The Elliot B. Sitt Edition and Audio Series of the Talmud Bavli, Masechet Yevamot, has been dedicated and sponsored by Mr. Isaac Jamal and his wife in honor of his family and for success and abundance in all their endeavors. May he raise his children in the ways of the Torah, and may they bring him much satisfaction. May he have many more children with health and happiness, and may he and his entire family be blessed.
As a note of interest, many cases in Masechet Yevamot require diagrams. We have chosen the Sefer Siyurim Masechet Yevamot as our book for diagrams, written by Aaron Shlomo B'Rabbi Baruch Moshe Hafner, available in the bookstore. We will be referring to pages from that book. We begin today's daf on Gimmel Amud Bet, starting eight lines from the bottom.
In our last discussion, we sought the source for why the 15 forbidden relatives, known as arayot, render a woman ineligible for Yibum. If a brother-in-law falls to an erva (a forbidden relative), he cannot perform Yibum. We also wanted to know how the co-wives (tzarot) of such a woman also become forbidden. The Gemara brought a proof from the verses concerning a sister-in-law (achot ishto). The verse states that one is not permitted to take her "aleha behayeha" (upon her in her lifetime). The Gemara explained that the word "aleha" is superfluous. We derive a logical connection (hekesh) from "aleha" to Yibum, because the verse regarding a Yevamah also says, "Yevamah yavo aleha" (the Yevamah shall come upon him). Just as the verse of Yevamah speaks of performing the mitzvah of Yibum, so too the verse of achot ishto, by juxtaposing "aleha," refers to the context of Yibum. Since the verse explicitly forbids it, we see that achot ishto is forbidden for Yibum.
The Gemara then asked, this only teaches us about achot ishto; how do we know about all other arayot? The answer is derived through a comparative principle (mamashinu): just as achot ishto is an erva whose transgression carries the penalty of karet for intentional violation and a sin-offering (chatat) for unintentional violation, and for whom the brother-in-law (yabam) is forbidden, and her co-wives (tzarot) are also forbidden; so too, all other arayot that incur karet for intentional violation and chatat for unintentional violation are in the same category and are therefore also ineligible for Yibum. It should be noted that all arayot mentioned in the Mishnah are subject to karet. Some are also subject to stoning (sekilah) or burning (serefa), but all are subject to karet, meaning if there are no witnesses and the transgression was intentional, the punishment is karet. Capital punishment (mitat beit din) is only administered if there were witnesses. Therefore, all of them are subject to a karet punishment.
The Gemara further asked, how do we know about the tzarot? The Gemara replied that we know about tzarot from the verse regarding achot isha, which states, "Lo tikach li tzaror" (do not take a co-wife). The word "tzaror" implies "tzarot" (co-wives), indicating that the co-wife also becomes forbidden. The Gemara then asked, this only teaches us about the tzarot of achot isha. How do we know about the tzarot of all other arayot? Again, the principle of mamashinu is applied: just as this erva incurs karet and chatat, and the yabam is forbidden to her, and her tzarot are forbidden; so too, all other arayot and their tzarot are forbidden. How do we know about the tzarot of their tzarot? The Gemara provides a derivation (derasha) from the doubled language of the word "litzror," which teaches that even the tzarot of tzarot are included.
This discussion only establishes the prohibition (isur). The Gemara now asks, "Azharah shama'nu, onesh minayin?" (We have heard the warning, from where do we know the punishment?) How do we know there is a punishment if someone performs Yibum with an erva or her tzara? The Gemara answers that the comprehensive verse at the end of the section on forbidden relations, which states, "Any of the abominations (to'evot) that anyone goes with," includes the case of someone who goes with an erva, and her tzarot, and the tzarot of her tzarot. The punishment for this is "nechretah," which means karet. This is how we know the punishment.
The Gemara then proceeds to a deeper analysis: "Ta'ama de'chtiv Rachmana 'aleha'" (The reason we know the brother-in-law is forbidden to the 15 arayot is because of the derivation from "aleha" written concerning achot ishto). "Ha lav hachi, hava amina achot isha meyabemet" (But if it were not written this way, I would have thought that achot ishto is eligible for Yibum). This means that even though she is his wife's sister, I would have thought Yibum could be performed. The Gemara asks, how could one even consider performing Yibum with his wife's sister, which is a Torah prohibition? The Gemara explains that one might have thought to apply the rule, "Na'ateh aseh v'docheh lo ta'aseh" (a positive commandment comes and overrides a negative commandment). The positive commandment of Yibum would override the negative commandment concerning achot ishto. The verse for achot ishto says, "Ba'alot tikach" (you shall not take her), which is a negative commandment. The verse for Yibum says, "Mitzvah ta'aseh" (it is a positive commandment) to perform Yibum. Therefore, if not for this exclusion, we would have used the rule that a positive commandment overrides a negative commandment and allowed Yibum to take place.
The Gemara challenges this: "Yim amar dam, li nanateh aseh v'docheh lo ta'aseh, lo ta'aseh gerida" (If you say a positive commandment overrides a negative commandment, that applies only to a simple negative commandment). "Lo ta'aseh she'yesh bo karet, midachah?" (But does it override a negative commandment that carries karet?) Since achot ishto is a prohibition that carries karet, the rule of a positive commandment overriding a negative commandment would not apply. Therefore, it would be forbidden anyway. Why do we need an exclusionary verse to tell us it is forbidden? It is forbidden by virtue of being a negative commandment that carries karet. Tosafot answers this by explaining that every Yibum involves a negative commandment that carries karet, namely, marrying one's brother's wife (eshet ach). The mitzvah of Yibum is specifically to override this karet. However, we are discussing additional cases, such as achot ishto, where one might think the rule of a positive commandment overriding a negative commandment applies even to a prohibition with karet. The Gemara then explains the general logic behind why a positive commandment overrides a negative one: A positive deed (aseh) demonstrates love for God (ahavat Hashem), while refraining from a negative deed (lo ta'aseh) demonstrates fear of God (yirat Hashem). Love overrides fear, so an aseh overrides a lo ta'aseh.
The Gemara raises a second question: "U'k's'had, lo ta'aseh gerida minayin dedachah?" (Furthermore, from where do we know that a positive commandment overrides even a simple negative commandment?) What is the Torah source for the principle that a positive commandment overrides a negative one? The Gemara answers that it is derived from the verses concerning fringes (tzitzit). One verse states, "Do not wear sha'atnez" (a mixture of wool and linen). The very next verse says, "Make for yourself fringes (tzitzit)." The Gemara derives a principle called "smichut" (juxtaposition). Why would these two verses be juxtaposed? To teach that while one should not wear sha'atnez generally, when it comes to making tzitzit, one can wear them even with sha'atnez. For example, if the garment is made of linen and the blue thread (tekhelet) is made of wool, this mixture is permitted for tzitzit. Rabbi Elazar further asks, "Smichut min haTorah minayin?" (From where do we know that we derive laws from juxtaposition in the Torah?) He answers that it is based on a verse, "Smuchim la'ad le'olam" (they are juxtaposed forever), implying that the juxtapositions in the Torah are truthful and can be used for derivation. Thus, we see a classic source for a positive commandment overriding a negative one: the positive commandment of tzitzit overrides the negative commandment of sha'atnez.
Tosafot raises an interesting question: if we make this derivation that sha'atnez is permitted for tzitzit, we could also derive that women are obligated in tzitzit. Just as women are forbidden to wear sha'atnez, they would also be obligated in tzitzit. Tosafot answers that tzitzit is a positive commandment dependent on time (mitzvah aseh she'zman gerama), and women are generally exempt from such commandments. Therefore, despite the derivation, women are not obligated in tzitzit.
The Gemara continues with another example of smichut. The verse states, "Do not muzzle an ox while it is plowing." The very next verse discusses the law of Yibum, "When brothers dwell together." This juxtaposition teaches that just as one should not muzzle an ox, one should not "muzzle" the Yevamah. This means that if she does not want to marry the brother-in-law (for example, if he is physically repulsive), her claims are accepted, and halitzah (the ceremony of release from Yibum) is performed. This again demonstrates the principle of smichut.
Tosafot questions this: if the second derivation (regarding the Yevamah) maintains the negative commandment ("do not muzzle"), why did the first derivation (regarding sha'atnez and tzitzit) interpret the juxtaposition as overriding the negative commandment ("do not wear sha'atnez, but for tzitzit you can")? Why not interpret it as "do not wear sha'atnez, and also do not wear sha'atnez even for tzitzit"? Tosafot answers that if that were the case, there would be no need for a derivation from smichut, because one would naturally assume sha'atnez is forbidden even for tzitzit. The fact that the Torah juxtaposed them must mean it is teaching a novel idea (chiddush) that it is permitted.
The Gemara then discusses the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who generally does not derive laws from smichut, except in the book of Devarim. The Gemara asks for proof that Rabbi Yehuda does not generally derive from smichut. Ben Hazai says, the verse states, "A sorceress (mechshefah) you shall not allow to live." This refers to a witch, male or female, involved in witchcraft, and the law is that they are put to death. The very next verse states, "Anyone who cohabitates with an animal (shochev im behemah) shall surely be put to death." What is the punishment for shochev im behemah? Stoning (sekilah), as it says "their blood is upon them." There is another verse regarding ovin yedoni (a type of sorcery involving necromancy), which also states the punishment is stoning. This is juxtaposed to the verse of mechshefah. One might derive that just as shochev im behemah is punished with sekilah, so too mechshefah is punished with sekilah. However, Rabbi Yehuda says that one should not give the most stringent punishment (sekilah) merely due to juxtaposition. Instead, he explains that ovin yedoni is a specific type of witch that is part of the general category of mechshefah. The rule is, "Kol sh'haya bi'klal v'yatza, lo lelamed al atzmo yatza, ela lelamed al ha'klal kulo yatza" (Anything that was part of a general category and was singled out, was not singled out to teach only about itself, but to teach about the entire general category). Thus, ovin yedoni was singled out to teach that just as ovin yedoni is punished with sekilah, so too mechshefah is punished with sekilah. This shows that Rabbi Yehuda does not use smichut outside of the book of Devarim.
Now, how do we know that Rabbi Yehuda does derive from smichut in the book of Devarim? The Sages hold that a man is permitted to marry a woman his father raped (anusat aviv) or seduced (mefutat aviv), or a woman his son raped or seduced. However, Rabbi Yehuda forbids marrying a woman his father raped or seduced. How does Rabbi Yehuda know this? It is written, "A man shall not take his father's wife." This refers to the woman his father was with. How do we know it refers to a raped woman (anusa)? Because the verse immediately before it speaks of someone who rapes a woman and must pay her father 50 pieces of silver. The juxtaposition teaches that the verse "A man shall not take his father's wife" refers to a woman his father raped. Thus, anusat aviv is forbidden based on the smichut of verses in the book of Devarim. This proves that Rabbi Yehuda accepts smichut in Devarim.
What do the Sages (who permit anusat aviv) do with this juxtaposition? They argue that the verses are not truly juxtaposed because there is another verse in between them. Therefore, they are not bound to interpret it as referring to an anusa. Instead, they interpret the verse "A man shall not take his father's wife" as referring to a "shomeret yabam" (a woman awaiting Yibum from his father). This means that a son is forbidden to marry his father's shomeret yabam. This is a second prohibition, in addition to the general prohibition against marrying any shomeret yabam, and the prohibition against marrying his aunt (his father's brother's wife). Thus, the Sages find a different novel idea (chiddush) in the verse.
The Gemara asks, what is the logic for Rabbi Yehuda specifically deriving from smichut in the book of Devarim as opposed to the rest of the Torah? It answers, "Iba'it eima mishum dimuchach, v'iba'it eima mishum dimufneh" (Either because it is conclusive, or because it is superfluous). This means that in the book of Devarim, the verses are either conclusively indicative of a derivation from smichut, or they contain superfluous words that allow for such a derivation. The Gemara then asks for proof that it is conclusive. In the case of arayot, where we said anusat aviv is forbidden due to the juxtaposition between the case of anusa and "lo yigaleh kenaf" (do not uncover the corner), why is this conclusive? Because if it were referring to a shomeret yabam of the father, that is already a known prohibition from the section of arayot. Why would the Torah place this verse here? The fact that it is juxtaposed to the case of anusa must be teaching a novel idea about anusa. If it were a regular statement, it would be placed in the section of arayot.
Alternatively, it is because the words are superfluous (mufneh). The verse says, "Do not take his father's wife," and then "lo yigaleh kenaf aviv" (do not uncover his father's corner). The second part is superfluous, as the first part already conveys the prohibition. This superfluous phrase allows for the derivation from smichut, teaching that anusat aviv is forbidden.
Similarly, regarding sha'atnez and tzitzit in Devarim, Rabbi Yehuda would derive from smichut either because it is conclusive or because it is superfluous. Why is it conclusive? Because the law of tzitzit is already found in the book of Bamidbar. Why would the Torah repeat the law of tzitzit in Devarim unless it was to juxtapose it to the law of sha'atnez, to teach that sha'atnez is permitted for tzitzit? The placement itself is conclusive. Alternatively, it is superfluous. The verse in Vayikra states, "A garment of mixed types (kelayim), sha'atnez, shall not come upon you." This already forbids sha'atnez. So why do we need the verse in Devarim, "Do not wear sha'atnez"? It is superfluous.
The Gemara refutes this, arguing that both verses are necessary. The verse "shall not come upon you" (lo ya'aleh alecha) might imply that any way of putting sha'atnez on oneself is forbidden, even for a clothes seller who has no intention of deriving benefit. The verse "do not wear" (lo tilbash) clarifies that one is only liable when wearing it for benefit. Conversely, if only "do not wear" was present, one might think liability only applies to normal wearing for warmth. "Shall not come upon you" teaches that even merely placing it on one's back with intention to benefit is forbidden. Therefore, both verses are necessary, and neither is superfluous.
The Gemara then identifies the truly superfluous words: "Semer u'fishtim" (wool and linen) in the verse "Do not wear sha'atnez, wool and linen." We already know that sha'atnez refers to wool and linen from the word "beged" (garment). Rabbi Yishmael taught that whenever the Torah uses the word "beged," it refers to wool or linen, as derived from the laws of leprosy in garments (tum'at nega'im). Therefore, "semer u'fishtim" is superfluous, allowing for the derivation from smichut to tzitzit.
The Gemara again challenges this: "Ha lav hachi, kelayim b'tzitzit hava amina de'asur Rachmana" (If not for these extra words, I would have thought that mixed types are forbidden for tzitzit). Why would one think this? Because the verse states, "And they shall make for themselves fringes upon the corners of their garments (kanfei bigdeihem)." The word "beged" (garment) implies wool or linen. If the garment is linen, and the tekhelet (blue string) is wool, then it is sha'atnez. How do we know tekhelet is wool? From the priestly garments (bigdei kehunah). On Yom Kippur, the High Priest wears linen garments, and it states that wool should not be on him. This implies that outside of Yom Kippur, he wears wool in his garments. The linen garments are called "bad" because flax grows individually (levad). Besides the linen, he wears colored garments (tekhelet, argaman), which must be wool. Thus, tekhelet is wool. Therefore, if the garment is linen and the tekhelet is wool, it is sha'atnez. So, according to Rabbi Yishmael, why would we need extra words to permit sha'atnez for tzitzit? It is already evident from the verses themselves that sha'atnez is inherent in tzitzit.
The Gemara replies that the extra words "semer u'fishtim" are necessary to counter the opinion of Rava, who holds that the strings of tzitzit must be of the same species as the garment (min kanef). For example, a silk garment requires silk tzitzit. Rava also holds that wool tzitzit are universal and can be placed on any garment, but other types of tzitzit must be min kanef. If Rabbi Yishmael would subscribe to Rava's opinion of min kanef, then if the garment is linen, the tzitzit must be linen. If the garment is wool, the tzitzit must be wool. In such a case, one could not put wool tekhelet on a linen garment. The extra words "semer u'fishtim" come to teach that even if the garment is wool, one can use linen tzitzit, and vice versa, thereby permitting sha'atnez for tzitzit. This means that even according to Rabbi Yishmael, who does not fully agree with Rava (as Rabbi Yishmael says only wool and linen garments are obligated in tzitzit, unlike Rava who says all garments are), he might still agree with Rava's principle of min kanef. Therefore, the extra words "semer u'fishtim" are needed to teach that one can mix wool and linen for tzitzit, overriding the min kanef principle.
The conclusion of the Gemara is that we never returned to our original question from the start of the discussion, which will have to be addressed on the next page. However, all of today's Gemara discussed the principle of a positive commandment overriding a negative commandment. How do we know this? From tzitzit, specifically the juxtaposition of "Do not wear sha'atnez" with "Make for yourself fringes." According to Rabbi Yehuda, this derivation from smichut applies in the book of Devarim either because it is conclusive (the placement of tzitzit next to sha'atnez in Devarim is a clear indication) or because it is superfluous (the words "semer u'fishtim" are extra, as the word "beged" already implies wool or linen). The extra words are crucial to teach that even if one might have thought, like Rava, that tzitzit must be of the same species as the garment, the extra words "semer u'fishtim" teach that mixing wool and linen for tzitzit is permissible. Thus, we know that a positive commandment overrides a negative commandment. Blessed is God forever. Amen.