in the wilderness, how could the verse say that they ate deer and gazelle there?
The Gemara answers that Rabbi Ishmael agrees that the Israelites could eat animals that were not suitable for sacrifice. What he prohibited was the slaughtering of an animal that could have been brought as a sacrifice for ordinary consumption. An animal that could be brought as a sacrifice could not be slaughtered in the ordinary manner. A deer, however, could never be brought as a sacrifice, and therefore it could be eaten in the wilderness.
This changes our understanding of Rabbi Ishmael’s position. We initially thought that according to him, the Israelites could not eat any ordinary meat at all in the wilderness. That is not correct. They could eat ordinary meat that was not suitable for sacrifice. For example, they could eat deer. They could not take a sheep, which could be brought as a sacrifice, and slaughter it as ordinary meat. Thus, when the verse says that they ate deer and gazelle in the wilderness, it is referring to animals that were not eligible to be sacrifices.
The Gemara now raises a question in the name of Birmiya: According to Rabbi Akiva, if an animal was killed without ritual slaughter in the wilderness, and the Israelites entered the Land of Israel with that meat, may they eat it there? Does the status of the meat follow the laws that applied in the wilderness, when it was killed, or the laws that applied in the Land of Israel, when they wanted to eat it?
The Gemara offers a significant qualification. When the Israelites entered the Land of Israel, the first seven years were devoted to conquering the land under Joshua. During the following seven years, they divided the land among the tribes. If the question concerns the first seven years, there is no difficulty. During those years, the Israelites were permitted to eat even non-kosher food. How do we know this? The verse says that their houses would be filled with all good things. What are those good things? They included the meat of pigs.
If the Israelites were permitted to eat pork during the first seven years, why would there be any question about meat that had been killed without ritual slaughter? The Gemara answers that the question must concern the period after the first seven years, when the ordinary laws of permitted food applied.
One might still say that the question applies even during the first seven years. The reason the Israelites could eat pork was that they had taken it as the spoils of war from the nations they conquered. During battle, they were permitted to eat whatever food they found in the homes of their enemies, so that they would not starve. But when they returned to their own homes, even during those first seven years, they could not eat their own animals if they were improperly killed or otherwise forbidden.
Thus, the question can still arise during the first seven years. The permission applied to the spoils of the enemy, not to ordinary meat belonging to the Israelites themselves. The Gemara leaves the question unresolved.
We now come to the next matter. Rabbah says that we have already learned how to explain the riddle in the Mishnah. The Mishnah says, “Everyone performs ritual slaughter,” and later, “One always performs ritual slaughter.” What does the first statement mean?
The first statement comes to teach that even birds require ritual slaughter. Although the Torah does not state this in the same explicit manner as it does regarding animals, the Mishnah teaches that birds also require ritual slaughter.
What does the statement “one always performs ritual slaughter” teach? Based on the opinions we have just discussed, one might have thought that ritual slaughter began only when the Israelites entered the Land of Israel. If so, perhaps after the Jewish people went into exile, they would return to the wilderness system and be permitted to kill animals without ritual slaughter. The Mishnah therefore teaches that once the requirement of ritual slaughter began, it continued permanently. Even in the Diaspora, one must perform ritual slaughter.
Until now, we were discussing the animal being slaughtered. The Mishnah first teaches that all animals, including birds and chickens, require ritual slaughter. It then teaches that this requirement applies everywhere, including outside the Land of Israel. The Gemara asks how to understand the final part of the Mishnah, which says that one may perform ritual slaughter with various objects.
The Mishnah is actually discussing the equipment used for slaughter. One may slaughter with a stone, with a sharp piece of glass, or with a sharp reed. The rule concerning these implements must be read consistently with the earlier statements. If the earlier statements discuss how slaughter is performed, then this statement also discusses how slaughter is performed, and everything fits together. But if the earlier statements refer to the animal being slaughtered, then the third statement should also refer to the animal, not to the instrument. The Gemara therefore reexamines the entire Mishnah.
Rabbah answers that the first statement, “Everyone performs ritual slaughter,” is not referring to every type of animal. It is referring to who may perform the slaughter. It comes to include a Kuti. The other Mishnah, which also says that everyone performs ritual slaughter, comes to include an apostate Israelite. Since one Mishnah includes one type of person and the other Mishnah includes another, both statements are necessary.
The phrase “one always performs ritual slaughter” then teaches the various circumstances in which slaughter may be performed. It may be performed during the day or at night, provided there is sufficient light. It may be performed on the roof of a building or on the top of a boat. On a roof, we do not suspect that the person is collecting the blood for idolatry. On a boat, we do not suspect that he is spilling the blood into the water for the sake of the spirit of the sea. He is on a boat, and where else would he place the blood? He does not want to leave it on the deck.
Rashi points out that slaughter at night is permitted only when there is adequate light. The issue is that the person must be able to see properly. Regarding slaughter on a roof, we do not suspect that the blood is being collected for idolatry. Regarding slaughter on a boat, we do not suspect that the blood is being offered to the sea, because the practical reason for spilling it into the water is obvious.
This, then, is the explanation of the Mishnah. The first statement concerns who may perform the slaughter. The second concerns when and where it may be performed. The third concerns the implement: one may use a stone, glass, or a sharp reed.
We now begin the discussion of the slaughtering knife. We need to examine several different types of blades, and some pictures help clarify the matter.
The Mishnah excludes a short sickle and a saw. These implements may not be used for ritual slaughter because they have teeth or notches. Instead of cutting the identifying organs cleanly, they may tear them. A saw is therefore not considered a proper slaughtering knife.
The father of Shmuel was in Babylonia and wanted to clarify the laws governing the slaughtering knife. He made different notches in a knife and sent it to the rabbis in the Land of Israel for a ruling. He sent one knife and asked whether it was prohibited. Then he made another notch and sent it again. He continued sending knives back and forth from Babylonia to the Land of Israel in order to obtain a ruling regarding each type of notch.
Rashi explains that the notches under discussion are notches with depth. Each notch has two points. When the slaughterer runs his fingernail back and forth along the blade, the nail catches on one point when moving in one direction and on the other point when moving in the opposite direction. There is a depression or crevice between the two points.
In one type of blade, the notch resembles an upside-down V or a small triangle. It has two points. When a person runs his finger across the blade, his fingernail catches on one point in one direction and on the other point in the opposite direction. The nail also enters the depression between them. This is considered a saw-like notch, and it invalidates the slaughter.
In another type of blade, the surface is generally straight, but there is a single notch that creates one point, similar to a right angle. The Gemara will say that this type of notch may not invalidate the slaughter in every case. We will have to understand why.
The Sages taught that a knife with many notches is considered like a saw. It is invalid even if the notches are of the type that, individually, might not invalidate the slaughter. The second type of notch is acceptable only when there is a single notch. If the entire knife is filled with such notches, it is also invalid.
Rashi explains that when the blade has one notch with two points, the notch is called a saw-like notch. When the blade has one point, the notch is described as catching or collecting, because the fingernail becomes caught in the depression as it passes over the blade.
When the blade has a single notch, the case may be acceptable because the blade can be used in a particular direction. The smooth section of the knife can cut through the flesh, and by the time the blade reaches the identifying organs, the remaining part of the blade may perform the slaughter properly. However, if the knife has many such notches, the first notch may cut the flesh and the next notch may tear the identifying organs. Therefore, many notches are always a problem.
The Gemara explains the terminology. A saw-like notch is one with points on both sides. No matter which direction the fingernail moves, it encounters a point. A notch of the other type has a point on only one side.
Why is a notch with points on both sides invalid? As the knife moves, the first notch pierces or opens the flesh without yet invalidating the slaughter. The next notch then catches and pulls out the identifying organs. Because the first notch affects the outer flesh and the second affects the identifying organs, the slaughter is invalid.
The Gemara asks why a single notch on one side should not also be a problem. Suppose the person begins with the thinner side of the blade. The sharp part may cut through the outer flesh, and by the time the blade reaches the identifying organs, the notch may tear them. The Gemara answers that this case can be acceptable when the notch is at the beginning of the blade and the slaughterer moves in only one direction. The initial notch opens the flesh, and the smooth part of the blade then performs the slaughter.
There are therefore several conditions for this type of knife to be acceptable. The notch must be at the beginning of the blade, the slaughterer must begin from that point, and he must move in only one direction. If he moves back and forth, the return movement may cause the notch to catch the identifying organs.
That is why a blade with many notches is invalid. The first notch may cut the outer flesh, and the next one may cut or pull the identifying organs. One notch can sometimes be accommodated under specific conditions, but many notches cannot.
The Mishnah also mentions a sickle. A sickle has ridges that face in one direction. If it is used in its ordinary direction, the ridges may not pull the identifying organs out. The blade is moved along the direction in which the ridges lie, so they do not catch and tear the organs. Nevertheless, it must be used in the proper direction. If it is moved against the direction of the ridges, it may become a problem.
Rashi explains that one type of notch catches the fingernail as it moves across the blade. Another type is smoothed with a sharpening tool. The first notch may break through the outer flesh, and the next notch may affect the identifying organs. This is the basic concern.
When there is a single notch of the acceptable type, moving in one direction may not cause a problem, because the notch will affect only the outer flesh and the remaining portion of the blade will perform the slaughter. On the return movement, however, the notch may catch the identifying organs. That is why the Gemara limits the case to a one-directional movement.
Rabbah gives three laws concerning the knife. A blade with a saw-like notch may not be used for slaughter. If a person nevertheless used it, the slaughter is invalid, even after the fact. A blade with a single notch may be used only under the conditions described above. If it is used in the ordinary back-and-forth manner, the slaughter is invalid after the fact. The concern is that the person may forget the special conditions and use the knife normally.
What about a blade that moves up and down in an uneven manner but has no sharp points? If the notches were filed down, the area may be slightly lower than the rest of the blade. The knife is not entirely on one plane, but the unevenness is smooth rather than pointed. This is acceptable. One does not have to measure the blade to make sure that every part is exactly level. As long as the sharp points have been filed away and the surface is smooth, the knife may be used.
Rabbah was challenged regarding these statements. He had said that a saw-like blade is invalid, even after the fact, but he had also discussed a blade with a similar appearance in a way that suggested it could be used. How can these two statements be reconciled?
The answer is that one statement concerns a knife used in a back-and-forth motion, while the other concerns a knife used in only one direction. When the blade is moved in only one direction, the notch may not reach the identifying organs, and the slaughter is valid. When the blade is moved back and forth, the return motion may cause the notch to pull them out, and the slaughter is invalid.
The Gemara then discusses a knife that resembles the top of a stalk of wheat. A stalk of wheat is not perfectly straight; it rises and falls in a wavy manner, but it does not have sharp points. The question is whether such a blade is acceptable. The answer is expressed rhetorically: Who would give me meat slaughtered with such a knife so that I could eat it? The point is that a blade without sharp points may be acceptable even if it is uneven, but the practical preference is obviously to use a smooth, proper blade.
The essential distinction is that the problem is not merely that the blade is uneven. The problem is the presence of sharp points or notches that catch the identifying organs. If the blade rises and falls smoothly, without points, it does not necessarily present the same concern.
Rav Hisda asks: From where do we know from the Torah that one must inspect the knife before performing ritual slaughter? The verse says that King Saul told the people to take a particular knife and perform the slaughter. This implies that the knife had to be checked beforehand.
The Gemara explains the logic. Since a defect in the knife can make the animal invalid, one should obviously inspect the knife before using it. If the blade has a notch, it may create a fatal defect in the animal. Why, then, is a verse needed to teach this requirement? The answer is that the verse may be needed for a different point.
Perhaps the verse teaches that the knife must be shown to a Torah scholar. One might say that a slaughterer himself is trustworthy. There is a general principle that one reliable witness is believed in matters of this kind. Why, then, must the knife be shown to the scholar of the town?
The Gemara answers that technically the knife does not have to be shown to the scholar. A qualified slaughterer may inspect it and be trusted. The practice of showing the knife to a scholar is required out of respect for the scholar. The verse cited from the account of Saul is therefore not a direct Torah source establishing that every knife must be shown to a scholar. It is merely a supporting allusion.
Thus, the actual inspection is required because the knife can cause the animal to become invalid. The slaughterer may perform the inspection himself, or another reliable slaughterer may inspect it. Showing it to the town’s scholar is a rabbinic practice undertaken out of respect, and the verse serves only as an allusion to that practice.