The Avi BZ edition, an audio series of the Talmud Bavli, Masechet Yevamot, has been dedicated and sponsored by our dear friend Mr. Isaac Jamal and his wife in honor of his family and success in all their endeavors. May he be zocheh to raise his children in the ways of the Torah, and may they bring him much nachat. He should have many more children with health and happiness, grace and kindness in the eyes of Hashem and mankind, and may blessings be sent to him and his entire family. Amen. Today’s daf is being studied in memory of Avraham ben Esther, may his soul be at rest in Gan Eden, amen. Today’s daf is also being studied for a complete healing for Sarah bat Rachel. Please, God, heal her among all the sick of His people Israel, amen.
We begin today’s daf on Kuf Yud Zayin, Amud Bet, and we are three lines from the bottom, starting with the Mishnah. The Mishnah begins: Beit Shammai says, “She may marry and collect her ketubah.” This means that when a woman comes and testifies that her husband has died, we learn that under certain circumstances we allow her to remarry, indicating that we trust her testimony. The Mishnah states that she is also believed regarding monetary matters, meaning she will receive the ketubah from her first husband’s estate that she claims he has died. Therefore, the law is that when a husband dies, he must pay the ketubah, and we believe her regarding the ketubah that she can collect.
Beit Hillel, however, says, “She may marry but may not collect her ketubah.” Beit Hillel argues that while we allow her to remarry based on her testimony that her husband has died, we do not allow her to claim the ketubah. The Gemara continues, stating that Beit Shammai tells Beit Hillel, “You permit a serious matter, yet you will not permit a minor monetary matter? If you believe her regarding the serious issue of remarrying, which is a stringent matter, certainly you should believe her regarding the monetary issue.” Beit Hillel responds that while she is believed with regard to the serious issue of ervah, we do not want her to remain an agunah. However, when it comes to monetary matters, there is no reason to believe her. They state, “We find that brothers do not enter an inheritance based on her testimony.” This means if she does not have children, normally, if a husband dies, his sons will inherit him, and if he has no sons, his brothers will inherit. Beit Hillel asserts that the brothers do not inherit based on her testimony. Even if she says her husband died, she is not believed; for matters of money, two witnesses are needed to provide testimony.
The Gemara continues, stating that Beit Shammai responds, “From the language written in the ketubah, we should learn that it states, ‘If you marry someone else, you will collect what is written for you.’” This means that if she is allowed to remarry, the condition of the ketubah is that in the event she marries someone else, she will receive the ketubah. Therefore, since we believe her to remarry, she should also receive the ketubah. The Gemara concludes that Beit Hillel retracted and agreed with Beit Shammai that not only is she believed to remarry, but she is also believed regarding the ketubah.
Rav Chisda states that if a woman testifies, “My husband has died,” and as a result, she falls to yibum, the yavam (brother-in-law) enters the inheritance based on her testimony. This means the yavam receives the inheritance because there is a gezeirat ha-katuv that the yavam inherits the nechasim of the deceased. Therefore, he enters in his stead. The rabbis derive that if the rabbis ruled that she will receive a ketubah payment, this is the law of our Mishnah; if the rabbis say that the ketubah goes to her, should we not also consider the law of the Torah? The pasuk regarding yibum states, “He shall rise in the name of his brother.” This means the estate should rise in the name of the brother, and God says that once the yavam establishes yibum, the Torah states that the inheritance goes to him. If the rabbis allowed a ketubah payment because they said the ketubah makes such a condition that if she remarries, she can collect the ketubah, certainly we will impose the Torah law that states a yavam receives the inheritance based even on her testimony.
Rav Nachman states that if a woman comes to beit din and says, “My husband has died, please allow me to remarry,” they permit her to remarry. This is because women are precise and will not testify unless they are certain, as they know that if they remarry and the husband resurfaces, they will be forbidden to return to their original husbands. Therefore, we believe her. The Gemara states that she is also given her ketubah. Why? Because in this case, she is indeed coming to testify regarding her desire to remarry. Hence, the ketubah follows suit; since she is allowed to remarry, she is entitled to the ketubah.
However, if she comes and says, “Give me my ketubah,” she is not believed. Not only is she not believed regarding the ketubah, but she is also not permitted to remarry. This means she has no ne'emanut. The reason is that she is coming with the intent of claiming the money. Now we do not have a reason to believe her regarding the money alone, as the logic for believing her testimony is based on her desire to remarry. Since she does not want to return to her previous marriage, she is careful. However, regarding the money, she could simply be claiming her ketubah without intending to remarry. Therefore, if she comes and says, “My husband has died, I want the ketubah,” she does not have ne'emanut. She receives it only if she comes and says, “My husband has died,” and as a result of her husband’s death, she receives the ketubah. But if she is only coming for the money, she does not have specific ne'emanut regarding the money.
The Gemara poses a question: If she says, “Allow me to remarry and give me my ketubah,” what is the ruling? Since she mentions the ketubah, perhaps she is primarily coming for the ketubah, and therefore she has no ne'emanut. Or perhaps we could say that it is normal for a person to present all claims before the beit din. This woman has two claims: she wants to get married and she also wants her ketubah. Therefore, this does not indicate that she is specifically coming for money; she is simply stating all her claims before the beit din. The Gemara seeks to clarify this point.
The Gemara continues, stating that if she first says, “Give me my ketubah and allow me to remarry,” what is the ruling? Here, it is clear that she is coming primarily for the ketubah, and thus she has no ne'emanut. Alternatively, it may be that since she does not know what will permit her to remarry, she states everything. Therefore, she mentions both claims, and the order of her requests does not mean she is primarily interested in the ketubah. The Gemara leaves this question unresolved for Eliyahu HaNavi.
The next Mishnah states that everyone is believed to testify that her husband has died, except for her mother-in-law. The Mishnah lists certain women who do not have ne'emanut because we suspect they may lie due to animosity towards the woman they are testifying against. They may wish to spoil her by saying, “Your husband has died,” leading her to remarry, after which the husband may resurface, making her forbidden to him. The Mishnah lists these women: the mother-in-law, the daughter of the mother-in-law, the co-wife, the yevamah, and the daughter of the husband.
The Gemara continues, asking what the difference is between a get and death. These women, who are not trusted to say that her husband has died, are trusted if they are the bearers of a get. If they bring a get from overseas and present it before the beit din, they are believed. The Gemara questions why they are not believed regarding death but are believed regarding the get. The Gemara explains that when they come with a get, we are not trusting their testimony; we trust the document itself. Therefore, even though they must testify that they witnessed the writing and signing of the get, the tangible document gives them credibility.
The Gemara then discusses the daughter of the father-in-law. Is she believed to testify? The Gemara states that the reason the daughter of the mother-in-law is not believed is that her mother hates the daughter-in-law, and therefore she too has animosity towards her. In this case, since there is no mother to instigate animosity, she may be able to testify. However, the Gemara questions whether the daughter of the father-in-law may also harbor hatred towards the daughter-in-law because she may believe that her father’s money will go to her husband’s daughter. The Gemara concludes that the daughter of the father-in-law is also not believed.
The Mishnah concludes that there are five women who are not believed to testify that her husband has died: the mother-in-law, the daughter of the mother-in-law, the co-wife, the yevamah, and the daughter of the husband. The Gemara questions whether the daughter of the father-in-law should also be included. If so, there would be six women listed. The Gemara clarifies that there is no need to include her since her case is similar to that of the daughter of the mother-in-law.
Rav Acha, the son of Rav Ivya, poses a new question from Eretz Yisrael regarding a mother-in-law who comes later. Is she believed? The Gemara explains that this refers to a situation where a woman’s husband dies, and she falls to yibum with her husband’s brother, who has a different mother. The question is whether the mother-in-law of the yavam is believed to say, “Your husband has died,” or does she harbor animosity and intend to spoil her? The Gemara discusses whether this potential animosity exists based on the relationship dynamics.
Ultimately, the Gemara leaves this question unresolved, considering the complexities of relationships and potential future animosity. The Mishnah continues with a case of contradictory witnesses. If one witness says that the husband has died and another says he has not, the woman does not have to leave the husband she married based on the first testimony. However, if two witnesses say he did not die, even if she married based on the first testimony, she must leave her new husband. The Gemara analyzes the implications of these rulings and the nature of testimony.
In summary, the discussions in the Gemara highlight the intricate balance between trust in testimony regarding marriage, inheritance, and the complexities of familial relationships. The rulings emphasize the need for clarity and caution in matters that affect personal status and financial obligations.