My name is Darim Dafghaf, and this session is dedicated in honor of Miriam bat Ester. I will begin today’s discussion at the end of the nineteenth chapter, where we are dealing with the Mishnah at the bottom of the page. The Mishnah states that when a person makes a vow using the unspecified term “terumah,” the meaning depends on where he is. In Judea, the term refers to the terumah of the Temple treasury, which is something one can use as the basis of a vow. In the Galilee, which is far from the Temple, it refers to agricultural terumah, which is already prohibited; therefore, the vow does not take effect in the same way.
The Gemara makes a precise inference from the wording of the Mishnah. The Mishnah says that the people of the Galilee do not recognize the terumah of the Temple treasury. This implies that if they did recognize it, then when they used the unspecified term “terumah,” it would be prohibited, even though there would be a doubt about their intention. They recognize the Temple terumah, but they merely said “terumah,” without specifying either agricultural terumah or Temple terumah. The implication is that we must be stringent. This appears to support the opinion that an uncertain vow is treated stringently.
Then we have the second part of the Mishnah, concerning the unspecified term “consecration.” In Judea, it is permitted, because the people there mean the consecration given to a priest, which is permitted for the priest to use. In the Galilee, however, it is prohibited, because there are fewer priests in that region, and the people are referring to consecration for the Temple treasury. The Mishnah says that the people of the Galilee do not recognize the consecration given to priests, and therefore, when they use the term “consecration,” it is prohibited.
Again, the Gemara asks what we can infer. If the people of the Galilee did recognize the consecration given to priests, then their unspecified use of the term would be permitted. This seems to be the opposite direction: here, we are treating the doubt leniently. How, then, can the first part of the Mishnah be stringent while the second part is lenient?
The Gemara answers that the second part of the Mishnah does not necessarily continue the opinion of Rabbi Yehudah. The first part, dealing with vows, is Rabbi Yehudah’s opinion. The second part, dealing with consecration, is the opinion of Rabbi Elazar bar Tzadok. We encountered this earlier. Rabbi Yehudah discussed vows, while Rabbi Elazar bar Tzadok discussed consecration. Although Rabbi Yehudah treats vows stringently, Rabbi Elazar bar Tzadok holds that the matter is treated leniently—not only with regard to consecration, but with regard to vows as well.
How do we know that Rabbi Elazar bar Tzadok is the authority who discusses unspecified consecration? A baraita explicitly identifies him. The Mishnah does not provide a name, so we initially assumed that the second part continued Rabbi Yehudah’s statement. The baraita, however, clearly says that the ruling concerning unspecified consecration belongs to Rabbi Elazar bar Tzadok. That resolves the apparent contradiction.
We now move on to the next Mishnah. In the previous Mishnah, we learned that when a person explains what he intended by his vow, the explanation is accepted leniently. The new Mishnah gives examples of such explanations. If a person explains his words in a way that removes the vow, even if the explanation is unusual, we accept it.
For example, a person says, “This item is consecrated to me.” He is then asked what he meant, and he answers, “I did not mean consecration that makes the item prohibited. I meant a fishing net.” A fishing net is called a “consecration” in this usage. This is a strange explanation, but it is accepted. The novelty of the Mishnah is that he did not choose the more ordinary alternative—that he meant the consecration given to a priest. Even though he offers the far-fetched explanation that he meant a fishing net, we accept his clarification. In effect, he is saying that he intended nothing connected with a vow.
Similarly, if he says, “This is like an offering,” and then explains, “I meant the offerings that people give to kings,” he is believed. He did not mean an offering that creates a prohibition; he meant a gift presented to a king, and he had no intention of making a vow.
If a person says to his fellow, “I am like an offering to you,” it sounds as though he is prohibiting himself from benefiting from that person. He can then explain, “I did not mean my body. I meant a bone that I have in my house.” He left a bone in his house so that he could say, “I am prohibiting this bone to myself.” Everyone might have understood him as saying that he was prohibiting himself, but he explains that he was referring to the bone. These explanations are strange and far-fetched, but the principle is that if he explains his words, we accept the explanation.
The Mishnah gives another example. A person says, “The benefit of my wife should be prohibited to me,” using the language of a vow. He then explains, “I meant my first wife, whom I divorced.” Ordinarily, when a person says “my wife,” he means his current wife. Nevertheless, he is allowed to explain that he was referring to his former wife.
With regard to all these cases, the Mishnah says that no annulment is required. Once the person explains his intention, he does not need to go to a rabbi to have the vow annulled. We accept his explanation and the matter is finished. Sometimes, as we have learned, even when a statement is not technically a vow, we treat it stringently. Here, however, once he explains the words, he does not need to seek an annulment.
The Mishnah continues: If they seek an annulment, they are punished and we are stringent with them. This refers to an unlearned person, who is not necessarily believed when he tries to explain his words away. We previously distinguished between a Torah scholar and an unlearned person. In the case of an unlearned person, if he comes to ask, he needs a proper annulment.
At first, this sounds contradictory. The Mishnah just said that no annulment is required, and then it says, “If they seek an annulment.” Why would they seek an annulment if none is necessary? The answer is that the first statement refers to a Torah scholar, while the second refers to an unlearned person. A Torah scholar is believed when he explains his intention, but an unlearned person must undergo the annulment process.
Furthermore, if the unlearned person acted as though the vow were permitted before coming to the rabbi, we punish him. We require him to come for an annulment, and if he treated the vow leniently before doing so, we penalize him. We do not simply remove the vow in the easiest possible way. There are two ways to annul a vow: by finding an opening that demonstrates that he would never have made the vow had he known certain facts, or through a general expression of regret. The latter is easier. One says, in effect, “I regret having made the vow,” and the vow is annulled.
The Mishnah teaches that with an unlearned person we are stringent in two ways. First, we punish him if he acted permissively before coming to the rabbi. Second, we do not annul the vow through the easy route of general regret. We require a more difficult opening. We want to teach unlearned people not to make vows in the first place and not to become accustomed to making them casually.
This is the opinion of Rabbi Meir. The Sages say that we may provide an opening based on another matter. In other words, we do not necessarily have to find an opening directly connected to the wording of the vow. General regret is sufficient, and we do not punish the person for having violated the vow before coming to the rabbi. The Sages are therefore more lenient, although they still teach the unlearned person to be careful with vows until the annulment has been completed, so that he does not come to treat vows lightly.
The commentator explains that when the Mishnah says, “If they seek an annulment,” it means that if an unlearned person seeks an annulment, he requires one. The Gemara clarifies that when the Mishnah says that they do not require an annulment, it means that a Torah scholar who gives such an explanation does not require one. When an unlearned person comes to ask, however, we punish him for having acted permissively and we are stringent with him regarding the procedure for annulment.
Regarding the punishment, suppose a person accepted a period of abstinence and then violated it. He comes to the rabbi and explains his original words, but he had already acted permissively for ten days—for example, he drank wine during those ten days. We believe his explanation, but we tell him to observe the restriction for ten days and then return. He must make up the days during which he treated the restriction as permitted.
The same applies whether the original period was the minimum period or a longer period. If he accepted the minimum period, he must at least observe the minimum period that remains applicable. If he accepted a longer period and had acted permissively during part of it, he must observe the number of days corresponding to the time during which he had been lenient. The point is that we do not permit him to benefit from his own delay in coming to ask.
We also remain stringent with him in the manner of annulment. We do not use the easy procedure of simply asking whether he regrets the vow. We require an opening: “Had you known this or that, would you have made the vow?” This is a more difficult procedure because it requires returning to the original vow and finding a circumstance that would have prevented him from making it.
The commentator explains that these penalties apply specifically to the far-fetched explanations in the Mishnah, such as saying that “consecration” meant a fishing net or that “my body” meant a bone in his house. These are implausible interpretations. In contrast, if the person offers a reasonable interpretation—for example, if he uses a term that could ordinarily refer to another meaning—we are not as stringent with an unlearned person. In that case, he may have genuinely meant the alternative meaning, and we do not treat him as someone who is intentionally making vows and then inventing an absurd explanation to escape them.
The Gemara then returns to the apparent contradiction in the Mishnah. It asks: You said that these people do not require an annulment, and then you said that if they seek an annulment, we punish them and are stringent with them. The Gemara presents this as a difficulty in the wording of the Mishnah.
Rabbi Yehudah answers that the Mishnah should be understood as follows: “All of these do not require an annulment” refers to a Torah scholar. “If they seek an annulment” refers to an unlearned person. When an unlearned person comes to ask, we punish him by requiring him to observe the restriction for the period during which he had acted permissively, and we are stringent with him by requiring an opening rather than a simple annulment through regret.
The Gemara then asks how this punishment is implemented. It gives the example of a person who accepted a period of abstinence and violated it. We do not immediately annul the vow. If he had been drinking wine for ten days, he must first observe the restriction for ten days and only afterward return to have the matter resolved.
What if he had accepted a longer period of abstinence? If the longer period was more than the minimum period, he must observe the number of days during which he acted permissively. At the very least, however, he must observe one complete minimum period. Thus, if the law defines the minimum period as thirty days, we impose thirty days when that is the applicable minimum, even if the circumstances involve a longer undertaking.
The Gemara also teaches that a court must follow this procedure. Any court dealing with such a person must tell him to return after the required period. A court that immediately annuls the vow is not following the proper protocol. We do not pursue the person to remove the vow when he has not violated it, because earlier we learned that we do not encourage people to maintain vows. Nevertheless, in this specific case, where an unlearned person violated his vow and then comes to have it removed, we are stringent.
One might have thought that if he comes on his own initiative, without the court pursuing him, the court can be lenient. The Gemara says that this is not so. Even when he comes to the court voluntarily, the court must require him to observe the necessary period before granting the annulment. In fact, the court itself is held responsible if it immediately removes the vow in a case where the procedure requires a delay.
This is different from the earlier cases, where the person explained his words and there was no real vow. There, the whole matter is merely a penalty intended to prevent people from becoming accustomed to making vows. But if the person made a genuine vow and violated it, we are not as lenient. In that case, we require him to observe the corresponding period before annulling the vow.
There is an exception discussed by the commentators. Suppose a person made a vow prohibiting himself from eating all fruit except grain, and then he ate fruit. He comes to the court to have the vow annulled. Ordinarily, since he violated a genuine vow, the court would require him to wait ten days—or, depending on the case, thirty days—without eating fruit before granting the annulment.
However, if avoiding fruit is so difficult that the person cannot reasonably stand it, the court may be lenient. The prohibition could affect his ability to function spiritually, including his ability to pray or to serve God properly. In such a case, we do not impose the full penalty merely to make him suffer. We may annul the vow immediately, because the purpose of the penalty is not to create an impossible situation.
This is the point of the discussion in Tosafot. The rabbi in that case is not included among those who violated the procedure because he understood that this was an exceptional circumstance. If the person were forced to remain under the vow, it could affect his relationship with God and his ability to pray. Therefore, although the ordinary rule is to make him wait and to require a more difficult annulment, here the rabbi was lenient.
It was asked whether, if a person violated a Torah-level prohibition connected with a vow, he would receive the Torah punishment and also be required to wait the additional period imposed by the Sages. The discussion indicates that the court’s penalty is an additional measure. Nevertheless, the case under discussion is one in which the person genuinely violated the vow. This is different from the earlier case, where he merely explained away his words and the vow was treated as nonexistent.
The Mishnah concludes with guidance about vows and proper conduct. A person should not accustom himself to making vows. If he becomes accustomed to vows, he may eventually come to make oaths, which are even more serious because they involve God’s Name. One should also not associate regularly with an unlearned person, because one may end up eating his food, and he may not separate the required tithes. As a result, one could unknowingly eat produce that is forbidden for consumption.
The commentator adds that even a priest should be careful about associating with an unlearned priest. A regular person may not need to be concerned about priestly gifts, but an unlearned priest may handle them improperly or cause others to consume impure priestly gifts. Therefore, even a priest should be careful with an unlearned priest.
The Mishnah also says not to spend excessive time with another man’s wife, because this may lead to adultery. The Gemara clarifies that when the Mishnah says this, it is referring to another man’s wife. With one’s own wife, the concern is different. If she is menstruating, excessive conversation and familiarity may lead to forbidden intimacy. With another man’s wife, the concern is that the relationship itself may lead to adultery.
The Gemara continues that if a person gazes at a woman’s heel, he may produce children who are not fitting. The commentators explain that even looking at a part of the body that is normally exposed can be problematic if it leads to inappropriate thoughts. The discussion then clarifies that the reference is not necessarily to an ordinary heel. It refers to the heel when it is positioned opposite the place of sexual nakedness. Under ordinary circumstances, looking at a heel that is normally exposed is not the issue. The problem is when the heel is positioned in a way that makes it part of the area that should not be seen.
The Gemara then cites the verse concerning Mount Sinai: “So that the fear of God will be upon your faces, that you should not sin.” The Gemara explains that “fear” refers to shame. A person must have a sense of shame before God and before other people, because shame protects him from sin. In Arabic, there is an expression for a person who possesses this sense of shame. Such a person is less likely to sin because he is embarrassed to act improperly.
The Sages say that anyone who is embarrassed will not quickly sin, while a person who has no shame is presumed not to have had ancestors who stood at Mount Sinai. The reason is that the entire purpose of the revelation at Sinai was that the fear of God should be upon the faces of the Jewish people so that they would not sin. A person who has no shame lacks that quality. This does not mean that we are determining his ancestry literally; it means that he is lacking the characteristic that the Jewish people received at Sinai.
The Gemara then cites Rabbi Yochanan ben Dahavai, who reported four matters that the ministering angels told him. He asked why certain children are born with particular defects, and he was told that these conditions result from improper conduct during marital relations.
Children who are lame, the Gemara says, result from the couple turning the table. This means that they did not have relations in the ordinary position but reversed the arrangement. The commentator explains that the act was performed from behind rather than in the ordinary manner, and that this affects the children.
Children who are mute result from the couple engaging in marital relations while speaking. Children who are deaf result from the couple speaking to one another during marital relations, because the speech affects the sense of hearing. Children who are blind result from looking at the place of sexual nakedness. In each case, the Gemara presents the consequence as corresponding to the improper conduct.
A contradiction is then brought from the story of Ima Shalom, the wife of Rabbi Eliezer. People asked her why her children were especially attractive. She answered that her husband did not have relations with her at the beginning of the night, when women might still be walking in the street, nor at the end of the night, when women might again be getting up and going out. He waited until people were asleep, so that his thoughts would not turn toward other women.
She also said that during relations he did not expose himself unnecessarily. He revealed only the minimum amount and kept the rest covered. Furthermore, he acted as though he were being compelled by a demon rather than pursuing the act with excessive desire. She asked him why he behaved in this way, and he answered that he did not want to think about another woman during relations. If he were to think about another woman at that time, it could cause his children to have the spiritual blemish associated with illegitimacy.
This story seems to imply that conversation during marital relations is permitted, because Ima Shalom and her husband were speaking. The answer is that not all speech is the same. It may be permitted to speak words that bring affection and reconciliation, but one should not carry on ordinary or unrelated conversation during relations. The problem is speech that distracts the mind or is inconsistent with modesty, not necessarily every word spoken for the purpose of affection.
The story also describes the degree of modesty practiced by Rabbi Eliezer. He did not act at the beginning or end of the night, when his thoughts might be directed toward women outside. He minimized exposure, and his conduct was restrained and modest.
The Gemara then presents the opinion of the Sages, who do not accept Rabbi Yochanan ben Dahavai’s teaching as the practical law. They say that whatever a person wishes to do with his wife, he may do. The Gemara compares this to meat. A person may receive meat from the butcher and prepare it in whatever manner he prefers: salted, roasted, cooked, or thoroughly cooked. The point is that a person may be intimate with his wife in different ways.
The Gemara gives a similar comparison with fish. A person may eat fish salted, roasted, or cooked. It even mentions eating fish with milk. This is the source of the familiar expression concerning fish and dairy. The purpose of these examples is to show that the Sages reject the restrictions attributed to Rabbi Yochanan ben Dahavai.
Why does the Gemara give four examples? The commentator explains that Rabbi Yochanan ben Dahavai had mentioned four forms of conduct: turning the table, looking at the place of nakedness, speaking during relations, and exposing oneself. The Sages respond with four corresponding examples, teaching that these matters are not prohibited. They are undoing the four consequences described by Rabbi Yochanan ben Dahavai.
The Gemara then asks who the “ministering angels” were who told Rabbi Yochanan ben Dahavai these things. One answer is that “ministering angels” refers to the Sages. They are called ministering angels because they separate themselves from ordinary people and maintain a higher level of conduct.
Another possibility is that the reference is literally to ministering angels. If so, the Gemara asks why Rabbi Yochanan ben Dahavai should not follow their teaching. The answer is that the Sages may know the practical reality better. The angels are separated from human beings and do not experience human life in the same way. The title “ministering angels” may therefore be a way of describing scholars who distinguish themselves from the rest of society.
The Gemara uses this expression elsewhere for people who are distinguished and separate. The term can refer to individuals who stand apart from others and do not mix with them. Thus, the discussion does not necessarily require us to understand that Rabbi Yochanan ben Dahavai literally held a conversation with angels.
The Gemara then tells of a woman who came before Rabbi and said, “I prepared the table for my husband, but he overturned it.” Rabbi answered her, “My daughter, the Torah has permitted your husband to you. What can I do for you?” The meaning is that the husband may conduct marital relations in whatever manner is permitted between husband and wife.
There are different interpretations of what “overturned the table” means. Some explain that it refers to relations from behind. Others understand it to mean a manner of relations that is not the ordinary form at all. Another interpretation is that the wife was above and the husband below, reversing the usual arrangement. The essential point is that she complained about her husband’s conduct, and Rabbi answered that the Torah allows a husband and wife latitude in their private relationship.
A similar story is told about a woman who came to Rav and said, “I prepared the table for my husband, but he overturned it.” Rav responded, “What difference is there between this and eating fish?” Just as a person may eat fish in the manner he chooses, so the husband and wife may conduct their relationship in a permitted manner.
The commentator emphasizes that even when a person has more than one wife, he must focus his thoughts on the wife with whom he is currently being intimate. He may not be physically with one wife while directing his thoughts toward another. The mind must be directed toward the wife who is present.
The Gemara then returns to the children who are described as rebellious or otherwise improper. It lists several forms of marital conduct that can produce a blemish in the children. These are organized through an acronym and include relations under coercion, relations when one spouse hates the other, relations when one spouse is under a ban, relations when a person mistakenly thinks he is with a different wife, relations during an argument, relations while intoxicated, relations with a woman whom he has decided to divorce, relations in a situation involving multiple men, and relations initiated improperly by the wife.
The first category is a child born through coercion. This means that the husband forces his wife to be intimate with him out of fear. The commentator explains that the husband pressures her and does not act with her consent. Because the relationship is conducted in this way, the children are described as affected by the parents’ conduct.
The Gemara distinguishes between a woman who is fully coerced and a woman who is merely pressured. These are closely related categories, but they are counted separately because the degree of coercion can differ.
The next category is a child born when one spouse hates the other. The commentator explains that the hatred causes the husband’s thoughts to turn toward another woman. Some authorities understand the category more broadly as referring to relations that take place while the couple is acting with hatred and hostility toward one another.
The next category involves a person who is under a ban. If either the husband or wife is under a religious ban, relations at that time are described as improper. The commentator discusses whether the reference is to the husband or the wife, but the point is that a person who is in such a condition should not engage in marital relations.
Another category is a child born through mistaken identity. This occurs when a man is intimate with one of his wives while thinking that she is another wife. The Gemara discusses Jacob as a contrast. Jacob did not have a specific intention toward Rachel or Leah in the act involving Leah, because he knew that Laban might deceive him. His intention was directed toward whoever was in front of him. Therefore, Jacob’s case is not considered the same kind of mistake.
The problem is when a man has specific intention toward one wife but is actually with another. That is the meaning of the category of mistaken identity. Jacob knew he was with Leah; he simply had not identified her by name. He did not see Rachel and imagine that Leah was Rachel. Rather, his intention was toward the woman who was present, regardless of her name.
The next category is relations during an argument. A person has quarreled with his wife and engages in relations before appeasing her or resolving the conflict. Even if he does not hate her, the fact that they are still fighting makes the relationship improper.
The next category is relations while intoxicated. A drunken person is not fully in control of his mind and does not properly direct his thoughts toward his wife. Since the mind is not properly focused, the Gemara describes the children as affected by that conduct.
Another category is a man who has decided to divorce his wife. Once he has determined that he will divorce her, he should not continue relations with her. The commentator explains that even if he has not yet formally divorced her, once he has made up his mind that she will no longer be his wife, his relationship with her is considered improper.
There is also a category involving a woman who has been with several men, creating uncertainty about the identity of the father. This is referred to as a case of mixture. Since the father is not known, the child is associated with the problem created by that uncertainty.
The final category is a woman who solicits her husband for relations. The term used describes a woman who is immodest in initiating the act. The Gemara says that she boldly asks her husband for relations, and this is considered improper. The commentators discuss the degree to which a wife may express her desire, but the category refers to an immodest and aggressive manner of doing so.
The legal authorities bring these categories together and record them as forms of conduct that can produce children described as defective in this spiritual sense: children born through coercion, hatred, a religious ban, mistaken identity, marital conflict, intoxication, a pending divorce, sexual mixture, and immodest solicitation.
There is a question concerning the category of mistaken identity and Jacob. If Jacob’s intention was directed toward Rachel but he was actually with Leah, why were the tribes not affected? The answer is that Jacob did not have intention toward Rachel specifically. He knew that Laban might replace the women, so his intention was directed toward the woman who was actually in front of him. He did not know Leah’s appearance or her name, but he was not imagining that he was physically with a different body. He simply thought that the woman’s name was Rachel when it was actually Leah. That is not the same as being physically with one wife while thinking about another wife.
The Gemara then quotes Rabbi Shmuel bar Nachmani, who says that any man whose wife solicits him for relations will have children like those of Moses. This seems to conflict with the earlier statement that a woman who solicits her husband produces improper children. The Gemara resolves the matter by distinguishing between improper solicitation and a wife expressing affection or desire in a permitted and loving way.
The example is Leah. Leah went out to meet Jacob and said, “You will come to me, because I have hired you with my son’s mandrakes.” She was asking him to come to her, yet the result was the birth of Issachar, who was known for wisdom. The Gemara therefore says that Issachar’s birth came about through Leah’s initiative, and this cannot be considered inherently improper.
The commentator explains that Leah did not merely demand relations. She spoke with Jacob in a way that attracted and appeased him, expressing affection and drawing him toward her. She did not say crudely, “Come and have relations.” She said, in effect, “Come to me,” and explained the circumstances. This type of affectionate speech is permitted and can even be praiseworthy.
Thus, the prohibition is not that a wife may never express desire or invite her husband. The problem is an immodest, aggressive, or coercive manner. Affectionate speech intended to bring closeness between husband and wife is a different matter. Leah’s conduct demonstrates that such communication can be permitted and can lead to righteous children.