In the Talmud Bavli, we are discussing a person who is pursuing a lost object—let us say an animal with a broken leg. The animal is running into someone’s field. The Mishnah teaches that the owner of the field acquires an object that passes through it. Rabbi Yirmiyah said in the name of Rabbi Yochanan that this applies only when the person pursuing the animal is capable of catching up with it. The animal is therefore not running too quickly, and if it were in the field, he could catch it.
Accordingly, even if he did not actually run after it, he must at least have the physical ability to catch it. In that case, the field acquires the animal for him.
The Gemara asks a similar question concerning a gift. In the case of a lost object, the object became ownerless on its own. A gift, however, involves another person’s intention to transfer ownership. Do you also need to be able to catch up with the object in order for your field to acquire it?
The Gemara answers that in the case of a gift, it does not matter even if you cannot catch up with it. The field still acquires it, because two factors are operating together: the intention of the person giving the gift and the field itself. Therefore, even if you are not standing next to the field and do not have the ability to catch the object, the field acquires it.
The Gemara then presents another case: a person throws a wallet through one doorway, and it travels through the house and exits through another doorway. How is the wallet treated while it is in the air?
Everyone would agree that if the wallet were going to land inside the house and someone caught it while it was still in the air, the house would acquire it. Airspace above land is considered part of the land when the object is destined to land there. The question is whether airspace above a field is also considered part of the field when the object is merely passing through it and will ultimately land somewhere outside the field.
Is passing through the airspace enough to create an acquisition, or is it not?
The Gemara attempts to answer from the case of a person pursuing a lost object. When he is capable of catching up with the object, the field acquires it. This would seem to indicate that even when the object is not going to stop in the field, and is merely passing through it, the field acquires it in the case of a gift. Since there is another person’s intention to transfer ownership, perhaps the same should be true when an object flies through the field.
The Gemara rejects this proof. The case in the Mishnah involves an object rolling through the field, not one flying through the air. An object that is rolling is considered to be resting on the ground. The Gemara is discussing something that is moving along the ground, like an object rolling into the field, and that is different from something flying through the air. Therefore, there is no proof that an object flying across the field is acquired by the field.
The Gemara brings another Mishnah: if a person’s minor son or minor daughter finds a lost object, it belongs to the father. If his Canaanite male or female servant finds a lost object, it belongs to the master. If his wife finds one, it belongs to the husband.
We understand why the lost object of a minor son or daughter belongs to the father. There are verses concerning the daughter of one’s youth, and we have already learned in Tractate Ketubot that the findings of a minor daughter belong to her father. Certainly, then, the findings of a minor son also belong to the father.
In the case of a servant, the reason is that the master owns the servant’s labor and everything connected with it. The same applies to a Canaanite female servant. In the case of a wife, the reason is that if she were allowed to keep the object, it could create resentment and disturb the peace of the household. Therefore, the object is given to the husband.
However, if the children are adults, or if the servant is Jewish, they may keep what they find. Likewise, if the woman has been divorced, she keeps her own finding.
Shmuel explains why the finding of a minor son belongs to his father. His explanation assumes that, according to Torah law, a minor does not have the ability to acquire property independently. If so, the Sages could establish a regulation concerning the object. They could decide that it should go to the father.
If, however, a minor had the ability to acquire property on the level of Torah law, the Sages could not take the object away from him and give it to his father. They would not uproot the minor’s Torah acquisition. Why, then, did the Sages give the object to the father? Because when a minor finds something, he generally does not take it for himself. He brings it to his father. Since the minor is effectively acting for his father, the object is given to the father.
The Gemara raises another case. A person hires a worker to work in his field. The worker’s children are poor, and they follow him into the field to collect the portions left for the poor. The law is that the worker’s children may follow their father and collect the gleanings, the forgotten sheaves, and the corner of the field. The worker is merely a hired laborer, so there is no problem with his children collecting those portions on his behalf.
If, however, the worker is a partner in the field—a sharecropper who receives half, a third, or a quarter of the produce—his children may not follow him and collect those portions. An owner is not permitted to take the gleanings, the forgotten sheaves, or the corner of his own field. Even if he himself is poor, he must leave them for someone else.
Rashi explains that the Gemara assumes that whatever the child collects belongs to the father. In the first case, where the father is merely a worker, the child may collect the portions and give them to his father, because the father is entitled to them. In the second case, where the father is an owner or sharecropper, the child’s collection would also ultimately belong to the father, and the father is not entitled to take from his own field.
Rabbi Yosef, however, says that in both cases the children may follow their father and collect the portions. It does not matter whether the father is merely a worker or is an owner of the field.
Shmuel explicitly says that the law follows Rabbi Yosef.
The Gemara analyzes Shmuel’s position. If you say that a minor has the ability to acquire property on the level of Torah law, then the explanation is straightforward. The child collects the portions and acquires them for himself. Only afterward does he give them to his father. The father is therefore receiving the portions from the child, not taking them directly from his own field.
But if a minor has no ability to acquire property on the level of Torah law, then whatever he collects automatically belongs to his father. In the case of a sharecropper, the father is considered an owner of the field. Why, then, may the children collect the portions for him?
The Gemara initially answers that Shmuel was merely explaining the Mishnah; he was not necessarily agreeing with its position. The Mishnah says that the finding of a minor belongs to his father, which reflects the view that a minor does not have an independent acquisition. Shmuel himself, however, follows Rabbi Yosef in the case of the portions left for the poor, where the child’s acquisition is treated differently.
There is therefore no contradiction in Shmuel. We had thought that Shmuel was explaining the Mishnah and then ruling according to Rabbi Yosef, and we asked how he could do both. Shmuel answers that he was only explaining what the Mishnah means according to its own position. That does not mean that he personally agrees with the Mishnah’s legal analysis. When ruling on the law of the portions left for the poor, he follows Rabbi Yosef.
The Gemara then asks whether Rabbi Yosef truly holds that a minor acquires property on the level of Torah law. We learned in another Mishnah that when a blind person, a mentally incompetent person, or a minor finds a lost object, it is prohibited to take it away from them because of the ways of peace.
Rabbi Yosef says that taking an object away from a minor is considered a form of rabbinic theft. The first opinion says that the object should not be taken away because of the ways of peace; Rabbi Yosef says that it is regarded as rabbinic theft. What is the practical difference?
If the rule is only based on the ways of peace, then the object should not be taken away, but if someone already took it, perhaps a court would not retrieve it from him. If, however, it is considered rabbinic theft, then a court would take it away from the person who took it and return it to the minor.
In any event, the Gemara asks, what do we see from Rabbi Yosef? If a minor’s acquisition were valid on the level of Torah law, then taking the object from him would be Torah-level theft. Yet Rabbi Yosef calls it rabbinic theft. This seems to indicate that the minor’s acquisition is only rabbinic.
Abaye answers that everyone agrees that a minor does not have an independent acquisition on the level of Torah law. Nevertheless, everyone also agrees that whatever the minor picks up goes to the father. The question is not whether the minor owns the object for himself, but whether the father may receive it.
How, then, can Rabbi Yosef allow the children of an owner or sharecropper to collect the portions left for the poor? The father is an owner of the field and should not be allowed to take them.
Abaye explains that the poor people relinquish their rights in this situation. Normally, the poor come after the workers have finished and collect what was left behind. Once they hear that a field has already been searched and that the workers’ children are following directly behind them, they assume that nothing remains. They move on to another field.
These people who search through the field after the first round of collection are called those who clear out the field. Once the poor have given up hope of finding anything there, the remaining produce becomes ownerless. At that point, even the owner may take it.
The same applies when a worker is in the field and his wife and children are following directly behind him. The poor hear about it and say, “There is nothing left in that field. The children are right behind the worker, taking everything as he cuts.” They therefore give up their rights, and the remaining produce becomes ownerless.
The Gemara compares this to someone who places a lion in his field. The poor see the lion and say, “We cannot enter that field,” and they relinquish their rights. The owner could then take the produce for himself. But that would be a dishonest strategy: he has deliberately created a situation that frightens away the poor so that he can take the produce himself.
The Gemara says that this case is different. In principle, the child should not be able to collect the produce, and the father should not be able to acquire it either, because he is an owner. Nevertheless, the Sages instituted that the father should be treated as though he were entitled to it.
Why? Because when workers are hired to work in someone else’s field, their children commonly follow them and collect these portions on their behalf. The Sages therefore established that the father may take the produce in this circumstance. The reason is not that the child independently acquires it on the level of Torah law. Rather, it is a rabbinic enactment that allows the father to receive it, because the poor people have already relinquished their rights.
There is also a practical consideration behind the enactment. One day, the same people may be hired as workers, and their own children may follow behind them. They will then benefit from the same arrangement. The Sages did not want to deny this benefit in a situation where it would apply to workers and their children generally.
The Gemara then says, “These are the two points.” We have been discussing the terms “minor” and “adult” in the Mishnah. Until now, we understood them literally: a minor is an actual minor, perhaps a child of six, and an adult is someone who has reached the age of thirteen. According to that understanding, when a minor finds an object, it goes to the father, while when an adult finds one, it remains with him.
Rabbi Chiya disputes this interpretation. He says that the terms do not necessarily refer to age. Rather, an “adult” is someone who is not dependent on his father’s table, while a “minor” is someone who is dependent on his father’s table.
According to Rabbi Chiya, a person could be fifteen years old and still be considered a minor for this purpose if his father supports him. Whatever he finds would go to his father. Conversely, a child could be six years old and be considered an adult if he supports himself; whatever he finds would remain his.
Thus, according to the first interpretation, the Mishnah is speaking about an actual minor and an actual adult. The issue is whether the minor has an independent acquisition. According to Rabbi Chiya, however, the terms are defined by financial dependence. The one who is supported by his father is considered a minor, regardless of age, while the one who supports himself is considered an adult, regardless of age.
The Gemara returns to the case of a Jewish male or female servant. The Mishnah says that if a servant finds a lost object, the servant may keep it. Why should that be so? It would seem that all of the servant’s time belongs to the master.
We learned that even a worker may keep an object that he finds under certain circumstances. If the employer gives him a specific task—such as removing weeds or digging—then the worker may stop for a moment, find a lost object, and keep it. He must compensate the employer for the time he spent away from the assigned work, but the object itself belongs to him, because he was not hired to search for lost objects.
If, however, the employer tells him generally, “Do all the work for me; you are mine today,” then an object that he finds belongs to the employer, because all of his time belongs to the employer.
In the case of a servant, it seems that all of the servant’s time belongs to the master. Why, then, does the Mishnah say that a Jewish servant may keep what he finds?
Rabbi Chiya bar Abba said in the name of Rabbi Yochanan that the case involves a servant who was assigned a specific task: searching for pearls. The pearls are extremely valuable, and the master wants the servant to continue looking for them. If the servant finds a lost object, the master would rather that he continue searching for pearls than spend time dealing with the lost object. The master therefore relinquishes his claim to the lost object.
Consequently, if the servant does stop to take the lost object, he may keep it, but he must compensate the master for the time he spent away from the assigned task.
The Shitah explains that the servant was not necessarily hired for a specific task. Rather, the first answer of the Gemara is that he was hired to search for pearls, and the master did not want him to interrupt that work in order to deal with a lost object.
The Gemara then gives another explanation. A regular servant who finds a lost object normally gives it to the master. In this case, however, the master does not want him to pick up lost objects. The reason is that the value of the lost object may be less than the value of the work that the servant would lose by stopping to deal with it. Therefore, if the servant finds something, he must compensate the master for the wages corresponding to the time that he neglected his work.
Rav Papa gives a case in which the servant or worker does not have to compensate the master: he found the object while continuing to work, without taking time away from his assigned task. Since there was no interruption of work, he may keep the object for himself.
The principle is that when a worker takes time away from his work to search for or pick up a lost object, the object belongs to the employer, or the worker must compensate the employer for the lost time. But if he finds it while doing his work, without any interruption, he may keep it.
Rav Papa says that the case involves a person who specifically hired the worker to search for lost objects. This explains why the worker would have to give the object to the employer: searching for such objects was the very work for which he was hired.
The Gemara asks how someone could hire a worker to search for lost objects. It answers that the case could involve a place where fish had gathered near a pond. There had been an overflow in the stream or river, and many fish had floated into one area. The employer told the worker to search there and collect the fish. In that case, the worker was specifically hired to find those objects, and what he finds belongs to the employer.
In an ordinary case, however, unless the worker was specifically hired to search for lost objects, he keeps what he finds, provided that he did not take time away from his assigned work.
The Gemara then asks about a female Jewish servant. If she finds a lost object, who receives it? The answer is that she may keep it herself.
The Gemara attempts to establish the case. Perhaps she has already reached the stage at which she has developed the identifying signs of maturity. If so, she would leave servitude through those signs, and she would no longer be a servant.
Perhaps she has not developed those signs. If her father is alive, then she is still under her father’s authority, and the object should belong to him. If her father is not alive, then she should leave servitude when he dies, so how can she still be a servant whose finding belongs to her?
The Gemara asks whether this question refutes the position that a female servant does not leave servitude when her father dies. If the Mishnah gives a case in which she remains a servant and keeps what she finds, perhaps we can infer that the death of the father does not free her.
The Gemara answers that no such proof can be drawn. The father may still be alive. What, then, does the Mishnah mean when it says that the object is hers? It means that the master does not receive it. It does not necessarily mean that the servant herself owns it independently; rather, it belongs to her father.
In other words, the wording excludes the master. It does not mean that the object belongs to the female servant in the full sense. It belongs to the father, while the master has no claim to it. Therefore, the case provides no proof concerning what happens when the father dies.
The Gemara then discusses a divorced woman who finds a lost object. We would expect the object to belong to her, because she is no longer connected to her husband. The Gemara asks why this needs to be stated.
The answer is that the case is not an ordinary divorce. It involves a doubtful divorce. A man threw a divorce document to his wife, but it landed in a place that might be considered closer to her and might instead be considered closer to him. Since it is uncertain whether the divorce was valid, she is considered doubtfully divorced.
In such a case, one might think that she should still be supported by her husband. The Sages generally established that wherever a woman is doubtfully divorced, she continues to receive her support and food from her husband as long as he remains alive.
The reason the Sages ordinarily gave a woman’s lost object to her husband was to prevent resentment. If the husband supports his wife and provides for her, he may resent the fact that she keeps a lost object for herself. To preserve peace in the household, the Sages gave the object to the husband.
In this case, however, there is already resentment and conflict. The husband is attempting to divorce her, and the divorce may or may not have taken effect. Since the relationship is already characterized by resentment, giving the object to the husband would not restore peace. There is no peace to preserve.
Therefore, even though she is only doubtfully divorced, the lost object belongs to her. The ruling teaches that the Sages’ reason for giving a wife’s lost object to her husband does not apply when the same resentment already exists between them.
That concludes this discussion.