The Eddie B. Sit Edition, an audio series of the Talmud Bavli, Masechet Temurah, is dedicated by our good friend Rabbi Shlomo ben Shmuel for the success of himself and his wife Simcha bat Bahira, may they merit to have children at a good and auspicious time, and for the success of their dear sons Shmuel Avraham and Shaul ben Simcha, that they all grow up to Torah, mitzvot, marriage, and good deeds. Amen. Today's daf is being studied for the elevation of the soul of Avraham ben Ester and u'mar chami Yosef ben Sabot. May their souls be at rest in the Garden of Eden. Amen. We are starting on Gimmel amud rishon and we begin at the two dots, six lines down, where it says: Amar Mar.
The Gemara is quoting a Braita that we learned earlier. Amar Mar states that in the Braita, it is written: “kodshei ovdei kochavim,” which means if a non-Jew consecrates an animal as hekdesh, we learn from the Torah that non-Jews can indeed consecrate animals, since they are permitted to bring korbanot. The ruling is that one is not allowed to derive benefit from that animal, and if one does derive benefit, they do not transgress the prohibition of me'ilah (the prohibition against benefiting from consecrated items). Me'ilah is a prohibition from the Torah against benefiting from something that is hekdesh. If one does benefit, they must pay the principal and an additional fifth, and they must bring a korban, but there is no me'ilah concerning a non-Jew's korban.
The Gemara continues, stating that the prohibition against deriving benefit is a rabbinic prohibition, meaning that the Rabbanan instituted a prohibition against deriving benefit from non-Jewish consecrated items. However, from the Torah, there is no me'ilah, but according to rabbinic law, it is prohibited to derive benefit. The Gemara asks: What is the reason for this? It is derived from the verse that states, “me'ilah nefesh ki tim'al ma'al vechat'ah bishgaga,” and we learn a comparison of sin from terumah. In the case of terumah, it is written, “Bnei Yisrael velo ovdei kochavim.” Therefore, we have a gezerah shavah regarding the word “chet” in both contexts. Since terumah is explicitly stated to apply only to Yisrael, we conclude that me'ilah also applies only to Yisrael.
The Braita continues: “And one is not liable for pigul, notar, or tamei.” These are three laws that do not apply to a non-Jew's korban: pigul refers to when a Kohain has an intention to eat it beyond its designated time, which invalidates the korban; notar refers to the prohibition against eating something after its designated time; and tamei refers to a tamei person being forbidden to eat the korban. If a person transgresses these laws concerning a non-Jew's korban, they are not liable.
The Gemara seeks a source for this ruling, as it states by tumah regarding eating a korban betumah: “Speak to Aaron and his sons, and they shall be careful with the consecrated items of the children of Bnei Yisrael and not profane My name.” The verse specifies “mikdashi Bnei Yisrael,” indicating that only the consecrated items of Bnei Yisrael have the laws of tumah, not those of a non-Jew. The Gemara then draws a parallel regarding notar and chillul. The verse states regarding tumah, “Bnei Yisrael velo yehallelu,” and regarding notar, “ve'ochelav avono yissa ki et kodesh Hashem chillel.” Therefore, the term chillul teaches us that notar also does not apply to a non-Jew.
Furthermore, the Gemara establishes the prohibition of pigul through a similar reasoning, stating that there is a gezerah shavah regarding the term “avon” from notar. The verse regarding pigul states, “vehanephesh ha'ochelet mimenu avono avonah tissa,” and the verse regarding notar states, “ve'ochelav avono yissa ki et kodesh Hashem chillel.” Thus, all these prohibitions apply specifically to Bnei Yisrael and not to non-Jews.
The Gemara then reviews the law of temurah. If one has an animal, the Torah states that one is not allowed to transfer the sanctity from this animal to a mundane animal. Even if the second animal is of greater value, the transfer cannot occur. However, if one does make the transfer, it is valid, and both animals become kodesh. The Torah states, “lo yachlifenu v'lo yamir.” If one does transfer, “v'hayah hu u'tmurato kodesh.” The ruling is that there is no law of temurah concerning a non-Jew's korban. The Gemara explains that it states, “lo yachlifenu v'lo yamir,” which is the law of temurah. The Torah writes at the beginning of the section, “Daber el Bnei Yisrael v'amarta aleihem,” which clearly refers to the Jewish people as opposed to non-Jews.
The Gemara continues, stating that there is no bringing of nesachim. This means that if a Jew wishes to bring a korban nesachim, such as wine, without a korban, he is permitted. However, the Braita states that non-Jews cannot bring wine alone. Yet, with their korban, they must bring nesachim, but they cannot bring nesachim alone. The source for this ruling is derived from the verse regarding nesachim, which states that a citizen, or ezrach, can bring nesachim. However, a non-Jew cannot bring nesachim.
The Gemara then poses a question: perhaps a non-Jew's olah should not require nesachim? The Gemara answers that the Torah states, “Kacha ya'aseh lashor ha'echad,” indicating that whenever it states “Kacha,” it is a requirement. Therefore, when it discusses bringing korbanot, it must include nesachim along with it, but to bring it alone is not permitted.
The Gemara continues with Rabbi Yose, who states that he is stringent regarding all these matters. He argues that if notar, tumah, and pigul do not apply to a non-Jew's korban, he maintains that they should apply. The reason given is that regarding a non-Jew's korban, it states “l'Hashem.” This teaches us that the korban of a non-Jew has the same sanctity as that of a Jew concerning the laws of me'ilah and pigul. Rabbi Yose concludes that the korbanot of non-Jews possess the same sanctity as those of Yisrael.
The Gemara then clarifies that when Rabbi Shimon stated that these laws do not apply, he was referring specifically to kodshei mizbe'ach, which pertains to korbanot. However, when a non-Jew consecrates something for the Beit HaMikdash, such as a donation, it is considered kedushat bedek habayit, and there is me'ilah in such a case. Kedushat bedek habayit refers to items donated to the Beit HaMikdash treasury, and here we have a gezerah shavah from terumah. Just as terumah applies only to Jews, so too does me'ilah apply only to kedushat haguf.
When it comes to kedushat bedek habayit, which relates to monetary value, me'ilah will apply. The Gemara then states that any negative commandment in the Torah that entails an action makes one liable. If one does not perform an action, they are exempt. This is a general principle: to be liable for lashes from the Torah, there must be a prohibition that involves an action. If one does not perform an action, they cannot be liable.
The Gemara asks whether this is a valid general principle, questioning whether one is exempt for prohibitions that do not entail an action. The Gemara brings a counterexample from temurah, which is a prohibition that does not involve an action, yet one is liable for lashes for making a temurah. The Mishnah states that if one makes a temurah, they are liable for lashes, even though it involves no physical action. The Gemara concludes that this ruling follows Rabbi Yehuda, who maintains that one can be liable for a prohibition that does not involve an action.
The Gemara continues to discuss the various prohibitions and their implications, stating that the prohibition of temurah is unique in that one can be liable for it even without an action. The Gemara then examines the laws surrounding shvuot, particularly focusing on shvuat sheker and shvuat shav. It concludes that even in cases where one swears falsely or makes a declaration that does not involve an action, they can still be held accountable for their statements.
In summary, the Gemara concludes that there are various cases in which one can be liable for lashes, even when no physical action is performed, and these cases are derived through careful examination of the Torah and its teachings. The discussion highlights the nuances of halachic rulings and the importance of understanding the distinctions between different types of prohibitions, whether they pertain to actions or statements.