The Eri B. Sitt Edition and Audio Series of the Talmud Bavli, Massechet Rosh Hashanah, has been sponsored by Mr. Soley and Cheryl Mizrahi, may God grant them life, for the success of both of their families. May they have, with God’s help, health, happiness, continued success, and much pleasure from their children. May their dedication to Massechet Rosh Hashanah bring them good judgment, goodness, and success in all their endeavors. Amen.
Today’s folio is being studied on the second side of the page, at the bottom line. Let us review where we are holding in the discussion.
In the previous discussion, we quoted an early teaching that cited a verse referring to the prohibition against delaying a vow or offering. The verse says that the person who delays bringing his offering incurs a sin, but the offering itself does not become invalid. In other words, even though he delayed bringing it, he can bring it at a later time; the offering does not become disqualified.
The Talmud then asked: What does this teach us? We have another verse that says that, just as the tithe may be brought after its proper time and does not become invalid from one year to the next, so too a firstborn offering does not become invalid from one year to the next, even if it was delayed. If so, why do we need two verses? They appear to teach the same thing.
The Talmud answered that both verses are necessary. I might have thought that a firstborn offering is different because it is not an offering that provides atonement. Since it does not come to atone for anything, perhaps even after its proper time it does not become invalid. Other types of offerings, however—such as a burnt offering or a peace offering—which a person brings as an offering in order to seek mercy and atonement, might become invalid if they were delayed. The verse therefore teaches us that even these offerings do not themselves become invalid.
The Talmud now asks: We can still derive this from what Ben Azzai taught. An early teaching states that Ben Azzai expounded a verse concerning an offering that becomes disqualified through improper intention. If, for example, the priest or another person had the intention of eating the offering after the time during which it may be eaten, the offering becomes subject to the law of disqualification through improper intention.
The Talmud explains that the offering itself becomes invalid because another verse says, “You shall not delay in fulfilling it.” I might have thought that even an offering that was merely delayed becomes nullified and is not accepted. The verse concerning improper intention therefore teaches that only an offering disqualified through improper intention becomes invalid and unacceptable; an offering that a person delayed bringing is not subject to that law.
We therefore see clearly that there is another verse concerning improper intention that uses the word “it,” teaching that only that offering becomes invalid. By contrast, in the prohibition against delaying an offering, the offering itself does not become invalid. What, then, do we need the two earlier expositions for?
The Talmud answers that the earlier exposition must be understood differently. When the verse says that the person will bear the sin, it means that the sin is upon him, but not upon his wife. I am sorry—when the verse says that it will be a sin for him, it means that he will bear the sin, but his wife will not.
What does this mean? One might have thought that, just as Rabbi Yohanan stated—and as Rabbi Elazar taught—that when a man dies, his wife may die as a result of money that he stole and did not repay, according to Rashi, or money that he vowed and did not pay, according to Tosafot, so too perhaps a person who delays bringing his offering can, heaven forbid, cause his wife to die.
How do we know this concerning stolen or vowed money? The verse says, in effect, that if a person does not have what to pay, why should his wife be taken from him? The Talmud therefore analyzes the verse as follows: One might have thought that delaying an offering could also, heaven forbid, cause a person’s wife to die. The verse teaches us that the sin is upon the person himself and not upon his wife.
Let us review what has happened. At one point, the Talmud had three different verses that appeared to teach the same principle: An offering subject to the prohibition against delay does not itself become invalid. We had the verse stating that the sin is upon the person and not upon the offering. We had the verse concerning a firstborn offering, teaching that just as a tithe does not become invalid after its time, so too a firstborn offering does not become invalid. And we had the verse concerning improper intention, which says that only an offering disqualified through improper intention becomes invalid, but not an offering that was delayed.
The Talmud explained why the verses concerning the firstborn offering and other offerings are both necessary. I might have thought that a firstborn offering, since it does not come for atonement and is intrinsically sacred from the beginning of its conception or birth, would not become invalid even after its proper time. The innovation is that ordinary offerings also do not become invalid, even though they come to provide atonement.
The Talmud then asked: What do you mean? We have another verse concerning improper intention that says “it,” and not an offering that was delayed. That verse teaches that only an offering disqualified through improper intention becomes invalid, but not one that was delayed. The Talmud answered that this is correct. The original exposition of the verse stating that the person bears the sin, but not the offering, teaches something entirely different: The sin belongs to the person who delayed the offering, but it does not affect his wife.
In other words, the person is not considered to have treated his vow with contempt in a way that would affect his wife. The offering remains valid, and he can still bring it. Since he can still bring the offering, it will not, heaven forbid, affect his wife or cause her death.
The Talmud continues with another early teaching. The verse says, “The utterance of your lips you shall keep and fulfill.” The phrase “the utterance of your lips” teaches a positive commandment: A person who makes a verbal vow must fulfill his words.
The word “you shall keep” introduces a negative commandment. The word “you shall fulfill” teaches that the court can even compel a person to fulfill his vows.
The next part of the verse says, “As you vowed to the Lord your God, what you spoke with your mouth.” The expression “as you vowed” refers to vow-offerings. These words are extra, and therefore they teach that all such offerings are subject to the commandment that a person must keep the utterance of his lips.
The verse also teaches that donations are included. This refers to a person who vows money to the treasury of the Temple. The word used here is also an extra word, and, as Tosafot says, there is a verse in Isaiah that uses a similar expression. That parallel teaches that donations to the Temple treasury are also included.
Let us review this exposition. The verse says, “The utterance of your lips you shall keep and fulfill, as you vowed to the Lord your God, what you spoke with your mouth.” “The utterance of your lips” teaches the obligation to fulfill what one says. “You shall keep” teaches the negative commandment. “As you vowed” refers to vow-offerings. “To the Lord your God” includes sin offerings, guilt offerings, burnt offerings, and peace offerings. “What” teaches that other donated offerings are included. “You spoke” teaches that donations to the Temple treasury are included. “With your mouth” teaches that charity is also subject to this law.
All these matters are subject to the commandment to fulfill what one says, as well as to the positive and negative commandments concerning the fulfillment and delay of one’s vow.
The Talmud now analyzes this teaching. We have been told that the words “you shall fulfill” teach a positive commandment. Why do we need this verse? We already learned above from another verse that there is a positive commandment to bring one’s vow to the Temple. Why do we need the verse concerning the utterance of one’s lips? The positive commandment is already known.
Similarly, we were told that the word “you shall keep” teaches a negative commandment. Why do we need that? We already know the prohibition from the Torah’s prohibition against delaying. Furthermore, we were told that the court can compel a person to bring the offering. Why do we need that verse? We already know that the court can compel him.
The full verse says that the person must bring his offering, and the Talmud asks whether the court can compel him to bring it against his will. It must be done willingly, but how can a person be forced to do something willingly? The Talmud answers that the court compels him until he says that he wishes to bring it willingly.
We therefore have apparent redundancy in three areas of the verse. The positive commandment is redundant because one verse says that the person must bring the offering and another verse says the same thing. The negative commandment is redundant because one verse says “you shall keep” and another verse already teaches the prohibition against delay. The court’s power to compel him is also redundant, because one verse says that the court can compel him and another verse says that the person must bring the offering, which also teaches that the court can compel him.
Why, then, do we need two verses that repeat these three concepts?
The Talmud answers that the two verses are referring to two different stages. The first exposition refers to the stage at which a person has merely made a vow but has not yet designated the offering. Even at the stage of the vow, he is already liable if he does not fulfill it and proceed to separate the offering. At that stage, he is also subject to the positive and negative commandments, and the court can compel him to separate the offering.
The second verse teaches that even if he has already designated the offering but has not yet brought it, he is still subject to the prohibition against delay, and the court can compel him to bring it. We therefore need both verses to teach both stages: first, when the person has made the vow but has not yet designated the offering; and second, when he has designated the offering but has not yet brought it.
Both verses are necessary. If we were taught only the case in which he made the vow but did not yet separate the offering, I might say that he is liable because he did not keep his word. He vowed to bring something but did not separate it. However, if he designated the offering but simply had not yet brought it, I might argue that, wherever the offering is, it is already considered to be in the treasury of Heaven, and therefore it is as though he has fulfilled his obligation. The verse therefore teaches that even after he designated the offering, if he did not bring it, he is still liable.
Conversely, if we were taught only the case in which he designated the offering but had not yet brought it, I might say that he is liable because he is delaying it while it remains in his possession. But if he merely said that he would bring an offering and did not yet designate one, I might say that his words have no effect and that he is not liable. Therefore, both stages are necessary.
The Talmud raises another question. You are saying that the verses teach the case in which a person made a vow but did not yet separate or designate the offering. How can you say that one of the verses is referring to a donation? We know that a donation, by definition, refers to a case in which he designated a specific animal.
The Mishnah teaches: What is a vow-offering? It is when a person says, “An elevation offering is upon me to bring.” What is a donation-offering? It is when he says, “This is an elevation offering,” thereby designating the animal.
What is the practical difference between a vow-offering and a donation-offering? In the case of a vow-offering, if the animal dies or is stolen, the person must replace it, because he said that an elevation offering was upon him to bring. In the case of a donation-offering, if the animal dies or is stolen, he is not obligated to replace it, because he designated this specific offering.
The Talmud therefore asks: How can one of the verses refer to a case in which the person made the vow but did not yet designate the animal? One of the verses is dealing with a donation, and a donation by definition means that he designated a specific animal.
Abaye answers that we can find such a case when a person says, “An elevation offering is upon me to bring,” on the condition that he will not be liable if something happens to the animal. Although he has not yet designated the offering, this is considered similar to a donation, because once he designates the animal, if something happens to it, he will not have to replace it. That is the case of a donation mentioned in the verse: He says that an elevation offering is upon him, but he stipulates that he will not be liable if something happens to it.
The word “with your mouth” teaches that charity is included. Abaye says that charity must be paid immediately. The poor are waiting for it; therefore, a person must give it immediately.
The Talmud asks whether this is not obvious. Charity has nothing to do with the three pilgrimage festivals. Charity is intended for the poor, so why should a person be able to wait for three festivals?
The Talmud answers that, since charity was mentioned in the context of offerings, I might have thought that one could wait three festivals, as one can with other offerings. The teaching therefore tells us that charity is different. With offerings, the time is determined by the festivals, but in the case of charity, when poor people are present and waiting for the money, it must be paid immediately.
This raises a difficulty. If you remember the earlier teaching, on the fourth folio, when it listed the various matters for which a person has three pilgrimage festivals to fulfill his obligation, it clearly gave charity as an example of an item for which one has three festivals. What, then, do we mean here when we say that charity must be given immediately?
The commentators answer that the earlier teaching is discussing a case in which poor people are not present. If no poor people are present, then the person indeed has three pilgrimage festivals. The teaching that says charity must be paid immediately is discussing a case in which poor people are present, expecting the money. In that situation, the money must be given right away.
Abaye says that once a person has made a vow to bring an offering, even after one festival has passed, he violates a positive commandment. This is the positive commandment that we discussed earlier, requiring him to fulfill his vow.
The Talmud raises a question from an early teaching. Rabbi Yehoshua and Rabbi Papias testified concerning the offspring of a consecrated animal. If a person designated a pregnant animal as an offering, then after it gives birth, the offspring also has the status of a peace offering. The offspring must therefore be brought as a peace offering.
Rabbi Papias said, “I testify that we had a cow that had been designated as a peace offering. We ate the mother as a peace offering on Passover, and we ate the offspring as a peace offering on Sukkot.”
The Talmud asks: Why was the offspring not slaughtered on Passover as a peace offering? The law is that one must wait at least eight days before slaughtering the offspring. Since the mother was slaughtered, the law requires waiting seven days before the offspring may be slaughtered. We therefore understand why the offspring could not be brought as a peace offering on Passover.
However, the offspring should have been brought on the next festival, which was Shavuot. The testimony says that it was not brought until Sukkot. How could they delay it and violate the positive commandment requiring a person to bring an offering on the first festival? If he delays it beyond the first festival, he violates a positive commandment.
We are assuming that when Rabbi Papias said that the mother was brought on Passover and the offspring on the festival, the latter festival means Sukkot. How, then, did they skip Shavuot?
Rav Zvid answered that the animal was sick on Shavuot. The law is that if the animal is sick, the person does not have to bring it. Therefore, they brought it on the following festival. Some explain that the word “sick” does not refer to the animal but to the owner. Since the owner was sick, they were able to bring the offering on Sukkot.
Rav Ashi gave a different answer. What does the statement mean when it says that they ate the offering on the festival? It means the festival of Shavuot. Who says that the word “festival” there refers to Sukkot?
The other rabbi, Rav Zvid, did not accept this answer. He said that whenever a teaching mentions Passover and then refers to “the festival,” the festival means Shavuot, which is called the assembly. It would therefore refer to Shavuot by that name, rather than simply calling it “the festival.”
The Talmud brings another statement of Abaye. Once the time has passed beyond three pilgrimage festivals, every day that a person continues to delay the offering, he violates the prohibition against delaying. This prohibition is not a one-time violation. Every single day after the three festivals that he does not bring the offering, an additional violation applies.
The Talmud raises a question from an early teaching: “Whether a firstborn offering or any other sacred offering, once a year has passed without the three pilgrimage festivals, or once the three pilgrimage festivals have passed without a year, he violates the prohibition against delaying.” These are two cases in which a person violates the prohibition: a year without three festivals, or three festivals without a year.
The Talmud asks: Since the teaching is listing cases in which a person violates the prohibition against delaying, it should also have said that if he delays the offering, he violates the prohibition every day. Why does it not state that every day after the relevant time has passed, he incurs another violation?
At first, the Talmud says that this is not a question. The one who raised the question is asking appropriately, because the teaching is seeking different ways in which a person violates the prohibition against delaying. It gives the cases of a year without three festivals and three festivals without a year. It should therefore also have taught the case in which every day of delay creates another violation.
The Talmud answers that the teaching is trying to identify different scenarios in which a person violates the prohibition against delaying, but it is not coming to teach the additional violations that arise each day. It is teaching the different circumstances that trigger the prohibition, not the fact that the prohibition is repeated daily. Therefore, the early teaching is not a difficulty for Abaye.
The Talmud now analyzes the two cases we learned: a year without three festivals, or three festivals without a year. It is understandable how three festivals can pass without a year. For example, if a person made a vow immediately before Passover, then Passover, Shavuot, and Sukkot can pass, even though only approximately six months have passed.
But how can a year pass without three festivals? Within one year, there will normally be three festivals.
According to the opinion that, in order to violate the prohibition against delaying, the three festivals must occur in their regular order—Passover first, followed by Shavuot and Sukkot—we can find such a case. If a person made the vow immediately after Passover, then a full year can pass and return to Passover, while the three festivals have not yet passed in the required order, because Passover did not occur after the vow. That would provide a case of a year without three festivals.
According to the opinion that the three festivals do not need to occur in their regular order, but can be any three festivals, what would be the case of a year without three festivals?
We can understand this according to Rabbi Yehudah in a leap year. An early teaching discusses the law of a house in Jerusalem that a person sold. The seller has one year in which he can retract the sale and reclaim the property. The language of the Torah says “for a year,” teaching that the seller has one year to retract and recover his property.
There is a major dispute concerning the meaning of “a year.” Rabbi Yehudah says that when the Torah says “a year,” it means 365 days. The Sages say that it means twelve months to the day.
If an additional month is added to the year, the seller benefits according to the Sages. For example, if he sold the house on the fifteenth of Nisan, then, in order to complete a full year, he waits until the fifteenth of Nisan of the following year. Even though an additional month, another Adar, was added, it makes no difference; he still waits until the fifteenth of Nisan. The seller thereby receives what is effectively an additional month.
Let us analyze the case according to Rabbi Yehudah, who says that a year consists of 365 days. Suppose the person consecrated an offering or made a vow after Passover, in a leap year. For example, he made the vow on the twenty-second of Nisan, immediately after Passover. According to Rabbi Yehudah, the year is measured as 365 days. Because an additional month was added, the 365th day could arrive toward the end of Adar. Thus, a year has passed, but the next Passover has not yet arrived, and the three festivals in their regular order have therefore not yet passed.
We can state the example more simply. Suppose he made the vow in the middle of Passover, on the sixteenth or seventeenth of Nisan. An additional month was then added to the year, so the 365th day falls at the end of Adar. A year has passed, even though the three festivals in their regular order have not yet passed. This gives us a case of a year without three festivals according to Rabbi Yehudah.
According to the Sages, however, who say that the year is measured from day to day, even in a leap year one would always have the three festivals within the year. If a person made the vow on the seventeenth of Nisan, he waits until the seventeenth of Nisan of the following year. Even though an additional month was added, a full year has passed and the three festivals have also passed.
How, then, can we find a case of a year without three festivals according to the Sages?
The Talmud answers that it follows the teaching of Rav Shemaya, who said that Shavuot can occur on the fifth, sixth, or seventh of Sivan. Let us understand how Shavuot can fall on any of these three dates.
The Torah says that Shavuot occurs fifty days after the second day of Passover, which is the sixteenth of Nisan. If both Nisan and Iyar are complete months of thirty days, there are fifteen days remaining in Nisan, followed by thirty days of Iyar. That gives forty-five days, requiring five additional days of Sivan. In that case, Shavuot falls on the fifth of Sivan.
If both Nisan and Iyar are deficient months of twenty-nine days, there are fourteen days remaining in Nisan, followed by twenty-nine days of Iyar. That brings us to forty-three days, requiring seven additional days of Sivan. In that case, Shavuot falls on the seventh of Sivan.
If one month is complete and the other is deficient, Shavuot falls on the sixth of Sivan. There are then forty-four days, requiring six additional days to reach Shavuot.
Thus, Shavuot can occur on the fifth, sixth, or seventh of Sivan, depending on whether the months of Nisan and Iyar are deficient or complete. If both are complete, Shavuot falls on the fifth of Sivan. If both are deficient, it falls on the seventh. If one is deficient and one is complete, it falls on the sixth.
We can now find a case according to the Sages in which a year passes but three festivals have not passed. Suppose that in one year Shavuot fell on the fifth of Sivan, and the person made his vow on the sixth of Sivan. In the following year, Shavuot fell on the seventh of Sivan. From the sixth of Sivan to the sixth of Sivan, one full year has passed, according to the Sages, who measure the year from day to day. Nevertheless, three festivals have not passed, because in the following year Shavuot will not occur until the seventh of Sivan.
The innovation of Abaye’s statement is therefore that even if three festivals have not passed, once a full year has passed, the person is liable for delaying the offering. The case is one in which Shavuot fell on the fifth of Sivan in the first year, the person made his vow on the sixth of Sivan, and Shavuot fell on the seventh of Sivan in the following year.
The Talmud notes that we do not find this opinion among the first teachers, but it appears that the opinion of Rav Oshaya, who says that Shavuot can occur on the fifth, sixth, or seventh of Sivan, is disputed.
The Talmud answers that the opposing opinion belongs to the Others. They say that the calendar is arranged so that one month is deficient and the following month is complete. There are never two consecutive deficient months or two consecutive complete months. According to the Others, Shavuot will always fall on the sixth of Sivan, as this teaching states.
They also teach that the interval from one Shavuot to the next, and likewise from one Rosh Hashanah to the next, can vary by only four days. The lunar year consists of 354 days. Divided into weeks, that is fifty weeks, or 350 days, with a remainder of four days. Therefore, each year the festivals are four days later in the week. For example, if Shavuot falls on a Sunday one year, it will fall on a Thursday the following year. The same applies to Rosh Hashanah.
In a leap year, the difference is five days, because the additional month has twenty-nine days. Twenty-eight days make exactly four weeks, leaving a remainder of one day. Therefore, in a leap year, the difference becomes five days.
According to the Others, Shavuot can occur only on the sixth of Sivan because the months alternate between deficient and complete, always following that order.
Rabbi Zeira raised another question. Suppose someone inherits his father’s offering. Is the son who inherits the offering subject to the prohibition against delaying?
What is the question? Perhaps the verse applies only to the person who made the vow. The son did not make the vow, so perhaps the prohibition does not apply to him. On the other hand, the son is obligated to go up to Jerusalem, and therefore, if he does not go up and bring his father’s offering, perhaps he violates the prohibition.
The verse says, “From you,” which might indicate that the prohibition applies specifically to the person who made the vow, excluding the heir, because the heir did not make the vow.
The Talmud asks: What do you mean? We learned in an earlier teaching that the word “with you” teaches that gleanings, forgotten produce, and the corner of the field are subject to the prohibition against delaying. There is another verse in the Torah that says, “The poor person with you,” and here the verse says, “From you.” We therefore derive that these agricultural gifts are included in the prohibition.
The Talmud answers that the two expressions are used differently. The agricultural gifts are learned from the word “with you,” while this exposition excludes the heir from the prohibition based on the additional letter in the word “from you.”
Rabbi Zeira raised one final question concerning a woman: Is she subject to the prohibition against delaying?
Why should she not be? One might say that she is not obligated to go up to Jerusalem, because the verse says, “Three times a year all your males shall appear.” Only males are obligated to go up, not women. Therefore, perhaps she is not subject to the prohibition against delaying.
Alternatively, perhaps she is included because she is obligated in the commandment of rejoicing during the festival. How does one rejoice? Through peace offerings. She may therefore be obligated to go up at least in order to eat the peace offering, and perhaps she must also bring her other offerings when she goes up.
Abaye gives the answer. Does Abaye really say that a woman is obligated to go up to Jerusalem to fulfill the commandment of rejoicing by eating peace offerings?
Abaye says that a woman does not have an independent obligation to rejoice herself through peace offerings. Rather, the obligation rests upon the husband to make his wife happy with clothing, jewelry, and similar things, not with peace offerings.
How, then, could Abaye present the possibility that a woman is liable because she is obligated to go up and eat a peace offering? He does not maintain that a woman’s rejoicing is expressed through peace offerings. According to Abaye, her rejoicing is fulfilled through clothing and jewelry.
The Talmud answers that Rabbi Zeira was presenting the two sides of the question according to the person who raised it. According to Abaye, you are correct: women are obviously exempt from the prohibition against delaying because they do not have to go up to Jerusalem for this purpose. But Rabbi Zeira was asking according to the possibility that women are obligated to go up for rejoicing through peace offerings. If they are obligated to go up for that purpose, perhaps they must bring the other offerings with them as well, and if they do not, they would violate the prohibition against delaying.
May we conclude with blessing. Amen and amen.