A man has two sheep, neither of which has yet given birth to a firstborn. Both sheep give birth, so there are two firstborn animals. Obviously, both belong to the priest; that case is straightforward.
If one sheep gives birth to a male and the other gives birth to a female, the male belongs to the priest, because it is the firstborn. If two males and one female are born, then one of the males certainly belongs to the priest. Even if one sheep gave birth to a firstborn male and the other gave birth first to a female, one of the two males is unquestionably a firstborn. Therefore, one animal goes to the priest, while the owner keeps the other, because it is uncertain which one is the firstborn.
Rabbi Tarfon says that the priest receives the better animal—the larger and stronger one. Rabbi Akiva, consistent with what we learned in the previous Mishnah, says that the priest receives the smaller and weaker one. What does the owner do with the animal that he keeps? We retracted an earlier interpretation of “from there,” and concluded that it means that the owner receives the weaker animal. The animal that remains with the Israelite must be allowed to live until it develops a blemish.
Once it develops a blemish, the owner may eat it. However, when he is told to give the priestly gifts, he must give the cheeks, the foreleg, and the maw. Why do we say that he must give those gifts? The priest can tell him: If this is a firstborn animal, I should receive the entire animal. If it is not a firstborn, then give me the priestly gifts. In either case, the priest is entitled to receive something.
Rabbi Yosef says that this Mishnah follows the same principle we learned in the previous Mishnah: the owner is exempt from giving the priestly gifts. We explained the reason in the previous discussion. When the owner gives the priest one animal, perhaps he has actually given him the animal that was not the firstborn. By receiving that animal, the priest is treated as though he also received the firstborn animal and returned it, or sold it back to the owner. Therefore, the owner is exempt from giving the additional gifts.
If one of the animals dies, the other animal is divided between the owner and the priest. The owner can say, “Why should you take money from me? Perhaps your animal died. Who says that the animal that died was mine?” Since the priest cannot prove that the animal that died was the firstborn, they divide the surviving animal.
The next case is two females and one male. The same applies to a case of two males and two females. In either case, the owner gives the priest nothing. Why? With two females and one male, it is possible that each female gave birth first to a female and only afterward did the male come out. Likewise, with two males and two females, it is possible that the two females were born first. Since the males may not be firstborns, the priest receives nothing.
Now we have a new case: two sheep, one of which has never yet given birth to a firstborn and one of which has already given birth to a firstborn. Both then give birth to male animals, and the two males become mixed up, so we do not know which male belongs to which mother. One male goes to the priest and one remains with the owner, because one of them certainly belongs to the priest. One of the two mothers had never yet given birth, so the male born from her is certainly a firstborn; we simply do not know which male that is.
Rabbi Tarfon says that the priest receives the better animal, while Rabbi Akiva says that he receives the weaker animal. The owner waits with the animal that remains with him until it develops a blemish. Rabbi Yosef says that whenever one animal is given to the priest and the other is effectively returned to the owner, the owner is exempt from the priestly gifts, as we learned earlier. When one of the animals dies, the same dispute applies: according to Rabbi Tarfon, they divide the surviving animal, while according to Rabbi Akiva, the priest receives the weaker portion.
There is another case involving two sheep, one male and one female. One of the sheep has never given birth before, while the other has already given birth. They then give birth to a male and a female. The owner gives the priest nothing. It is possible that the female was born first from the sheep that had never given birth, while the male was born from the sheep that had already given birth. In that situation, neither male is certainly a firstborn, and the priest receives nothing.
The Gemara now asks: Why were the opinions of Rabbi Tarfon and Rabbi Akiva stated three times? In each case, Rabbi Tarfon says that the priest receives the better animal, while Rabbi Akiva says that he receives the weaker one.
The first case is the one we learned previously, involving a single animal that gave birth to two animals at once. If one animal must be given to the priest, which one should be given? Rabbi Akiva says that the weaker one is given. The second case is our Mishnah, involving two sheep that had never yet given birth and that produced two males and one female. One male must be given to the priest, and Rabbi Akiva says that the weaker one is given. The third case is that of one sheep that had already given birth and one that had not, when both produced two males. Again, one of the males must be given to the priest, and Rabbi Akiva says that the weaker one is given.
The Gemara explains that all three cases are necessary. If we had been taught only the first case, involving one animal that gave birth to two males, we might have thought that Rabbi Akiva requires the weaker animal only because both males came from the same mother. Perhaps the firstborn was actually the larger animal, and the weaker one is given merely because of the uncertainty.
But what would we say when two animals are involved, one producing a male and a female? We might think that the male born alone from one mother is stronger than the male born together with another animal. Therefore, the Mishnah teaches that even in this case Rabbi Akiva requires the weaker animal to be given to the priest.
On the other hand, if we had been taught only the case involving two sheep that had never yet given birth, we might have said that there is no reason to assume that one animal gave birth to a stronger male than the other. Since everything is uncertain, perhaps the two animals should be treated equally. Therefore, the Mishnah also teaches Rabbi Akiva’s ruling in the case of a single animal that gave birth to two males.
Finally, if we had been taught only the case involving one sheep that had already given birth and one that had not, we might have thought that the animal giving birth for the first time would probably produce a larger animal. At least, that might have been our initial assumption. Therefore, the Mishnah teaches that even in that case the priest receives the weaker animal. Each of the three cases contains a distinct innovation.
The next Mishnah discusses an animal born by cesarean section. The womb is cut open and the animal is removed through the incision. What is the status of an animal born in this manner, followed by another animal born through a normal delivery?
Rabbi Tarfon says that both animals must be allowed to graze until they develop blemishes, after which the owners may eat them. Rabbi Akiva says that the first animal is not considered a firstborn, because it did not emerge from the womb. The second animal is also not considered a firstborn, because another animal preceded it, even though that earlier animal emerged by cesarean section. Therefore, according to Rabbi Akiva, neither animal has the sanctity of a firstborn.
What is the dispute between Rabbi Tarfon and Rabbi Akiva? Rashi explains that the requirement of being a firstborn has two components. It must be the first birth, and it must be the first animal to emerge from the womb. It is not enough to satisfy only one of those requirements; the animal must satisfy both.
Rabbi Tarfon, however, maintains that satisfying one of the two requirements is enough to create a doubt. It is the first birth, even though it did not emerge from the womb. Rabbi Tarfon therefore views it as a firstborn in one respect, and that is sufficient for the animal to be treated as a doubtful firstborn. Rabbi Akiva says that being a firstborn in only one respect is not enough. A firstborn must be a firstborn in both respects.
According to Rabbi Akiva, the first animal is a firstborn in the sense that it was the first animal born, but it was not the first animal to emerge from the womb. The second animal was the first to emerge from the womb, but it was not the first animal born. Since each animal satisfies only one of the two conditions, neither is treated as a firstborn. Rabbi Tarfon, by contrast, says that satisfying one condition is enough to create a doubt, and the animals are therefore treated accordingly.
One of the thirteen interpretive principles is the rule that a general statement requires a specification. The Gemara asks for the classic example of this principle. Rashi first explains the terminology: the specification is connected to the general statement. Some explain the relationship in the opposite order, but we will examine the matter.
The Torah says that all firstborn animals are sanctified. It then specifies that the animal is male. From this, one might initially think that any male is sanctified, even if a female emerged from the womb first. Perhaps the male is the first male, and that is sufficient to give it sanctity.
The phrase “first to emerge from the womb” teaches that the animal must be the first one to emerge from the womb. If another animal emerged from the womb before it, the second animal is not considered the first to emerge from the womb. But perhaps even if an animal was born first by cesarean section, the first animal to emerge from the womb should still be considered a firstborn, because it is the first one to emerge from the womb. The word “firstborn” therefore teaches that the animal must be a firstborn in every respect.
It must be the first animal born, and it must be the first animal to emerge from the womb. That is the principle taught by Rabbi Akiva in our Mishnah.
Rashi asks whether this is truly a standard example of a general statement followed by a specification. In an ordinary example, the specification limits the general statement. Here, however, the words “male” and “first to emerge from the womb” do not independently define the term “firstborn.” Their meaning depends on the general statement.
The Gemara gives a comparison from the laws of covering blood. The Torah says, “You shall cover it,” which is a general statement. It then says that it should be covered with earth. There are different ways one might cover something: one could place another object over it, or one could cover it with earth. The word “cover” by itself is ambiguous and lacks a precise interpretation. The specification of earth explains what type of covering is required.
That is a case of a general statement that requires a specification. The general statement cannot be understood without the specification. It does not mean merely that any form of covering is acceptable; the specification teaches that earth is required.
In a standard generality-and-specification structure, the principle is that the general statement contains only what is found in the specification. For example, the Torah says that one should cover the blood, and then specifies earth. One might think that only earth is acceptable and that stones are not. However, that cannot be the correct model in every case, because there are other passages where a general statement and a specification function differently.
Here, the general statement is that all firstborn animals are sanctified, and the specification is that the animal must be male. The general statement already has meaning: “firstborn” means the first animal born. The specification does not explain an otherwise ambiguous word, as “earth” explains the meaning of “cover.” Instead, the specification limits the general statement by excluding females.
When the Torah says that all firstborn animals are sanctified, that includes both males and females. The specification then teaches that only males are included. The word “firstborn” is not lacking an interpretation; the specification comes to narrow its scope.
Rashi therefore explains that the requirement of “male” and “first to emerge from the womb” is connected to the general term “firstborn.” If we had only the word “male,” we would not know whether the Torah meant any male or specifically a firstborn male. If we had only “first to emerge from the womb,” we would not know whether the Torah meant any animal emerging from the womb or specifically a firstborn animal. These specifications require the general term in order to define their context.
That is different from the case of a person who entrusts an animal to another person for safekeeping. The Torah states, “When a person gives an animal to his fellow,” and lists an ox, a donkey, a sheep, and then all animals. The ox, donkey, and sheep are specifications, while “all animals” is the general statement. Yet the individual terms do not need the general statement in order to be understood. An ox is an ox, a donkey is a donkey, and a sheep is a sheep. The general term does not define them; it simply includes other comparable animals.
Here, by contrast, when the Torah says “male,” we do not know whether it means an ordinary male or a male that is a firstborn. When it says “first to emerge from the womb,” we do not know whether it means any animal emerging from the womb or the firstborn animal emerging from the womb. Therefore, those specifications require the general term “firstborn.”
The general statement is the term “firstborn,” while “male” and “first to emerge from the womb” are the specifications. The specifications do not stand independently; they define which firstborn animals are included.
The beginning of the teaching says that all firstborn animals are sanctified, which could include females. The specification “male” excludes females. The middle section says that the animal must be male, and one might think that it is sufficient for it to be the first male, even if a female emerged first. The phrase “first to emerge from the womb” teaches that it must be the first animal to emerge from the womb. Finally, one might think that even an animal born by cesarean section, followed by the first animal born through the womb, would qualify. The word “firstborn” teaches that it must be the first in both respects.
At first, the Gemara appears to use the word “firstborn” only at the end of the teaching. Rabbi Shabsiya asks Abaye: Why is the word “firstborn” not used at the beginning? Perhaps this indicates that being a firstborn in only one respect is sufficient. If an animal is a firstborn male, even though it is not the first animal to emerge from the womb, perhaps it is still considered a firstborn in that respect.
The middle section also raises a question. It says that the animal must be male and then discusses the possibility that a female emerged first. It does not yet use the word “firstborn.” Perhaps that means that the male is considered a firstborn male even when it is preceded by a female. Only later, when the teaching says “first to emerge from the womb,” does it establish the additional requirement that it be the first animal from the womb.
According to this reading, the word “firstborn” at the end means a complete firstborn—first in both respects. Earlier, however, the teaching may have been discussing a firstborn in only one respect. The Gemara therefore asks how the term “firstborn” is being used at each stage.
Rashi explains that when the word “firstborn” appears in the final section, it means a complete firstborn: it must be the first male and the first animal from the womb. But when the word is absent, the teaching may be referring to an animal that is a firstborn in only one respect.
The Gemara answers that the beginning and the middle of the teaching should not be understood that way. The word “firstborn” always means a complete firstborn. The beginning says that if the Torah had written only “male,” one might have thought that even an animal born by cesarean section would qualify. The phrase “first to emerge from the womb” excludes that possibility.
The first derivation therefore proceeds as follows: “male” teaches that females are excluded. The next derivation teaches that the male must emerge from the womb. At this point, the word “firstborn” has not yet been used to create a separate category of a partial firstborn. Rather, it is understood throughout as referring to a complete firstborn.
The Gemara then asks why the word “firstborn” is needed at the end. If the requirement is simply that the animal be the first to emerge from the womb, why not say only “first to emerge from the womb”? Why add the word “firstborn”?
The answer is that the word “firstborn” teaches that the animal must be a firstborn in both respects. It must be the first male and the first animal to emerge from the womb. The Torah is not merely excluding cesarean births; it is requiring a complete firstborn.
The Gemara then considers a possible alternative. Perhaps when an animal is a firstborn in only one respect, it should still be considered a firstborn. For example, perhaps an animal born by cesarean section is followed by a male born through the womb. The second animal is the first male to emerge from the womb, even though it was preceded by the first male overall. If a partial firstborn is sufficient, the second animal should be holy.
If that were the intended rule, the word “firstborn” would be unnecessary. The phrase “first to emerge from the womb” would already teach that the second animal is the first from the womb, regardless of what emerged by cesarean section. The addition of “firstborn” therefore teaches that the animal must be the first in both respects.
The Gemara asks: If a firstborn in only one respect could qualify, what practical case would there be? The answer would be a male born through the womb after a male born by cesarean section. The second animal is the first male to emerge from the womb, but not the first male born overall. That would be a firstborn in one respect.
However, if the word “firstborn” teaches a complete firstborn, that case is excluded. The second male is not the first male born, because it was preceded by the cesarean birth. It is therefore not holy.
The Gemara returns to the wording of the teaching. The first section says that all firstborn animals are sanctified, which is a general statement. The word “male” excludes females. The middle section says that if one thinks that even a male preceded by a female should qualify, the phrase “first to emerge from the womb” teaches that the animal must be the first from the womb. The final section then says that if one thinks that even an animal preceded by a cesarean birth qualifies, the word “firstborn” teaches that it must be first in every respect.
According to this understanding, the final word “firstborn” is not introducing a new, weaker definition. It clarifies that the animal must satisfy all the requirements of a complete firstborn. The first male, the first animal overall, and the first animal from the womb must all be the same animal.
Rashi describes the difficulty as follows: at different points in the teaching, it might appear that “firstborn” has different meanings. In one place, it seems that being the first male is enough; in another, it seems that the animal must be the first male and the first from the womb. The Gemara resolves this by explaining that “firstborn” always means a complete firstborn. The earlier sections are not establishing a partial category; they are eliminating possible misunderstandings about what the complete firstborn requirement entails.
The Gemara then proposes another reading. Perhaps the word “firstborn” means a firstborn with respect to one matter. If so, the phrase “first to emerge from the womb” would teach that the male must be the first male to emerge from the womb. This would allow a male born through the womb after a female born by cesarean section, because it would be the first male and the first animal from the womb.
But this reading creates a problem. If an animal born by cesarean section is followed by a male born through the womb, the latter is the first male from the womb, but it is not the first male born. If the Torah intends to exclude that case, the word “firstborn” can be used to do so. Yet if a female was born by cesarean section first, and the male is the first male and the first animal from the womb, it is not clear why that case should be excluded.
The Gemara therefore reasons that if the word “firstborn” is being used to exclude only one case, it should exclude the more innovative case: a male born by cesarean section followed by a male born from the womb. That animal is neither the first male nor the first animal from the womb. By contrast, a male preceded only by a female born by cesarean section is the first male and the first animal from the womb, and perhaps that case should remain included.
But that approach does not fit the wording of the teaching. The teaching refers to a male and to the first animal from the womb without distinguishing whether the preceding animal was male or female. Therefore, the Gemara returns to the earlier explanation: “firstborn” means a complete firstborn, and the animal must be first in both respects.
Abaye’s version of the text explains that whenever the Torah uses the word “firstborn,” it means a firstborn in every respect. The phrase “all firstborn animals” initially includes everything, even females. The word “male” excludes females. The phrase “first to emerge from the womb” teaches that the male must be the first animal from the womb. The word “firstborn” then confirms that the animal must be the complete firstborn.
According to Abaye, if a female emerges first from the womb and a male follows, the male is not holy, because it is not the first animal from the womb. If a male emerges by cesarean section and another male follows through the womb, the second male is also not holy, because it is not the first male born. A complete firstborn must satisfy both requirements.
The Gemara then examines another possible interpretation. Perhaps the phrase “firstborn” means that the animal must be first in every respect, while the phrase “male” merely teaches that a female is excluded. If a female emerges first, followed by a male, the male is certainly a male, but it is not a complete firstborn. If something emerged by cesarean section first, the later animal is not a complete firstborn either, because it was preceded by another birth.
This reading makes the teaching consistent: the general statement includes all firstborn animals, the word “male” removes females, the phrase “first to emerge from the womb” requires the first womb birth, and the word “firstborn” requires that the animal be first overall as well. Nothing that precedes the animal—whether male or female, and whether born normally or by cesarean section—can prevent it from being first in one respect while leaving it a complete firstborn in another.
The Gemara returns to the question of a male preceded by a female. If the female emerged from the womb first, the male is the first male but not the first animal from the womb. If the female emerged by cesarean section, the male may be the first male and the first animal from the womb, but it is still not necessarily a complete firstborn, because another animal was born before it. The requirement of a complete firstborn resolves both cases.
Thus, the conclusion is that the sanctity of a firstborn requires two things: it must be the first male born, and it must be the first animal to emerge from the womb. An animal born by cesarean section does not satisfy the womb requirement, and an animal born afterward does not satisfy the requirement of being first overall. This is the basis of Rabbi Akiva’s position in the Mishnah.