The Edyit B-Sit Edition, an audio series of the Talmud Bavli, specifically Gemara Yevamot, has been dedicated and sponsored by our dear friend Mr. Isaac Jamal and his wife. This dedication honors his family and wishes them success and blessings in all their endeavors. May he merit to raise his children in the ways of the Torah, and may they bring him much joy. He should be blessed with health and happiness, favor and kindness in the eyes of both God and man, and may he and his entire family be blessed in every way, amen.
As we study Masechet Yevamot, we note that many of the cases require diagrams. We have chosen the book Sefer Tziyurim L'masechet Yevamot, written by Aharon Shlomo ben Rabi Baruch Moshe Hafner, which is available in bookstores. When we refer to pages, we will be using this book. Today’s page is Daf Kaf-Vav.
Today’s daf is studied for the elevation of the soul of Avraham ben Esther. May the spirit of God rest upon him in the Garden of Eden, amen. We begin today’s daf on Kaf-Vav, Amud Rishon, starting on the second line with the Mishnah. The Mishnah states: “And all who had wives and they died are permitted to marry them.”
In the previous Mishnayot, we learned about different examples, such as a chacham who permits a woman to get divorced. He is not allowed to marry her due to the suspicion that would arise. Similarly, if a person brings a get from medinat hayam, he must state “bifnay nechtav u'bifnay nechtam” to validate the get. Since the divorce is contingent upon his words, he cannot marry the woman he affected the divorce for. The same applies to those who testified about the death of a woman’s husband, allowing her to remarry; the Mishnah specifies that the person who gave the testimony cannot marry her. When they say “met ba'alech” or “haragti,” in all these cases, the individual is not allowed to marry her.
The Mishnah continues with the ruling: “And all who had wives and they died are permitted to marry them.” Rashi explains that this refers to those who were married at the time of their testimony, and later their own wives died. Therefore, it would be permissible for them to marry the women they testified about, as at that time there is no suspicion, since they were married when they testified, and their intent was not to deceive.
Furthermore, the Mishnah states: “And all who married others and were divorced or became widowed are permitted to marry them.” If these women, who were testified about, married others and were subsequently divorced or widowed, they are permitted to marry the original men. This alleviates suspicion, as they did not marry immediately after the testimony; they first married someone else. Only if he takes her immediately would there be a problem, as it could appear that he had a scheme to marry her all along.
The Mishnah concludes: “And all are permitted to their sons or brothers.” This means that while the testimony affects the one who gave it, it does not extend to their close family. For instance, if a chacham prohibited a woman from being with her husband, he cannot marry her, but his son or brother can. The Gemara then discusses the implications of this ruling.
It states: “If they died, then yes.” The Mishnah specifies that it is only if they died; if they were divorced, it is not permissible. This is because a divorce is within his control, and thus, if he divorced her, it raises suspicion that he did so to marry her. Rav Hillel asks Rav Ashi: “But didn’t we learn in a Braita that even if they were divorced, it is permissible?” The Gemara clarifies that this is not a contradiction, as it depends on whether there was a fight or not.
If they were already fighting prior to the testimony, then the divorce was in motion, and it was not a scheme. However, if the fighting began after the testimony, we assume he did it to marry her. The Gemara explains that if there was a fight beforehand, the divorce was not a result of the testimony, hence he is permitted to marry her. Conversely, if the fight arose after the testimony, it suggests ulterior motives.
Additionally, the Gemara elaborates on the cases where the testimony is valid for their sons or brothers, but not for themselves. This distinction is crucial, as it highlights the different levels of suspicion and the halachic implications of each scenario.
As the discussion unfolds, the Gemara explores further nuances, such as the implications of testimony relating to death or divorce, and how these affect the permissibility of marriage in subsequent scenarios. Each case is examined meticulously, ensuring that the logical distinctions and halachic meanings remain precise.
The Gemara concludes with a discussion on the relationships between the brothers and sisters involved, further clarifying the complexities of the halachic rulings regarding yibum and chalitzah. The intricate nature of these laws serves as a reminder of the depth and precision required in understanding the Torah and its applications in daily life.