The Artscroll Edition and Audio Series of the Talmud Bavli, Tractate Chullin, has been dedicated by our good friend Mr. Joey Jamal and his wife in honor of their son Jack’s engagement to Shirley Sutton. With God’s help, may they marry at an auspicious and successful time, and may they have much joy, peace in their home, prosperity, and all blessings. Amen.
Today’s page begins four lines before the section becomes wider. We are in the middle of a discussion about different mitzvot and whether a partnership affects the obligation. We previously said that certain mitzvot, when there is joint ownership, do not apply. For example, according to one opinion, the gifts to the priest from an animal owned by partners—including a partnership between a Jew and a non-Jew—are not subject to the law of those gifts. We are now discussing other mitzvot in relation to joint ownership.
There is a mitzvah to leave the corner of the field, the portion called the corner offering, for the poor. The law is that even when a field is owned by partners, there is still an obligation to leave that portion. Although the verse says “your field” in the singular, which sounds as though the field must belong to one person and not to partners, that is not the conclusion. The verse is teaching that a field owned by partners is also subject to the obligation.
The discussion then considers whether a partnership with a non-Jew exempts the field from the obligation. The novelty would be that even when the firstborn animal has a partner, it remains subject to the relevant obligation, despite the singular wording that seems to exclude a partnership.
Another example is the mezuzah. One might think that when a house is owned by partners, there is no obligation, because the verse says “your house” in the singular. The verse therefore teaches that even a jointly owned house requires a mezuzah. The word “your” is written in the plural form, teaching that a house owned by partners is included.
The discussion also explains the placement of the mezuzah. It is placed on the right side, because a person normally enters with the right foot first. Just as one puts the right foot forward when entering, the mezuzah is affixed on the right side of the entrance.
We then come to the mitzvah of separating a tenth of one’s produce. Even when a person owns only a share of the produce, the obligation may still apply. The question is how to understand the singular wording of the verse, and whether it teaches that the laws of the priestly gifts and tithes do not apply to a partnership.
The same issue arises with the foreleg, the jaw, and the stomach that must be given to the priest from a slaughtered animal. Even an animal owned by partners is subject to this obligation. Although the verse says, “and he shall give,” the same expression is used regarding the first shearing. Since the law of the first shearing applies to a partnership, we might derive through the repeated word “give” that the priestly gifts from a slaughtered animal also apply to a partnership.
Alternatively, one might derive the law of the first shearing from the priestly gifts. Just as the priestly gifts apply to a partnership, so too the first shearing would apply to a partnership. The verse concerning the first shearing, however, uses a plural expression, teaching that even an animal owned by partners is included.
Why is that verse necessary? Without it, we might have used the repeated expression “give” to derive the law from the first shearing. The answer is that the verse is needed to teach that the priestly gifts apply even to a partnership. Without that verse, one could have derived the opposite conclusion through the verbal analogy and said that the priestly gifts do not apply to partners.
The Gemara responds that we should indeed learn the law of the priestly gifts from the laws of terumah, because both involve giving. Just as terumah applies even when the produce is owned by partners, so too the priestly gifts apply to partners. The verse concerning the foreleg, jaw, and stomach is nevertheless necessary to establish this point.
The discussion then turns to first fruits. What are the first fruits? They are the first fruits of the produce that must be brought to the priest. Even when a person owns only a share of the produce, he must bring the first fruits.
One might object that the verse says “your land” in the singular, suggesting that the obligation applies only when the land belongs to one person and not when it belongs to partners. The Torah therefore says, “the first fruits of everything in their land,” using a plural form to teach that land owned by partners is included.
That verse also teaches that the mitzvah of first fruits applies only in the Land of Israel and not outside the Land.
The same reasoning is applied to ritual fringes. The verse says “your garment,” in the singular, which might suggest that a garment owned by partners is exempt. Yet the Torah also says “on the corners of their garments,” in the plural, teaching that a garment owned by partners requires ritual fringes.
There is a further law concerning a borrowed garment. A borrowed garment is exempt from ritual fringes when it is borrowed for less than thirty days. If it is borrowed for more than thirty days, it becomes obligated. The expression “your garment” teaches this law concerning a borrowed garment.
Another mitzvah is the parapet, the protective fence placed around a roof. Even a house owned by partners requires a parapet. Although the verse says “your roof” in the singular, the requirement is not limited to a privately owned house.
The verse gives the reason for the parapet: “that you not place blood in your house.” The concern is that someone could fall from the roof. One might ask why this should depend on how many people own the house. The danger exists regardless.
The answer is that people do not usually go onto a roof, so under ordinary circumstances the danger is not considered prevalent. Nevertheless, in a private home a person must be especially careful, even regarding dangers that are not common. In a house of worship, however, people do not live there, and the building is not owned by a private individual. Therefore, the Rambam was not as strict in requiring a parapet there.
At this point, it might appear that Rabbi Elai agrees in all these cases that an obligation applies to a partnership, based on the verses that were cited. The Gemara says that this is not so.
We have a teaching that seems to contradict this conclusion. We were told that Rabbi Elai considers a firstborn animal owned by partners obligated, but another teaching says that Rabbi Elai considers it exempt. What is Rabbi Elai’s reason? He expounds the singular wording of the verse. But the verse also uses a plural expression.
The answer is that “all of Israel” refers to the animals of all the Jews collectively, not to one individual animal owned by partners. In truth, Rabbi Elai holds that only an animal owned by one individual is obligated, while a firstborn animal owned by partners is exempt.
According to this version, the firstborn animal owned by partners is indeed exempt. The disagreement between the authorities therefore remains.
Rav Avya suggests that we should not apply the general principle stated earlier. Rabbi Elai says in one teaching that an animal owned by partners is exempt, while the other authorities agree that an animal owned by partners is obligated. In another teaching, however, Rabbi Elai says that a partnership is exempt.
He explains that when the earlier teaching mentioned a non-Jewish servant or an animal belonging to a non-Jew, the reference was to a different case. The first authority must have been speaking about a partnership between Jews; otherwise, Rabbi Elai would not be disagreeing with him.
Rav Chanina brings another proof that we cannot establish a general rule in this matter. A teaching says that an animal owned by partners is obligated, while Rabbi Elai says that it is exempt. We have therefore encountered the same disagreement again.
Why not derive the law from terumah? The Gemara answers that according to Rabbi Elai, terumah itself is exempt when the produce is owned by partners. Therefore, terumah cannot serve as a source for obligating a partnership in the other mitzvot.
We return to the earlier discussion. The first shearing was derived from terumah in order to exempt a partnership. Thus, according to Rabbi Elai, terumah is also exempt when there is a partnership.
The Gemara asks: Why not say that we derive the first shearing from terumah in every respect? Just as terumah does not apply outside the Land of Israel, the first shearing should also apply only in the Land of Israel. We know that this is not correct, because the Mishnah explicitly says that the mitzvah of the first shearing applies both in the Land of Israel and outside the Land.
Rav Yosef responds that this is in fact a proof. Rabbi Elai said that the first shearing applies only in the Land of Israel precisely because he derived it from terumah. Just as terumah applies only in the Land of Israel and involves giving, so too the first shearing involves giving and would apply only in the Land of Israel. The Mishnah that says the first shearing applies outside the Land therefore cannot be following Rabbi Elai.
One might still suggest that, just as failure to separate terumah makes the produce forbidden to eat, perhaps all the wool should remain forbidden until the first shearing is given to the priest. The Gemara answers with the verse, “You shall certainly give it to him.” The wording indicates that the obligation applies only to the first shearing. Once the first shearing has been separated, the remaining wool becomes permissible to the owner even if the first shearing has not yet been given to the priest.
The priest does not have a share in all the future shearings. His entitlement is to the first shearing only. Once that first shearing has been removed, there is no prohibition of untithed produce on the rest of the wool.
Perhaps we should nevertheless say that if someone uses the first shearing for himself, he is liable in the same way as someone who eats terumah. A non-priest who intentionally eats terumah is liable to death at the hands of Heaven and must repay the principal together with an additional fifth. Maybe using the first shearing for oneself should carry the same liability.
The Gemara rejects this comparison. The verse concerning terumah uses the words “upon it” and “in it,” teaching that those consequences apply specifically to terumah. The first shearing does not have those same consequences.
Perhaps the comparison to terumah should be extended in another direction. Terumah is followed by other separations, such as the first tithe and the second tithe. Maybe the first shearing also requires additional gifts after the first shearing has been given.
The verse says “the first,” teaching that only the first shearing is given. There is no second or third shearing that must be given to the priest. Thus, the first shearing differs from terumah in this respect.
Perhaps we can compare the first shearing to terumah regarding produce from different years. With terumah, one may not take produce from this year to fulfill an obligation from a different year. Perhaps the same rule applies to the first shearing: wool from one year may not be used to fulfill an obligation from the previous year.
The Gemara examines this through the case of the minimum quantity. If a person had only two sheep, he had not yet reached the minimum of five sheep required for the obligation. He sheared those sheep and stored the wool. Later, when he had five sheep, the question is whether the earlier shearings combine with the later ones.
The Mishnah indicates that the minimum is measured by the number of sheep, not by the number of shearings. One requires five animals, not merely five separate shearings.
The Gemara then asks whether five animals from different years may combine. One teaching appears to indicate that they may combine, while another teaching says that they may not combine across different years.
The answer is that the first teaching follows Rabbi Elai, who permits combining the animals from one year with animals from another year. The later teaching follows the Rabbis, who do not permit such a combination. Thus, according to Rabbi Elai, two sheep from one year and three sheep from another year may combine, provided the relevant shearings are present.
The Rabbis derive their position from terumah: just as one may not use the produce of one year to fulfill an obligation of another year, so too the shearings of different years may not be combined. Rabbi Elai, however, does not accept that derivation in this matter.
The Gemara continues by examining another possible comparison with terumah. Perhaps, just as produce that grew while exempt remains exempt and produce that grew while obligated becomes obligated, the same should apply to the first shearing.
For example, if produce began growing in a non-Jew’s field and a Jew purchased the field while the produce was still growing, the portion that grew while the field was exempt remains exempt, while the portion that grew after the Jew acquired it becomes obligated.
Perhaps the same rule should apply to the first shearing. If the animal was owned by a non-Jew when the wool grew, and a Jew then purchased the animal while the wool was still growing, the wool that grew while the animal was exempt would remain exempt, while the wool that grew after the Jewish purchase would be obligated.
The Gemara brings a case from Syria, specifically Aram Soba, which is also known as the holy city of Halab. Syria does not have the full sanctity of the Land of Israel. When a non-Jew acquires land in Syria, the sanctity is removed, whereas when a non-Jew acquires land in the Land of Israel, the sanctity remains.
The case concerns produce that had not yet grown to one-third of its development. The field was owned by a non-Jew in Syria, and the Jew purchased it before the produce had reached one-third of its growth. Since the produce reached one-third of its growth while in the Jew’s possession, it becomes obligated.
If, however, the Jew purchased the field only after the produce had already reached one-third of its growth, the produce remains exempt. Once the decisive point of obligation occurred while the field was owned by the non-Jew, the later sale to the Jew does not create an obligation, even if the produce grows substantially afterward.
What do we see from this? According to Rabbi Elai, whatever grew while exempt remains exempt, and whatever grew while obligated becomes obligated. Therefore, one might apply the same rule to the first shearing and say that wool that grew while the animal was owned by a non-Jew remains exempt even after the Jew purchases the animal.
The Gemara asks whether this applies only when the wool itself was purchased. If someone purchases shearings that had already been removed from an animal, he is obviously exempt, because he did not own the animal when the obligation arose.
The question concerns someone who purchased the sheep itself. In that case, the Mishnah says that if the seller retained some of the sheep, the seller remains obligated. This suggests that once the animal is in the Jew’s possession at the time of shearing, the obligation applies to the owner, even if some of the wool had grown while the animal was exempt.
Therefore, one cannot say that the rule is simply that wool that grew while the animal was exempt remains exempt and wool that grew while it was obligated becomes obligated. In the case of the first shearing, the decisive factor may be ownership of the animal at the time of shearing.
The Gemara responds that the Mishnah cited does not follow Rabbi Elai. Rabbi Elai consistently derives the law of the first shearing from terumah. Just as with terumah the portion that grew while obligated is obligated and the portion that grew while exempt is exempt, so too with the first shearing. The Mishnah that seems to say otherwise cannot be used as a question against Rabbi Elai.
Perhaps there is another comparison with terumah. Suppose there are two types of figs, black figs and white figs. One may not separate terumah from one type on behalf of the other. Perhaps the same should apply to the first shearing. If a person has two kinds of wool, such as white wool and black wool, perhaps he may not use one kind to fulfill the obligation for the other.
The Gemara brings a teaching concerning figs. The teaching indicates that the different colors are still considered one type for this purpose. It therefore appears that black figs and white figs may be treated as one category.
Perhaps the same should be said regarding the first shearing: white wool and black wool may also be considered one type. The Gemara responds that according to Rabbi Elai, just as different types of figs may be combined, the different types of wool may also be combined. This is not a question against Rabbi Elai but a proof of his position.
The discussion then considers a case in which a seller retained some animals and sold others. For example, if the seller had red and white sheep and sold the red sheep while retaining the white sheep, each party must give from his own animals. Even though together they still possess the minimum number of animals, one person cannot fulfill the other person’s obligation.
Why should each person have to give separately? Why can one of them not give on behalf of both? The case is that there was already an obligation when the animals were divided. The seller had the minimum number of animals, and then sold some of them. The buyer purchased the sheep, not the shearings, but the obligation attached to the animals.
Since the seller retained some of the sheep, he remains obligated to provide the gifts. The buyer is also obligated because he acquired sheep upon which the gifts were already due. The seller cannot say that he sold an ordinary animal and has no connection to the gifts. There was already an obligation attached to the animal.
However, the seller cannot fulfill the obligation from the buyer’s animals if they are of a different type. If the seller retained white sheep and sold red sheep, he cannot use the buyer’s red wool to fulfill the obligation for his white sheep. Each person must give from the type that he owns.
The Gemara asks why the Mishnah says that each person gives separately. Perhaps the reason is that male and female sheep are considered separate categories. But that cannot be the explanation, because male and female sheep are certainly the same species.
The answer is that the Mishnah is offering good advice. It is advising the owner to give the priest some of the wool from the males and some from the females. The wool from the females may be softer, while the wool from the males may be coarser or stronger. The Mishnah is recommending that the priest receive both types.
The novelty is that the seller is not required to give all of his best wool. Suppose the seller retained the female sheep, whose wool is softer and better, while selling the male sheep. One might think that he must give all of his valuable wool. The Mishnah teaches him an advantageous procedure: he can buy back some of the wool from the buyer and then give wool from both groups.
The obligation technically remains with the seller, because he retained some of the sheep when he sold the others. Nevertheless, he may purchase some of the wool back from the buyer, allowing him to give some of the less expensive wool rather than losing all of the better wool that he retained.
The Gemara asks whether the same advice applies when there are white and red shearings. If a person sold the red wool and retained the white wool, perhaps he should give some of both types. The answer is that this too is merely good advice. He need not give all of his white wool; he can buy back some of the red wool and give both colors to the priest.
This does not prove that different species may be combined. According to Rabbi Elai, the law is that different species may be treated together in this case. The Mishnah is simply advising the owner to divide the gift between the two colors.
There is nevertheless a question against Rabbi Elai from the laws of terumah. With terumah, one may not separate from one species on behalf of another. We might therefore have expected the same rule to apply to the first shearing.
The answer is that the Mishnah previously cited is not a baraita following Rabbi Elai. According to the Rabbis, different species may not be used interchangeably for the first shearing, just as they may not be used interchangeably for terumah. The Mishnah that appeared to permit it was only offering practical advice about how to divide the gift.
The Gemara considers yet another possible comparison with terumah. With terumah, one must leave a recognizable remainder. If someone designates the entire produce as terumah, he has not designated anything properly, because there must be a remainder that is clearly identifiable as the portion left over.
Perhaps the same should apply to the first shearing. Maybe one must give only part of the wool, leaving a recognizable remainder, and may not give the entire shearing to the priest.
A teaching appears to support this rule. If someone says, “Let my entire threshing floor be terumah,” or “Let all my dough be challah,” he has said nothing. One cannot designate the entire amount as terumah or challah.
Another teaching, however, indicates that one may give the entire first shearing. The Gemara resolves the contradiction by distinguishing the opinions. The Rabbis require a recognizable remainder, just as they do with terumah. Rabbi Elai permits the entire first shearing to be given. Thus, the law remains consistent with each authority’s position.
We now reach the practical ruling. Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak says that nowadays the accepted practice follows three elderly sages. The first ruling is like Rabbi Elai regarding the first shearing: the mitzvah applies only in the Land of Israel.
The second ruling is also according to Rabbi Elai regarding the laws of ritual immersion and Torah study. There is a disagreement about whether a person who is impure because of a seminal emission may study Torah. Some authorities say that just as fire cannot become impure, the words of Torah cannot become impure, and therefore such a person may study Torah. Other rabbis say that a person in that state should not study Torah.
The practice follows the lenient opinion in this matter, allowing a person in that state to study Torah even without immersion.
The third ruling concerns the prohibition of mixtures. The accepted practice follows the three elderly sages regarding the requirement that different seeds be planted together in one act. It is not sufficient merely to plant them in separate places. They must be placed together in one handful and planted together; only then does the prohibition apply in this particular case.
Thus, in these three matters, the accepted practice follows the opinions of the three elderly sages.
We return to the Mishnah, which says that there is a stringency regarding the gifts from a slaughtered animal compared with the first shearing. The gifts from a slaughtered animal apply even when there is only one animal, whereas the first shearing applies only when a person has the required minimum number of sheep. The gifts also apply to a wider range of animals, while the first shearing applies only to sheep. In this respect, the gifts from the slaughtered animal are more stringent.
One asks why we do not say the opposite: that the first shearing is more stringent because it applies even to an animal that is not fit for sacrifice, whereas the gifts from a slaughtered animal may not apply in the same way to an animal that is a tereifah.
Rabbi Shimon indeed holds that a tereifah is exempt from the first shearing. His reason is that he derives the law through the repeated word “giving” from the priestly gifts. Just as the priestly gifts do not apply to a tereifah, the first shearing also does not apply to a tereifah.
But if Rabbi Shimon derives the first shearing from the priestly gifts through the repeated word “giving,” why not derive it from terumah instead? Terumah applies specifically in the Land of Israel. If the first shearing is derived from terumah, one would conclude that it too applies only in the Land of Israel. Yet the Mishnah says that the first shearing applies even outside the Land.
The Gemara answers that Rabbi Shimon has a different reason. He does not derive the first shearing from the priestly gifts through the repeated word “giving.” Rather, he derives it through the repeated word “sheep” from the tithe of animals.
Just as the tithe of animals does not apply to a tereifah, so too the first shearing does not apply to a tereifah.
Why does the tithe of animals not apply to a tereifah? The animals had to pass individually beneath a gate or opening, and the tenth animal was marked as the tithe. A tereifah cannot pass through the process properly if it cannot walk. For example, if an animal’s leg was amputated below the knee, that could render it a tereifah, and it could not pass through the opening.
Therefore, all animals classified as tereifot are exempt from the tithe of animals. Rabbi Shimon derives from this that they are also exempt from the first shearing.
The Gemara then asks why we should derive the first shearing from the tithe of animals rather than from the firstborn offering. A firstborn animal is obligated even if it is a tereifah. Perhaps the first shearing should likewise remain obligatory even in the case of a tereifah.
The Gemara explains that the first shearing is more similar to the tithe of animals than to the firstborn offering. The discussion enumerates the similarities.
First, both the first shearing and the tithe of animals apply to males and females, whereas the firstborn offering applies only to males. Thus, in this respect, the first shearing is similar to the tithe of animals and unlike the firstborn offering.
Second, neither the first shearing nor the tithe of animals applies to non-kosher animals. The firstborn law, however, includes the firstborn of a donkey. In this respect as well, the first shearing is more similar to the tithe of animals.
Third, both the first shearing and the tithe of animals require a minimum quantity. The first shearing requires five sheep, while the tithe of animals requires ten. A firstborn offering, however, applies even to a single animal.
Fourth, neither the first shearing nor the tithe of animals is connected to the womb. The animal does not acquire this status merely by being born. The first shearing becomes relevant when the sheep grows wool, and the tithe of animals applies when the animals pass through the counting process. A firstborn animal, by contrast, becomes holy from birth, from the moment it emerges from the womb.
Fifth, the first shearing and the tithe of animals apply only to animals, whereas the law of the firstborn also applies to human beings, as in the redemption of a firstborn son.
Sixth, the first shearing and the tithe of animals apply to animals that are not firstborn. The firstborn offering, by definition, applies only to a firstborn animal.
Seventh, the first shearing and the tithe of animals were given after the Torah was given. The sanctity of the firstborn, however, was established earlier, before the Giving of the Torah.
For these reasons, the first shearing is more similar to the tithe of animals than to the firstborn offering. Rabbi Shimon therefore derives its law from the tithe of animals and concludes that a tereifah is exempt from the first shearing.
The Gemara responds that one could nevertheless point to similarities between the first shearing and the firstborn offering. Both apply even when the mother has died; the tithe of animals does not apply in the same way to an orphaned animal. Both apply even to an animal that a person purchased, whereas a purchased animal is exempt from the tithe of animals. Both apply when the animal is owned by partners, whereas the tithe of animals does not apply to a partnership. Both apply when the animal was received as a gift, whereas the tithe of animals does not apply in the same way to animals received as a gift.
In addition, the first shearing applies even in the present time, when there is no Temple, whereas the tithe of animals applies only when the Temple is functioning. Both the firstborn offering and the first shearing are given to a priest, while the tithe of animals is eaten by its owner in the manner of a peace offering and is not given to a priest.
There is also a distinction concerning sanctity. The firstborn animal is holy in its own right and requires sanctification. The first shearing, by contrast, has no inherent sanctity; it is simply the monetary property of the priest. The tithe of animals also involves a sanctification process, in which the tenth animal is marked.
Finally, after receiving the first shearing, the priest may sell it to anyone he wishes. The tithe of an animal, however, may not be sold in that manner.
Thus, there are numerous similarities between the first shearing and the firstborn offering. One might therefore argue that the first shearing should be derived from the firstborn offering and should remain obligatory even in the case of a tereifah.
The Gemara answers that, despite these similarities, the firstborn offering is obligated even in the case of a tereifah, while the tithe of animals is not. Since the first shearing is more similar to the tithe of animals in the relevant respect, it is preferable to derive its law from the tithe of animals. Therefore, according to Rabbi Shimon, a tereifah is exempt from the first shearing.
Although the firstborn offering is similar to the first shearing in eight ways, while the tithe of animals is similar in only seven ways, one of the similarities to the tithe is decisive: both the first shearing and the tithe of animals apply to ordinary animals, not specifically to firstborn animals. The firstborn offering, by contrast, applies only to a firstborn animal. For that reason, the first shearing is considered more appropriately derived from the tithe of animals.
Accordingly, the conclusion is that the first shearing does not apply to a tereifah, following Rabbi Shimon.