The B-SIT Edition of the audio series on the Talmud Bavli, specifically Daf Yevamot, is dedicated and sponsored by our dear friend Mr. Isaac Jamal and his wife. This dedication honors his family and prays for success and prosperity in all their endeavors. May he be blessed to raise his children in the ways of the Torah, bringing him much joy and fulfillment, and may he be granted health and happiness, along with blessings for him and his entire family, Amen. Today, we study Daf Nun Dalet, beginning from Nun Gimmel Amud Bet, specifically six lines from the bottom.
In our Mishnah, we learn about the case where a person has bi'ah with his yevamah, whether he is acting in error (shogeg) or intentionally (mezid). A shogeg means he mistakenly thought it was his wife, lacking the proper intention (kavana), while a mezid refers to a deliberate act done for the sake of illicit relations (zenut), rather than for the mitzvah. Additionally, if he was forced (be'ones), the Mishnah states that in all these scenarios, the kinyan is valid (kana), establishing a legal bond.
The Gemara now introduces a braita taught by Rabbi Chiya, who states that even if both parties are shogeg, meaning the husband believes it is his wife and the wife believes it is her husband, the kinyan is still valid. The same applies if both are mezid or both are forced (anusim). The Gemara seeks to clarify the case of anus in the Mishnah, asking what constitutes this forced situation. The Gemara suggests that perhaps it refers to a case where non-Jews (ovdei kochavim) forced the man upon the woman, thus acting against his will.
Rava counters this by asserting that one cannot have a case of ones for an erva, because a person must have the capacity to arouse himself (kishuy) intentionally. Therefore, one cannot be forced into a situation of erva, which requires intention. The Gemara then proposes an alternative scenario: it must be that the man was asleep (yashen) when the bi'ah occurred, and thus the act could be considered ones. Rashi explains that he had an arousal while sleeping, which leads to the conclusion that the act was not done willingly.
Rav Yehuda teaches that a person who is sleeping does not acquire (kana) his yevamah. Rashi clarifies that a sleeping person lacks the necessary awareness (da'at) to effectuate a kinyan. The Gemara then continues to explore the case of someone who falls from a roof (nafal min ha-gag) and lands on his yevamah, suggesting this too is a case of ones, as it was not done willingly.
Rava explains that if someone falls from a roof and causes damage, he is liable for four out of five types of damages: nezek (damage), tza'ar (pain), shevet (loss of work), and rippuy (medical expenses). However, he is not liable for embarrassment (boshet), as one is only liable for boshet when there was intention (kavanah). In the case of falling onto his yevamah, the act does not constitute a valid kinyan because he lacked intention for the bi'ah.
The Gemara then presents a case where a person intended to throw himself against a wall but accidentally landed on his yevamah. Here, he does not acquire the yevamah because his intention was not for that act. Conversely, if he intended to strike an animal and ended up with the yevamah, he is considered to have acquired her, as he had some intention for the bi'ah.
The Mishnah states that even if a person performs a partial act (ha'ara'ah) on the yevamah, it is still considered a kinyan. Ulla asks how we derive the concept of ha'ara'ah being valid from the Torah. The Gemara cites a verse regarding a man who lies with a woman who is a nida, indicating that even a partial act is significant. The Gemara then questions how we can apply this to other ervot, suggesting that we cannot learn from the nida case alone.
The Gemara proposes to derive from the case of a brother's wife (eshet ach) and states that the verse teaches us that just as a nida is forbidden with ha'ara'ah, so too all ervot are forbidden. However, the Gemara notes that this cannot apply to all cases since some are distinct. It highlights that the prohibition of a brother's wife is different from that of a nida.
In conclusion, the Gemara discusses various sources and interpretations regarding the laws of ervot and the implications of ha'ara'ah. The discussions highlight the intricate nature of these laws and their applications, demonstrating the depth of halachic reasoning in the context of family and marital relations.