The Eri B. Sitt edition and audio series of the Talmud Bavli, Masechet Ketubot, has been dedicated by our dear friend Mr. Elliot Shasho. May the merit of the study of Masechet Ketubot stand for him and his family for a year of blessing, success, prosperity, honor, peace in the home, and success in all their endeavors. May he continue, with God’s help, to support Torah and all holy projects. Amen.
Today’s study is dedicated in memory of Avraham ben Garaz, Avraham Asis, may he rest in peace, by Moshe Asis. May his soul rest beneath the Divine Presence in the Garden of Eden. Amen.
The study is also dedicated in memory of Avraham ben Esther. May his soul rest beneath the Divine Presence in the Garden of Eden. Amen. It is also dedicated for a complete recovery for Yosef ben Sarah, Rahim ben Adel, and Sarah bat Rachel Elna, and for a complete recovery for all the sick among the Jewish people. Amen.
We begin today’s Masechet Ketubot, on page 44b, three lines from the bottom.
It is taught: “Shalosh middot bena’arah hame’orasa.” There are three laws with different consequences regarding a betrothed maiden who committed adultery. The punishment of a betrothed maiden who committed adultery is death by stoning, and these three laws determine where and how that punishment is carried out.
The first case is: Witnesses came to her father-in-law’s house and testified that she had committed the act while she was still betrothed, when she was living in her father’s house. In that case, she is stoned at the entrance of her father’s house. This is what the verse says: They take the maiden and bring her to the entrance of her father’s house.
The classic case of a betrothed maiden who committed adultery is one in which she is already married when the witnesses arrive, but they testify about an act that took place before the marriage, while she was still betrothed and living in her father’s house. We know that she was already married when the witnesses came because the verse says that her husband brought an accusation against her, saying, “I did not find signs of virginity in her.” The entire case of the betrothed maiden therefore occurs after the marriage, when the witnesses come and testify about something that allegedly happened before the marriage.
Why is she stoned at her father’s house? One possibility is that this publicizes that such a girl came from this house. The commentators, however, explain somewhat differently. We should not think that the act took place after she entered the marriage, because in that case the punishment would be strangulation. She is therefore stoned at her father’s house to demonstrate that the act occurred there, while she was still betrothed, thereby justifying the punishment of stoning.
The second case is one in which the witnesses came while she was still betrothed and still living in her father’s house, and they testified that the act took place at that time. She is still stoned, but the stoning takes place at the gate of the city. There is no need to use her father’s house to demonstrate that the act occurred before the marriage, because everyone knows that she had not yet been married. The gate of the city is more public, so people will know about the punishment of a betrothed maiden who committed adultery.
The third case is: She committed the act while she was a maiden, but ultimately became a bogeret, an adult woman. She is judged by strangulation. The reason is that the punishment of a betrothed maiden who committed adultery applies only when the act was committed while she was a maiden. If she committed the act when she was already an adult, the punishment would be strangulation. The novel point here is that even though she committed the act while she was a maiden, by the time she is judged she has become an adult, and the punishment follows her present status. In other words, if she had committed the act now, as an adult, she would have received strangulation, and that is the punishment she receives now as well.
The teaching is therefore coming to establish the principle that whenever there is a physical change in a person—for example, when she changes from a maiden to an adult—the punishment also changes. In this case, we do not follow the time of the sin; we follow what she is now.
The Gemara challenges this principle. Consider a betrothed girl who committed the act, then became an adult and married. Her husband subsequently made a false accusation against her, claiming that he had not found signs of virginity. Even though he was defaming her and was proven wrong, he does not receive lashes and does not have to pay the one hundred sela because the law of a husband who falsely accuses his wife applies only when he makes the accusation while she is a maiden. Since he made the accusation only after she had become an adult, the penalties of lashes and payment do not apply.
But if the accusation were true, both she and the witnesses who contradicted her would be taken to the place of stoning and stoned. This statement appears impossible. If she is guilty, she is stoned, while the witnesses are innocent and do not receive that punishment. If she is innocent, the witnesses are false witnesses and are stoned, while she is not. How can both she and the witnesses be stoned?
The Gemara first answers that the statement should be understood as an alternative: either she is stoned if she is guilty, or, if she is innocent, the witnesses who tried to have her executed are stoned.
Rashi points out the difficulty. Even though her body changed, since she committed the act when she was a maiden, why should her punishment change? If she were to commit the act now, as an adult, she would receive strangulation, but the statement regarding the false accusation indicates that she receives stoning. This appears to contradict the teaching of Shila, which said that when her physical status changes, the punishment changes as well.
Rava answers that the comparison is not valid. The case of a husband who falsely accuses his wife is different because the entire law of that accusation is a novel legal provision. Normally, if a man marries a woman and she subsequently commits adultery, the punishment after marriage is strangulation. The law of the false accusation teaches that even though she is now married and would receive strangulation for an act committed at that point, the punishment is determined according to the earlier stage, when she was a maiden and betrothed, and she therefore receives stoning.
Rava’s logic is as follows: In an ordinary case of adultery, there is a difference between a betrothed woman, who receives stoning, and a married woman, who receives strangulation. Similarly, one might say that there is a difference between a maiden and an adult. If she committed the act as a maiden and then became an adult, perhaps the punishment should change to strangulation. The case of the false accusation cannot prove this, because the law of the false accusation itself is a novel provision: even when the woman is already married, the punishment remains stoning.
The Gemara challenges Rava. Perhaps the novel provision of the Torah applies only when there is a change in status, from betrothal to marriage, but not when there is a physical change, from maidenhood to adulthood. In the case of the false accusation, she was a maiden before and remained a maiden afterward; only her status changed when she married. Who says that the same rule applies when her body physically changes from a maiden to an adult?
Nevertheless, the teaching concerning the false accusation explicitly says that when she was a maiden, committed the act, then became an adult and married, she is still stoned. This appears to demonstrate that even a physical change does not change the punishment, contradicting the teaching of Shila.
Rashi explains the proposed distinction. The only reason the false-acquisition case might retain the earlier punishment is that the woman remained physically a maiden; she merely changed from a betrothed woman to a married woman. Perhaps the novel provision of the Torah applies only in that situation. When there is an actual physical change, however, perhaps the punishment should change. Yet the teaching still says that even when she became an adult, she receives stoning. Thus it appears that a physical change does not change the punishment, contrary to Shila’s ruling that a change in the body changes the punishment.
Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak therefore says that the question of whether a physical change changes the punishment is a dispute among the Tannaim. One Tanna holds that when the person’s physical status changes, the punishment changes; another holds that even when the person’s physical status changes, the punishment does not change.
The Gemara seeks to identify this dispute from another teaching. An ordinary person who commits a sin requiring a sin-offering brings either a sheep or a goat. If the person is a ruler of Israel, he brings a different offering, and if he is a High Priest, he brings yet another offering. A High Priest or a ruler does not bring the same offering as an ordinary person.
What happens if a person committed the sin while he was an ordinary individual, but before he brought the offering he was appointed as the ruler or as the High Priest? Which offering does he bring—the offering of an ordinary person or the offering appropriate to his new status?
The first Tanna says that if they sinned before being appointed, while they were ordinary individuals, and were appointed before bringing the offering, they bring the offering of an ordinary person. This seems to indicate that even though their status changed, the law does not change; the offering is determined by what they were at the time of the sin. This resembles the case of a maiden who became an adult: the punishment should follow the earlier status.
Rabbi Shimon says that if they became aware of the sin before they were appointed, they bring the ordinary person’s offering, because both the sin and the awareness of the sin occurred while they were ordinary individuals. But if they became aware of the sin only after they were appointed, they are exempt from any offering. According to Rabbi Shimon, the awareness and the sin must occur at the same stage of status in order for an offering to be brought. Here the sin occurred while the person was an ordinary individual, but the awareness occurred after he became a High Priest or ruler, so no offering is brought.
The Gemara attempts to say that Rabbi Shimon holds that we follow the person’s status at the time of the awareness, rather than at the time of the sin. But the Gemara rejects this. Rabbi Shimon does not say that the person should bring the offering appropriate to his current status. If he followed only the present status, then a person who became a High Priest should bring the High Priest’s offering. Instead, he says that no offering is brought, because the sin and the awareness did not occur in the same stage.
Thus, Rabbi Shimon’s ruling does not establish that he follows the person’s current status. His ruling is based on a separate principle concerning offerings: the awareness and the sin must occur at the same stage of status. Therefore, the dispute between the Tannaim has not yet been demonstrated.
The Gemara offers its final answer. Rabbi Yochanan instructed the Tanna to change the teaching. Instead of teaching that when a maiden committed the act and subsequently became an adult she is strangled, the teaching should say that she is stoned. In other words, whether in the case of the adulterous betrothed maiden or in the case of the husband who falsely accused his wife, the punishment is always determined according to the time of the sin. Since she committed the act while she was a maiden, she is stoned.
Rashi explains the difficulty with this version. How can the woman receive stoning? The Torah says that a maiden receives stoning, but she is now an adult. Nevertheless, the verse speaks about the person who committed the act as a maiden. Since the sin was committed while she was a maiden, that is sufficient to establish liability, even though she is now an adult.
The Gemara then raises a question from the case of the false accusation. If everything is determined according to the time of the sin, then when the woman committed the act while she was a maiden, why does the husband not have to pay the one hundred sela? The ruling was that once she became an adult, he does not pay. If we go back to the time of the sin, he should have to pay according to her status at that time.
Rav Hanina presents this question to Rav Ila. Rav Ila responds, “May God save me from such a question,” meaning that the question reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of the distinction between the two cases. Rav Hanina replies that he is asking a legitimate question and has not yet received an answer.
The distinction is this: When the woman is punished, she is being punished for her actions. When did her actions take place? They took place when she was a maiden. Therefore, she is punished according to her status at the time of the act. The husband, however, is being punished with lashes and payment for his false testimony and defamatory accusation. When did his wrongdoing take place? It took place when he made the accusation, after she had become an adult. Therefore, he is punished according to her status at the time of his accusation.
She committed the act as a maiden, and therefore she is stoned. His lips caused the liability, because he made a false accusation when she was already an adult, and therefore he does not pay the one hundred sela. Each person is judged according to the time of his or her own wrongdoing.
The practical conclusion of this section is that, ordinarily, we go back to the time of the sin. The original statement of Shila should therefore be amended. Instead of saying that when a maiden committed the act and later became an adult she is strangled, it should say that she is stoned, because she committed the act while she was a maiden. Likewise, in the case of the false accusation, the woman’s punishment is determined by the time of her act, while the husband’s penalty is determined by the time he made his false accusation.
We now turn to another teaching concerning a betrothed maiden who committed adultery. If she has no father’s house, she is not taken to the entrance of her father’s house. Instead, she is taken to the gate of the city and stoned there. If the majority of the city’s inhabitants are non-Jews, she is not taken to the gate of the city, because it is not considered “your” city. In that case, she is taken to the gate of the court and stoned there.
Similarly, regarding a person who worships idolatry, he is taken and stoned at the gate of the city where he worshipped the idolatry, rather than at the gate of the court. If the majority of the city’s inhabitants are non-Jews, he is stoned at the gate of the court.
The Gemara asks how we know these laws concerning stoning at the city gate. The Torah says regarding idolatry: “If there is found among you, within one of your gates that the Lord your God gives you, a man or woman who does what is evil in the eyes of the Lord your God, violating His covenant.” The person is found within one of the city’s gates, meaning the gate of the city where the sin occurred.
Another verse then says that the person should be taken outside and stoned. Which gate does that refer to—the gate of the city where the sin occurred, or the gate of the city where the person was judged?
The Gemara answers through a verbal analogy involving the word “your gates.” The word appears in an earlier verse and in a later verse. Just as the earlier reference to “your gates” refers to the gate of the city where the idolatry was committed, so the later reference refers to the gate of that same city. The person is therefore stoned at the gate of the city where he committed the sin.
The same verse says “within one of your gates,” teaching that the city must be considered yours. If the majority of its inhabitants are non-Jews, it is not considered your city, and the person is stoned at the gate of the court.
The Gemara asks how the same word can teach both that the punishment takes place at the gate of the city where the sin occurred and that the city must have a Jewish majority. The Gemara answers that the first law is derived from the verbal analogy involving the word “gate,” while the second law is learned directly from the wording “your gate.”
Rav Avin explains the derivation in greater detail. In the case of a betrothed maiden, the verse uses the word “entrance,” rather than “your gates.” We find the word “entrance” used regarding the Sanctuary, together with the word “gate.” Through the connection between “entrance” and “gate,” and then between “gate” and “your gates,” we learn that the stoning of the betrothed maiden takes place at the gate of the city where she committed the sin. From there we also learn that when the city is not considered Jewish because the majority of its inhabitants are non-Jews, the punishment takes place at the gate of the court.
We now come to another teaching concerning a husband who falsely accuses his wife. In the ordinary case, a man marries a woman and claims that he did not find signs of virginity. If he is proven to have made a false accusation, he receives lashes and must pay her father one hundred sela for defaming her.
Rabbi Yehuda says that he always receives lashes, but the payment depends on whether he had relations with her. If he had relations with her and then made the false accusation, he must pay the one hundred sela. If he did not have relations with her, he does not pay the one hundred sela.
The first Tanna holds that whether or not he had relations with her, once he makes the false accusation he receives lashes and must pay the one hundred sela. Rabbi Yehuda makes a distinction: the law of the one hundred sela applies only when he had relations with her. Without relations, there is no payment, because the specific law of the false accusation does not apply. He nevertheless receives lashes for the separate prohibition against spreading slander and gossip.
One might ask how Rabbi Yehuda can impose lashes for that prohibition, since it is a prohibition without an action. Rabbi Yehuda holds that lashes can be administered for such a prohibition.
Let us review the dispute. The first Tanna says that the law of the false accusation applies whether or not the husband had relations with his wife. In either case, he receives lashes and pays the one hundred sela. Rabbi Yehuda says that he always receives lashes, but the payment applies only when he had relations with her. If he did not have relations with her, he does not pay because the law of the false accusation does not apply, but he still receives lashes for the prohibition against slander.
The Gemara says that these two opinions may reflect the same dispute as the opinions of Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov and the Rabbis, which will be discussed on the following page. According to the first understanding of the teaching, the first opinion follows the Rabbis, who say that whether or not the husband had relations with his wife, the law of the false accusation applies. Rabbi Yehuda follows Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov, who says that the law of the false accusation applies only when he had relations with her.
The Gemara then presents another version. Perhaps the entire teaching follows Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov. The first opinion says that when the teaching states that the husband receives lashes and pays the one hundred sela, it is referring specifically to a case in which he had relations with her. Rabbi Yehuda agrees that payment applies only in such a case, but he says that the husband receives lashes even when he did not have relations, because of the prohibition against slander.
According to this second version, Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov holds that the specific law of the false accusation applies only when the husband had relations with his wife. In that case, he pays the one hundred sela and receives lashes. If he did not have relations with her, he does not pay, because the law of the false accusation does not apply. Nor does he receive lashes for the slander, because Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov holds that lashes are not administered for a prohibition without an action.
Rabbi Yehuda disagrees only regarding the lashes. He agrees that payment applies only when the husband had relations with her, but he holds that lashes are administered for the prohibition against slander even when there was no act of intercourse. Thus, the difference between the two versions is whether Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov holds that the husband receives lashes for the general prohibition against slander when he did not have relations with her. In the first version, he does receive lashes; in the second version, he does not.
That concludes the discussion of this section.