The **Mishnah** discusses a case where a man makes a vow against his wife, prohibiting her from attending weddings or funerals. If he does so, she may demand a divorce and receive her **Ketubah**. The **Mishnah** explains this by stating he "closes the door in front of her." The **Gemara** seeks to understand this reasoning, first addressing the prohibition against attending weddings.
Regarding weddings, the **Gemara** explains that a wife desires to alleviate her distress and enjoy herself. Attending a wedding provides this relief. Furthermore, by attending others' celebrations, she fosters reciprocal relationships, ensuring that others will attend her own celebrations. Preventing her from doing so stops this reciprocation. The commentators clarify that the term used, *Pikuach Sa'ad*, refers to alleviating distress, not investigating it.
The **Gemara** then asks what "door" is closed by preventing her from attending a house of mourning. It answers that she loses the opportunity for others to eulogize or bury her upon her death. The principle is one of "measure for measure": if she does not attend others' funerals, they will not attend hers. Thus, he closes the door to her receiving proper respect in death. This concept is underscored by a **Pasuk** in **Kohelet**: "It is better to go to a house of mourning than to go to a house of celebration, for that is the end of all humanity, and the living will take it to heart."
The **Gemara** elaborates on what the living should "take to heart": the principle of "measure for measure" in the context of death. Those who eulogize will be eulogized; those who bury will be buried; those who carry the coffin will have theirs carried. This means the **Borei Olam** orchestrates the world so that good deeds are reciprocated. A deeper interpretation suggests that **Shlomo HaMelech** compares a house of mourning and a house of celebration because both can lead to contemplation of mortality. At a wedding, one contemplates the purpose of marriage – to have children and perpetuate the species – precisely because human life is finite. Thus, a wedding, too, can be a time to reflect on death, though less overtly than a funeral. This is why, according to commentators, people instinctively cry at weddings; the soul senses the underlying truth of human mortality and the need for continuity. **Rabbi Rachot** even recounted a custom of a rabbi who would sing about death at weddings, understanding this profound connection.
However, the **Mishnah** states that if the husband's reason for prohibiting his wife from attending weddings or funerals is for another valid purpose, then the vow is permissible, and she cannot demand a divorce or her **Ketubah**. What is this "other purpose"? The **Gemara** cites the book of **Samuel**, explaining that he might be concerned about the presence of immoral people (*pirutzim*) at these gatherings. If he fears his wife might be taken advantage of, his vow to protect her is valid. This is only true if there is an established presumption (*hazekah*) that such people are present. Mere suspicion is not enough.
The **Mishnah** also states that if a husband makes a vow contingent on his wife revealing private information to someone, or emptying a "garbage can," she may demand a divorce and receive her **Ketubah**. The **Gemara** queries the significance of these actions. Regarding revealing information, **Aviv Udam** explains that the husband is demanding she reveal "embarrassing matters" (*Devarim Shel Kalon*), such as cursing someone with "curses and insults" (*heruf and geduf*). A wife is not obligated to perform such humiliating acts. If it were a simple, non-embarrassing message, she would be bound by the vow.
As for emptying the "garbage can," the **Gemara** initially asks what the big deal is. It then explains that this is a euphemism for the husband demanding his wife expel his seed after marital relations, to prevent pregnancy. The **Mishnah** uses this delicate language. The wife has a right to have children and fulfill the commandment of procreation (*bitul pru u'rvu*), and a husband cannot force her to nullify this. Therefore, she can demand a divorce. A different interpretation from a **Baraisa** suggests the phrase means filling ten pitchers of water and pouring them into the garbage. The **Gemara** asks why this would be grounds for divorce. The answer is that it makes her appear foolish and is embarrassing, giving her a bad reputation among her neighbors. If a husband forces his wife into such a light, she can demand a divorce and receive her **Ketubah**.
**Rav Kahana** teaches that if a man makes a vow that his wife cannot borrow or lend basic household items like a sifter or a sieve, she can demand a divorce. The reason is that this gives her a bad reputation among the neighbors, who will see her as uncooperative and stingy. Similarly, if he vows she cannot borrow or lend any movable goods, the same logic applies. However, if a wife vows that she will not weave clothes for her husband's children, he can divorce her without paying the **Ketubah**. In this case, she is giving *him* a bad reputation, making him appear stingy or uncaring, as people will assume he instructed her not to provide for his children.
The **Mishnah** then lists categories of women whom a husband may divorce without paying a **Ketubah**: those who "transgress Torah law and Jewish custom" (*Ha'overet al dat Moshe ve'yehudit*). **Dat Moshe** refers to transgressions of Torah law that directly affect the husband. **Dat Yehudit** refers to transgressions of Jewish custom, particularly regarding standards of modesty (*tziniut*), which are rabbinic enactments or established customs.
The **Mishnah** clarifies what constitutes **Dat Moshe**: if she feeds him food from which tithes (*terumot and ma'asrot*) were not taken, or engages in marital relations with him when she is a menstruating woman (**Nida**), or gives him bread from which the dough-offering (**Challah**) was not taken, or makes vows and does not fulfill them (*mekayemet*). The **Gemara** will elaborate on how these actions affect him.
What constitutes **Dat Yehudit**? If she goes out in the marketplace with her head uncovered, or weaves in the marketplace and talks flirtatiously to men. **Abba Shaul** adds that if she curses her husband's parents in front of him, this is also grounds for divorce without a **Ketubah**. **Rabi Tarfon** adds that a "screamer" (*kolanit*) can also be divorced without a **Ketubah**.
The **Gemara** delves into each case. Regarding food from which tithes were not taken: how would a husband know? If he knows beforehand, he simply won't eat it. If he doesn't know, how does he find out? The **Gemara** explains the case: she claims that a certain **Kohen** took the tithes. He trusts her, eats the food, and later asks the **Kohen**, who denies it. In such a scenario, the husband is believed, and she is deemed to have deceived him.
Regarding marital relations when she is a **Nida**: again, if he knows, he will refrain. If he doesn't know, he should rely on her word that she is ritually pure (*tahor*), as the Torah grants a woman credibility in such matters. The **Gemara** asks, why then is this a problem? The case is similar: she claims a certain **Hacham** declared her *tahor* after examining her blood. He trusts her, but later the **Hacham** denies it, stating he declared her ritually impure (*tameh*). Thus, she tricked him. Another scenario is if her status as a **Nida** is publicly known through her clothing, as women used to wear specific garments when menstruating. If she then engages in relations, she is deceiving him, as the neighbors know her status.
Regarding bread from which **Challah** was not taken: the same question arises. How does he find out? The **Gemara** explains she claimed that a certain kneader took the **Challah** for her, but upon inquiry, the kneader denies it, proving she lied.
Regarding making vows and not fulfilling them: the **Gemara** asks why this affects the husband. It explains that making vows and not keeping them can, **Hashem** forbid, cause children to die. While adults are not punished for their parents' sins, minors can be. Thus, her actions jeopardize their children. This is derived from a **Pasuk** in **Kohelet**: "Do not let your mouth cause your flesh to sin, and do not say before the messenger that it was a mistake. Why should God be angry at your voice and destroy the work of your hands?" The "work of a person's hands" refers to their children, as indicated by a **Pasuk** in **Yirmiya** where God says, "Because of vain vows I struck your children."
**Rabbi Meir** teaches that if a man knows his wife makes vows and does not fulfill them, he should make a similar vow on her behalf, effectively annulling her vow. The **Gemara** asks what this achieves if she still doesn't keep it. The strategy, the **Gemara** explains, is for the husband to provoke her to make the vow in his presence. Once he hears it, he can immediately annul it (*hafara*). This way, even if she thinks she is breaking a vow, it is not halachically binding, protecting the children from potential punishment. However, the **Gemara** rejects this, stating, "One cannot live with a snake in a basket." A husband cannot constantly be on guard to annul his wife's vows; eventually, she will make one he doesn't hear, endangering the children. Therefore, he is not obligated to remain married to a "vow-maker" (*nedranit*).
Similarly, **Rabbi Yehudah** teaches that if a man knows his wife does not take **Challah** from the dough, he should take it himself. Again, the **Gemara** rejects this with the "snake in a basket" analogy. He cannot always be present when she bakes, and she might inadvertently feed him un-tithed bread. Therefore, he cannot be mandated to stay married to her.
The **Gemara** then compares the two cases: if the "snake in a basket" argument applies to **Challah**, it should certainly apply to vows, as **Challah** is an everyday occurrence, requiring constant vigilance, whereas vows are less frequent. Conversely, if one can fix the **Challah** issue, it's easier to fix vows because they are less common. The conclusion is that the husband cannot be expected to constantly monitor his wife for either transgression.
Returning to **Dat Yehudit**: the **Mishnah** mentions going out with an uncovered head. The **Gemara** asks if this is truly **Dat Yehudit** (Jewish custom) or **Dat Moshe** (Torah law). It cites the **Pasuk** regarding the **Sotah** woman in the **Beit HaMikdash**: "And he shall uncover the woman's head." This implies her head was normally covered, suggesting it is a Torah law. Many **Rishonim** indeed learn that head covering is a Torah law. However, the **Tirmat Adish**, quoting the **Maharamban**, holds that it is a rabbinic prohibition, with the **Sotah** verse serving as a hint or support from Torah law. This law applies specifically to a married woman (*misua*), not an unmarried woman (*penuyah*).
The **Gemara** then clarifies the extent of the Torah law: it only requires a minimal covering, such as a "basket" (*kalta*) or netting, which might still allow some hair to be visible. However, **Dat Yehudit**, Jewish custom, demands a full covering where no hair is shown. Thus, if a woman goes out in a public thoroughfare (**Shul Trabim**) with only a *kalta*, she transgresses **Dat Yehudit**.
**Rav Yohanan** states that a *kalta* is not considered an "uncovered head" (*peru arosh*). The **Gemara** questions this: if he means in the marketplace, it still violates **Dat Yehudit**. Therefore, **Rav Yohanan** must be referring to a private courtyard (**Hatzir**). But if a woman must wear a *kalta* even in her private courtyard, then no married woman would remain, as it was customary for women to leave their hair uncovered in their courtyards. **Rav Ashi** clarifies that **Rav Yohanan** refers to a woman going from one courtyard to another through an alleyway (**Mavuy**), which is considered a public thoroughfare. In such a case, she must wear at least a *kalta*. In her own private courtyard, she does not need to cover her hair. Some, however, learn that even in her private home, a woman should cover her hair, citing the example of **Kimheit** in **Yom Ha'av**, who credited her righteous children to the fact that the walls of her house never saw her hair. This demonstrates a direct link between a woman's modesty and the spiritual outcome of her children.
Regarding the **Mishnah**'s case of a woman "weaving in the marketplace and talking to men": **Rav Yehudah** in the name of **Shmuel** offers a different reason for this being grounds for divorce. When she weaves, her sleeve might go up, revealing her arm, which is a lack of modesty (*tziniut*). Another opinion suggests that if she weaves with a red thread, it might dangle down to the lower part of her body (*paneh shulmata*), drawing attention and causing people to look, again a lack of modesty. The original explanation, however, is that she is talking flirtatiously to men, prolonging conversations unnecessarily. **Rav Ukba** once observed an Arab woman purposely dropping her spindle to engage young men in conversation. He remarked that if a Jewish woman were to do this, it would be grounds for divorce without a **Ketubah**. **Ravina** clarifies that even the mere act of initiating an unnecessary conversation with a stranger, such as asking for the spindle to be picked up, is sufficient grounds.
Finally, **Abba Shaul**'s addition: "a lady that curses her husband's parents in front of him." **Rav Yehudah** in the name of **Shmuel** clarifies that this includes cursing them in front of his children. The children, being the next generation, are considered an extension of the husband, as implied by the **Pasuk** that refers to Joseph's children as "Joseph." Thus, cursing the grandparents in front of the grandchildren is as if cursing them in front of the husband. An example given is a woman saying, "A lion should eat grandpa" in front of the children.
Regarding **Rabi Tarfon**'s addition of a "screamer" (*kolanit*): **Rav Yehudah** in the name of **Shmuel** defines a *kolanit* as a woman who screams private matters, allowing the entire neighborhood to hear. This embarrasses her husband. The **Gemara** initially considers if this refers to a woman screaming during marital relations due to pain, but rejects this as it would fall under the next **Mishnah**'s discussion of physical blemishes. Instead, it concludes that a *kolanit* is one who loudly argues with her husband about private matters, shaming him publicly.